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Title: Families and the State: Relations of dependency, responsibility and educational 
inequality in Singapore 
 
This study explores how socio-economically disadvantaged families in Singapore navigate the 
opportunities and constraints of Singapore’s education system. Singapore’s education system 
is widely emulated for its performance on international education benchmarking tests. However, 
there is growing recognition of persistent educational and income inequalities in Singapore, and 
how Singaporean meritocracy – a cornerstone of Singaporean education policy – flattens social 
disadvantage, rendering poverty invisible. Currently, there is little research on how 
disadvantaged families navigate this stratifying, yet putatively ‘successful’ education system. 
To understand families’ perceptions and experiences of Singapore’s education system, one 
needs an approach that meaningfully connects families’ perspectives to the wider context.   
 As such, I draw on the conceptualisation of the three tiers of governance (inspired by 
Michel Foucault, and extended by Nikolas Rose and Teo Youyenn), comprised of political 
rationalities and political technologies (macro) and technologies of the self (micro). I identify 
the key political rationalities in Singaporean governance (neoliberalism and developmentalism) 
and their instantiations in the key political technology of interest in this study (the meritocracy-
education mechanism). However, this study’s analytic focus is on families’ technologies of the 
self – how families mediate these political rationalities and technologies, to achieve their goals. 
To this end, I conducted 72 interviews with 12 socio-economically disadvantaged (low income, 
ethnic minority) families. I primarily interviewed young people at the Secondary Four level, as 
well as their primary caregiver (usually a parent, or both parents). I conducted three rounds of 
interview with each family: two rounds of semi-structured, individual interview with the young 
person and parent(s) – followed by a focus group interview with each family.   
 This study makes two original contributions to educational research. Firstly, I develop 
a way to understand macro and micro levels within a single analytic. To do this, I combine the 
three tiers of governance framework with the responsibility-dependency frame (which, I argue, 
weaves together these three tiers of governance). In this way, one can explore familial and 
individual pedagogic work, while paying attention to the structuring power of the wider context. 
Secondly, I analyse families’ pedagogic work, drawing on concepts of responsibility and 
dependency. My findings demonstrate that in the ‘strong’, interventionist state of Singapore, 
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dependency on the state and schools facilitates the acceptance of (individual and familial) 
responsibility. Unlike research in Anglo-American contexts which largely suggests that 
disadvantaged groups relate to state institutions with distance and disenfranchisement – the 
relations between disadvantaged groups and state (education) institutions in Singapore seem 
warm and collaborative. However, I problematise these relations, and discuss the equity 
implications arising from what I call the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity.  
Overall, this study unpacks the politics of an education system’s putative success, via 
the perspectives of 12 disadvantaged families in Singapore. Through the two abovementioned 
contributions, this study seeks to deepen our understanding of a little-understood, often 
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“I respect the Singapore government, the father of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. He was 
here, he already do for us everything already. Everything already he do, then he say “bye bye” 
then go. For Singapore government, for Singaporean, they never give us suffer. What you 
need, everything here.” (Srinivas, father, F31) 
 
“The great city today is a site…for a contingent citizenship based on meritocracy. It compels 
ordinary citizens to increase their brainpower as a condition of more secure attachment to the 
metropolitan motherland.” (Ong, 2007:92) 
 
 
1.0. Outline of the Research Problem 
Education policy in the “great cities” (Ong, 2007:88) of the world can be sites of both 
marginalisation and empowerment. This thesis explores the entanglement of opportunities and 
constraints of education policy in the Singapore city-state, through the perspectives of 12 socio-
economically disadvantaged families. In-depth interviews with these families form the 
empirical anchor of this study. The blending of structure and agency, macro and micro, the 
political and personal animate my analysis; how this ‘blending’ works out theoretically, 
methodologically and empirically are explored throughout the thesis. As the opening quotes 
suggest – the first from an interview with one father, and the second from an anthropologist’s 
analysis of Asian mega-cities – the relations between the institutions of family and state are 
complex, eschewing reductionist accounts of these relations. Read together, these quotes sketch 
out the seemingly paradoxical co-existence of families’ dependency on the state’s provision, 
alongside the responsibilisation of individuals for ‘success’. How disadvantaged families 
navigate Singapore’s education system – including their relations of responsibility and 
dependency with the state and state institutions such as schools, as they do so – forms this thesis’ 
central problematic.   
Understanding the perspectives of disadvantaged families in Singapore is pertinent, 
because in Singapore, public and political discourses about the Singaporean state, both within 
and beyond its borders, have historically been dominated by success and exceptionalism (Barr, 
2016). For instance, Singapore’s education system is widely viewed as a model by countries 
 
1 This is a quote from a father interviewed in this study. I generally accompany interview quotes with the 
pseudonym of the person speaking, and their role in the family (i.e. father, mother, son, daughter), except where 
these details are already obvious due to repetition. Additionally, I include a reference code for each family (F1, 
F2, etc.), to help readers locate the individual or family in Appendix C, which provides background information 
for each family. I also describe this format in my discussion of methodology, in Chapter Three.  
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and cities (including England, Qatar, Dalian, Bangalore) (Teo, 2011), and think-tanks, such as 
McKinsey and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereon, OECD) 
(Lee & Morris, 2016). Singapore is globally recognised and credited for its management of a 
top-performing education system, according to international benchmarking tests such as the 
Programme for International Student Assessments (hereon, PISA) and Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (hereon, TIMSS) (Deng & Gopinathan, 2016). However, the 
equity dimension of Singaporean education – while becoming increasingly prominent to the 
Singaporean public – is relatively less understood. In Singapore, there is growing recognition 
by scholars and politicians of the persistent, widening gaps in educational opportunities and 
outcomes between those from different socio-economic backgrounds (Gopinathan, 2012; Koh 
& Chong, 2014). Critics note how wealthier families in Singapore strategise and invest in their 
children’s futures, in ways that poor families struggle to (Gee, 2012). It has been pointed out 
that  while Singapore’s ‘successes’ are widely-celebrated: “…there is comparatively little 
coverage of the consequences for those less well positioned to benefit from its economic and 
education strategies” (Lee & Morris, 2016:288). 
 The overarching question of this study is thus: how do disadvantaged families navigate 
the opportunities and constraints of the Singaporean education policy landscape, to secure a 
successful future for their children? The problem, or impetus for research, in this question is 
twofold.2  The first is methodological. A central assumption in this study is that families’ 
perspectives provide crucial insight into understanding the logics, principles and failures of 
education policy. To date, while policy sociology has grappled extensively with systemic 
inequalities embedded in policy documents and as enacted by formal actors, it has not deeply 
considered the role families play in mediating policy (Gillies, 2011; Maithreyi & Sriprakash, 
2018). This is perhaps because there is uncertainty over how to conceptualise small-scale 
everyday worlds within broader state and international systems – in other words, there is 
“methodological confusion” over how to combine the macro and micro levels within a single 
analytic (Shore & Wright, 2005:12). Studies that explore one level – such as that of ‘micro’ 
(personal, situational, everyday) phenomena – tend to neglect ‘macro’ processes (related to 
wider systems of state and international institutions, political economy, social relations) (Mylan 
& Southerton, 2018; Shore & Wright, 2005). Yet, the interface between the macro and micro 
is particularly important to study, given the close engagement between both levels in the ‘strong’ 
Singapore state, which has been described as interventionist and paternalistic, exercising 
 
2 A summary of how these problems are addressed in this thesis can be found in Chapter 8, Section 8.2.  
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ideological leadership over economy and society, including over the education system 
(Gopinathan, 2007; Lim & Apple, 2016).  
The second problem is empirical: how do families carry out their pedagogic work, 
within the hybrid Singaporean ‘neoliberal-developmental state’3  (Liow, 2011:241)? In this 
thesis, I define families’ pedagogic work as families’ “educational practices” and related beliefs 
and desires, to help young people gain a successful future – their “recipes for movement 
somewhere else” (Thomas, 2008:152). This definition assumes that families are actively 
working to help young people attain success; based on my interview findings, this assumption 
does not seem misplaced. In this conceptualisation of ‘educational practices’, Thomas 
(2008:152) draws on the Foucauldian notion that individuals are constantly “rejecting, and 
modifying selfhood”, because “[t]he main interest in life and work is to become someone else 
that you were not in the beginning” (ibid). The ‘movement’ here thus refers to movement 
towards what families saw as a better future.  
Within the neoliberal-developmental state, developmental state logics, such as 
comprehensive provision of public education and housing, seem to invite citizens’ dependence 
on the state. However, a key part of Singapore’s state-citizen compact also emphasises 
individual responsibility and reliance (Bhaskaran et al., 2012). ‘Meritocracy’, an explicit, 
foundational governing philosophy that forms the “basis of economic and social order” in 
Singapore – presumes that success or failure depends on one’s own natural ability and effort 
(Chua, 2017:134). As such, neoliberal institutional practices exist: Singapore has the second 
freest economy in the world (Heritage Foundation, 2019); in the formal education realm, it has 
a performative, high-stakes education system, and a growing diversity of streams and school 
types that reinforces differentiated allocation of resources and rewards for individuals based on 
academic ‘merit’ – practices that are widely viewed as regressive in nature, and contribute to 
the persistence of inequality in Singapore (Ng, 2014). How, then, do socio-economically 
disadvantaged families conduct their pedagogic work, within a putatively high-achieving, 
globally-recognised yet deeply-stratifying education system – that both invites dependence and 
demands responsibility? 
To structure my inquiry, the following research questions were devised: 
1. How do disadvantaged families conceptualise and attempt to enact a successful future 
for their children?  
 
3 I provide a more detailed conceptualisation of these terms in the Singaporean context, in Chapter Four, Section 
4.3. The ‘developmental’ state is classified as a kind of ‘strong’ state in the East Asian context.  
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2. How do families relate to the state, state policies and state institutions (in particular, 
schools), as they navigate the wider historical, socio-political and policy context, in 
which they are embedded? What accounts for these relations?  
 
To answer these questions, I draw primarily on the conceptual orientations offered by the 
governmentality perspective, an analysis of academic literature on state-society relations in 
Singapore, and the empirical focus of this thesis: 72 interviews with 12 socio-economically 
disadvantaged (low-income, ethnic minority) families in Singapore.  
Finally, while ‘educational inequality’4 is a key theme throughout this thesis, I hope also 
to demonstrate that the state, schools and families act in complex ways that do not necessarily 
either challenge or reinforce inequality in straightforward ways. In this study, I discuss the 
articulated experiences of families on the socio-economic margins of Singapore society, as far 
as possible on their own terms, using open-ended questions raised through the governmentality 
perspective and its emphasis on the ‘how’ question. Specifically, the governmentality 
perspective raises questions such as: how families carry out their pedagogic work, how they 
construct relations with the school and state, how power works in contemporary governance. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows. I begin with my conceptualisation of the ‘socio-
economically disadvantaged family’ used in this thesis. Next, I discuss existing gaps in 
scholarship, and the study’s main contributions. Following this, I introduce the key features and 
paradoxes of the Singaporean education policy landscape that are relevant to this study. Here, 
I argue that what is remarkable – in light of the stratifying nature and paradoxes of Singaporean 
education policy – is the positivity, and degree of collaboration amongst Singaporeans with the 
state in everyday life, and the general lack of collective drive for significant socio-political 
transformations (Teo, 2011; Tremewan, 1994). This thread of analysing the politics of positivity 
and collaboration – how and why this politics is constructed and contested, and with what 
effects in Singaporeans’ everyday lives – is developed throughout subsequent chapters. I 
conclude this chapter by outlining the structure of the rest of the thesis.  
 
 
4 In this thesis, I follow Raymond Williams (1983:118) in defining ‘equality’ as a “the premise that all…should 
‘start equal’, though the…effect of this may then be that they become unequal in achievement or condition.” The 
most common form of this conceptualisation is ‘equality of opportunity’, as opposed to ‘equality of outcomes’. 
Equality of opportunity might be seen as the ideal that is (at least rhetorically) adopted by the PAP government. 
Whether this is achieved in practice is a different matter altogether. At times, I use the word ‘equity’, which has 
similar meaning to ‘equality of opportunity’. ‘Equity’ refers to the state where “personal or social 
circumstances…are not obstacles to achieving educational potential (fairness) and…inclusion” (OECD, 2012:9). 
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1.1. Defining the ‘Socio-economically Disadvantaged Family’ 
There is no official social class mapping in Singapore (Tan, 2004). As such, I use the term 
‘socio-economic disadvantage’ to understand a broad demographic group that, based on official 
and scholarly analyses, are viewed as ‘underrepresented’ in educationally prestigious 
institutions such as universities and elite schools, and ‘underperforming’ compared to other 
social groups in Singapore. My criteria for a ‘socio-economically disadvantaged family’, is 
based on: families’ self-identification as part of an ethnic minority group (my study focuses on 
Indian and Malay families), and additional indicators of social class: household income, 
parental education and parental occupation.5 Based on academic literature in Singapore and 
other contexts (e.g. Tan, 2004), these different vectors of ‘socio-economic disadvantage’ I have 
selected are deemed to have effects on families’ lives. If these vectors have social and political 
effects at the intersection of identity and institutional power, the category of ‘socio-economic 
disadvantage’, though constructed, remains valuable.  
In this thesis, ‘socio-economic disadvantage’ refers also to those of ethnic minority 
status (Malays and Indians). Many liberal democratic states have tended to prefer the “less 
emotively charged” ‘ethnicity’ over the term ‘race’ (Chua, 2017:123) due to the biological 
connotations of ‘race’ and the more socio-cultural connotations of ‘ethnicity’. However, I 
generally use the term ‘race’ instead of ‘ethnicity’ in this thesis, because ‘race is used in the 
Singapore constitution, by the government, and in everyday life (ibid). Scholars have described 
‘race’ as a self-conscious ideological construction of the People’s Action Party (hereon, PAP – 
the ruling party since Singapore’s independence in 1965).  
Since independence, the PAP government has built a policy of ‘state multiracialism’ 
which categorises citizens explicitly into visible racial groups to facilitate administration and 
governance (Chua, 2009): ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Other’. There is no consistent 
criteria for defining these groups; categorisation is typically based on social, cultural or 
geographical elements (Chua, 2017). ‘Chinese’ tends to represent ethnic Chinese from southern 
China provinces, ‘Malay’ tends to represent “someone who is Malay, Javanese, Boyanese, 
Bugis, Arab or any other person who is generally accepted as a member of the Malay 
community” (ibid, 129) and of Islamic faith, and ‘Indian’ tends to represent those from South 
Asia – India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
The analytic focus on ‘race’ evolved in this thesis, over time. Initially, informed by 
intersectionality theory,6 I chose to focus on low-income and ethnic minority groups. From 
 
5 See Chapter Three, Section 3.3.2 ‘Participant Criteria’ for details.  
6 Intersectionality theory suggests that one must study disadvantage as the intersection of multiple dimensions of 
identity: race, class, gender, religion and so on (Collins, 2015). 
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statistical analyses, the Indian minority group on average performs relatively well academically 
and socio-economically, compared to their Malay counterparts – but less so than the Chinese 
(Moore, 2000). I deemed it useful to include their views as a minority group, to understand the 
possibly different or similar relations between state and citizen across different minority groups. 
However, as the study progressed, I noticed that families seemed largely uninterested in 
discussing the effects of race, compared to that of class, on their educational and financial 
futures. I also noticed significant homogeneity between low-income Malay and Indians’ views 
concerning education.7 This homogeneity across Malay and Indian families resonates with 
scholarly literature that suggests there are greater social divisions in Singapore based on class, 
rather than racial lines; that is, a low-income Malay family likely has more in common with a 
low-income Chinese or Indian family, than with a middle-income Malay family (Chua, 2017; 
Teo, 2018). Hence, ‘class’ is seen by these scholars as a more powerful structuring force in 
Singaporean everyday life, cutting across racial categories. As such, in this thesis, the analytic 
focus is on class-related disadvantage, based on the amount of empirical data I have for class 
vis-à-vis race.8 However, this does not mean that race is not important; social class in Singapore 
is racialised (Barr & Skrbis, 2008). In Chapter Seven, I examine the ways in which meritocratic 
discourse can erase race-consciousness, through what I call the ‘non-productions’ of race. 
 Overall, it is important to remain sensitive to the potential danger of reproducing 
stereotypes through category-making. As Bourdieu (1989:19) reminds us: “nothing classifies 
somebody more than the way he or she classifies”. To this end, it is useful to remain upfront 
about the tenuousness of categories, and to highlight their socially and historically constructed 
nature. Furthermore, the onus is on the researcher to adopt a power-sensitive, reflexive 
understanding of the relationality of disadvantage. The term ‘disadvantage’ aptly hints at this 
relationality – it suggests that one might be materially poor not due to “supposed defects…[of 
an] aberrant minority”, but experiences “an absence, lack or denial of advantage” due to 
systemic failure (Dean, 2016:3). Families do not exist in a vacuum; relations of power and 
oppression produce disadvantage. Disadvantage does not cohere on one body, but develops in-
between state, state institutions and families (Desmond, 2014). As such, families’ pedagogic 
work should be viewed in light of the wider socio-political context. It is also important to 
understand ‘disadvantage’ as relative in a different sense – that disadvantage is relative to 
higher-income and ethnic majority groups. In Singapore, there have been significant absolute 
 
7 Perhaps their views are different in domains of sociality beyond education – but this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Because of this homogeneity, I do not differentiate between ‘Malay’ and ‘Indian’ pedagogic work. 
Another reason to not do so, is to avoid reinforcing racial stereotypes which can enable racism (Teo, 2018). 
8 This in turn is based on what families seemed to foreground as important in structuring their everyday lives.  
9 
 
gains in terms of economic and educational attainment across ethnic and income groups. To 
assume absolute disadvantage is to ignore the progress made by low-income and ethnic 
minority groups over time. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are persistent relative gaps in 
economic and educational attainment, across certain groups (Rahim, 1998; Teo, 2018). The 
nature of these inequalities is worth studying in greater detail. 
 
1.2 Justifications for this Study  
This section provides a justification for an interview-based study of disadvantaged families in 
Singapore, through: 1) outlining existing gaps in scholarship this study addresses, 2) presenting 
the contribution of the study.  
 
1.2.1 Existing gaps  
This research seeks to meet four gaps in current literature.  
Firstly, as argued earlier, critical policy scholarship has not deeply considered the role 
families play in mediating and brokering policy (Ball, 2003), often treating the ‘family’ as a de-
politicised entity (Gillies, 2011; Maithreyi & Sriprakash, 2018) and passive recipients of 
education policy – or overlooking the ‘family’ altogether. While there is some literature that 
has considered the ‘family’ in education policy analysis, such research is largely based on 
European-American contexts (Gillies, 2005; Olmedo & Wilkins, 2017; Vincent & Tomlinson, 
1997), with little such research conducted in the Singapore context. It is a well-rehearsed 
argument in policy sociology that official conceptualisations, messages and visions captured in 
policy documents are not neatly implemented, but subject to mediation, brokering and re-
contextualisation as they ‘flow’ through ensembles of agencies (Singh, Thomas & Harris, 2013). 
Yet, there is a methodological and epistemological mismatch with this ontological ‘truth’: much 
research has focused on the brokering work of formal institutions and actors, such as schools 
and official policy actors, without in-depth engagement with how families – the key brokers 
and targets of education policy – mediate policy ideals, intentionally or unintentionally.  
At the same time, it is insufficient to focus on families’ perspectives, without recourse 
to the wider context. Too many empirical studies of individuals’ everyday lives focus on 
“descriptive accounts of the micro, with limited critical analysis of broader social processes” 
(Mylan and Southerton, 2018:1136). Hence, secondly, this research aims to fill a gap in works 
connecting the micro and macro in meaningful ways. This is a significant lacuna, in light of 
shifts in modes of contemporary governance from vertical, authoritarian relationships with 
those based on creating the self-disciplined, regulated, yet ‘free’ subject (Miller & Rose, 2008) 
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where the state devolves increasing responsibility and agency to families in navigating their 
own futures, to enhance efficiency in capital accumulation. It is precisely on this basis that 
Eklund and Göransson (2016) argue that families’ pedagogic work should be understood within 
their socio-political and ideological context.  
This imperative is amplified in studies concerning poverty and disadvantage. Merely 
including ‘voices’ from the margins can fetishise “difference”, reduce inequality to “diversity” 
and reinforce implicit hegemonic norms (Choo & Ferree, 2010:133). Instead, it is important to 
analyse the perspectives of the disadvantaged in relation to “unmarked categories” (ibid:133) 
of privilege. In other words, one should analyse how the norms of the powerful are normalised 
via subjectification (subject-making) processes. Such an approach will clearly challenge our 
existing methodological habits as sociologists to focus on either the micro, or the macro (Choo 
and Ferree, 2010). Choo and Ferree (2010:146) rightly argue that complexity can be obscured, 
when “macrostructures of inequality are separated from the micro-structures of social 
construction of meaning”.   
Thirdly, there is a lack of research that explicitly focuses on families in relation to 
educational inequality. This is surprising, as many East Asian governments view ‘family’ as 
the basic building-block of society, positioning them as responsible for socio-economic success 
(Eklund & Göransson, 2016). Of particular interest to this study is the suggestion that the 
concept of families as a “social and political phenomenon” has fallen outside the “sociological 
gaze” (Gillies, 2011). In the Singapore context, Gillies’ (2011) argument particularly resonates: 
there is insufficient research that understands educational and socio-economic inequalities in 
relation to family and family life. Much of the research on educational inequality has been 
conducted through studying policy documents (e.g. Lim, 2012; Talib & Fitzgerald, 2015), 
curriculum documents (e.g. Ho, 2012) and at the school-level (e.g. Koh, 2014; Lim, 2015). 
Furthermore, research that focuses on family life tends to be quantitative (Quah, Sharpe, Lim, 
& Heng, 1995; Quah, 2004), or employs a property-accrual framework typical of Bourdieusian 
scholarship – for instance, by focusing on inequitable social capital accrual between racial 
groups (e.g. Chua & Ng, 2015). A summary of existing empirical studies on social class and 
race-based inequalities in relation to education in Singapore, is provided in Appendix A. While 
this body of Singapore-based research is crucial in understanding inequality, much of it ignores 
the family, with particularly few studies on low-income families. These studies also tend to 
unanimously point to the exacerbation of inequality in Singapore, without in-depth engagement 
with the multiple, complex, at times simultaneous ways in which state, familial and individual 




Fourthly, there is a lack of research on disadvantaged families in Singapore. Some 
critics have called for closer attention to the cultural production of elite identity and practices, 
in understanding inequality (Massoumi, Miller & Mills, 2018). However, while there is 
growing research on middle-income family dynamics in ‘accumulating’ opportunities for their 
children in Singapore (e.g. Khong, 2001; Göransson, 2015) and on elite schools (Koh, 2014), 
there remains a notable lacuna in existing research on how disadvantaged families are 
navigating Singaporean education. This is particularly unfortunate, as it is precisely at the socio-
economic margins of society where policy is least likely to map out as policymakers expect.  
In summary, the four gaps in research that this study aims to fill, are: the lack of studies 
on the mediating role of families in policy processes; the lack of studies that span macro and 
micro levels; the lack of studies on how families negotiate, contest and reproduce forces of 
educational inequality; and the lack of studies specifically focusing on socio-economically 
disadvantaged families. The lack of research across these four areas is particularly apparent in 
the Singapore context.  
 
1.2.2. Contributions and significance of this study 
In light of existing gaps, this study makes a novel contribution in three ways.   
Firstly, it seeks to understand families’ pedagogic work – a little-understood area in 
Singaporean research. It aims to understand families’ emotions, logics, values, approaches – 
their conceptualisations and normative perspectives on social mobility, success and how to 
achieve this success for future generations. This study encourages families to articulate their 
experiences on their own terms, in contrast to much policymaking and policy scholarship, 
where families’ views are often elided. Families’ views are insufficiently foregrounded in 
policy and public domains – yet, as key pedagogic agents, their perspectives should count. Their 
perspectives can shed light on the underlying logics, assumptions and problems in Singapore’s 
education system and policy. Families’ perspectives can also highlight alternative visions to the 
dominant symbolic system, and challenge the tendencies of policy-makers to see families 
through the lens of “abstractions from the bourgeois model of the singular self”, highlighting 
in more precise ways “how sociality is formed through different material conditions” (Skeggs, 
2011:509).  
Due to the under-explored nature of how disadvantaged families negotiate their wider 
policy context, qualitative research is useful, as it lends itself well to exploratory research where 
little is known about a particular topic. Qualitative research is amenable to foregrounding the 
perspectives of those often neglected in policy-making and scholarship; it is also the most 
effective means to empirically understand how participants construct their opportunities, goals 
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and constraints (in line with my research questions). Moreover, unlike many studies on 
educational inequality in Singapore, this study foregrounds how inequality and its injuries are 
produced, rather than assuming a priori that the state, the school or the family is perpetuating 
inequality. I take an open-ended approach, rather than foreclosing empirical data possibilities, 
in light of the complexity of state, familial and individual agency in the reproduction and/or 
transformation of inequality.  
 Secondly, this study provides an approach to studying the interaction of macro and 
micro levels. It offers a theoretical and methodological approach to analyse the relations 
between the micro-level (families’ everyday perspectives) and macro-level (policy mechanisms 
and political rationalities). Thus, as elaborated on in Chapter Two, I adopt a theoretical 
framework built from a conceptualisation of the three tiers of governance (political rationalities, 
political technologies and technologies of the self) and what I call the ‘responsibility-
dependency frame’.  
To my knowledge, few studies draw on relations of responsibility and dependency to 
understand families’ pedagogic work in Singapore. This framework may be useful in studying 
contexts beyond Singapore – particularly where there is growing complexity on the state’s part 
(especially in advanced capitalist states with maturing, slowing economies), in managing 
relations of responsibility and dependency to build collaboration, institutional trust and a more 
robust state-citizen compact.  
Thirdly, the Singapore city-state is an apt choice of context. While there is a rapidly 
expanding literature on the effects of neoliberalism on individuals’ lives across many 
geographical contexts (Flew, 2014), not enough research has understood how the interactions 
between neoliberal institutional practices and individual lives, and how this might vary in 
contexts beyond the Global North. In Singapore, the combination of neoliberal-developmental 
logics in the neoliberal-developmental state (Liow, 2011) calls for a context-sensitive 
understanding of how ‘neoliberal’ practices can coexist with other political philosophies such 
as ‘developmentalism’, and the effects of these hybrid regimes on the construction and 
normalisation of particular subjectivities. As Flew (2014) argues, assumptions are often made 
in Anglo-American literature concerning the links between neoliberal institutional practices and 
dystopian outcomes – this is not necessarily so in Singapore.  
This study opens up questions concerning whether, how, and under what conditions, 
neoliberal institutional practices may (or may not) be associated with injuries and fractures in 
state-citizen relations. The link between neoliberalism and the break-down of state-citizen 
relations is commonly made, in existing literature on neoliberalism (e.g. Ule et al., 2015; 
Güemes, 2017). For instance, Güemes (2017) argues that neoliberal reform tends to weaken 
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institutional trust and state-citizen relations. By breaking open the links between neoliberalism 
and a ‘weak’, budget-strapped state, this study demonstrates the theoretical versatility of 
‘neoliberalism’, beyond predominantly Anglo-American theorisations. It calls for sensitivity to 
the hybridity of logics and historically-contingent institutional diversity, in understanding 
neoliberalism (Flew, 2014).  
Understanding disadvantaged families’ everyday lives is crucial, because as a top-
performer in PISA and TIMSS tests, Singapore’s education system is widely emulated, both in 
Asia and beyond. Because of the temptations of careless policy transfer, it is important to 
attentively study the contexts of high-performing systems, as comparative education scholars 
(e.g. Phillips & Schweisfurth [2014]) have long pointed out. Thus, the next section provides an 
overall picture of the education policy context of Singapore, to begin understanding the 
paradoxes and inequalities in Singaporean education and family life.  
 
1.3. Background: Sketching the Singaporean Education Policy Landscape 
This section introduces key features of Singapore’s education landscape that structure and 
frame families’ pedagogic work. Given the immense importance given by Singaporean 
politicians and policy-makers to ‘meritocracy’ as an explicit guiding principle in Singaporean 
governance (Tan, 2008), visible across every public institution in Singapore, from civil service 
to schools to armed forces (Koh, 2014) – I outline key features of Singapore’s education policy 
with reference to ‘meritocracy’.9 This section is organised into three subsections: the first 
introduces Singaporean meritocracy and its putative connection with national and individual 
success in Singapore; the second explores the fraught relationship between meritocracy and 
inequality; the third delves into the more concrete instantiations of ‘meritocracy’ in Singapore’s 
education system.  
 
1.3.1. ‘Majulah Singapura’: Meritocracy and success 
The Republic of Singapore, a city-state in Southeast Asia, gained independence first from the 
British colonial administration in 1959, then from present-day Malaysia following a failed 
merger between the two countries lasting from 1963-1965. The PAP government, which has 
remained in power from 1959 to present-day, is popularly credited for rapidly transforming 
Singapore over three decades, from a ‘backwater’ third-world economy with few natural 
resources and a high unemployment rate, to a ‘global city’ with robust alliances with 
 
9 Some key themes raised in this section are revisited in greater depth, in Chapter Four – in relation to how 




transnational capital (Tremewan, 1994), and a top-performing education system according to 
international benchmarking tests as well as one of the highest GDP/capita figures in the world 
(Wear, forthcoming). The PAP drew on a “marriage of economic globalisation and state 
capitalism” to achieve high levels of economic growth (Rodan, 2016:214). Furthermore, despite 
‘racial riots’ (particularly between Chinese and Malay groups) in the early days of Singapore’s 
independence, the PAP is credited for fostering a largely peaceful society. Today, Singapore 
has a population of 5.6 million, and a multi-ethnic composition of 75% ‘Chinese’, 13% ‘Malay-
Muslim’ and 8% ‘Indians’ (as classified under the PAP’s multiracial schema of Chinese, Indian, 
Malay, Other).  
Often seen as the leader of this transformation was the ‘founding father’ of Singapore, 
Lee Kuan Yew, who was Prime Minister of Singapore from 1959-1990. His son, Lee Hsien 
Loong, became Prime Minister in 2004 and still leads Singapore today. The ‘Singapore Story’ 
– a “singular meta-narrative of state-building” (Gopinathan, 2012:13) taught in Social Studies 
to students in Singapore – is one of success, progress and survival against the odds, under the 
leadership of PAP politicians, especially Lee Kuan Yew. The widespread awareness of the 
success and competence of the PAP is evidenced in the dominant form of the state-citizen 
contract in Singapore – that of the ‘prosperity-loyalty compact’ (Gopinathan, 2007:66) or the 
‘prosperity consensus’ (Ismail & Shaw, 2006:31), where the government secures stable 
conditions for economic opportunity and flourishing, in exchange for citizens’ discipline in 
work, obedience and loyalty to the government. The spirit of ‘Majulah Singapura’ (Malay for 
‘Onwards, Singapore’) – the title of Singapore’s national anthem – captures the aspirational, 
success-driven nature of Singaporean politics and popular culture (S. Lim, 2015). 
 Success, both on national and individual levels, is widely attributed by the PAP 
government to its allegiance to the concept and practice of ‘meritocracy’. Singaporean 
‘meritocracy’ presumes that any individual, with talent and effort, can achieve educational and 
life success (Bellows, 2009; Chua, 2017), regardless of social class or race. Since independence, 
‘meritocracy’ has been explicitly inscribed as indispensable to Singaporean governance – to its 
nation-building (Gopinathan, 2007; Lim, 2013), as well as in present-day policy-making and 
politics (Talib & Fitzgerald, 2015). ‘Meritocracy’ was popularised by Michael Young’s fiction 
novel, ‘The Rise of the Meritocracy’ in 1958 – around the time when Lee Kuan Yew became 
Chief Minister in 1959 and then Prime Minister of Singapore, in 1965. ‘Meritocracy’ is used 
pejoratively in Young’s book – which offers a dystopian account of a society rigidly stratified 
by intelligence in place of descent. However, Lee Kuan Yew explicitly instantiated 
‘meritocracy’ as a positive, central governing principle since Singapore’s independence in 1965 
(Lim & Apple, 2015).  
15 
 
The official justification for ‘meritocracy’ may be described as threefold. Firstly, it 
motivates individuals to strive for excellence, to ensure Singapore’s survival and 
competitiveness, and protect it from cronyism and complacency. Secondly, it is described as 
the fairest, most legitimate way to distribute Singapore’s limited resources, based on talent and 
effort. This was deemed particularly important, after racial tensions in Singapore in the 1960s. 
As such, social cohesion is a further justification for meritocracy. Thirdly, ‘meritocracy’ helps 
in identifying and ensuring that the top talents are in positions of leadership (particularly 
political leadership), to serve the country effectively for the collective good.  
Furthermore, Singaporean meritocracy is bolstered through explicit pronouncements by 
PAP politicians of its fairness. Singaporean politicians called for not merely a ‘meritocracy’ 
but a ‘multiracial meritocracy’ (Moore, 2000:344). Singaporean ‘multiracialism’ posits that all 
ethnic groups have their part to play in Singaporean social and economic development, and that 
all groups are treated equally; affirmative action is thus absent in its policies (Moore, 2000). 
Crucially, Singaporean meritocratic logic is undergirded by the dominant metaphor of 
‘levelling the playing field’: that is, because the state is providing a fair system and 
comprehensive support, individuals and families should take on responsibility and work hard. 
Because the playing-field has been levelled, it is putatively ‘fair’ for a high-achieving group to 
be educationally and financially rewarded (Ahmad, 2018; Kassim, 2006). 
Central to meritocratic functioning in Singapore is the primacy of educational 
achievement, viewed as a key signal of natural ability and effort (and thus, ‘merit’) (Koh, 2014). 
Meritocracy in education has been the focus of considerable literature in the Singapore context 
(e.g. Talib & Fitzgerald, 2015; Chua, 2014; Koh, 2014; Lim, 2013; Bellows, 2009; Tan, 2008). 
This literature typically portrays ‘meritocracy’ as undesirable, a mechanism exploited by the 
government to pretend at fairness, while in reality, generating inequality. Scholars have 
delineated tensions between the egalitarian and elitist strands of Singaporean ‘meritocracy’ 
(Koh, 2014; Lim, 2013). That is, since Singaporean meritocracy suggests that any individual 
with talent and hard work can rise (a seemingly egalitarian process), it ‘follows’ that those at 
the top ‘justifiably’ receive a greater reward (an elitist outcome). As such, inequality and elitism 
are the obvious consequence of meritocratic functioning. In particular, the isolation of ‘merit’ 
in achieving success is problematic, given the unlevel playing-field that sociologists have long-
argued exists between different families (Littler, 2018).  
 
1.3.2. Meritocracy and inequality  
The ‘meritocracy’ narrative is one of optimism and progress, charting (theoretically) a linear 
pathway from educational achievement to future success in Singapore. However, this narrative 
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has been problematised through growing scholarly and public recognition of the existence of 
persistent inequalities in Singapore (Gopinathan, 2012). Not only is meritocracy suggested to 
not ‘work’, it has been framed as legitimising a stratified social, economic and political order 
(Lim and Apple, 2015). It has also been critiqued for invisibilising racial and class difference 
by providing “the veneer of equality while simultaneously masking the real advantages and 
disadvantages that have been differentially distributed across a society”  (Lim, 2016a:161).  
Scholarly analyses suggest that the most powerful axes of educational inequality in 
Singapore are social class and race (Barr & Skrbis, 2008). While ‘race’ is explicitly inscribed 
by the PAP, through the demarcating of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Other – the term ‘class’ is 
also not used in official discourse (Tan, 2004). Chua & Tan (1999)  argue that the PAP is 
particularly sensitive to the social divisiveness of the term ‘class’. Having collaborated with 
left-wing socialists in 1950s, PAP politicians recognised the “ideological appeal of class 
analysis of social inequalities”, resulting in the PAP’s “ideological vigilance against any 
suggestions of class, especially within a Marxist framework” (ibid, 154). In Singapore, ‘social 
class’ and ‘race’ have long been taboo subjects (Talib & Fitzgerald, 2015). The PAP has 
actively tried to diffuse the “potential politicisation of social inequalities”, arguing instead that 
‘meritocracy’ is a fair basis of resource allocation and shaming those expressing discontent over 
inequalities as indulging in envy (Chua & Tan, 1999:154).  
However, the meritocratic promise has been destabilised in recent decades, both in 
scholarly and public discourse. Notably, scholarly analyses have suggested the persistence and 
severity of economic and educational inequalities in Singapore. Singapore has been ranked as 
the fourth most economically unequal in Asia (measured by Gini index), after Hong Kong, 
China and Malaysia, and the most unequal developed economy, after Hong Kong (Central 
Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2017). Initially, Singapore’s Gini coefficient decreased in the 1970s, 
as the country rapidly industrialised and opportunity structures expanded. However, the Gini 
coefficient increased from the 1980s, rising from 0.412 (1997) to 0.458 (2016), suggesting an 
uneven sharing of the overall rise in wages in Singapore (Chew, 2017). While the Gini 
coefficient decreased again slightly between 2012 and 2016, from 0.478 to 0.458, its range of 
0.410-0.482 throughout the last two decades suggests Singapore’s inequality level lies far above 
the UN-Habitat International’s Alert line for Income Inequality, at 0.4. A figure above 0.4 
suggests inequality in the ‘dangerously high’ range, signifying potential loss in investment and 
social unrest, without remedial interventions (ibid). Rodan (2016:214) suggests that inequalities 




…unskilled and working-class Singaporeans have suffered from the absence of a 
minimum wage, the market impact of low-cost foreign workers, and the lack of 
genuinely independent and effective trade union representation of their interests. 
Meanwhile, the inflationary costs of housing, transport and health, driven by dramatic 
population growth and high professional and executive salaries, have affected many 
middle-class Singaporeans too. 
 
While it is difficult to ascertain the proportion of people in Singapore who are ‘poor’ in the 
absence of an official poverty line, Teo (2018) argues that by setting the poverty line to less 
than half the median household income (a measure used widely by scholars), about one-fifths 
of the resident population might be defined as poor. Chew (2017) finds that income earnings of 
the lowest strata of the population are stagnating, compared to that at the highest strata. She 
argues that between 2000-2016, there was a 120% growth rate in income earnings for the top 
decile, which was almost double that of the lowest decile, at 70%. ‘Meritocracy’ may have been 
received more comfortably with growing social mobility across a larger segment of the 
population in the 1970s and 80s, but there is growing recognition of the increasing bifurcation 
of life outcomes within a post-industrial, maturing Singaporean economy faced with the 
vulnerabilities of globalisation (external economic shocks, and influxes of foreign labour that 
depress wage earnings) and technological innovation (Gopinathan, 2012). Furthermore, class-
based inequality is intertwined in complex ways with ethnic-based inequality. Statistical data 
suggests that the lowest income-earners in Singapore are disproportionately from ethnic 
minority backgrounds (Moore, 2000). Within Singapore’s economic hierarchy, Chinese are on 
top, Malays on the bottom, and Indians occupy the middle ground; “[t]his hierarchy is reflected 
in income, education, housing and virtually every other social and economic category” (ibid, 
340).  
 Given that educational attainment is seen in Singapore as a key arbiter for merit (for 
instance, in getting a job in Singapore’s public service, but also more broadly within 
Singaporean society) – it is unsurprising that widening economic inequalities have been 
accompanied by widening educational inequalities. In the education domain, OECD Deputy 
Director for Education and Skills, Andreas Schleicher, noted that Singapore’s education system 
is a “strong performer in quality, but an average performer in equity” (cited in NIE, 2013). 
There is considerable empirical literature that highlights class-based inequalities. Research such 
as Chang & Cai’s (2011) report that the proportion of students in Singapore’s elite schools with 
fathers as university graduates exceeds 50%; in mainstream schools, however, the proportion 
estimated is only 10%. Furthermore, Lim & Kwek (2006) find that one third of the recipients 
of the prestigious Public Service Commission scholarship come from households earning less 
than SGD $10,000/month; a mere 7% come from households earning less than SGD $2000. 
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The PAP’s neoconservative educational agenda that views education through a human capital, 
pragmatic lens – as a resource to be deployed for economic development – has historically 
favoured stratification and efficiency, at the expense of equity (Koh & Chong, 2014); it is thus 
conducive to the development of an academic elite. These elites tend to come from wealthy 
families, where parents can help their children take advantage of the education system’s 
stratified opportunities (Koh, 2014) – as the next section elaborates on. 
Moreover, Singapore’s Ministry of Education (hereon, MOE) itself has recognised the 
disparity between Malay and Indian attainment, and their Chinese counterparts, particularly in 
Math and Science. Official MOE statistical data suggests that while there is narrowing of 
attainment gaps between racial groups, there continues to be sustained gaps – both at Primary 
and Secondary school levels (Government of Singapore, 2017).  Furthermore, it is difficult to 
close the gap, because as lower-performing racial groups improve, the higher-performing group 
also improves (Lee, 2007); this is because the higher-performing group constantly strategises 
to perpetuate its advantage (Chua, 2011). Chinese are described as over-represented in local 
universities and polytechnics (92.4% and 84% of total enrolments respectively, while only 
being 76.8% of the population) while Indians and Malays are underrepresented (Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2011). Differences in educational experience between the high-
performing Chinese and lower-performing Malay and has been reasonably well-documented in 
Singapore. Notably, this disparity has been explored in terms of: the low educational aspirations 
of low-income Malays (e.g. Kang, 2005; Adzahar, 2012; Senin & Ng, 2012); state-supported 
kindergartens that favour the values, attitudes and norms of Chinese Confucian culture (Barr & 
Low, 2005); the socialisation of different racial groups through different schooling experiences 
into elite (for Chinese students) and non-elite (for non-Chinese students) jobs (Barr & Skrbis 
2008); elitist education policies that provide more resources and opportunities for the most 
privileged families (Rahim, 1998); the internalisation by Malays and the broader Singapore 
society of the ‘cultural deficit thesis’ that inscribes Malay inferiority – leading to self-fulfilling 
prophesies concerning Malay students’ relatively low academic attainment (Rahim, 1998), 
while the ‘Chinese’ race is endowed with traits of thrift and hard work (Barr & Low, 2005).  
Other factors that contribute to ethno-racial marginalisation include the prohibiting of 
wearing the tudung (a headscarf worn for religious reasons by Malay-Muslim women) both in 
schools and in the workplace, as part of the assimilationist impulses of a largely Chinese-
dominated PAP government (Barr & Low, 2005). Substantially less has been done on the 
educational achievement and opportunities of the Indian ethnic group, although there is general 
consensus that they generally perform less well educationally and economically, compared to 
the Chinese (Moore, 2000).  
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 The growing frustrations of the Singaporean populace is reflected in the General 
Elections of 2011. The PAP’s poor electoral performance – acquiring its lowest share of votes 
since independence (falling from 75.3% in 2001 to 60.1% in 2011) was termed a “rude 
awakening” (Koh & Chong, 2014:626). Scholarly analyses have attributed the PAP’s downturn 
in popularity to rising costs of living, growing inequalities, PAP elitism, and unpopular 
immigration policies that have increased educational and job competition (Koh & Chong, 2014; 
Gopinathan & Mardiana, 2013). Following concerted efforts by the PAP to increase equity 
measures across housing, healthcare and education, and rhetoric that attempted to soften 
meritocracy to make it ‘inclusive’ – the PAP acquired a landslide victory in the following 
General Elections of 2015 (Chua, 2017; Rodan, 2016). 
 On the one hand, this suggests that the prosperity-loyalty compact (Gopinathan, 2007) 
continues to thrive. On the other, inequality and elitism remain significant challenges for the 
PAP. Current Minister for Education, Ong Ye Kung, noted that meritocracy is at risk of 
becoming a “dirty word”, and appealed for Singaporeans to not “lose faith” in meritocracy 
(Teng, 2018). Political rhetoric that describes the PAP’s ideological direction as left-of-centre 
is at tension with its neoliberal values (Rodan, 2016). Inequality is simultaneously an inevitable 
result of Singaporean meritocracy, deeply intertwined into its logics – as well as what 
constitutes meritocracy’s greatest challenge. 
  
1.3.3. Meritocracy and education policy  
In this section, I highlight key features of Singapore’s education system that structure families’ 
pedagogic work (see Appendix B for a diagrammatic representation of Singapore’s education 
system) – and demonstrate how Singapore’s education system is strongly structured by 
meritocratic logics.  
As argued earlier, the metaphor of ‘levelling the playing field’ is a crucial metaphor in 
Singaporean meritocracy. Some attempts by the government to ‘level the playing field’ are clear 
from particular elements in Singapore’s education system. To begin with, the MOE has 
historically been the main provider of a highly-subsidised, well-resourced public education for 
98.5% Singaporean students in Singapore – close in proportion to social-democratic Norway 
(Wear, forthcoming). For mainstream government schools, monthly school fees in Singapore 
is free at Primary school level, and SGD$5/month at Secondary school level. The MOE scheme, 
Edusave, provides Singaporean students aged 7-16 with monetary awards (such as for progress 
and achievement in both academic and non-academic areas), scholarships (for attending post-
Secondary institutions) and contributions for “school enrichment activities in support of 
[students’] holistic development and to encourage students to excel in both academic and non-
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academic areas” (such as in purchasing resources or attending enrichment activities) (MOE, 
2019a). Furthermore, the MOE’s Financial Assistance Scheme is available for households 
earning less than $690/month/household member; it provides a full waiver of Secondary school 
fees, free school attire and textbooks, as well as transport subsidisation costs (MOE, 2019b). 
There are also local community councils and centres, such as Family Service Centres, that can 
provide financial assistance, help from social workers and other forms of support (OECD, 2011).  
One key way the PAP government has attempted to ‘level the playing field’ in the 
education realm, is through the establishment of self-help groups. Each major racial group has 
a self-help group (hereon, SHG): Mendaki for Malays, the Singapore Indian Development 
Assistance Council (hereon, SINDA) for Indians, the Chinese Development Assistance Council 
(hereon, CDAC) for Chinese and the Eurasian Association for Eurasians. The three largest 
groups: Mendaki, SINDA and CDAC were founded in 1982, 1991 and 1992 respectively. 
Historically, SHGs were established out of a concern over the low educational outcomes of 
ethnic minority groups. While educational attainment continues to be the focus of SHGs, over 
the years, these groups have expanded their programmes to encompass “economic, social and 
cultural areas of community life” (Kok & Liow, 1993:305). This includes tuition programmes, 
mentorship schemes, leadership camps, life skills classes for young people and adults (such as 
computing, money management even parenting classes), as well as bursaries for families and 
for education-related purposes. SHGs are “household names” in Singapore (“Helping Self-Help 
Groups,” 2014) – one of the most extensive programmes of support for the poor in Singapore.  
SHGs were set up as part of the government’s ‘Many Helping Hands’ policy. The ‘Many 
Helping Hands’ concept involved “the state that set the legal, regulatory and financial 
parameters, the voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs) that directly serve beneficiaries, the 
volunteers, the donors and the larger community” (Tai, 2016). SHGs are key examples of 
‘voluntary welfare organisations’. The main rationale given by politicians for the establishment 
of SHGs, was to provide the poor with sources of support beyond government support (Kok & 
Liow, 1993). Furthermore, politicians have suggested that the establishment of SHGs would 
facilitate inter-class bonding within each racial community (since wealthier members of a racial 
community were expected to volunteer and financially support these organisations) (ibid). It 
was also felt that grassroots volunteers could provide help that was less patronising (compared 
to the state), and identify problems and suggest solutions to these problems more effectively 
(ibid).  
While SHGs are given a degree of autonomy in planning and conducting their activities, 
government representatives sit on the Board of the different SHGs. Thus, while these SHGs are 
largely run by grassroots volunteers, they are also partly state-controlled. Members of each 
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racial group contribute to the operation of these SHGs – through volunteering, and financial 
contribution. All Singaporean citizens and Permanent Residents are expected to contribute a 
small fraction of their salary, to the SHG of the racial community they are classified as a part 
of. However, they can opt out by filling and submitting relevant forms to SHGs.10 The state 
also provides financial grants to SHGs; the PAP government increased these grants in recent 
years, to “ensure that no ethnic community falls behind on the national road to progress” 
(“Helping Self-Help Groups,” 2014).  
The ‘levelling the playing field’ metaphor, however, sits uncomfortably with other 
elements in Singapore’s education system. Stratifying practices within a performative, high-
stakes education system instantiate the meritocratic ethos, with regressive effects (Ng, 2014). 
The Singapore system has many pathways (see Appendix B), under the official rationale that 
diverse pathways cater to different learning needs and interests. However, state rhetoric on the 
value of ‘diversity’ and ‘multiple pathways’ elides how these practices lead to different 
outcomes for groups of different socio-economic status (Anderson, 2015; Talib & Fitzgerald, 
2015) – and how the complexity and diversity favours families with the educational know-how, 
and economic, social and cultural capital to navigate more complex, differentiated systems 
(Ball, 2003). ‘Diversity’ is instantiated through different academic streams – Express, Normal-
Academic (hereon, NA) and Normal-Technical (hereon, NT) and a growing diversity of school 
types.  The typical Singapore educational experience comprises three key stages:  
 
1. Primary School. (6 years)  
The compulsory starting school age is six. Education is compulsory for six years of 
primary education; however, completion of 10-11 years of education is virtually 
universal in Singapore (OECD, 2011). Upon completing compulsory education, 
students take the nationally administered Primary School Leaving Examinations 
(hereon, PSLE). Streaming begins as early as Primary Four. Based on students’ scores, 
and proximity to schools, students are accepted into different schools (Gee, 2012). The 
government recently introduced the Direct School Admissions (DSA) scheme in 2013, 
which admits students based on exceptional non-academic achievements, such as in 
leadership, arts and sports, in order to reduce the ‘tyranny’ of a points-based system 
(Koh, 2014). In 2019, the MOE announced reductions in the number of examinations 
taken at Primary school level, although critics have questioned whether this will only 
ramp up academic pressure when examinations do take place (Daud, 2018). At the same 
 




time, the MOE has also announced report cards will no longer rank students 
academically within their class, to discourage excessive comparison with peers (ibid).  
  
2. Secondary School. (4-5 years)  
Students progress to Secondary education of four to five years, taking one of four routes: 
1) Government schools (mainstream, autonomous or independent). Broadly, there are 
eight independent schools that are academically most prestigious – these have the most 
curricular and financial autonomy from the MOE; the rest may be called mainstream 
government schools (L. Lim, 2015). These mainstream schools were once labelled 
‘neighbourhood schools’, before this label was removed following widespread 
recognition of the stigma attached to this label (Koh & Chong, 2014).11 In addition, 
studies suggest a disproportionately low number of students from poor backgrounds, in 
Singapore’s elite independent schools (e.g. Chang and Cai, 2011). 
2) Specialised schools for students wishing to enter the vocational track 
3) Specialised independent schools (e.g. Singapore Sports School, and the School of 
Arts) 
4) Privately-funded schools (e.g. international schools) offering an alternative to 
government provision; the MOE generally does not subsidise student enrolment in 
private schools.  
 
Up until 2019, within mainstream government schools, following the PSLE, students 
are placed in one of three academic streams: Express, comprised of approximately 60% 
of each Primary Six cohort, Normal-Academic, or Normal-Technical (the lowest-
achieving 15% of each cohort) (Anderson, 2015). Each follows different curricula, 
although NA students do not take significantly different course offerings to Express 
students. Each stream is also associated with different post-Secondary outcomes (Ho, 
2012). In 2019, the MOE announced plans to entirely replace the Express, NA and NT 
streaming system by 2024, replacing this with subject-based banding, which allows 
students to take different subjects at different levels (Foundation, Standard, Higher), 
instead of categorising students through one label of ‘Express’, ‘NA’ and ‘NT’ (Wear, 
forthcoming). In this thesis, I retain the terms of Express, NA and NT, as these were 
and continue to be the markers experienced by families in this study. 
 
11 As most Singaporean students attend mainstream government schools, all families selected for this study 
attended mainstream government schools (Lim, 2015). 
23 
 
At the end of Secondary school, students take the Singapore-Cambridge General 
Certificate of Education (GCE) 12  – either the GCE N-Level (typically taken by 
Secondary Four NA and NT students) or the GCE O-Level (the more academically 
prestigious qualification – typically taken by Secondary Four Express, and Secondary 
Five NA students who score highly enough in their N-levels to study another year to 
obtain this). Movement between the three streams is possible, based on grades. However, 
it is uncommon – for instance, on average, less than 1% of the national cohort moved 
from NT to NA streams between Secondary Three and Four, between 2002-2012 
(Anderson, 2015). NT stream students are disproportionately male, Malay, and from 
low SES backgrounds, forming a mixture of special needs students and students who 
have scored lowly (Kassim, 2006; Anderson, 2015). 
 
3. Post-Secondary Level (2-3 years)  
Based on N- and O-Level results, students are admitted either to Junior Colleges (JCs), 
Polytechnics or the Institute for Technical Education (ITE). JC offers a two-year 
preparatory course (typically the A-level or International Baccalaureate diploma) for 
university – providing the most straightforward route to a Singaporean public university; 
it is also academically the most competitive to enter, typically requiring O-level 
certification. 
Polytechnics offer three-year, industry-oriented diploma programs, after which 
high-scoring students can apply for university. ITE offers pre-employment, vocational 
courses that result in certificates or diplomas; most ITE students do not proceed to 
university (Anderson, 2015). In 2014, 28% of Singaporean students entered Junior 
College, 44% to Polytechnic and 21% to ITE (Anderson, 2015). Apart from the ITE, 
NT students have few options. While Poly education is possible for those in ITE with 
exceptional scores, only 15% of each NT cohort, on average, pursue any education after 
ITE, leading Anderson (2015:8) to conclude that statistics point to “the constrained 
future opportunities associated with being in the NT track”. 
 
1.4. The Dilemmas of Singapore’s Education System 
In light of the inequalities generated by Singaporean education policy, what is surprising is the 
degree of positivity towards, and collaboration with the state, on the part of most Singaporeans 
 
12 The GCEs are the Singapore MOE’s own set tests, established in collaboration with the Cambridge 
International Examinations board in the U.K. 
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(Teo, 2011). In this section, I discuss three dilemmas in Singapore education policy that 
structure families’ pedagogic work. The first is the contradiction between the appearance of 
endless possibilities, vis-à-vis the structural impossibility of every Singaporean (child) 
achieving educational and financial success (Tremewan, 1994). This dilemma has already been 
discussed in the previous two subsections. In this section, I outline two further education policy 
dilemmas that structure families’ pedagogic work.  
 A second dilemma is that of ‘parentocracy’ in a ‘strong’ state – that is, should families 
depend on themselves and their own enterprise, or on the state, in its pursuit of success? On the 
one hand, the Singapore state has been described as a ‘strong’ state (Lim, 2016b; Tan, 2008). 
‘Strong’ states are characterised by “extensive state intervention, regulation, and planning over 
the economy and public policy” (Lim, 2016:714). This seems to encourage families to depend 
on the government, to trust it, to not take matters into their own hands. In a 2012 National Day 
Rally speech, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong argued against the excessive interference of 
parents in enrolling their children in multiple kindergartens or sending their kindergarten-age 
children to tuition: “Please let your children have their childhood…Instead of growing up 
balanced and happy, he grows up narrow and neurotic…It’s good for young children to play”. 
He berated over-zealous parenting: “You do harm. You turn the kid off, you make his life 
miserable” (Lee, 2012). 
On the other, commentators have argued that Singapore is increasingly shifting from a 
‘meritocracy’ to a ‘parentocracy’ (Brown 1990; Ong 2014). Within a ‘parentocracy’, a child’s 
educational outcomes and opportunities are increasingly contingent on parents’ capacities (or 
difficulties in this respect) to invest and strategise on their child’s behalf, to navigate a complex, 
competitive system.  The PAP government seems to devolve responsibility for success to 
families, tacitly encouraging ‘parentocratic’ behaviour through its high-stakes, performative 
education system. Moreover, the explicit responsibilisation of families is not uncommon in East 
Asian states influenced by neo-Confucianism – such as Singapore, where Confucian thought 
that has influenced the Chinese-majority PAP political culture (Chia, 2011). Within Confucian 
thought, the family is the basic social unit of society, responsible as the first port of call for its 
own social and economic problems (Chua, 2017). Unsurprisingly, given Singaporean 
politicians’ emphasis on responsibility and self-reliance, and its high-stakes education system, 
Singapore’s (formal) education system is accompanied by a flourishing, largely unregulated 
shadow education market for private tuition and enrichment activities (Gee, 2012). Tuition in 
particular is seen as necessary by many middle-class parents in helping their children survive 
the system. In Singapore, private tuition is an SGD $1.1 billion industry; 40% of preschoolers 
are enrolled in private tuition (Wise, 2016). The unregulated private education industry 
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exacerbates inequality and undermines the MOE’s attempts to de-emphasise academic grades, 
as the third policy dilemma (below) suggests. Yet, its emergence and other ‘parentocratic’ 
behaviours are likely the inevitable result of Singapore’s stratified education system. The 
phenomenon of intense responsibilisation within a ‘strong’ state poses a question amenable to 
empirical inquiry: how do disadvantaged families navigate increasingly ‘parentocratic’ 
Singapore? How does the emergence of ‘parentocracy’ influence their construction of relations 
with the state and school?  
The third education policy dilemma lies in the confluence of high-stakes, performative 
processes and structures – and relatively more recent reforms, towards student-centric, child-
centred holistic education. While the MOE recognises the importance of establishing a rigorous 
curriculum and assessment procedure, it has also worked to reduce the emphasis on high-stakes 
examinations to “reduce a societal obsession with grades by channelling educational resources 
to holistic education and a lifelong joy of learning” (Tan, 2018:78). It focuses, at least 
rhetorically, on students’ individual learning and providing time to discover students’ strengths, 
interests and the skills required to succeed in the future (ibid) – rather than on outperforming 
others. A further justification for these recent reforms, is that as Singapore transitions into a 
global knowledge-based economy, within a context of rapid technological advancement and 
the precariousness of economic globalisation – students must be equipped with broader, flexible, 
higher-order skills (such as critical and creative thinking) and dispositions of resilience and 
enterprise.  
The beginnings of such emphases can be traced to over two decades ago, when then-
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong gave his speech in 1997, in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, calling for comprehensive reform of the education system under the policy framework: 
‘Thinking School, Learning Nation’ (hereon, TSLN). Generally, reforms such as 21st-Century 
Competencies in 2009 (hereon, 21CC) and student-centric education have been accompanied 
by (a degree of) reduction in curriculum content, changes to assessment intended to reduce 
academic competition (especially at the PSLE level), incorporating subjects that promote deep, 
interdisciplinary thinking and problem-solving such as Project Work and Knowledge and 
Inquiry, and a slew of programmes such as the Programme for Active Learning (promoting 
holistic development through outdoor education and performing and visual arts), the Applied 
Learning Programme (connecting academic learning to hands-on experience in real-life 
industries), the Learning for Life Programme (developing students’ character and values 
through real-life experiences, such as outdoor activities, sports and visual arts).  
Yet, the Singapore case is unique in incorporating these higher-order competencies in 
an ‘additive’ fashion to the existing curriculum, without subtracting from an already highly-
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saturated curriculum (Deng, Gopinathan, & Lee, 2013b). Ong Ye Kung, the current Minister 
for Education, calls this dynamic the balancing between ‘rigour’ and ‘joy of learning’, 
emphasising the need to retain the system’s emphasis on ‘strong fundamentals’ of numeracy 
and literacy (MOE, 2018). The result of this, however, is disjunctions between policy rhetoric 
and system properties. For instance, in classrooms, a hybrid pedagogy that attempts to balance 
between child-centred and inquiry-based, versus didactic, content-based methods (yet leans 
more heavily toward didactic methods) – is prevalent (Deng et al., 2013b). Despite policy 
rhetoric, the enduring structures and processes of the high-stakes Singapore education system 
implicitly create pressures on schools and families to earn good examination results. Bach and 
Christensen’s (2017:135) research on middle-class parents suggests that parents remain 
confused over the “fundamental split” between injunctions to relax, versus pushing children to 
work hard for success – and between injunctions to encourage holistic development, versus the 
imperative of acquiring top academic grades. They use the term ‘double bind’ to describe the 
conflicting messages sent by those in authority.  
Gopinathan (2007) notes that it is not unusual to see concurrent policy trajectories of 
strong emphases on performativity, testing and accountability, and policy interest in developing 
21st-century, higher-order skills. However, these dilemmas influence families’ experiences and 
negotiations of child-rearing, creating ambivalence and confusion. Underlying all three 
abovementioned dilemmas are questions concerning responsibility and dependency. These 
dilemmas, and the development of positivity and collaboration with the state and schools 
regardless, will be explored throughout the thesis. 
 
1.5. Structure and Organisation of the Thesis 
The structure of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Having outlined the Singaporean education 
policy backdrop, Chapter Two explores the theoretical context for understanding how families 
negotiate this context and offers a theoretical framework. Chapter Three discusses methodology 
– it locates this study’s approach in the critical policy analysis tradition, and outlines and 
justifies methodological principles and decisions made in constructing an ethical, rigorous 
study. 
 Chapters Four to Seven explore how particular state-family subjectivities are 
normalised, constructed and contested, through historical and empirical resources. Chapter Four 
builds on the problematics within Singapore’s socio-political and educational contexts 
conveyed in this chapter; it draws on historical resources to understand how certain norms 
concerning state-family relations were, and continue to be normalised. This analysis focuses on 
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the development of mechanisms that achieve this, from the end of British colonial rule in 1959 
to present-day Singapore.  
Chapter Five discusses the dynamics of responsibility and responsibilisation, which I 
find are most clearly operating at the parent-child interface; yet these parent-child relations are 
structured by wider socio-political conditions. Chapter Six examines dynamics of dependency 
on state expertise, and particularly schools, in families’ pedagogic work. Chapter Seven focuses 
on the contestations and breakdowns in Singaporean meritocratic rationality. As such, this 
chapter highlights disjunctions between meritocratic optimism, families’ material conditions, 
the structure of Singapore’s education system and the political economy in which it is embedded. 
Chapter Eight elucidates the main contributions of the study – and offers final reflections and 
directions for future research.  
Collectively, the chapters assemble a view of a dynamic social space, often obscured in 
policy-making and research through the “bourgeoise” gaze of policy-making (Skeggs, 
2011:496) – a social space that is in fact crisscrossed by structural, institutional and creative 
agentic forces that produce and reproduce normativities that support, and challenge, inequality 
in myriad ways. The confluence of liberal-individual meritocracy and state developmentalism 
provide an under-explored site to understand the contradictions, opportunities and constraints 
that disadvantaged families in Singapore encounter – and it is to a theoretical understanding of 






CHAPTER 2. Theoretical Perspectives: Governance, the State and Families 
 
 
2.0. Introduction  
This chapter provides the “idea context’” (Maxwell, 2013:39) or conceptual backdrop for this 
thesis. I begin by identifying and discussing relevant theoretical literature, then justify my 
adoption of the governmentality perspective. Specifically, I elaborate on a heuristic based on 
the three tiers of governance (inspired by the French philosopher and social scientist, Michel 
Foucault, and extended by sociologists Nikolas Rose and Teo Youyenn). I also discuss my 
addition to this heuristic – what I call the responsibility-dependency frame.  
This chapter consists of four sections. This chapter’s structure tells the story of my own 
journey in developing key theoretical resources used in this study. In the first section, I discuss 
existing theories on families and educational inequality – my starting-point in understanding 
how disadvantaged families navigate the Singapore education system. Here, I detail my pre-
fieldwork engagement with dominant literature in the field of family-school relations. While 
this literature continued to inform my analysis, in the second section, I justify my adoption of 
the governmentality perspective, and define key concepts offered by this perspective that are 
particularly pertinent in my analysis – including ‘subjectivity’, the ‘state’ and the ‘family’. I 
situate these discussions in scholarly and political trends towards understanding governance as 
de-centred, involving multiple actors, including the family.  
In the third section, I discuss the three tiers of governance, comprised of three 
interdependent tiers: ‘political rationalities’, ‘political technologies’ and ‘technologies of the 
self’. Through an emphasis on the fundamental interdependence of these three dimensions, this 
framework bridges the macro socio-political and micro everyday levels. In the fourth section, I 
discuss what a responsibility-dependency frame might contribute; the idea for this frame 
emerged as I analysed interview transcripts and read literature on state-society relations on 
Singapore.  
My theoretical journey from pre- to post-fieldwork follows Wacquant’s (2011:81) 
notion of “[using] fieldwork as an instrument of theoretical construction”. He argues that theory 
is not an up-in-the-air abstraction disconnected from nitty-gritty social realities – instead, 
fieldwork experiences should shape the categories and concepts used to understand social 
reality. Overall, this chapter provides a conceptual foundation for the discussion of findings in 




2.1. Existing Theories on Families and Educational Inequality     
2.1.1. Overview of existing theories   
This section explores existing literature on families and educational inequality. At risk of over-
simplification, I broadly categorise existing work into two main bodies of literature: the first 
understands these interfaces in terms of improving home-school relations to raise student 
outcomes (traditionally geared towards policy-makers and practitioners); the second examines 
these interfaces from a sociological perspective, and seeks to unpack why and how 
disadvantaged families get left behind through uneven (typically, classed and racialised) 
relations between home and school.13  Through this overview, I argue that both bodies of 
literature often elide institutional actors, and an in-depth consideration of power and politics in 
understanding educational inequality.   
 The first body of literature links families’ pedagogic work to educational outcomes. 
This literature draws on sociological, psychological and educational perspectives, and typically 
employs  experiential and longitudinal, or large-scale qualitative designs (de Carvalho, 2001). 
Such work tends to conclude that parental involvement can enhance outcomes – such as higher 
academic achievement, self-esteem, school attendance and enrolment in post-secondary 
educational institutions (see: Goodall & Montgomery [2014] and Wilder [2014] for useful 
meta-syntheses of such research). Often, these studies are driven by the policy rationale that 
parental involvement can narrow the achievement gap between poor and middle-class students 
(Henderson & Berla, 1994). They typically assume that improving the ways parents and schools 
interact with each other can enhance achievement and counter inequity (de Carvalho, 2001).  
To this end, key variables identified as important to improved outcomes include: how 
parents foster attitudes to learning (through parents’ expectations for children, modelling 
learning and achievement and behavioural control); teaching children at home (through helping 
with schoolwork, home-based learning activities); setting a conducive home learning 
environment; and emotional responsiveness and care for children (de Carvalho, 2001; Hartas, 
2015). Additionally, research has pointed to the importance of family-school contact; these 
have highlighted the importance of sustained collaboration and communication borne through 
shared objectives and values, shared decision-making (e.g. through parental representation on 
school boards) and parental involvement in schools (e.g. volunteering) (Driessen, Smit, & 
Sleegers, 2005; Epstein, 2001). However, the benefits of implementing these suggestions are 
 
13 Increasingly, the first body of literature has drawn on the second body of literature to acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of parents’ income and class backgrounds – for instance, see Mayo and Siraj (2015) and Goodall 
and Montgomery's (2014) research. 
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sometimes over-stated and highly context-specific, depending on families’ class and race 
positions, and historical and geographical context (de Carvalho, 2001). 
 The second body of literature, rooted in the sociology of education, explicitly focuses 
on social and educational disadvantage. This literature typically posits that families’ relations 
to public sector institutions (such as schools) are deeply classed and racialised. The prevailing 
argument here is that upper and middle-class families tend to interact with the schooling system 
with greater ease and familiarity than poor, working-class families. This is because, to use 
theoretical language, the former group of families share with schools similar ‘codes’ of 
communication (Bernstein, 1977) and ‘habituses’ (ingrained dispositions and competencies) 
(Bourdieu, 1977). Upper and middle-class families discuss educational processes in the same 
‘language’ as teachers, participate in familiar rituals of home-school interaction such as parent-
teacher meetings, and hold similar expectations of the education system and beliefs regarding 
how one might excel in it (Crozier, 1998:130). There is growing research that suggests tension 
between middle-class families and teachers over the sharing of pedagogic authority (e.g. Lee, 
2014). However, generally by contrast, working-class and poor parents are depicted as alienated 
and distant from schools. They are portrayed as passive, only becoming involved when 
disciplinary issues arise (Crozier, 1998) and uncomfortable in school environments, struggling 
to dialogue openly with teachers (Reay, 1998). Interview-based research in eight European 
countries reveals that home-school relations are “very problematic in all researched countries 
and dissatisfaction exists on both sides”; however, the researchers note that the strongest 
tensions are experienced by families with less material resources (Ule et. al, 2015:344).  
 A closely related thread of research has been emerging in the sociology of family, which 
examines the emergence of the global cultural script of ‘intensive parenting’ (Faircloth, 
Hoffman, & Layne, 2013). This research links the spread of the ‘market’ metaphor through the 
social body, to the rise of ‘intensive parenting’. ‘Intensive parenting’ refers to the classed, raced 
and gendered process whereby parents are expected to invest significant time, energy and 
financial resources to help their children succeed (ibid). Against a backdrop of neoliberal 
institutional practices such as welfare retrenchment, the emphasis on competition and 
performance, and the devolution of accountability to families (Edwards, 2002), states 
increasingly ‘retreat’ into the role of facilitators of the educational marketplace (Olmedo & 
Wilkins, 2017).14  
 
14 Olmedo and Wilkins (2017:575) argue: “[T]he market is envisioned as a ‘fair space’ in which the ‘bad 
players’ will lose and will be publicly exposed (this is the case of…the unsupportive parent etc.). The way in 
which subjects successfully position themselves as individuals within the market (atomized [sic], self-seeking, 
self-regulating) determines their possibilities of success or failure.” 
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Consequently, families aggressively compete and self-monitor, in order to secure 
rewards within the educational marketplace. The production of this marketplace strengthens the 
imperative of ‘intensive’ parenting and blames parents who fail to ‘intensively’ parent; these 
parents disproportionately tend to be poor and from ethnic minority or migrant groups (Ule et 
al., 2015). The visions and ideals of ‘intensive parenting’ fail to account for a range of socio-
economic statuses, financial resources and the wider socio-cultural and material environment 
in which families are embedded (Ule et al., 2015). While ‘home-school relations’ have not been 
sufficiently theorised in terms of politics and power, Vincent and Tomlinson (1997) and Crozier 
(1998) valuably problematise the language of ‘partnership’ as eliding power imbalances; they 
frame the increasingly loud calls for families to ‘partner’ with the state and schools as 
mechanisms of state surveillance and disciplinary colonisation over the intimate spaces of home, 
for the purpose of capital accumulation. 
Overall, what both bodies of literature have in common, and what both crucially 
highlight, is the recognition that while families are heterogeneous, particularly in terms of class 
and race positions, families are often problematically positioned in policy rhetoric as singular 
and unified, as though the playing-field were level (LaRocque, Kleiman, & Darling, 2011; Reay, 
1998). However, both bodies of literature also share shortfalls. Many studies on families and 
educational inequality are insufficiently attentive to power, politics and institutional actors and 
relations; the ‘state’ is often absent (Ball, 2003). While relatively more research has been done 
concerning this in European and Anglo-American contexts (Gillies, 2005; Olmedo & Wilkins, 
2017; Vincent & Tomlinson, 1997), there is little Singapore-based research on this. Relatedly, 
both literature bodies often fail to engage deeply with how particular values (or variables, in the 
case of quantitative research) come to matter – that is, how do certain configurations of home-
school and state-school-family relations come to be produced, normalised and contested? 
Hence, both bodies of literature (often based on research in European and Anglo-American 
contexts) fail to grapple with how processes in the production of inequality might differ, in 
regimes that vary historically, institutionally and socio-politically.  
 
2.1.2. A critique of dominant frameworks in the sociology of education 
The second body of scholarship – largely rooted in the sociology of education – has provided 
very beneficial insights into the existence and reasons for the reproduction of educational 
inequality. It is worth, however, outlining here in greater detail why I depart from particular 
frameworks in the sociology of education that are often used to understand the relationship 
between families and educational inequality. Specifically, common frameworks include those 
in the ‘conflict’ tradition and the Bourdieusian tradition. The arguments in this section offer 
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reasons why I opt for the more open-ended governmentality perspective (which I expand on, in 
Section 2.2).  
 Much scholarship on inequality in the sociology of education sits on either side of the 
prevalent functionalist-conflict binary– whereby formal schooling either acts as a vehicle for 
the promotes greater social equality (functionalist theory, as espoused by Talcott Parsons and 
Émile Durkheim), or perpetuates social inequality (conflict theory, as espoused by Karl Marx 
and Max Weber and developed further, particularly in relation to families and inequality, by 
Pierre Bourdieu) (Sadovnik & Semel, 2010). Furthermore, much empirical research on 
educational inequality – conducted in Anglo-American and Singaporean contexts – has tended 
towards the conflict tradition, in either assuming or concluding with straightforward 
pronouncements of the existence of educational inequality.  
However, in this thesis, I wish to move beyond the prevalent functionalist-conflict 
binary. While these two traditions delineate important relationships between the equitableness 
of a system, and the social practices of the system – thinking in such binary terms (does an 
education system stifle or support social mobility?) can obscure complexity, both regarding the 
internal worlds of families, and the role of institutional actors such as the state, and how the 
two interact. A functionalist-conflict starting-point results in less detailed, rich studies that can 
account for the scope, and sometimes Janus-like nature of (state, familial and individual) agency 
in both perpetuating and challenging inequality within particular socio-political contexts. Such 
an approach thus fails to grapple deeply with ‘how’, ‘to what extent’, ‘under what conditions’ 
and ‘with what myriad effects’ schooling influences opportunities for mobility.  
 One of the most dominant theoretical frameworks in theorising families and educational 
inequality, is the Bourdieusian framework (e.g. Lareau, 2003; Reay, Crozier & Clayton, 2009). 
A Bourdieusian framework, advanced by Pierre Bourdieu, typically suggests that “students with 
more valuable social and cultural capital fare better in school than do their otherwise-
comparable peers with less valuable social and cultural capital” (Lareau & McNamara Horvat, 
1999:37). While Bourdieusian theory seems like the intuitive choice for studying relations 
between family life and inequality, three criticisms may be levelled at the use of this framework, 
for my purposes.  
Firstly, it is not sufficiently attentive to the role of institutional actors and their 
mediating role in enabling and rebuffing the activation of capitals (Ball, 2003). Ball (2003) thus 
argues that Bourdieusian scholarship requires a more explicit consideration of the state. 
Secondly, underpinning the Bourdieusian framework is the assumption of an ‘accrual-
acquisition property model’ (Skeggs & Loveday, 2012:476) captured by the utilitarian logics 
of ‘capital’ accumulation (Skeggs, 2011). The language of capitals can lead to inadvertently 
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mis-recognising and degrading (in particular, disadvantaged) families’ alternative value-
formations and approaching young people for the future, which are inadvertently viewed as 
irrelevant, beyond the scope of the dominant symbolic system (Skeggs, 2011) – thus eliding 
important dimensions of families’ everyday lives. Thirdly, the Bourdieusian framework 
typically presumes that social systems reproduce stratification through valorising and 
rewarding the capitals of the middle- and upper-class, and thus, has been critiqued for its passive 
portrayal of people as docilely absorbing experiences from their social environment and 
transmitting this to the next generation.  
It is worth noting that contemporary Bourdieusian scholars have sought to develop 
Bourdieusian theory to overcome these criticisms – for instance, through accounting for the 
gradations between the two poles of reproduction and mobility, and arguing that families 
mediate capital possession differently (Atkinson, 2012, 2016). However, while similar 
criticisms concerning the over-emphasised docility of subjects have been made concerning 
Foucauldian scholarship (Lemke, 2002), Foucauldian scholarship tends to make less claims 
about possibilities for social mobility and class stratification.  
While I broadly agree with the overall prognosis of perpetuated stratification (oft-
implied in Bourdieusian scholarship) in Singapore, I wish to begin from a different starting-
point – one that foregrounds the relations between macro and micro-political levels, drawing 
on an analytic vocabulary that foregrounds how, why and under what conditions power works. 
I wish to explore the ways in which policy logics such as ‘meritocracy’ might act as a double-
edged sword that drives and stifles social mobility within different generational, historical, 
material and socio-political conditions. Thus, an open-ended theoretical framework that focuses 
on governance processes is most apt for my purposes.   
This third critique became clear post-fieldwork, as I analysed transcripts that affirmed 
the Singapore government, and indicated an optimism concerning the opportunities that 
disadvantaged families believed Singapore’s education system would offer. I decided it was 
important to retain an open-ended approach, even though large-scale statistical studies and 
much of the scholarly analyses (qualitative and quantitative) yielded a picture of persistent, 
even widening inequality (as Chapter One described). This open-endedness felt like a crucial 
way I could respect families’ perspectives, instead of viewing them as ideological dupes of 
government rhetoric. I wanted an analytical stance that allowed flexibility to explore these 
complex, colliding constructions of the life chances of the disadvantaged.  
Overall, what was required was a theoretical perspective that was theoretically 
amenable to a variety of value-formations, that neither made binary dystopian or utopian 
pronouncements on the existence of inequality, and that was sensitive to the question of ‘how’ 
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power works (and the importance of power relations, and the processes influencing the 
activation, or not, of capitals). In the next section, I discuss why the governmentality optic is a 
valuable theoretical perspective, to this end.  
 
2.2. The Governmentality Perspective  
Moving beyond a functionalist and conflict binary perspective, as well as a property-accrual 
model – I draw on a governmentality perspective, largely inspired by Foucault, but extended 
by various scholars. The Foucauldian perspective has been used to understand changing state-
citizen relations, the governance and subjectification of subjects, and how these changing 
formations influence educational inequalities – including in the Nordic context (e.g. Kivinen & 
Rinne, 1998) and the English context (e.g. Ball, 2015). There is some literature that applies a 
governmentality optic to understand families’ educational lives – such as Vincent and 
Tomlinson's (1997) analysis of the surveillance and colonisation of the state’s views over the 
home, bio-politics and child-rearing in East Asia (Eklund & Göransson, 2016), and studies that 
seek to understand families’ negotiations of neoliberal governmentality in terms of family 
policy in Singapore (Teo, 2011).  
While social theory is not commonly used in Singaporean education system research, 
where it has been used, research has often drawn on Foucauldian notions of ‘discourse’, 
‘biopolitics’ and ‘tactics’ (e.g. Koh, 2007; Teo, 2011; Koh & Chong, 2014; Weninger & Kho, 
2014). Foucauldian theory perhaps particularly resonates, in the ‘strong’, paternalistic and 
highly-interventionist state of Singapore. In this study, I draw on particular features of the 
governmentality perspective to inform my analysis. Section 2.2 sketches out the features of 
relevance to this study: 1) the overall ethos of the governmentality perspective, 2) key concepts 
of subject, subjectification and subjectivity, 3) how to conceptualise the ‘state’ and ‘family’.  
 
2.2.1. The ethos of the governmentality perspective    
The term ‘governmentality’ is a neologism coined by Foucault. It refers to the “art of 
government”;  it draws on the “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power…” (Foucault, 1991:102). Within a governmentality perspective, 
governing is not the linear top-down imposition of control; rather, governing involves the 
moulding of mentalities, the “complex processes by which policies not only impose conditions, 
as if from ‘outside’ or ‘above’, but influence people’s indigenous norms of conduct so that they 
themselves contribute, not necessarily consciously, to a government’s model of social order” 
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(Shore & Wright, 2005:5). The work of governing “both acts on and through the agency and 
subjectivity of individuals as ethically free and [rational] subjects”, and thus “presupposes 
rather than annuls their capacity as agents” (ibid). As such, the work of governing is 
characterised by governing-at-a-distance – acting on the “desires and activities of others who 
are spatially and organizationally [sic] distinct” (Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde, 2006).15  
A governmentality perspective is not a theory of power, authority or even governance – 
rather, it asks questions about the process and operation of power (Rose et al., 2006). A 
governmentality perspective asks: what are the conditions of formation of thought, what are the 
principles and knowledges that these formations of thought generate and borrow from, how do 
knowledge, resources and power flow in networks, why, in whose interests, and with what 
normalising effects (Rose et. al, 2006)? The emphasis here is on process – not on the conditions 
of state control, or even the conditions of inequality – but the conditions of the production and 
normalisation of particular subject-positions, co-constructed across macro-political and micro-
political levels.  
In so doing, the governmentality perspective offers potential to understand the 
messiness and complexity of policy enactment in a way that transcends macro-micro dualisms. 
A governmentality perspective primarily provides this, through focusing on how governments 
work – not on, but through agency to develop particular selves (such as that which is amenable 
to capital accumulation). As Thomas Lemke (2002:52) argues: “Governmentality is introduced 
by Foucault to study the ‘autonomous’ individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is 
linked to forms of political rule and economic exploitation” – the relationship between 
“technologies of the self and technologies of   domination”. As such, the governmentality 
approach highlights the “integral link between micro- and macropolitical levels” – the 
connections between global and local forces and personal imperatives (such as the imperative 
to enhance beauty or material achievement) (ibid). Such connections between micro- and 
macropolitical levels are crucial, particularly “new forms of governance” call for researchers to 
“look beyond the official parameters and spaces of politics – the realm of policies, political 
institutions and even social movements – and consider the way in which a range of apparently 
‘personal’ and/or ‘cultural’ locales are acquiring governmental functions” (Walters & Haahr, 
2005:295).  
 In line with Foucault’s own injunction to only use his work as a thinking tool rather than 
a totalising theory (Mifsud, 2016), my use of the governmentality perspective is more in terms 
of providing concepts and shaping an ethos for thinking – an open-ended approach. I draw on 
 
15 For a comprehensive review of the key features, trends and criticisms of governmentality scholarship, see 
Rose et. al (2006). 
36 
 
the governmentality perspective to provide a vocabulary for thinking about power, and to raise 
particular problematising questions – specifically, concerning ‘how’ particular configuration of 
state-family relations came to be, and how they become normalised. In its emphasis on ‘how’, 
and on specificity and complexity, the governmentality perspective lends itself well to empirical 
inquiry. Furthermore, analyses of power need not be dystopian and deterministic, they can be 
open-ended; political mechanisms can maximise and constrain individuals’ capacity. Power, 
Foucault argued, can be productive – not necessarily repressive (Rose, 1992). Rose (1992:3) 
argues:  
To analyse the relations between ‘the self’ and power, then, is not a matter of lamenting 
the ways in which our autonomy is suppressed by the state, but of investigating the ways 
in which subjectivity has become an essential object and target for certain strategies, 
tactics and procedures of regulation. 
 
Foucault (1980:119) notes: “What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply 
the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge.”  
Thus, the governmentality perspective offers a relatively open-ended way to understand 
families’ values, emotions and logics, while linking this to wider forces of power.  
 
2.2.2. Subjects, subjectivity and subjectification 
Ironically, while a governmentality perspective is, in various ways, open-ended – it has been 
critiqued for its tendencies towards “homeostasis”, for blocking analytic possibilities for change 
and resistance through foregrounding power’s forcefulness (Rose et al., 2006:98). However, 
what actually makes a Foucauldian perspective distinct from many theorisations of power is its 
emphasis on the “reality of reflective thought” of the active subject, in processes of self-
formation (Laidlaw, 2014:101).  
 The terms ‘subject’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subjectification’ are crucial within a 
governmentality perspective; each is defined in turn. The term ‘subject’ does not mean ‘person’; 
rather, it refers to “the possibility of being a certain kind of person”, a historically contingent 
possibility (Heyes, 2014:159). Foucault (1982:781) argues that there are two meanings of the 
word ‘subject’: “subject to someone else by control and dependence”, and the production of 
one’s own identity “by a conscience or self-knowledge.” To Foucault, the “recalcitrance” of 
individual will and the “intransigence” of curtailed freedom co-exist simultaneously (ibid, 791). 
On the one hand, individuals construct themselves based on “models that he [sic] finds in his 
culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, his social 
group” (1997:291). However, this assertion does not deny the “active processes of reflective 
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self-formation” (Laidlaw, 2014:101). Laidlaw argues: “the reflective motion of stepping back 
[to reflect on one’s acting and reacting] is not negated by the fact that in order for this to be 
possible you have to be standing somewhere in particular to begin with” (ibid:103).  
Closely related to the term ‘subject’ is the term ‘subjectivity’, 16  which refers to 
“particular spaces for being a subject” or “subject-positions” (Heyes, 2014:159). The term 
‘subjectification’ refers to the “way a human being turns him or herself into a subject” (Foucault, 
1982:778) – the subject-making process. Because all three terms defined here imply active self-
formation (though mediated by external authority), they lay emphasis on the “processes of 
becoming” (Ball & Olmedo, 2013:87). The term ‘subject’ makes no claims on the fundamental 
nature of a person, but on how individuals, influenced and constrained by techniques of 
governing, act upon themselves to reach a desired end-point.   
 
2.2.3. Conceptualising the ‘state’  
Given the salience of political power in structuring everyday life in the ‘strong’ Singaporean 
state (Teo, 2011) – a notion that became increasingly apparent as I analysed interviews – the 
‘state’ is a crucial concept in this study. However, as there is divergence and competing 
traditions in how the ‘state’ is defined, it is apposite to clarify what I mean by the ‘state’.  
There is a vast literature that theorises the ‘state’; due to space constraints, I do not 
provide a comprehensive review of these theories here.17 The ‘state’ has been widely studied 
by social theorists, historical sociologists and sociologists of state formation, political 
sociologists and political scientists. It has been studied in relation to other key social and 
intellectual trends – such as feminism, globalisation, social movements and civil society 
(Roberts, 2018). Of particular interest in this study, is the scholarly work on how the ‘state’ 
relates to individuals in the production and maintenance of relations of inequality.  
A range of social theorists have sought to understand this question. To Max Weber 
(1968/2006), bureaucracy (rationalised procedures) legitimised political rule and maintained 
social hierarchies. To Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the state reproduces (capitalistic) 
relations of production, through the state’s maintenance of the ideology-consciousness link, 
where individuals maintain an imaginary relationship to their actual conditions of existence 
(Marx & Engels, 1998). Thereafter, much sociological theorisation on state-citizen relations 
was done in the neo-Marxist tradition – for instance, by Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. 
Gramsci (1971/2006) theorised the educative and formative role of the state, conducted through 
hegemonic processes to foster the consent of individuals. Althusser (1971/2006) theorised 
 
16 In this thesis, I use the terms ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ interchangeably (Heyes, 2014). 
17 For a more comprehensive review of state theory, see, for instance, Sharma & Gupta's (2006) work. 
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‘ideological state apparatuses’ (which included the school and the family) – social structures 
that work through ideology, not repression, to reproduce relations of production (although these 
apparatuses can also be sites of resistance).  
Some neo-Marxist approaches are critiqued for being overly-economistic. These 
theorisations tend to view social, political and cultural practices of the state as determined by 
economic relations of production that function to perpetuate the status quo (Rose et al., 2006), 
resulting in “reductionist” approaches that presuppose that “every aspect of the school system, 
religion, and cultural artifacts [sic] operated to maintain the existing social order” (Rose et al., 
2006). In response, there has been an increasing, valuable emphasis on the contradictory and 
multidimensional nature of the state’s functions: including its economic (capital accumulation), 
political (self-legitimising), ideological and cultural (moral and educative) functions (e.g. Ball, 
1990; Dale, 1990). These functions can contradict each other, because the state does not only 
aim to secure capital, but also the long-term accumulation of capital and its own political 
legitimacy (Dale, 1990). As such, the state might curtail its capitalist expansionary tendencies, 
through providing welfare for the poor and working-class, to secure their political support, and 
encourage workers to work (Offe, 2006).  
 However, few have written more prolifically or influentially about how individuals 
conspire in their own subjectification, as Foucault (Shore & Wright, 2005). Foucault was 
intensely interested in how individuals related to political power, how they were governed by, 
and implicated within the ‘microphysics’ of power (Foucault, 1979). Foucault’s explicit dislike 
for state-centric and Marxist theory (Jessop, 2007), and his pronouncements of the state as a 
“mythicized [sic] abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think”, 
as lacking functionality or unity (Foucault, 1991:103) – seems to suggest a lack of interest in 
the ‘state’. However, it is not so much that Foucault was uninterested in the ‘state’ (as Jessop 
[2007] explicitly contests). It is more that, in emphasising the de-centered state (Roberts, 2018), 
Foucault advocates a different starting-point (Mitchell, 2006). Foucault (2003:30) argues: “it is 
important not to…deduce power by beginning at the center and trying to see how far down it 
goes”. Instead of starting with the ‘state’, one’s starting point should be on the micro-practices 
and relations at the heart of modern rule (Ekers & Loftus, 2007). Accordingly, this study’s 
analytic focus is not so much the ‘state’, as on how individuals and families construct their 
relations with the ‘state’. The analytic focus is on: “what relations are established between 
political and other authorities; what funds, forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are 
utilised” (Rose & Miller, 2010:275). The ‘state’ is, as Jessop (2016:88) argues, only one part 
of the social formation, such that “the exercise of state powers always encounters…constraints 
and resistances” from other spheres within the social formation. 
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 Like Foucault (1991), I understand the ‘state’ as invented and historically contingent. 
The ‘state’ is a “specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified…a 
way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability” 
(Foucault 1982:781). However, this is not to deny the importance of material structure; Foucault 
believed in the “territorially based, institutionally structured order of the modern state” 
(Mitchell, 2006:178) and in the real effects of state power. As such, ontologically, I see the 
‘state’ as an important, powerful, material structure, especially in the context of the ‘strong’ 
state of Singapore. It has “its own distinctive dynamic and strategic capacities”, such that it is 
at least always partly “resistant to direct external control” (Jessop, 2016:89). Analytically, 
however, because it is an invented structure, the ‘state’ should be understood not as a universal 
functional entity, but in terms of specific techniques, devices and mechanisms. As such, in my 
theoretical framework in Section 2.3, I understand the workings of ‘state’ power in terms of 
political rationalities, political technologies and technologies of the self. Thus, when I refer to 
the term ‘state’ in this thesis, I refer simultaneously to material structure and invention.18 While 
I occasionally use ‘government’ in the theoretical sense to refer to the ‘art of government’, I 
also use the term in conjunction with the PAP (‘PAP government’) to refer to the explicit, 
visible presentation of the state apparatus.  
 
2.2.3. Conceptualising the ‘family’ in the de-centred state   
Within the Foucauldian de-centred state (Roberts, 2018), the ‘family’ is deeply implicated in 
the work of governing. Influenced by the governmentality perspective and other social theories, 
policy sociology scholars are increasingly recognising that policy is creatively mediated by 
multiple actors. In the past, policy studies were dominated by a rational systems model that 
emphasised ‘problem identification’, ‘formulation of solutions’ and ‘implementation and 
evaluation’ (Shore & Wright, 2005:15). However, Hajer & Wagenaar (2003) argue that there 
has been a shift in the ontological topography of politics from the salience of authoritative 
decisions and directives, to a growing reliance of political authorities on multiple actors 
involved in the increasingly complex governing process.19 Scholars influenced by Foucauldian 
thought have described a shift from ‘vertical’, authoritarian modes of state-citizen relations to 
 
18 See Mitchell (2006) for a defense of seeing the ‘state’ as both material structure and invention, in line with 
Foucauldian thought. Also, see Section 3.1 for more detail on my ontological and epistemological stance.  
19 Nonetheless, it is important to not adopt, paradoxically, a normative, narrow conceptualisations concerning the 
‘complexity’ of governing. This multiplicity of institutions and individuals does not necessarily imply a 
democratisation in governing processes, nor a weakening state. Indeed, the growing number of actors involved 
may indicate the contrary, revealing the growing reach of power (Foucault, 1979). Furthermore, the shift towards 
the language of ‘multiplicity’ or ‘complexity’ can elide injurious responsibilisation; it can also be purely 
rhetorical, or be rejected by individual actors (Davies & Chorianopoulos, 2018).  
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a ‘lateral’ modes of relations, whereby those in power govern through creating self-disciplining 
subjects (Eklund & Göransson, 2016). The connections between individual subjectivity and 
politics is becoming increasingly important, as the “frontiers of policy are expanding”, and 
policy mechanisms “increasingly [shape] the way individuals construct themselves as subjects” 
(Shore & Wright, 2005:4).  
Within this context, families are increasingly important instruments of government 
(Foucault, 1979); modern government is increasingly centering around the question of “how to 
introduce…the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the 
family…into the management of the state”, how to govern-from-a-distance, and govern through 
the freedom of families (Miller & Rose, 2008). Governing, in a Foucauldian sense, is the “more 
or less methodical… ‘art’, for acting on the actions of individuals…so as to shape, guide, correct 
and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves” (Burchell, 1993:267). Rose (1992:17) 
notes how governments used to focus centrally on the ‘malfunctioning family’ – yet 
increasingly, attention has “shifted from the prevention of maladaption to the production of 
normality itself” (emphasis added). In the process of “familialization [sic]” (Rose, 1992:16), a 
family’s conduct comes to be socialised and maximised, in accordance with dominant moral 
and political principles.  
In Singapore, the nuclear family is represented in policy as the cornerstone of society, 
the first port of call in resolving social and economic issues (Teo, 2011). In both Western (Finch 
and Mason, 1993) and East Asian contexts (Eklund & Göransson, 2016), ‘familialising’ 
processes (processes that increasingly devolve responsibility to families – and typically 
accompanied by retrenchment in state welfare) have intensified in recent decades (Edwards, 
2002). As such, Eklund & Göransson (2016) argue that East Asian families’ pedagogic work 
must “be understood in a larger framework in which the family is regarded as a site of state 
politics and ideology”.  
  Yet, families are often ignored in sociological and policy scholarship. Gillies (2011) 
documents various reasons why the concept of ‘family’ has acquired pejorative ideological 
baggage: domesticity is too dull and small-scale to warrant attention (reflecting, Gillies argues, 
a male-dominated interest in macro structures); the ideology and practice of ‘family’ 
perpetuates hetero-normative norms and the oppression of women; relationships are becoming 
more fluid as people seek intimacy and care from others beyond traditionally-defined notions 
of ‘family’. However, she argues convincingly for the continued conceptual salience of ‘family’, 
given that families continue to be central to policy-making and politics. Gillies (2011) argues: 
“The decentring of family has…entailed a decentring of childrearing…diverting the attention 
of sociologists from a core and deeply politicised activity”. The institution of ‘family’ produces 
41 
 
real effects on people’s lives – it is a “reality almost as coercive as gravity” (ibid). Gillies (2011) 
argues that it is precisely because ‘family’ as a concept carries ideological baggage, that one 
should study how the concept of ‘family’ is constructed, lived and understood in terms of 
relationships of rights, responsibilities and dependencies, and appropriated, normalised and 
naturalised by different stakeholders (e.g. state, schools). Thus, in this thesis, the term ‘family’ 
is used to “describe households in which children live, with the minutiae of everyday family 
life and parenting practices now systematically linked to outcomes for the child and the health 
of society as a whole” (Gillies, 2011).  
 Overall, I argue for the conceptual salience of the state, family, and the relations 
between them. I also suggest that the governmentality perspective facilitates an open-ended 
approach to understanding how states act (not just to perpetuate the status quo, or economic 
relations of production, but through various historically and socio-politically specific 
mechanisms of government) – as well as how families act (seeing their free-yet-constrained 
negotiations of their socio-political context) in preparing young people for the future. An open-
endedness and sensitivity to complexity is particularly important in the Singapore context, 
where the state is often viewed in functionalist, reductive ways, characterised by an 
“authoritarianism in politics and apparently unstinting support for free market capitalism in 
Singapore’s economic policy” (Chua, 2017). The same might be said of portrayals of 
Singaporean families, who are popularly criticised as passive and unthinkingly reliant on the 
Singapore state (Teo, 2011) – what Low & Kuo (1999:51) call the “dependency syndrome” of 
Singaporeans.  
 
2.3. The Three Tiers of Governance 
Rose (1992) suggests that modes of governing are comprised of three dimensions that are 
interdependent in subject-making: political rationalities and political technologies (macro) and 
technologies of the self (micro). These dimensions form the conceptual backbone of my 
theoretical framework. This ‘backbone’ helps to transcend the micro/macro dualism that 
plagues much sociological thinking. It enables an approach of ‘studying through’ ensembles of 
agencies, rather than ‘studying up’ or ‘studying down’ (Shore & Wright, 2005). As my 
overarching research question seeks to understand how families navigate the opportunities and 
constraints of Singapore’s education system, this framework helps to situate families’ 
pedagogic work within an understanding of political mechanisms. 
While analytically, these three tiers of governance are conceptualised as interdependent, 
the empirical focus of this thesis is on the micro-level – on families’ ‘technologies of the self’. 
Table 2.1 summarises the key elements of this theoretical framework and its relevance to the 
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Singapore context.20 Of course, these tiers do not map neatly onto each other – although the 
slippages are possibly less significant, compared to other contexts, in the ‘strong’ Singaporean 
state. Moreover, these tiers are often inadvertently portrayed in hierarchical fashion in much 
governmentality literature, with social reality presented as a “serene world” freed from the 
messy actualities of governance and implementation (Rose et al., 2006:99). Through my 
analysis, I reformulate this more top-down portrayal of the levels of governance to one that 
foregrounds the potential of families’ agency more. This reformulation is most clearly portrayed 
in Figure 8.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Three Tiers of Governance  
Source: Adapted from Rose (1992) and Teo (2011) 
 
In the next three sections, I delineate each tier of governance, briefly sketching the constituent 
elements of the framework. 
 
2.3.1. Political rationalities  
Political rationalities may be defined as the macro-level “changing discursive fields within 
which the exercise of power is conceptualized [sic], the moral justifications for particular ways 
of exercising power…notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and 
conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among…sectors” (Rose & Miller, 
2010:274). Political rationalities have an epistemological form, pertaining to the “conception 
of the nature of the objects governed”, and a moral form that circumscribes the fitting 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities between “authorities of different types – political, 
spiritual, military, pedagogic and familial”. These rationalities are “more than rhetoric”; they 
 
20 Part II delves into how these tiers operate in Singapore: Chapter Four charts the political rationalities and 
political technologies in Singapore, over time, while Chapters Five to Seven explore families’ technologies of 
the self. 
Tiers of Governance Specifics of the Singapore Case Relevant to this Study 
 
Political Rationalities Developmentalism  
Neoliberalism  
Political Technologies Meritocracy-Education Mechanism  
(reinforced through traditional media, education policy, incentive 
structures in school and labour market, socio-cultural norms) 
Technologies of the 
Self 





are an “intellectual machinery…for rendering reality thinkable” (ibid), often informed by social 
scientific theories and explanations about the appropriate ruler-ruled relationship.  
In the Singapore context, I identify the major political rationalities as 
‘developmentalism’ and ‘neoliberalism’. While I define these terms with respect to the 
Singapore context in Chapter Four, Section 4.3, it is worth noting here that I use the term 
‘developmentalism’, rather than ‘strong’ state, to describe a key political rationality in 
Singapore, because the term ‘developmentalism’ is more specific to the Singapore state (the 
term being specifically devised to capture observations of a phenomena in East Asia). 
‘Developmentalism’ is thus more well-suited to capturing the nuances of the Singapore context, 
although the Singapore context also exhibits characteristics of a ‘strong’ state (Lim, 2016b), 
defined as that which intervenes significantly in public policy and the social lives of citizens 
(ibid). Governance in Singapore nonetheless significantly differs to other ‘strong’ states, such 
as North Korea – as evidenced in Singapore’s alliances with transnational capital, and its 
encouragement of market competition, though this is always coupled with the state’s ‘market-
steering’ (Wade, 2018:518).  
Unsurprisingly, political rationalities at times contradict each other; there is constant 
conflict and contestation between plural socio-political visions. For instance, the 
epistemological character of ‘developmentalism’ broadly implies a subject that is dependent on 
a capable government, while the epistemological character of ‘neoliberalism’ implies a subject 
that is individualistic and responsible. The moral form (the articulation of the appropriate 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities) of ‘developmentalism’ primarily revolves around the 
responsibility of the state, while that of ‘neoliberalism’ primarily revolves around the 
responsibility of the family and individual. These political rationalities (and their contradictions) 
are instantiated in the political technology of the meritocracy-education mechanism, as the next 
section suggests.  
 
2.3.2. Political technologies  
Political technologies exist in intricate interdependency with political rationalities; they are the 
“complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses…through which 
authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions” (Rose & Miller, 
2010:274). They embody political rationalities, sustain social life and produce normality (ibid). 
While the range of political technologies is in principle endless – for the purpose of my inquiry, 
and in the Singapore context, I identify the ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ as a key 
political technology. Contemporary meritocracy, Allen (2011:377) argues, is a key way 
governments “[steer] from a distance”.  
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 As discussed in Chapter One, ‘meritocracy’ is a cornerstone of Singaporean policy, 
portrayed in political rhetoric as fundamental to achieving a putatively equitable, efficient 
allocation of resources. Moreover, ‘education’ (formal academic qualifications) is deployed as 
a key evaluative criterion for ‘merit’. Formal education is a “crucial mechanism of meritocracy”, 
because, as McNamee & Miller  (2009:198) note:  
[I]t is a system within which information, training, and skills can be attained and 
credentials for their attainment awarded, based solely on objectively measurable and 
demonstrated mastery, which presumably directly reflects individual merit and 
indirectly reflects intelligence, ability, and other desirable individual qualities.  
 
The ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ embodies the contradicting assumptions about selves 
and responsibilities inherent in ‘developmentalism’ and ‘neoliberalism’. Notably, it presumes 
that because the state has ‘levelled the playing field’ (Ahmad, 2018) and provided adequately, 
individuals and families should take responsibility for their own lives and futures. These 
assumptions are in turn instantiated in the design of space, arrangement of time and activity, 
reward and punishment procedures and the system of norms. The ‘meritocracy-education 
mechanism’ typically governs-at-a-distance through ‘expert’ knowledge (Rose, 1992). In 
Singapore, the ‘expert’ is the technocratic state, its expertise reinforced historically through 
exceptionalism and ‘success’ (Barr, 2016). 
Thus, the ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ provides a seemingly-coherent, 
commonsense design of how political rationalities (neoliberal and developmental thought) are 
instantiated in governing techniques (specifically: high-stakes examinations and extensive 
streaming) operating across institutional spaces such as homes and schools in people’s everyday 
lives. Rose and Miller (2010:282) argue: “Installing a calculative technology…in the school or 
the family enjoins those within these locales to work out ‘where they are’, [and] calibrate 
themselves in relation to ‘where they should be’ ”. The technology of the meritocracy-education 
mechanism can both maximise and constrain individuals’ capacities.  
This seemingly-commonsense design of the ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ is 
reinforced through largely state-controlled traditional media, largely state-controlled incentive 
structures in schools and the labour market, and socio-cultural norms. Additionally, the 
‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ is legitimised through notions of ‘fairness’ – bolstered by 
the explicit principle of ‘multiracialism’ (which posits equal treatment of all ethnic groups) and 
metaphors of ‘levelling the playing field’. Chapter Four provides further explanation of how 
the ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ draws on neoliberal and developmental thought, and 




2.3.3. Technologies of the self 
It is insufficient to examine only political rationalities and technologies; the ‘technologies of 
the self’ are crucial to grapple with, too, in order to understand the ways in which families 
navigate this complex assemblage. Foucault’s earlier work emphasised the “unproductive 
humanisms of phenomenology and existentialism” – which is probably why many Foucauldian 
analyses do not prioritise the speaking subject (Rose et. al, 2006:90). However, his later works 
suggest a greater interest in subjectivity, through concepts such as ‘ethics’ and ‘technology of 
the self’ (ibid). ‘Technologies of the self’ generally refer to the “ways in which human beings 
come to understand and act upon themselves within certain regimes of authority and knowledge, 
and by means of certain techniques directed to self-improvement” (ibid:90).  
Yet, in contemporary governance, it seems plausible to refer to ‘technologies of the self’ 
as having not only an individual, but familial dimension. This is because technologies of the 
self, especially regarding education, involve how one will act in relation to (or upon) one’s 
family members to achieve improvement in the family’s financial or cultural status (Rose, 1992). 
As such, in this thesis, the ‘technologies of the self’ has a double meaning: it refers both to the 
pedagogic work of individuals upon themselves, and upon others within their family, to achieve 
particular (often politically constituted) ideals.21 These techniques can differ within a family 
unit, and even be at conflict with each other. Broadly, ‘technologies of the self’ refer, in this 
thesis, to the pedagogic work (conducted either by an individual, or family unit) that occurs 
within the ‘private’, intimate sphere of the family (ibid).  
A governmentality perspective has often been critiqued in relation to its failure to 
recognise “subjects’ subjectivities” (Teo, 2011:12). Teo (2011:12) argues that while the 
‘subject’ is central to Foucauldian thought, “subjects’ subjectivities – their interpretations of 
the state – are largely irrelevant” to many Foucauldian scholars. Ironically, while theoretically 
amenable to complexity in subject-making processes, many governmentality analyses focus 
only on the “mind of the programmer”, presenting this as falsely unified and usually dystopian 
in the totalisation and coherence of power. These analyses ignore “the messy world of 
realpolitik, implementation and non-implementation” (Rose et. al 2006:99) and dimensions of 
agency, experience and resistance (Ball, 2016). 
Yet, the governmentality perspective pushes one to consider the unintended 
consequences, what Teo (2011) calls the “latent effects” of power. This is because, as Foucault 
 
21 Other governmentality scholars have depicted ‘technologies of the self’ as the pedagogic work done within the 
intimate, ‘private’ sphere of the home, by families, as the ‘family’ increasingly becomes a central governing 
mechanism (Rose, 1992) – as “individuals can themselves evaluate and normalise their parental…conduct in 
terms of the images of normality, of parental conduct and family life” (ibid, 17).  
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(1980) argues, power is perpetually accompanied by resistance and inertia. Apple (2003:15) 
notes: “all texts and commodities” are “leaky” – “there is always a surplus of meaning and 
interpretation that can lead to alternative or even oppositional uses.” Relations between the state 
and the pedagogic work of families is thus ontologically unstable and dynamic, requiring an 
epistemology that is processual, and sensitive to how subjects negotiate and discuss the state. 
Thus, in addition to understanding that state disciplinary mechanisms can influence the 
formation of subjects in Singapore, it is also useful to analyse how people think, talk and make 
sense of these mechanisms (Teo, 2011). Accordingly, this study pays particular attention to 
families’ ‘technologies of the self’ – while explicating the political rationalities and 
technologies that likely pattern subjects’ technologies of the self.  
Thus, partly responding to the criticism that much governmentality scholarship elides 
agency, experience and subjects’ subjectivities – my empirical work focuses on this third tier 
of governance: how can we understand families’ subjectivities within the regimes of authority 
and knowledge they inhabit? To do this, drawing on interview data, I sub-divide ‘technologies 
of self’ into constituent elements of pedagogic beliefs, approaches, challenges and desires (Ball, 
2003). These became key themes to categorise the different aspects of families’ pedagogic 
work.22 Furthermore, these categories helped me to open-endedly explore the different possible 
normative goals of families, beyond common theoretical assumptions of the ‘good and proper 
self’ that are typically “a reflexive, enterprising, individualising, rational, prosthetic or 
possessive self”, built on “ideas about self-interest, investment, and/or ‘playing the game’” 
(Skeggs, 2011:496). 
As such, instead of starting at the level of abstract theories of ‘macro’ state power, the 
empirical focus of this study is the everyday patterns of families’ pedagogic work. Yet, the 
overall analytic affirms a ‘studying through’ approach, whereby patterns of pedagogic work in 
the small-scale family space are understood in relation to political rationalities and technologies. 
These patterns of pedagogic work help to shed light, and act as a “chemical catalyst” to reveal 
the methods and points of application of power (Foucault, 1982:780). Stated differently, it is 
methodologically illuminating to reverse Foucault’s injunction that “where there is power, there 
is resistance” to “where there is resistance, there is power” (Abu-Lughod, 1990:42) – as this 
opens methodological space for detailed empirical explorations which can help uncover the 
multiple intersecting power structures that individuals inhabit at any one time (Abu-Lughod, 
1990), including, in this study, state-family, parent-child and home-school relations. 
 
 




2.4. The Responsibility-Dependency Frame  
While the three tiers of governance framework offers an overall form for understanding 
families’ lives in relation to state power, I felt more conceptual work was required to connect 
this framework meaningfully to my analysis. Specifically: methodologically, how might one 
understand families’ technologies of self, in relation to political rationalities and technologies? 
While Rose’s (1992) three tiers of governance provides an overall form for understanding the 
social reality, I add to this what I call the ‘responsibility-dependency frame’ to understand the 
substance or content of the relations between the tiers. The responsibility-dependency frame 
helps one to analyse, with greater specificity, the nature and workings of these relations.  
 The concepts of ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ were selected as two meta-themes 
from reviewing academic literature and coding interviews: dependency and responsibility. 
These were two recurrent concepts in both academic literature on state-society relations in 
Singapore (e.g. Teo, 2011; Salaff, 1988), and interviews. ‘Dependency’ and ‘responsibility’ 
seemed to be as concepts that strongly animated the logics of political rationalities, the political 
technology of the meritocracy-education mechanism, as well as families’ technologies of the 
self. As such, these concepts possibly constitute what Lauren Berlant (2012:165) calls a 
“magnetizing [sic] concept” – “an emotionally invested slogan that circulates in and beyond 
specific circumstances” (ibid:166) that magnetises mass attachments and affects. In 
governmentality terms, the responsibility-dependency frame might be understood as knitting 
together these three dimensions, the way Rose (1999) describes ‘enterprise culture’ as knitting 
together these three dimensions in the U.K. 
Families and policymakers alike seemed to either use these terms frequently or imply 
them in the ways they constructed their relations with each other. As such, these terms can help 
us methodologically and epistemologically to cross the seemingly large chasm between the 
moral universes of policy-making and disadvantaged families (Shore & Wright, 2005). The  
qualitative nature of, and relations between, dependency and responsibility – and how, 
specifically, the responsible-yet-dependent subjectivity is normalised and contested – form 
central problematics in my analysis. As noted earlier, fieldwork was used as an “instrument of 
theoretical construction”, because theory “must of necessity engage observation in order to 
convert itself into propositions about an empirically existing entity” Wacquant (2011:81). The 
responsibility-dependency frame is thus a theoretical construction that emerged from fieldwork, 
forming an important addition to the three tiers of governance. 
 In the remainder of this section, I outline how I understand ‘responsibility’ and 
‘dependency’. Both terms are often seen as negative – ‘dependency’ is pathologised in political 
discourse, while ‘responsibility’ is pathologised in scholarly discourse, as I explain later in this 
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section. In this study both terms are viewed as power-laden and socio-politically constituted. 
However, neither are understood as necessarily intrinsically undesirable or negative – but 
understood in more flexible ways. Notably, there is analytic room to reformulate these terms in 
ways that create fairer conditions for vulnerable groups.23 Furthermore, living in relations of 
dependency and responsibility are inevitable in social life. Humans are usually simultaneously 
implicated in multiple webs of dependencies and responsibilities for self and others (Kittay, 
1999). Foucault (1982:791) argues that: “to live in society is to live in such a way that action 
upon other actions is possible – and ongoing”; he elaborates that society without power relations 
is a mere abstraction. What this means, though, is that it is a “permanent political task” to make 
these power relations visible, and to interrogate them (ibid).  
 Broadly, the concepts of responsibility and dependency have been deployed to 
understand work and welfare reform in political science (e.g. Dean, 2004; Sawhill, 2018), to 
understand the ethics of care in philosophy (e.g. Kittay, 1999) and, though the terms are not 
explicitly referenced, these concepts are often implied in many classical anthropological texts 
on themes such as kinship, community, health care and politics (Trnka & Trundle, 2017). To 
my knowledge, few studies have empirically analysed responsibility and dependency relations 
in families’ pedagogic work.   
 In this study, I understand ‘responsibility’ as the construction of “moral agency” and 
“reflexive subjectivity”, entailing dispositions and actions to part-take in self-government and 
bear consequences for one’s own actions (Shamir, 2008:4). Substantial sociological scholarship 
on ‘responsibility’ has been inspired by Foucault, who theorised how political power intersects 
with individual self-realisation projects in producing responsible citizens (Trnka & Trundle, 
2017). The term responsibility, in late modern social theories, is often discussed in relation to 
its “regulatory and negative aspects”, in connection with self-responsibility and 
responsibilisation (McLeod, 2017:243) – with gendered, raced and classed consequences. It is 
a term implying cause and liability; it is seen to atomise individuals, and exacerbate inequalities 
and the divisiveness of neoliberalism (Hage & Eckersley, 2012).  
However, it is possible to reframe responsibility as “a productive and affirming 
orientation to self and other in educational work” (McLeod, 2017:46) – as part of everyday life 
and healthy society functioning – while being attentive to the critique of ‘responsibility’ in 
theoretical literature. In fact, some critics have given renewed value to personal responsibility 
for individual actions, against the “modern malaise” (McLeod, 2017:47) of over-attributing all 
failure to external, social causes (Peters, 1959). More relational understandings of responsibility 
 
23 I do this, based on my analyses, in Chapter Seven, Section 7.5. 
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are possible – notions that encompass responsibility for self and others, that account for 
circumstances of growing precarity and vulnerability, and which are motivated not by market 
logics but also care (McLeod, 2017).  
 While ‘responsibility’ is often discussed in scholarly literature on neoliberalism and 
education (Doherty & Dooley, 2018; McLeod, 2017; Ule et al., 2015), less discussed is the 
notion of dependency. Yet, I argue that ‘dependency’ is conceptually important in 
understanding how responsibilisation works in the Singapore context. The concept of 
dependency is often pathologised in political discourse (Fraser and Gordon, 1994), particularly 
in Singapore (Teo, 2013, 2018). Teo (2018) argues that there is widespread belief in Singapore 
that those with ‘low-income’ tend to be lazy, passively reliant on state support. She argues: 
“Here, the belief is perpetuated through public policies that place ‘dependence’ front and centre 
as that which is to be avoided” (ibid:85).  
 I understand ‘dependence’ as the construction of a particular relationship, whereby one 
party entrusts the care, custody and management of themselves to another party (Kittay, 1999). 
Dependency is fundamental to human relationships; the ‘naturalness’ and desirability of 
independence should be resisted (Bowlby, 2012). Dependency is understood as an unassailable, 
unavoidable fact of human existence, grounded not only in biology (early childhood, old age, 
disability) but also in material conditions (Kittay, 1999). It necessarily implies an inequality in 
power and authority; it sometimes (though not always) leads to domination, an illegitimate 
exercise of power (ibid).  
 As such, dependency is not an unalloyed good, either. In the case of state-school-family 
relations, I conceptualise ‘interdependency’ as a better goal, capturing relations where 
pedagogic authority and power is shared more equally. Dependency, when theorised without 
room for individual responsibility and reflexivity, can disempower individuals, treating them 
as passive and helpless (Sayer, 2017). I therefore understand ‘dependency’ as encompassing a 
range of relations, some more problematic than others, some tending more towards 
interdependence than others.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped the governmentality perspective, the three tiers of governance and the 
responsibility-dependency frame as key theoretical resources in this study. To conclude, I offer 
four ways in which a governmentality perspective is a useful thinking tool for my purposes. 
Firstly, it overcomes the macro-micro dualism through conceptualising the fundamental 
interdependence of three tiers of governance: political rationalities, political technologies and 
technologies of the self. Secondly, instead of taking a pre-determined stance or offering a 
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totalising theory on the nature of inequality, it is open-ended and sensitive to complexity. It 
raises the important question of ‘how’ power works, and the conditions that enable its 
functioning – which involves investigating the multiplicity and interlocking nature of power 
structures working in people’s everyday lives, including and beyond state-family relations 
(Abu-Lughod, 1990).  
Thirdly, it provides a vocabulary to explore state-family relations, using terms such as 
power, governmentality, subject, subjectivity and subjectification. Fourthly, the 
governmentality perspective encourages one to critically interrogate dominant power relations. 
It does this, through making explicit the historical and social construction of social categories 
(including the ‘state’ and ‘family’) – what Burchell (1993) calls the exteriorising of the present. 
Burchell (1993:277) argues that a governmentality optic sensitises us to the ‘inventedness’ of 
our social world, a discernment of the “contours of our goldfish bowl, of our present, taking 
shape in all their necessarily contingent exteriority”; it enables an “operation of an 
exteriorization [sic] of the present ‘in’ which we live”, which “turns the present inside out”, 
leaving us with questions such as: “[W]here are we? Who are we?” To understand with greater 
specificity the content of these power relations, I add to the three tiers of governance, the 
responsibility-dependency frame.  
Overall, this theoretical framework foregrounds the question of how families’ 
technologies of the self dynamically and creatively mediate political rationalities and political 
technologies (while not foreclosing power structures beyond the political). Thus, the theoretical 
resources outlined in this chapter facilitate an analysis of how families interact with and against 
their surrounding context, in seeking a better future. The next chapter outlines the 



















CHAPTER 3. Methodology and Ethics 
 
3.0. Overview of Research Design 
Incorporating the micro and macro within a single analytic is difficult, with no set methodology 
(Shore and Wright, 2005) – yet, an analysis that focuses on one without the other is limiting 
(Mylan & Southerton, 2018). My overarching research question calls explicitly for a 
methodology that encompasses macro and micro levels, by asking how families navigate the 
opportunities and constraints of the Singaporean education policy landscape. The previous 
chapter has outlined a theoretical framework for combining macro-micro levels (that is, the 
three tiers of governance framework, and a research ethos that emphasises not just ‘that’ power 
works but ‘how’ power works. This chapter explores how, methodologically, I explored the 
interface between political rationalities, political technologies and technologies of the self.   
 This study is primarily an in-depth interview-based study with 12 families in 
Singapore, since my analytic focus is on families’ technologies of the self. To provide access 
to wider social processes and their shaping influences on families, I also reviewed secondary 
(largely academic) literature on the historical, socio-political context of Singapore.24 My 
overall research design is summarised in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Key Features of My Research Design  
Tiers of Governance  
  
Method  Data Collection Period 
Political Rationalities 
  
Analytical re-reading of academic 
literature  
Throughout fieldwork 
and write-up process 
 Political Technologies  
  
Technologies of the 
Self 
  




Between January to July 2017, I conducted three rounds of interview with 12 disadvantaged 
young people at the Secondary Four level, and their main caregivers (typically, either one or 
both parents). I conducted three interview rounds per family, to develop an in-depth 
understanding of families’ pedagogic work. The first two rounds were semi-structured 
individual interviews. At least one month later, a focus group interview was conducted with 
both young people and parents, as well as occasionally, for three families where siblings were 
eager to participate, the young person’s siblings. While including siblings was not planned in 
my original research design, within the confined space of families’ homes, siblings at times 
 
24 This analysis is presented in Chapter Four, ‘State-Family Relations in Historical Perspective’. 
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overheard their family members in interview, and expressed eagerness to be interviewed. In 
these cases, I invited siblings to join the focus group interview. This happened in three families, 
providing an additional dimension of understanding families’ everyday lives, and their 
approaches to raising children (at times, via older siblings). 
My overall research design is situated in critical policy analysis tradition, which 
provides the overarching philosophical justification for many of this study’s methodological 
principles and practicalities. I begin this chapter by locating this study (and its ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings) within the critical policy analysis tradition. I then describe the 
practicalities and steps taken in developing a rigorous and ethical study – before summarising 
the limitations of my approach. 
 
3.1. Critical Policy Analysis: Ontological and Epistemological Perspectives  
This study is situated in the field of ‘critical policy analysis’ (Diem et al., 2014; Taylor, 1997), 
or ‘critical policy sociology’ (Gale, 2001). Before the ‘critical’ turn in policy analysis in the 
1980s, policy analysis was largely dominated by policy implementation and evaluation, and 
located within positivist, managerialist orientations towards uncovering ‘best’ solutions for 
identified problems (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003:19). This approach has been critiqued for being 
apolitical and a-theoretical, assuming straightforward linearity from policy production to 
implementation (Diem et al. 2014; Gale, 2001; Mabokela & Mlambo, 2017). Critical policy 
analysis (hereon, CPA) was developed in response to this methodological reductionism (Diem 
et al, 2014; Gale, 2001). In this section, I outline two salient features of CPA – its ontological 
orientation and epistemological inclinations – that form the philosophical foundations of this 
study. 
 The first relevant feature of CPA is its ontological understanding of social reality, and 
particularly, the nature of ‘policy’. The overarching research question seeks to understand how 
families navigate Singapore’s education policy landscape. The field of CPA, influenced partly 
by post-structuralist conceptualisations of policy as ‘discourse’ and as political and value-laden 
(Diem et al, 2014), views policy as ‘articulation’ rather than a given ‘fact’ (Gottweis, 2003; 
Kingfisher, 2016). Within this conceptualisation, policies are both produced, and produce 
subjectivities and subject-positions; policy discourses “systematically form the objects of which 
they speak”, and in so doing, conceal their own invention (Foucault, 1972:49). As such, ‘policy’ 
is not a static text with definitive effects on a polity; rather, it is an instrument of governance 
that attempts to legitimise particular subjectivities (Grimaldi, 2012). According to Grimaldi 
(2012), conceptualising ‘policy’ as ‘discourse’ has three key benefits. Firstly, it shifts the focus 
from policy statements to the relations between policy statements and their conditions of 
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existence and enactment. To sever these links is to assume a thin ontological reality. Secondly, 
policy as ‘discourse’ views policy as shaping subjectivities through socially constructed ‘truth’ 
and ‘knowledge’ – this makes visible these regimes of ‘truth’ and prises open spaces for critique 
of dominant norms. Thirdly, such a stance avoids reductionist analyses, enabling instead more 
dynamic, processual accounts of interactions between the dominant and alternative discursive 
formations (for instance, these might collide, grate against each other or reinforce each other). 
Hence, in this study, ‘policy’ is seen as providing a shared context, through which individuals 
form a common script of norms, values and practices (Teo, 2011). 
 However, CPA does not necessarily preclude a realist ontology, despite its strong post-
structuralist influences (e.g. Jessop & Sum, 2016). In fact, in emphasising the disjunction 
between policy rhetoric and the social reality of enactment, CPA studies often imply the 
existence of social reality (Diem et al., 2014). I adopt a critical realist approach, viewing 
education policy as patterned by underlying, at times subterranean mechanisms, tendencies and 
liabilities (Jessop & Sum, 2016) that shape, and are shaped by economic, political and cultural 
processes (Robertson & Dale, 2015) – these social realities exist independently of the researcher. 
Education policy is viewed as patterned by meaningful social regularities – even if, as critical 
realists hold, there is a perpetual gap between researchers’ practices and knowledge, and the 
external world (Sayer, 1994).  
Understanding ‘policy’ in these ways – as constructed, yet as ‘real’ and constructing 
subjectivity – has two methodological implications. Firstly, it shines a methodological spotlight 
on the mechanisms and processes through which seemingly nebulous policy ideas and goals are 
transformed, legitimised and normalised (Diem et al., 2014; Grimaldi, 2012). In Foucauldian 
terms, the “conditions of existence” of policy production and enactment become analytically 
generative (Grimaldi, 2012:447). The focus is not on policy text itself, but on the relations 
between policy messages and its conditions of existence, both at the policy production and 
policy enactment levels (ibid). Many studies, even in CPA, have focused on official, formal 
actors and the conditions of production. Significantly less research has taken seriously the 
aspect of CPA that examines relations between dominant policy narratives, and the conditions 
of enactment, particularly at the latter stages in the “social life” of policy (Kingfisher, 2016:1) 
– at the family level. The question of how dominant policy narratives shape and constrain 
families’ subjectivities – the reasons, mechanisms and processes through which policy ideas 
come to be and exist within families’ understandings of how they can attain a successful future, 
are important in this study.  
 The second methodological implication of seeing policy as constructed and constructing, 
is that it foregrounds the value of individual ‘voices’, particularly of the marginalised 
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(Mabokela & Mlambo, 2017). On the one hand, CPA lays strong emphasis on context, rooted 
in its post-structuralist recognition of historical and socio-political contingency. Broader social, 
historical, economic and political contexts are important; in particular, CPA must be 
“historically informed” (Gale, 2001:382). 
However, while ‘context’ is seen as deeply structuring policy and subjectivity, 
constraining possibilities for interpretation, enactment and for thinking or acting ‘otherwise’ 
(Grimaldi, 2012:453) – the CPA tradition also encourages rich conceptualisations of creative 
agency. Foucault increasingly emphasised, particularly in his later works, that his theorisations 
around power were not intended to result in dystopian representations, where fields of actuality 
are unequivocally defined by a single discourse (Grimaldi, 2012). Rather, these fields are 
contested, as policy discourse mingles with individual agency and non-discursive factors, 
sometimes forming a springboard for developing opposing strategies (ibid). As such, this study 
aims to produce a ‘thick’ account of agents’ reflexivity within the opportunities and constraints 
of the Singaporean context. CPA has a preference for “rich description, connection to context 
and voice” (Diem et al., 2014:1085). Many CPA scholars use ‘voice’ to problematise ‘context’ 
and dominant norms and ‘common-sense’ embedded therein (Diem et al., 2014). This reflects 
a key goal of many critical policy analysts: to critically interrogate structures, practices and the 
status quo, motivated by a desire for social justice and a sensitivity to power and oppression 
(Gale, 2001). 
Of course, it would be impossible to presume with certainty that a particular policy idea 
has definitively influenced an individual’s behaviour – the problem of ‘backward mapping’ 
(Elmore, 1979-1980:604).25 Furthermore, structural contexts can shape families’ subjectivities 
in different ways and to different extents. Nonetheless, it remains fruitful to understand the 
mechanisms and processes through which substantive policy goals interact with individuals’ 
conceptualisations, priorities and actions (Desimone, 2009) – even if we might only connect 
this chain probabilistically. The onus is on researchers to provide evidence and counter-
evidence for claims, in order for readers to derive their own judgment (Lincoln & Guba, 1984).  
 The second feature of CPA salient to this study, lies in the epistemological preferences 
of critical policy analysts. While CPA is generally theoretically and methodologically eclectic 
(Taylor, 1997) with a generally pragmatist orientation (Diem et al, 2014) – many critical policy 
analysts draw heavily on an interpretivist epistemology. The ‘interpretive turn’ in policy studies 
occurred around the same time as the ‘critical turn’, calling for subtler understandings of policy-
 
25 Richard Elmore (1979/80:604) argues that ‘backward mapping’ “questions the assumption that explicit policy 
directives, clear statements of administrative responsibilities, and well-defined outcomes will necessarily 
increase the likelihood that policies will be successfully implemented.” 
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making and its underlying politics (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). ‘Interpretivism’ as a social 
scientific epistemology emerged in the late 19th and early 20th-century as part of the ‘Verstehen’ 
tradition, reacting against positivism, and emphasising instead the meaningfulness of human 
agency and perspective (Schwandt, 2000) over action and behaviour (Outhwaite, 1974). This 
coheres with my emphasis on actors’ interpretations and understandings of their social world. 
It also highlights the importance of researchers’ humility in analysis. Interpretive researchers 
“assume that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social 
constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments” (Myers, 
2008). From Myers’ (2008) quote, it is clear that an interpretivist epistemology and a realist 
ontology are not necessarily incompatible; he describes that ‘reality’ can be “given or socially 
constructed”, but in either case, only partially knowable to researchers. The researcher’s job is 
therefore not to “provide a natural science of human life” but “rather to deepen, systematise and 
often qualify, by means of empirical and conceptual investigations” (Outhwaite, 1974:16-17).  
 In line with the interpretivist epistemology, a CPA framework valorises qualitative 
methods. Common approaches include discourse analysis, critical policy ethnography and 
historical approaches (Diem et al., 2014). CPA also tends to draw on sociological theory – 
which can be particularly useful in bridging understandings of micro and macro contexts, via 
an understanding of power and its workings (Taylor, 1997) – although theoretical 
interdisciplinarity is also valuable (Diem et al,. 2014). In this study, I draw on both a 
governmentality perspective (largely from the discipline of sociology) and qualitative methods.  
In summary, a CPA framework is valuable to this study, because through advancing 
nuanced epistemological and ontological perspectives on social reality, it offers ways of 
bridging the nitty-gritty details, decisions, emotions and logics of families, to the wider 
structural forces operating in families’ lives – and to the workings of power and inequality. 
While the CPA framework does not solve all the methodological and ethical dilemmas of 
researching disadvantaged groups, it offers a starting-point to help me identify and develop rich, 
ethical and power-sensitive modes of research.   
 
3.2. Key Tools for Exploring the Makings of Subjectivity    
3.2.1. Why interviews?  
Building on CPA’s valuing of the perspectives of marginalised groups in policy analysis, 
interviews were judged to be the most appropriate method for my project. In line with my 
research questions, interviews were viewed to be the most effective way of understanding 
families’ constructions of a successful future, how they felt they could achieve this, and the 
56 
 
nature of relations they construct with other institutions. Interviews provide insight into cultural 
imaginaries, conceptualisations, values, ideals, reflections, motives and experiences (Lamont 
& Swidler, 2014; Morris, 2015), as well as emotional landscapes of desire (Pugh, 2013). 
Interviews also encourage identification with particular social groups by taking seriously 
individual perspectives (Wacquant, 2011). I agree with Irving Seidman (2006:9) that interviews 
are a mode of inquiry with “an interest in other individuals’ stories because they are of worth.” 
Furthermore, an interview-based design would allow me to easily and inexpensively vary 
contexts and situations in theoretically enriching ways (Lamont & Swidler, 2014). In my study, 
theoretical variation was achieved by including participants from two different ethnic minority 
groups (Malay and Indian) and across three different academic streams in Singapore. Moreover, 
interviews provided the opportunity to ask hypothetical questions that provided deeper glimpses 
into families’ imaginaries.26  
 However, the interview method is commonly critiqued on three counts: the gap between 
what people say and do, the unreliability of human ‘talk’, and the limited scope for 
generalisability in interview studies. I discuss these three critiques here; later, in Section 3.6, I 
describe three other methods-related limitations that arose during fieldwork, and how I dealt 
with those.  
 Firstly, Jerolmack and Khan (2014) argue that there are significant gaps between what 
people say and what they do – that is, articulated perceptions do not necessarily translate into 
behaviour. Such critiques are commonly accompanied by the argument that interviews should 
be combined with observations, within the typical ‘ethnographic’ method; interviews are 
viewed as second choice, due to force of circumstance (Forsey, 2010). Nonetheless, there have 
been robust defenses of interview-based studies against such criticism (Forsey, 2010; Lamont 
& Swidler, 2014; Pugh, 2013). These typically begin by calling for a need for research 
pragmatism rather than methodological tribalism, in matching the method to the purpose of 
inquiry.27 
While interviews do not provide access to directly observable behaviour, interviews are 
uniquely well-suited in excavating in-depth meaning-making processes – and for understanding 
 
26 For instance, one interview question asked of young people was: “if you were given a well-paid, stable job for 
the rest of your life right now, but you had to quit school – would you do it?” to understand whether they viewed 
education as crucial to the meaning of ‘success’, and whether education was viewed as instrumentally or 
intrinsically valuable. 
27 The debate between observations and interviews tap into a larger debate over “what is determinative in last 
instance” (for instance, ‘saying versus doing)” (Lamont & Swidler, 2014:156). They continue: “Some of the 
debaters want to know who is tapping the most “really real,” significant reality.” However, Lamont & Swidler 
(2014) are right in arguing that all methods capture realities, and interviews are particularly apposite in capturing 




the types of information my research questions seek to grasp. Observations do not lend 
themselves well to the deep, meaning-making questions or imaginaries that this study seeks to 
unpack. My study does partly explore families’ pedagogic approaches28; hence, observations 
could have added more insight. However, it is not behaviour per se that my work is primarily 
interested in. Behaviour constitutes an unnecessarily-narrow focus, an obsession of social 
science (Lamont & Swidler, 2014). My primary interest is in understanding what underlies the 
directly observable: the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, the meanings that families attach to these 
pedagogic approaches. Moreover, observations, particularly over a period of time, can be 
particularly intrusive in the Singapore context, where homes are small because land is 
expensive. I felt that to spend a long time ‘hanging out’ with families would cause undue 
pressure on families, given the long, unpredictable working hours of many poor families (Teo, 
2018). 
A second criticism relates to the unreliability of human ‘talk’. It may be the case that 
participants might omit and present selected information to make themselves appear the way 
they want to appear (as most humans do). Participants can exaggerate and downplay; they are 
perpetually subject to social processes, such as wanting to please the interviewer, other 
interview participants, or the government. As I grew in friendship with families over the six 
months of fieldwork, this may have simultaneously enabled participants to converse more freely 
about issues that mattered to them, but also enhanced a desire to provide pleasing responses. 
To mitigate some of these limitations, and to maximise the scope of analysis, I used set-
of-three interviews (Seidman, 2006) for key participants (the parents and the Secondary Four 
child). Each key participant underwent three rounds of interview: two individual semi-
structured and one focus group interview. This set-up allowed a variety of responses to emerge, 
and for multiple forms of triangulation: between different rounds (over time), different 
interview formats (semi-structured and focus group), different families, and different 
individuals within families (parent and child). I also sought to develop deeper reflections from 
participants, when I felt a more surface-level response was provided – through asking why, and 
eliciting examples and elaboration. 
Relatedly, interviews are sometimes critiqued for creating an artificial (rather than 
‘natural’) setting, and for the limited temporal depth of interviews, as interviews typically last 
only 60-120 minutes; this can exacerbate the unreliability of human ‘talk’. Yet, conversation is 
central to human communication, and need not be artificial and contrived (Lamont & Swidler, 
2014). I drew ‘ethnographic interviewing’ principles (Spradley, 1979), where descriptive, open-
 




ended questions are used to encourage respondents to discuss topics of interest within the limits 
of research questions, and to speak as far as possible from their own frames of reference. This 
generates a more conversational feeling in interviews. Details concerning the structure and 
content of set-of-three and ‘ethnographic’ interviews is provided in Section 3.3.3. 
 Thirdly, given that interview-based studies typically rely on a small sample size and 
draw on non-probabilistic sampling, this study does not aim to make statistically generalisable 
claims. However, it is possible to make analytical generalisations from interview investigations 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015), whereby chains of logic, substantiated by reasoning and evidence, 
enrich analytic understanding (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). In any case, the goal is not 
to generate context-independent, universal knowledge – but to provide rich, contextualised, in-
depth descriptions of phenomena, so that other researchers can carefully consider whether there 
are relevant features and mechanisms that are useful in analysing other contexts. Paradoxically, 
it is these rich, ‘thick descriptions’ that provide the soundest basis for generalisations beyond 
the studied context (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015). It was precisely because I worked with a small 
participant group of 12 families, that allowed the generation of an in-depth understanding of 
families’ perspectives. 
The families I interviewed are, of course, not homogenous; they are internally diverse, 
with varying demographic backgrounds and perspectives. In this study, I elucidate tentative 
scripts and patterns regarding how “people come to experience themselves as subjects through 
processes of…subjectification” (Phoenix, 2009:103) – as well as the ways families rupture, 
refuse and adapt normativity to reach their desired end-point. Yet, families share notable 
similarities from living in and experiencing a shared context of policy and history. To 
understand subjectification processes on both macro and micro levels, I conducted an analytical 
review of academic literature on state-family relations in Singapore, as the next section 
describes.  
 
3.2.2. Reading secondary literature, re-reading history  
The work of governing perpetually occurs within a “historically constituted matrix” (Rose & 
Miller, 2010:273). Families and individuals are enmeshed in discourse; historically-produced 
discursive frames circulate and constitute subjectivities (Grimaldi, 2012). As such, history and 
historiography have long been important in Foucauldian-inspired governmentality studies, in 
understanding the genealogy of how we “become particular kinds of beings” (Rose, 1992:22), 
and “how, at a certain historical moment, had the state come to embroil itself with the business 
of knowing and administering the lives and activities of the persons and things across a territory” 
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(Rose et al., 2006:88). For Foucault, the historical was important in making visible the invention 
of particular subjectivities and why we often feel compelled to inhabit them (ibid).  
 There are few historically informed accounts of state-society relations in Singapore, and 
to my knowledge, none that explicitly foreground state-family relations,29 or how particular 
subjectivities are legitimised within particular political systems. For the purpose of this study, 
I conducted an analytical review, or re-reading, of secondary academic literature (including 
historical accounts), and present this in Chapter Four: ‘State-Family Relations in Historical 
Perspective’. To do this, I read secondary academic literature on the state, schooling and family 
in Singapore,30 with an explicit analytic focus on the construction of families’ subjectivities. 
The re-reading presented in Chapter Four is provisional, drawing mainly on secondary literature 
and not on primary evidence like policy documents. However, I ensured I carefully and 
comprehensively read secondary literature to the point of theoretical saturation (that is, when 
additional literature did not add much to my understanding). I also consulted well-known 
specialists on social stratification, education and curriculum, politics and governance in 
Singapore (see the next section, specifically on ‘contextualising’ conversations).   
I followed some principles of writing a Foucault-inspired ‘policy historiography’ (Rose 
et al. 2006; Gale, 2001), which I outline here. Notably, my historical analysis is not structured 
through historical periods, because historical periods are not “self-evident and consensual” 
(Gale, 2001:386). Rejecting totalising tendencies and grand theorisations, or the suggestion that 
something “substantially novel” appears as the Singapore city-state industrialises – my analysis 
focuses instead on a “mapping of governmental rationalities and techniques” (Rose et al. 
2006:99), on how particular subjectivities are constructed (see Table 3.1). As such, this re-
reading is both original and crucial to my overall analysis. Through this re-reading and 
analysing interview findings, I came to identify and understand what I call the ‘dependent-yet-
responsible subjectivity’, as a key dimension of state-family relations. This concept implies the 
seemingly paradoxical co-existence of expressions of dependence on the state and school, 
alongside feelings of responsibility for one’s own success and future. I elaborate on the makings 
of this subjectivity in Part II. 
In line with Foucauldian thought, however, the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity 
is not a universal ideal-type, but constantly mediated by human creativity and contingency 
 
29 One exception is Janet Salaff’s (1988) ‘State and Family in Singapore: Restructuring an Industrial Society’, 
which, though dated (written over 20 years ago), is a useful resource in my own historical mapping in Chapter 
Four.  
30 This review of literature occurred throughout the research process, from preparing to enter the field, to 




(Rose et al., 2006). As such, while this re-reading enables us to map political rationalities and 
technologies, families’ technologies of the self – how they mediate these governing techniques 
– is this study’s empirical focus.  
 
3.3. Conducting Interviews: Design and Procedure 
3.3.1. Preparation stage: Access and piloting   
In July 2016, I made my first trip to Singapore to explore ways I might connect with families. 
As someone who had never lived in Singapore before,31 I was grateful to meet two Singaporean 
academics who became my fieldwork mentors. Both mentors provided advice on researching 
and analysing the Singapore context, from 2016 and throughout the write-up phase. Over the 
course of July-September and December 2016, my main goal was to ascertain the feasibility of 
my overall research design. By the end of 2016, I made the decision to interview disadvantaged 
families with the help of SHGs, and secured the approval of SHG leaders to conduct research 
through these organisations. 
I chose to work through SHGs, because, as Chapter One has suggested, SHGs explicitly 
focus on helping disadvantaged families. Schools in Singapore could have provided similar 
access, but being securely part of state apparatus (unlike SHGs, which are only partly state-
controlled 32 ), families contacted through schools might not have felt as free to speak. 
Furthermore, gaining permission to research schools is generally difficult in Singapore, and 
even more so for foreigners like myself.33 Although there are three dominant racial groups and 
three major SHGs in Singapore, I worked only with SINDA and Mendaki, for two reasons: 
firstly, for practical reasons – the CDAC required MOE clearance prior to interviewing families; 
secondly, I decided to focus on how ethnic minority groups – marginalised through not only 
class but racial relations – relate to the state.  
With the help of my professional contacts, I established contact with individuals on the 
leadership committees of SHGs. I met the Chief Operating Officer of SINDA, and the Director 
of Research and Policy of Mendaki. During each meeting, I laid out my purpose (PhD project 
and possible publications), how I hoped they would be able to help (allowing me to interview 
families) and my projected timeline. It was crucial during those meetings to establish mutual 
trust. I also asked them what they were most interested in finding out. Both SHG leaders had 
 
31 I describe my reasons for studying the Singapore context in Section 3.5.2, on researcher positionality.  
32 During my meetings with SHG leaders, they explained that SHGs are largely viewed by Singaporeans as 
mediating between state and citizen. 
33 My fieldwork mentors advised that the MOE would be unlikely to provide clearance for my research due to its 
explicit focus on race and social class. I spoke to an MOE representative involved in research clearance, who 
confirmed this.  
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similar responses: What is the difference between those from middle and low-income families? 
Why is there such a gap in educational outcomes? At the end of the meetings, both SHG leaders 
agreed for me to conduct research through their organisations.  
To prepare for interviews with families, I carried out two additional steps: pilot 
interviews, and what I call ‘contextualising’ conversations.34 I conducted pilot interviews with 
two disadvantaged families (one Indian, one Malay), with the help of SINDA and Mendaki, in 
January 2017. The piloting process refined interview questions and sampling decisions further. 
Notably, I initially decided to interview eight families from any academic stream. However, 
upon realising through these interviews how deeply streaming influenced families’ worldviews 
regarding education, I decided to interview 12 families instead (six Indian, six Malay families), 
so that I could interview two families of each racial group from each academic stream (Express, 
NA, NT).  
 ‘Contextualising’ conversations were conducted with the purpose of understanding the 
socio-political and research context for this study. These conversations were informal, face-to-
face exchanges with policy and school professionals in Singapore, including representatives on 
the leadership committee of SHGs, education practitioners and policy-makers – as well as 
academics studying social stratification and poverty, politics and governance, education and 
curriculum issues in Singapore. While these conversations varied significantly in content and 
focus, these conversations had two broad purposes:  
1) Provide insight into how to effectively and ethically conduct research with 
disadvantaged families – for instance, concerning content and phrasing of questions. 
This is important because there are different socio-cultural norms regarding 
answering and asking of questions that should influence researchers’ approach 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015). Some academics and school and policy professionals 
shared their experience of researching and working with disadvantaged groups.  
2) Deepen understanding of the broader socio-political and institutional context of 
Singapore: the PAP’s governing philosophy, Singapore’s education policy 
landscape and inequality in Singapore. 
 
Concerning the second purpose, ‘contextualising’ conversations were particularly helpful in 
providing insight into the political rationalities and technologies of the PAP government. This 
supplemented and formed important checks-and-balances of my historical analyses of these 
 
34 For both pilot interviews and contextualising’ conversations, I adhered to the ethical principles detailed in 
Section 3.5, including privacy and anonymity. However, almost all policy, school and academic professionals 
did not mind if their identity was revealed.  
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tiers of governance, presented in Chapter Four. However, ‘contextualising’ conversations were 
not analysed in detail, as this study’s focus was on disadvantaged families’ technologies of the 
self. Neither pilot nor ‘contextualising’ conversations were deeply analysed, but both were 
useful in paving the way for more careful and ethical analyses. 
 
3.3.2. Participant criteria  
Because there is no clear mapping of social class in Singapore, I drew on academic literature 
both in Singapore and beyond, to devise my criteria for ‘socio-economic disadvantage’. Apart 
from self-identification as part of an ethnic minority group (Indian or Malay), I conceptualised 
the following criteria for ‘socio-economic disadvantage’, drawing on Ern-Ser Tan’s (2004) 
work on social class in Singapore, Lareau’s (2003) work on social class in the U.S. and the 
Singapore Department of Statistics (2016):  
1) Household income: below SGD$1,100/capita/month – constituting the bottom 20% 
of population.35 
2) Parental occupation: typically blue-collar or at most low-level white-collar jobs with 
limited professional autonomy. Typically working in the lowest-earning occupation 
categories in Singapore (Sales/Service Workers; Plant and Machine 
Operators/Assemblers; Cleaners; Labourers). 
3) Parental education: typically secondary school qualification at most. 
 
Additionally, I wanted to interview families with prolonged experience of living in Singapore 
– particularly those where successive family generations have experienced the ebbs and flows 
in Singapore social and education policy. This was important in providing temporally deep 
understandings of state-citizen relations in Singapore, the Singapore context and dominant 
structures of inequality therein.36  
 Furthermore, all Secondary Four participants had to be attending mainstream 
government schools, which the majority of Singaporean students attend. As described earlier, I 
interviewed across the three major academic streams present in most Singaporean mainstream 
schools: Express, Normal-Academic, Normal-Technical. I selected the Secondary Four level 
(typically 16-17-year-old students), because in the Singapore education system, this is a crucial 
decision-making stage where students actively decide which post-Secondary institutions they 
 
35 In a Singapore Children’s Society study (Tai, 2019), a ‘low-income’ household in Singapore is defined as one 
earning SGD$1000/month/capita or less.  
36 Notably, one focus group interview question asked parent(s) and child how ‘education in Singapore’ had 
changed over time, to understand families’ constructions of the shifts and continuities in Singapore’s education 
system. See Appendix E.3 for the focus group interview schedule. 
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wish to apply for. This makes Secondary Four a juncture that richly illuminates structure-
agency tensions. Furthermore, at this level, young people are generally more articulate 
(compared to younger groups), particularly concerning future plans at the school-work 
transition stage – an important stage in understanding the reproduction of inequality. Families 
would also generally have had sustained engagement with the education system.  
Within each family, I interviewed the Secondary Four young person, and either one or 
both parents.37 Where possible, I interviewed both parents,38 but this was not always possible, 
due to linguistic barriers, divorce, time constraints (e.g. due to long irregular shift hours). Where 
interviewing both parents was not possible, I interviewed the parent who self-identified as the 
‘primary’ caregiver of the child (which I defined as the one who spent most time with the child), 
and occasionally, siblings, in the focus group interview. Finally, I also sought a gender balance 
amongst the Secondary Four young people, as this provides scope for exploring gender-related 
disadvantage more fully – although this was also not always possible.  
Details on the demographic background of the twelve families – including pseudonyms 
and how they match the criteria delineated here – is provided in Appendix C. In this thesis, 
when quoting interview excerpts, I give their role in the family (father, mother, etc.) and a 
reference code for each family (F1, F2, etc.) which corresponds to their reference in Appendix 
C, to help readers locate the family and their background information provided in Appendix C.  
 
3.3.3. Devising interview questions 
Kvale & Brinkmann (2015) warn that spontaneous interview studies tend to reproduce 
dominant opinions and stereotypes. As such, care was taken in devising interview questions 
that are open-ended and invite discussion on the participant’s terms.  
I began the process of devising interview questions through laying out my research 
questions. I then branched out from these research questions into more ‘everyday questions’ 
using ‘everyday language’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015:158). The formulation of research 
questions, and the movement across Table 3.2’s columns (from ‘research questions’, to devising 
‘key concepts’, and then actual ‘interview questions’) was based on my reading of wider 
academic, theoretical and policy literature, as well as my CPA methodological framework – 
which heightened sensitivity to issues such as the role of institutions in relations of power and 
 
37 The general term of ‘parent’ is used to represent ‘primary caregiver’ to maintain intellectual lineage with the 
sociology of parenting literature. The term ‘parent’ in this project, however, encompasses one grandparent (see 
F1 in Appendix C) who fulfils a ‘parental’ role in the eyes of both the grandparent and grandchild in question.  




inequality, and the importance of hearing marginalised perspectives. A full list of interview 
questions is provided in Appendix E. 
 
Table 3.2. Using Research Questions to Devise Interview Questions 
Research Question  Key Concepts Example of Interview 
Questions 
  
1. How do 
disadvantaged families 
conceptualise and 
attempt to enact a 
successful future for 
their children?  
 
  
Conceptualising a successful 
future 
-Aspirations and anxieties   
-Ambitions  
-What a ‘successful future’ 
looks like 
-The role of education in 
attaining success 




-How young people can 
succeed  
-How families help children 
succeed 
-What are their challenges in 
enacting approaches  
“What is your biggest wish for 
your child?” / “What is your 
biggest wish?” 
 
“What do you think is the 







“How do you/your family help 
your child to succeed in life?” 
 
“What are the main challenges 
you face, in helping your child to 
succeed in education and life?” 
  
2. How do families 
relate to the state, state 
policies and state 
institutions, as they 
navigate the wider 
context in which they 
are embedded? What 
accounts for these 
relations?  
 
Relations to state  
-Nature and value of relations 
-Channels through which 
families and state relate 
 
Relations to institutions of 
school and SHG 
-Nature and value of relations  
-Channels through which 
families and schools/SHGs 
relate 
-Perceptions of what happens 
within schools (assessment, 
teaching style, etc.) and their 
usefulness for future success 
 
“What do you like/dislike about 
education in Singapore?” 
 
“Who is most responsible for a 
child’s success – school 
teachers, or family, the child 
him/herself, or anyone else?”  
 
“How does SINDA/Mendaki 
help you/your family reach their 
fullest potential?” 
 
“Have you been to parent-
teacher meetings recently? Do 
you feel comfortable at these 
meetings?”   
 
 
I organised the key concepts into three rounds of interview, following Seidman’s (2006) set-of-
three interview design. I adapted Seidman’s (2006) original formulation (life-history interview, 
followed by two semi-structured interviews), to suit my intention of two individual and one 
focus group interview (all of which follow a semi-structured pattern), although the first 
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interview began with a ‘life-history’ question: “Tell me about the most important things that 
have happened in your life up till now”.   
Semi-structured interviews are useful in drawing out responses to my research questions, 
yet retaining open-endedness and flexibility. While an interview schedule was used, questions 
were not asked in a fixed order or in fixed phrasing, and follow-up questions were frequently 
asked depending on what participants said. This looser structure allowed for surprises to emerge.  
Focus group interviews, conducted at least one month after the Round Two interview,39 
provided opportunities to see relationships and interactions (agreement and disagreement) 
between different family members’ viewpoints, and reasons for any discrepancies (Silverman, 
2013). Focus group interviews also provided opportunities for family members to discuss new 
dimensions that emerged from the co-construction of perspectives. The structure and content 
of interviews is summarised in Table 3.3. Each interview typically lasted 60-90 minutes40. 
 













Life-history and broad 
views on education and 









Concrete details of views 
and experiences related to 
social and educational 
services and policy  
February-May 
2017 





parent(s), and any 
siblings willing to 
be interviewed  
In-depth reflections on 
major themes, revisiting 
key themes from earlier 
rounds, assessing 
stability and change of 




Furthermore, the content of interview questions was inspired by Spradley’s (1979) concept of 
ethnographic interviewing and Forsey’s (2010:558) concept of interviews “conducted with an 
ethnographic imaginary”. While this study is not a traditional ethnographic study (at least in the 
sense of including participant observation), the following principles of ethnographic 
interviewing informed my approach:  
1) Encourage participants to analyse their own lives, from their own “frame of reference” 
(Spradley, 1979:48), rather than imposing the researcher’s own agenda. This is at the 
 
39 Round Three interviews were conducted during school holidays, which provided an additional angle of 
understanding of their everyday lives. 
40 The shortest interview was 30 minutes, the longest was approximately 120 minutes.  
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heart of ethnographic interviews. I aimed to keep questions broad and open-ended, 
stayed away from leading questions and asked follow-up questions based on what 
participants raised.41  
2) Develop rapport. Through using ethnographic questions, “rapport will usually develop 
in a smooth way from apprehension through cooperation and even into the stage of 
participation”. At the desired ‘participation’ stage, the informant plays a more “assertive 
role” in ‘teaching’ the researcher (Spradley, 1979:48). Participants should be 
encouraged to talk more than the researcher does (ibid). I kept the interview tone 
conversational, to create rapport, mitigate feelings of artificiality, and reduce feelings 
of power distance (which is particularly crucial given the power-sensitive CPA 
framework).  
3) Make repeated explanations that they are the experts, that you are interested in how they 
think and represent their experiences.   
4) Restate what participants say, in their lingo. For instance, participants liked to use the 
word ‘ponteng’ (Malay for skipping school) or ‘kiasu’ (a Singaporean colloquialism 
that refers to an intense anxiety or fear over losing out in competition). I used these 
terms, too, where relevant, to encourage their use of their preferred terms.  
5) Practise “engaged listening” (Forsey, 2010:560): demonstrate that you will listen non-
judgmentally.   
6) Ask descriptive questions that encourage participants to represent an in-depth 
description of the cultural context of lived experience (Forsey, 2010; Spradley, 1979). 
Thus, I often asked participants to provide examples of statements they made. I also 
asked participants to describe what a ‘typical’ Secondary school classroom looked like, 
and at the end of Rounds One and Three, families were asked about “typical weekday 
and weekend in your life”. 
 
There were challenges in Round Two that were unique to the nature of my research questions 
– that is, how do you engage families’ opinions on education policy reforms, which often 
possess a specific terminology that might seem abstract and foreign to (disadvantaged) families’ 
everyday lives? I found this to be easier than expected, because families were familiar with 
notions used often in schools, such as ‘Learning Journeys’42. In retrospect, this is unsurprising, 
 
41 This was particularly important in Round One interviews – as I wanted to understand families’ rationalities on 
their own terms, before asking them more specific questions about the concrete details of their relations with 
state, state institutions and policy in Round Two.   
42 Field trips that Singaporean students make – such as to museums, Parliament or Chinatown. 
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given families’ deep interest in education in Singapore. Furthermore, to elicit their opinion on 
the major policy frameworks such as the ‘21st-Century Competencies’ framework, I printed a 
diagram from the MOE website (see Appendix F). I brought this to interviews, and explained 
this reform to participants in everyday language where needed. I felt this move to have two 
functions: first, it laid the foundation of common understanding on which I could ask deeper 
questions about how they felt about these reforms; second, this had an ethical function of 
deepening families’ knowledge and understanding of the system. 
 
3.3.4. Analytic memos  
During interviews, I made notes of anything I found particularly striking – including 
connections to academic literature, or to earlier statements participants made that I wanted to 
follow up on. For families that invited me into their homes, I took notes on the interior of the 
homes, paying particular attention to the presence of books and computers.  
Usually on the same day of interview, I typed up an ‘analytic memo’ for each interview, 
building on these quick notes and sketching my preliminary impressions of the interview, the 
participants and the phenomenon being studied. An analytic memo is “a brief or extended 
narrative that documents the researcher’s reflections and thinking processes about the data”; 
these are not just descriptive, but also cluster pieces of data together into emergent patterns, 
producing “higher level analytic meanings” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014:95) – serving 
as a basis for more expanded, final reports. These notes can be “personal, methodological, and 
substantive” (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014:96). Appendix G provides an example of an 
analytic memo, written up after an individual interview with one mother, Dania.  
 My analytic memos typically included:  
- Details of time, date, location of interview  
- Interview dynamics – the overall mood of the interview 
- Anything participants mentioned that I found striking or surprising  
- Emergent themes and patterns  
- Possible analytic and theoretical connections to literature, to earlier interviews  
- Reminders of questions I wanted elaboration on, during the next interview  
- How I felt I did as an interviewer, and what could be improved. 
These reflections were invaluable memory and analytic devices throughout the write-up process, 
transporting me back to the feelings and thoughts at the moment of interview, and revealing 




3.3.5. Procedure for conducting interviews 
After devising, piloting and refining the interview schedule, I began conducting interviews. 
Administrators at SINDA and Mendaki searched their databases for families that matched my 
participant criteria and called families to describe the research project. Upon securing families’ 
consent to be contacted by me, the administrators forwarded to me participants’ contact 
information. I then contacted families by phone, explained my project again and the 
involvement required – as well as key ethical principles such as confidentiality and permission 
to withdraw, at any moment. If families were still willing to participate, we mutually set a time, 
day and place for the first interview. I aimed to give participants maximum flexibility in 
selecting these.  
 During my first phone call with parents, I would suggest a range of locations: a nearby 
café, or their homes, whichever was most convenient. 10 out of 12 families opted to have 
interviews conducted in their homes.43 Two families that chose alternative locations: one chose 
a nearby McDonald’s and Resident’s Corner (an indoors common room for people living in 
public housing to socialise and engage in community activities); the other family chose an open-
air sheltered sitting area within the compound of the public housing flat they lived in – popularly 
called ‘void decks’44 in Singapore.    
Home-based interviews tended to generate the richest interactions with participants, 
because while rapport was generally not difficult to establish across all interviews, families 
tended to be most comfortable at home. Home-based interviews were also useful because 
parents could show me newsletters from school, or their children’s worksheets to illustrate 
statements. Most families were extremely hospitable; many offered sweet carbonated drinks, 
sweetened tea or small gifts during or the final interview. Some insisted that I eat dinner or 
lunch with them afterwards, which I generally accepted. Other times, such as at interviews at 
McDonald’s and the Resident’s Corner, I bought lunch for participants. Over time, these 
practices built friendship, familiarity and rapport.   
 At times, where scheduling multiple visits was logistically difficult, Rounds One and 
Two were conducted on the same day, with five-minute breaks in-between. All interviews were 
conducted and audio-recorded with families’ permission, then transcribed and analysed. Round 
 
43 My mentors and I discussed the pros and cons of conducting interviews in (at least up until the time of 
interview) a ‘stranger’s’ house. I was aware of potential risks; however, I also knew that the SHGs had full 
information (address, contact details) of each participant and I was aware that Singapore’s crime rate is low. I 
was advised by my mentors to bring a safety alarm with me to interviews as a precautionary measure, though I 
never had to use it. 
44 ‘Void decks’ are a Singaporean term, referring to the open-air, sheltered space on the ground floor of HDB 
flats. These are used as a residents’ socialising space, for children to play, as well as where socially important 
events, including weddings, birthday parties and funerals, might be held. They might also house an early years’ 
education centre, a convenience shop and eateries (National Heritage Board, 2013). 
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One interviews typically began with me introducing myself and my project, explaining the 
consent form, and asking them if they had questions before they signed the forms (the consent 
form is provided in Appendix D). I also went through key research ethics principles with them 
before each interview, ensuring they were comfortable to continue participating in this project 
(see Section 3.5.1 for further detail). Before each interview, I would also remind them they 
were the ‘expert’, which often made them laugh (sometimes self-disparagingly, but it often 
‘broke the ice’, so to speak). I encouraged them to ask if they didn’t understand any question, 
and to be unafraid to ask for time to think, or to not answer any question they did not feel 
comfortable answering. For the purpose of accuracy, I also conducted a short debrief session at 
the end of interviews, to ask if they wanted to change anything; and in later rounds, I revisited 
themes and ideas I wasn’t confident I understood. Most families had done the interview without 
knowledge that they would receive any remuneration. However, after the final interview, as a 
token of appreciation for their time, I gave each family an SGD$30 voucher.45  
 
3.4. Analysing Data 
3.4.1. Data analysis approach  
Thematic analysis – a “method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within 
data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006:79) – was selected as the broad data analysis strategy. While 
qualitative data analysis processes tend to be recursive rather than linear, I broadly followed the 
steps in thematic analysis: familiarisation, generating and refining codes and (more overarching) 
themes, and producing the writeup.   
 The first step involved familiarisation. I had several transcribers who transcribed 
approximately three-quarters of the voluminous interview data (the rest I transcribed myself). 
Guidelines I sent to transcribers, and the confidentiality agreement, is included in Appendix H. 
When transcriptions were sent back to me, I listened to audio-recordings to check transcriptions, 
which deepened my familiarity with the transcripts.  
 Following this, I read each transcript in greater detail (my first detailed reading of 
transcripts), and initial codes were generated flexibly and freely. This was done through 
studying both the ‘case’ of each family, and through a constant comparative approach, 
comparing ideas both within the ‘case’ of each family and the ‘case’ of other families (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014). Codes – repeated patterns across the data-set – were combined 
and refined. I arranged the codes in an emerging coding framework. This framework was 
refined through close reading of transcripts, until a point of theoretical saturation was reached, 
 
45Although for those who asked at the outset, I told them they would receive this voucher. 
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where additional interview data did not add much to the overall coding framework. These codes 
were categorised into themes (‘Context’, ‘Approaches/Practices’, ‘Conceptualisations/Beliefs’, 
‘Challenges’, ‘Desires’), which I identified as key elements of families’ pedagogic work. The 
final coding framework is provided in Appendix I. 
 In building this coding framework, I remained sensitive to both semantic/explicit and 
latent/interpretative meanings (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Semantic meanings refer to the 
surface-meanings, while the latent meanings refer to the “underlying ideas, assumptions and 
conceptualizations [sic]…that are…shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006:85). The CPA framework draws attention to deeper meanings and 
influences on meaning-making processes, and the power relations that underpin these. To draw 
out latent meanings, my coding attempted to grasp why families responded the way they did – 
giving rise to codes such as ‘Competence of State’. Families’ views on the government were 
generally not explicitly solicited in most interviews, but often emerged in explanations of why 
they held particular views concerning schools or the education system.   
 I read each transcript in detail a second time (my second detailed reading), this time 
applying the coding framework to the transcript. This time, I collated these quotes into one 
Microsoft Word document for each family. Each document began with: families’ demographic 
information, information on the child’s academic particulars, general notes on anything striking 
(see Figure 3.1) – followed by a ‘coding matrix’ that collated illustrative quotes for each code 
(see Figure 3.2). The coding matrix included a ‘Researcher’s Notes’ column to record 

















Figure 3.1. Families’ Background Information and Academic Particulars 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Coding Matrix46 
 
 
As these steps were carried out, I was simultaneously conducting my analytic review of 
secondary academic literature to build understanding of the historical context. From my 
historical analysis of secondary literature and from coding interviews, I derived two higher-
geared meta-themes: dependency and responsibility. Meta-themes refer to the key principles of 
a phenomenon, usually emerging from the seeing interrelationships or unifying concepts 
 
46 This screenshot only shows the first 15 codes.   
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between themes (Tesch, 1987). Meta-themes are more abstract, less substantive and situational 
than themes are (ibid). In this thesis, I identified dependency and responsibility as meta-themes; 
I inferred that they were key principles animating not only political rationalities and political 
technologies, but also families’ approaches, conceptualisations, desires and their perceptions of 
challenges. These meta-themes were crucial in structuring my analysis in Part II. 
 The analysis process is best represented as a creative, flexible ‘to-and-fro’ dialogue 
between interview data, historical and policy context, theoretical understandings of 
governmentality and power, and the researcher’s judgment. Brannen (2012:10) argues that the 
meshing of ‘context’ to ‘individual lives’ draws together different perspectives that 
“corroborate, complement and conflict” with each other, thus often raising new questions and 
perspectives in analysis.  
 
3.4.2 Enhancing trustworthiness  
According to my epistemological and ontological perspective, social reality exists, independent 
of our representations, but is not fully knowable to human researchers. This does not render 
concepts of rigour meaningless, as would a radically post-modern perspective (Schwandt, 
2000),47 but it does call for a re-consideration of what ‘rigour’ means, especially in qualitative 
research where canons for rigour are more variously defined (Lincoln & Guba, 1984). 
I understand qualitative inquiry as acquiring rigour, through maintaining consistency 
between evidence and account – what Lincoln and Guba (1985) call ‘trustworthiness’ – unlike 
quantitative research that does so mainly through establishing cause-effect relations (Thomas 
& James, 2006). Lincoln & Guba (1984) outline four criterion of rigour in qualitative research: 
credibility (the plausibility of findings), transferability (while it is the job of other researchers 
to examine possibilities for transfer of findings to different contexts, the onus is on the 
researcher to provide thorough explanation of context to enable this), dependability 
(transparency of method to enable repeatability, if desired) and confirmability (demonstrating 
that analysis doesn’t arise entirely from my own preconceptions and presuppositions, although 
it is cognitively impossible to escape this entirely). The strategies taken to reinforce this study’s 




47 Here, Schwandt (2000:201) argues that in radically post-modern perspectives, the “interpretation never goes 
beyond itself”; there is no universal fixed criteria, and thus no questioning of “what does it mean to make a 
reasonable choice from among alternative interpretations?” While such views help us to acknowledge multiple 
constructions of social reality and deconstruct the very idea of a universal rationality, it can hinder and 
interrogation or critique of social reality, a key feature of the CPA approach. 
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Table 3.4. Strategies to Strengthen Trustworthiness 
Criterion Strategies 
Credibility Member-checking during interviews: I constantly clarified with 
participants if this was what they meant, including in post-interview 
debrief sessions. I followed up on participants’ responses I was unsure 
about, in later interview rounds. I also discussed my emerging analysis 
with my fieldwork mentors, explaining and discussing cases I found 
surprising. 
 
Multiple forms of triangulation: between rounds of interview and over 
time, between family members, between families, and between theory-
context-data.  
 
Codes and analyses were checked against the data-set to the point of 
‘theoretical saturation’. 
Transferability In-depth, rich descriptions of wider socio-political context were laid out 
to discourage careless generalising of results. 
Dependability Transparent recording of methods and keeping ‘audit trails’ – representing 
the methods process as clearly as possible. 
Confirmability External audit: Presenting my work at academic events is a way of gaining 
external checks on my analysis.48 
 
Weighing the evidence: negative case analysis (deliberately searching for 
alternative explanations), following up on surprises, analysing the 
meaning of outliers. 
 
Adopting a reflexive, humble, generous approach. 
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2003), Pillow (2003), Miles, Huberman & Saldana 
(2014) 
 
3.5. Ethics and Researcher Positionality   
3.5.1. Research ethics: Principles and practices  
Epistemologies have ethical implications (Schwandt, 2000). The interpretivist epistemology 
(and the CPA tradition, more broadly) deeply values human agency and perspective. A 
corresponding ethical approach should then exceed rational calculations and procedures, 
drawing instead on an overall disposition of care and respect for the participant-other, a 
willingness to be moved by the plight of others (ibid). Such an ethical approach entails a 
necessary reflexivity – a turning back in on oneself, to assess and make transparent the nature 
and limits of knowing and knowledge.  
 




In this study, I followed guidelines from the British Educational Research Association 
(2011) and the Singapore Statement on Research Integrity (2010). These are limited, but helpful 
in setting the baseline for ethical principles and practice. I discuss key ethical principles and 
practices adhered to, below.  
 
Voluntary informed consent 
Participant consent was acquired at multiple stages: by SHG administrators when they first 
contacted families; when I called families on the phone to introduce myself to the families; 
when I sought verbal and written consent (via consent forms) at the start of the first interview; 
and verbally, at the start of every interview 49  with each participant. Each participant was 
required to sign a consent form (see Appendix D), given to the participant and, in the case of 
young people, parents as well (BERA, 2011). Consent forms were in English, as most in 
Singapore can speak at least conversational English. The form described who I (the researcher) 
was, the purpose of the study and the likely audience, the likely impact on their lives (e.g. the 
time required), and that interviews would be audio-recorded (Creswell, 2003). The form also 
detailed their rights to privacy, anonymity, and to withdraw from the project at any time. 
Signatures from both participants and researcher, agreeing to the above, were required 
(Creswell, 2003). To ensure participants understood the research process, I discussed the 
consent form line-by-line, and asked them if they had questions or concerns before beginning 
the interview.  
 
Privacy and anonymity 
Participants were given the option to remain anonymous, or to be identified in the research (as 
some may wish to be) – out of recognition of literature that suggests anonymity can strip 
participants of ownership (Guenther, 2009). This seemed incongruent with my purpose of 
working to foreground marginalised families’ perspectives. However, as nearly all participants 
preferred not to be named, and the rest expressed ambivalence, not minding either way, I 
decided to provide pseudonyms for all participants, entirely anonymising participation in this 
study. This was partly because I felt that the ramifications of this study – how this study’s 
findings might be interpreted and used – are, at least to some extent, unpredictable and 
unknowable, both to myself and to participants (Moore, 2012). Furthermore, while criticism of 
the government is not officially banned, it can be frowned upon and even penalised in the 
Singapore context, so it seemed right to err on the side of caution. I password-protected any 
 
49 Except when two rounds of interview were conducted back-to-back on the same day. 
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data with participants’ personal information in it. My spreadsheet with participants’ personal 
information on it will be permanently destroyed within three months of the final submission of 
this thesis. Transcribers were also required to sign a confidentiality agreement (see Appendix 
H).  
 
Burden on participants  
I aimed to minimise disruption to participants’ everyday lives by asking participants to select 
times and places for interview that were most convenient for them. The months which I chose 
to interview participants (January to July) were also purposely selected to avoid the latter half 
of the year, when GCE N-level examinations are held.  
 
Working with vulnerable populations 
As my study involves interviewing children of 16-17 years of age who are socio-economically 
disadvantaged and their families, this meant I was working with vulnerable populations 
(Creswell, 2003). Thus, I worked closely with young people, parents and gatekeepers (in this 
case: representatives from SINDA and Mendaki), ensuring that I had their permission in 
conducting the research. Across the research process, I had two concerns related to working 
with vulnerable groups: firstly, representation of participants’ perspectives, and secondly, the 
insider-outsider issue.50  
The first concern relates to the representation of participants’ perspective. This concern 
encompasses questions, such as: how will I conduct my research and provide representations 
in ways that respect the agency of participants? How will my representations be read? Will it 
perpetuate negative stereotypes? Who is rendered responsible or exposed in and through this 
analysis? Ultimately, it is important to recognise that, partly because ethics is not a matter of 
rational procedure-following but draws on higher ideals of respect and care, researchers’ actions 
are “endemically ambivalent, forever threading precariously the thin lines dividing care from 
domination and tolerance from indifference” (Schwandt, 2000:191). The overall ethic of care 
and reflexivity is crucial to counterbalance (not perfectly, but to mitigate) the precarious nature 
of researching disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, while there is perpetual potential for 
injustice in how our representations are produced and interpreted, it can constitute an even 
larger injustice to entirely not represent their perspectives – if the alternative is a careful co-
construction of perspectives between researcher and participant.  
 
50 Both, in keeping with the concerns of many critical policy analysts, centre on power. Here, the concern was 
not with the substantive analysis of power, but the conduct of the researcher in navigating power differentials 
between the researcher and the researched. 
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Further useful principles regarding researching disadvantage include resisting the 
temptation to ask interview questions or write analyses that emphasise the violent and exotic, 
instead remaining attentive to the mundane, which constitutes much of people’s lives in poverty 
(Fine, Weis, Weseen, & Wong, 2000). Analyses should be linked back to an understanding of 
historic, structural relations in which individuals’ ‘stories’ and ‘voices’ are embedded – because 
‘context’ is rarely narrated by participants (ibid). As emphasised throughout this chapter, and 
in line with critical policy analysts (e.g. Taylor, 1997), Fine et al. (2000:126) call for the 
“[excavations of] relations, excavating how qualitative narratives…are nested within a system 
of historic and material conditions.” These excavations of relations thus have both analytical 
and ethical value.  
In applying this practically, this begs the question of whose epistemological standpoint 
should take precedence – the analyst, who connects context, theory and data, or the participant’s 
perspective? A better approach might lie in making explicit the “situated, contingent and 
relational dynamics of ‘knowing’ itself” (Sriprakash & Mukhopadhyay, 2015:231). I do this 
partly through acknowledging that all my analysis constitutes ‘messy texts’, which are “always 
open ended, and resistant to theoretical holism, but always committed to…criticism” of 
dominant norms (Rubinstein-Ávila, 2012:392). This critical reflexivity over dominant norms is 
in line with a Foucauldian-inspired research ethic.51 As such, constant checks-and-balances 
between different sources of social scientific knowledge (participant, researcher judgment, 
theory, context, other secondary literature) can facilitate the development of complexity and 
‘messiness’.52 In line with CPA concerns, the drawing of claims should draw on theories of 
power (see Chapter Two) and an understanding of historical structural inequalities (see Chapter 
Four). Overall, CPA is valuable as it is extremely self-conscious about not pretending to 
produce totalising theories of reality, recognising that human constructions are fallible.  
Additionally, being transparent and held accountable in research procedures to my 
Cambridge-based supervisor, my two Singapore-based fieldwork mentors, helped provide a 
broad range of sources of ethics guidance. Furthermore, I employed strategies to develop 
‘trustworthiness’ (see Table 3.4) to provide a complex rather than essentialising picture. The 
post-interview debrief sessions were also valuable in addressing changes or elaborations 
participants wanted to make to their answers.  
 
51 Hammersley & Traianou (2014:235) claim that: “the most obvious injunction that follows from [Foucault’s] 
views requires that prevailing moral codes and ethical intuitions must be subjected to reflexive assessment.” 
52 See, for the clearest example of this, the ‘Closing Reflections’ of Chapter Seven, which discusses participants’ 
optimism and positivity towards the state and state institutions – juxtaposed against large-scale quantitative data 
and other analyses that emphasise growing inequalities in Singapore.  
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The second major concern I had with working with disadvantaged groups, is that of the 
insider-outsider issue. Being Chinese, non-Singaporean and university-educated rendered me 
in some ways an ‘outsider’ to Malay and Indian disadvantaged families. Thus, rapport was 
crucial in building conditions for meaningful exchange. Rapport-building was one reason why 
I conducted three interviews over time, rather than one. As Pillow (2003) argues, researchers 
should retain a spirit of caution, humility and generosity – regardless of whether one is an 
‘insider’ or ‘outsider’. However, the insider-outsider categories provide dichotomies that are 
not necessarily useful. Sharing the same racial, educational or economic background as 
participants does not necessarily guarantee more ethical representations of experience (Burgess, 
1984). Coming from a similar background, for example, can reduce sensitivity to patterned 
regularities (ibid). Cognisance of pitfalls, and sensitivity in conducting research is more 
valuable. Instead, my own positionality offers a lens through which I conduct this inquiry, as 
the next section discusses. 
 
3.5.2. Researcher positionality: Locating the ‘I’  
Making explicit one’s position is important because “[n]o one is ‘outside society’; the question 
is where each stands within it” (Mills, 1959:184). Generally, I have tried to reduce the explicit 
presence of the ‘I’ in my analysis chapters in Part II, preferring to foreground families’ 
perspectives. However, I inevitably bring my own biases, experiences and interests to this study, 
and these are worth discussing at greater length.  
 In some ways, my decision to research the Singapore context is surprising, as I am 
neither Singaporean, nor have I lived in Singapore before conducting fieldwork for this study. 
I grew up in Brunei Darussalam, a small, Malay-Muslim majority state in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore is a Chinese-majority state, surrounded by Malay-Muslim neighbours (Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Brunei). Yet, the differences extend beyond demography: Singapore has 
followed a vastly different development trajectory, undergoing fast-paced industrialisation and 
developing a highly cosmopolitan culture. Over many visits to Singapore as a young child to 
visit relatives, I found myself amidst brightly-lit shopping malls, pristine boulevards and 
skylines that “inscribe a calligraphy of global significance” (Ong, 2007:83), unlike the 
relatively slower pace of life in Brunei. Friends and relatives sometimes talked about 
Singapore’s ‘success’ – its cleanliness, its education system, its effective governance – often in 
tones of awe and praise.  
Yet, my memories of visiting Singapore as a child are coloured by feelings of 
dislocation and uncertainty – perhaps due to the stark differences in the ways of life in Brunei 
and Singapore. While Singapore was widely praised by many, I also heard and observed other 
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stories about Singapore – stories of excessive tuition, academic pressure and even of stress-
related suicide. As an undergraduate, I first began understanding Singaporean education from 
an academic perspective, through a project on elite Singaporean schools. Through this process, 
I learned that, contrary to popular perception, poverty existed in Singapore, yet was largely 
invisible, hidden from the public eye. I wanted to understand this ‘invisible’ poverty more, also 
driven by my own grandparents’ and parents’ experiences of poverty in their earlier days. They 
had emerged from poverty, with the help of others and hard work, but not everyone is given the 
same opportunities and platforms to fight the oppressiveness and hardships of poverty.  
Based on the biographical and intellectual origins of my research interest, I found it 
necessary throughout this research process to retain as far as possible a humble openness to 
viewpoints that may differ from expectations. It is furthermore crucial to remain sensitive to 
nuance. As a system that is fetishised (both positively and negatively) by the media, care should 
be taken to not excessively criticise or glorify Singapore’s education system, and to avoid clean-
cut theoretical conclusions.  
Finally, I am aware that I come from a position of socio-economic and educational 
privilege, and the blind-spots that come with this. This heightens the importance of the 
aforementioned humble openness in understanding and re-presenting the struggles I have not 
had to inhabit myself. At the same time, there are also benefits afforded to me through my 
formal education – such as, through my social science training, an understanding and sensitivity 
concerning the influence of wider structure on personal lives (Mills, 1959), and the injuries of 
social class and race that are often ‘hidden’ particularly in strong, meritocratic regimes (Sennett 
& Cobb, 1972). 
 
3.6. Methodological Limitations 
In this section, I discuss three limitations of this study, and how I sought to mitigate these. 
  
3.6.1. Locating the ‘socio-economically disadvantaged family’  
While I had criteria for the demographic group I hoped to interview, the practical 
implementation of this criteria was complicated by each family’s specific circumstances; some 
families met some of my indicators of disadvantage, yet did not meet others. Take, for instance, 




In these cases, how does one weigh up the different indicators of disadvantage to decide who 
qualifies as a ‘disadvantaged’ family? Ultimately, instead of becoming trapped by my inability 
(and the impossibility) in finding a bona fide ‘textbook’ case of ‘disadvantage’, I firstly resolved 
to apply the participant criteria flexibly – as useful but imperfect indicators of socio-economic 
disadvantage. Secondly, I used the peculiarities of real-life contexts to raise sociologically 
significant questions – such as, with the first case: How do parents with different educational 
and occupational backgrounds manage and divide the labour of child-rearing?53 And in the 
second case: How do issues such as migration influence educational worldviews and family 
lives?54 This felt like a more fruitful way forward.  
 
3.6.2. Self-selection biases  
Common to many studies on disadvantage is the difficulty of reaching the most disadvantaged 
participants. Selecting families via SHGs created an inevitable self-selecting bias, such that the 
families interviewed were not only ‘bottom 20% earners’, but bottom 20% earners who had 
actively sought help from SHGs, implying these families were, to an extent, invested in 
education and what it can achieve – although some might suggest that this is true for most 
Singaporeans, and education constitutes a national interest in Singapore (Deng et al., 2013b). 
While SHGs have an extensive reach and aim to fill gaps in MOE provision, as one SHG leader 
told me, there are inevitably families that are so marginalised that they fall through the safety-
net of SHG provision, although this constitutes a small minority.55 
 
53 This analysis is presented in Chapter Five, in Section 5.6.1, in discussing how Omar and Nasifah (F6) divided 
the labour of child-rearing.  
54 This analysis is presented in Chapter Six, in Section 6.3.1, in discussing how family members’ experiences of 
migration from neighbouring countries coloured their perceptions of Singapore’s education system.  
55 This SHG leader could not identify the proportion of people who needed SHG help, yet fell through the 
cracks. Interviewing the most disadvantaged families in Singapore would build a deeper understanding of the 
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Nevertheless, in order to take advantage of SHG benefits, families often had to fill forms 
(for example, to apply for bursaries); this requires literateness. Furthermore, families who were 
interviewed also had to be stable enough to make time for interviews. They also had to be able 
to converse in English.56 These are all indicators of advantage; in the absence of these markers, 
it would have been near-impossible for me to interview them. While I have expressed that my 
interest is not to find the ‘bona fide’ family, these sampling biases call for tentativeness in 
describing the position of these families in Singapore society. The families interviewed in this 
study are disadvantaged in significant ways, but likely do not form the most disadvantaged 
group in Singapore.  
A second self-selecting bias can be identified at the race-gender intersection. Upon 
reviewing the list of interviewees mid-way through fieldwork, I realised there was a near-
perfect inverse-mirroring of the gender of parents interviewed, between the two ethnic groups. 
For the Malay families that agreed to be interviewed, it was typically the mother who put herself 
forward for the interview (or was asked by the father to interview, if the father was the first 
point of contact provided by Mendaki). This practice may be rooted in Malay cultural norms; 
Malay culture is in some ways maternal – when a couple marries, the husband marries into the 
wife’s family, for instance. For Indian families that agreed to be interviewed, it was typically 
the father who put himself forward for interview. When I asked if I could interview the mother, 
they sometimes told me their wives were not articulate, they were not good at English, they 
were shy, and so on. This arrangement might be influenced by Hindu cultural norms (Derné, 
1994) where husbands are viewed as breadwinners and head of the family. Thus, while I 
expressed my desire for both parents to be interviewed, this was at times constrained by families’ 
preferences. 
 
3.6.3. Linguistic considerations 
For some families, English is not their first language. At the same time, I cannot speak Tamil 
(typically the language Indian families spoke at home, alongside or in place of English), and 
while I can understand basic Malay, I cannot speak it proficiently. Consequently, there were 
moments in interviews where I wasn’t sure if the interviewee had grasped the question as I had 
intended, or if I had understood them as they had intended. In such circumstances, I generally 
attempted to return to the relevant questions or topics, either later in the interview, or in future 
 
experience of disadvantage in Singapore. I elaborate on this as a recommendation for further research, in Chapter 
8, Section 8.4.  
56 Several Malay-speaking families suggested by SHG administrators, for instance, declined to be interviewed 
because I could not conduct an interview in Malay. 
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interviews, to seek clarity. This was a relatively minor issue, given most families in Singapore 
can speak English at least conversationally, especially the colloquial variant of English spoken 
widely in Singapore, ‘Singlish’ (Goh, 2016). Furthermore, interviews with families who 
struggled more with English proficiency provided insight into the lives of families who were 
not familiar with the dominant linguistic code for business, education and politics in Singapore.  
 Families varied in their inclinations towards Singlish or Standard English. Generally, 
Singlish is viewed as “lingua franca in settings with a wide mix of ethnic and socioeconomic 
participants…a cultural marker of Singaporean identity” (Goh, 2016:749); even amongst well-
educated groups, “a certain familiarity with (and even fondness for) Singlish has been 
maintained” (ibid).57 In this study, most interviews were transcribed and quoted verbatim; I 
only lightly edited quotes for readability for readers unfamiliar with Singlish. While there are 
varying views on how much researchers should edit slang out of respect for participants – this 
seemed less necessary given the cultural status of Singlish in Singapore. Moreover, I felt that 
to edit quotes more heavy-handedly might be patronising – or dilute a sense of participants’ 
personality and speaking style, thus reducing the impact of their perspectives (Corden & 
Sainsbury, 2006).  
 
3.7. Conclusion   
In this chapter, I have outlined key methodological principles and practices that have influenced 
how I designed and conducted this study. I have sought to demonstrate congruence between: 
my overall CPA approach, my underlying philosophical understanding of reality, my approach 
to ethics, the use of the interview method and my data analysis approach. I demonstrate how, 
collectively, these theorisations and tools might facilitate an understanding of disadvantaged 
families’ pedagogic work. Through engaging the views of socio-economically disadvantaged 
groups in Singapore, and situating their views in relation to ‘context’ and ‘theory’, I argue that 
it is possible to explore state-family relations in rich, ethical, rigorous ways.  
Chapters Two and Three have laid the theoretical and methodological foundations for 
understanding the ‘family’ as a site of governance, a site for the normalisation and contestation 
of particular subjectivities. Thus, foundations have been laid for the historical and empirical 





57 However, linguistic, educational and political elites tend not to use Singlish (or at least, codeswitch between 
Standard English and Singlish depending on context). Politicians even discourage use of Singlish, as Standard 
English tends to be (from an instrumental perspective) the more remunerative language, the language of higher 















































































































CHAPTER 4. State-Family Relations in Historical Perspective 
 
 “[A historical investigation] would seek to document the categories and explanatory schemes 
according to which we think ourselves, the criteria and norms we use to judge ourselves, the 
practices through which we act upon ourselves and one another…to make us particular kinds 
of beings. We would, that is to say, endeavour to describe the historical a priori of our 





If governing takes place in a “historically constituted matrix” (Rose & Miller, 2010:273), then 
it is apt to begin an analysis of families’ pedagogic work with a historical perspective. This 
chapter details a historical investigation into how we become “particular kinds of beings” (Rose, 
1992:22), providing a basis for what Rose, drawing on Foucault, calls a “critical ontology of 
ourselves” (ibid). As described in the previous chapter, I conducted an analytical re-reading of 
existing secondary literature to understand two matters: firstly, the nature of state-citizen and 
especially state-family relations in Singapore, and secondly, how these relations have been 
constructed and normalised over time.  
The nature of state-family relations and what kinds of familial and individual 
subjectivities are desired by the state, is absent from most accounts of Singapore’s political and 
development history. The “singular meta-narrative of state-building” – the ‘Singapore Story’ 
often taught in Singaporean Social Studies classrooms that celebrates the nation-building 
successes of the PAP government – generally dominates, resulting in a “restrictive view of the 
national experience” (Gopinathan, 2012:13). This analytical re-reading is original not only in 
its explicit focus on the Singaporean state’s interest in cultivating particular subjectivities, but 
on how these subjectivities have been normalised and produced (that is, a focus on the 
techniques deployed in these processes).  
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive account of Singapore’s 
historical development. Apart from the widely-known ‘Singapore Story’, there are other, more 
detailed accounts of Singapore’s education system (e.g. Goh & Gopinathan, 2006) and even 
critique-oriented historical accounts of Singapore’s ‘development story’ (e.g. Tremewan, 1994). 
My goal in this chapter is different: to analyse how norms in Singaporean state-family relations 
have been built, suggesting that the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity is central to 
understanding this. Instead of a comprehensive account of Singaporean history, I highlight and 
reflect on four key strands (Sections 4.2-4.5) that are salient in understanding the seemingly 
paradoxical formation of the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. In line with my theoretical 
framework, this chapter foregrounds discussion of key political rationalities and political 
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technologies in Singapore 58  – how they influence the development of this subjectivity. 
Subsequently, I elucidate four governing techniques that underpin and normalise the dependent-
yet-responsible subjectivity – these are presented at the end of the chapter, in Table 4.1.  
Thus, this chapter maps how political rationalities and technologies have, over time, 
shaped the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. It explores the shifts, continuities and 
paradoxes in the development of the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity in Singapore, 
before subsequent chapters (Chapter Five and Six) unpack, through interview findings, how 
families negotiate their historically-constituted subject-positions.  
 
4.1. Making Dependent-yet-Responsible Subjects: The Historical Production of 
Normality  
History constitutes policies, and policies shape citizens’ behaviours and norms. This was a 
claim made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, at the 6th 
S. Rajaratnam Lecture 59  (MOF, 2013). For instance, free-market capitalism develops 
individualistic self-preservation, while the social-democratic model has “seen a steady erosion 
of the work ethic, increased dependence on state support” (ibid). Shanmugaratnam articulated 
the kind of behavioural norms Singapore required: a “compact between personal and collective 
responsibility, where each reinforces the other, rather than a zero sum game” (ibid).  
In other words, policies in Singapore should support the need for an “active” 
government that is “[doing] more to help the poor” – but this should be done “in a way that 
reinforces individual effort and responsibility for the family” (ibid). He argued: “This paradox 
of active government support for self-reliance has to run through all our social policies” (ibid). 
The very ‘paradox’ highlighted here is the one at the heart of the dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity. Furthermore, Shanmugaratnam’s broader claim, that history reveals how policies 
might influence norms and behaviours, forms a central premise of this chapter.  
The effect of policies on the production of subjects is likely particularly powerful in the 
‘strong’, soft authoritarian Singapore state (Tan, 2008). The term ‘subject’ is apt in the 
Singapore context – where the state is explicitly invested in creating subjectivities amenable to 
economic development (Koh, 2007), and possessing “favoured disciplinary modalities of rule” 
(Wee, 2001:987). The next four sections discuss, in turn, four key strands that are salient in 
 
58 I identify key political rationalities as developmentalism and neoliberalism, and the key political technology 
relevant for this study, as the meritocracy-education mechanism (see Table 2.1). 
59 The S. Rajaratnam Lectures are a lecture series organised by Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 




understanding the formation of particular state-family and state-citizen relations that influence 
families’ pedagogic work in contemporary Singapore. 
 
4.2. Legacies of Empire: Possible Origins of the Dependent-yet-Responsible Subject  
‘Singapore’ was founded by the British in 1819 as a commercial trading station – a free port 
that enabled British regional trade and exported rubber and tin. It only gained independence 
from the British in 1959 – and then, after an ensuing ‘merger’ period where it was ‘merged’ 
with Malaysia, became an independent city-state on August 9, 1965. The racial majority when 
the British first arrived in Singapore were Malays, but with the influx of Chinese traders from 
present-day Malaysia and China, the Chinese formed 75% of the population by 1914 – a 
proportion that has more or less held ever since (Tremewan, 1994).  
The Chinese traders worked closely with the British, benefitting economically from 
stable colonial rule (Tremewan, 1994). While there was no unified education system in place, 
as the British did not deem this useful to their own economic interests, there was a significant 
stratum of Chinese who received English language training to staff the civil service and trading 
firms. However, the Japanese Occupation of Singapore from 1942-45 – which led to widespread 
unemployment, starvation and the massacre of 25,000-50,000 Chinese60 across the Singaporean 
and Malayan regions – weakened the authority of British colonial rule in the eyes of locals, and 
unleashed strong nationalist movements across these regions. 1950s Singapore were marked by 
widespread strikes, in the struggle for an independent Malayan nation comprised of present-
day Singapore and Malaysia. The British initially responded by repressing resistance; however, 
as conflicts intensified, they eventually realised they had to concede power, and began 
searching for a political party that might be amenable to their economic interests, who were 
pro-British and non-communist (Tremewan, 1994). The People’s Action Party, led by a young 
lawyer, Lee Kuan Yew, appealed to the British colonial administration. At the time, the PAP 
was comprised of two factions: left-wing socialists, and British university-educated 
professionals such as Lee Kuan Yew himself, who had studied law at the University of 
Cambridge. In 1959, backed by the British, the PAP won elections and gained leadership over 
Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew, as head of PAP, became Chief Minister of Singapore in 1959.  
 One can delineate four legacies that were inherited partly from the British – yet have 
remained central (in evolved forms) to Singaporean politics over the years. I describe each here 
to provide an understanding of the historical constitution of dependency and responsibility 
 
60 There were casualties across all racial groups, but the Chinese were specifically targeted by the Japanese army 
to achieve “strictly ethnic and political “cleansing’ that meets broad definitions of genocide” (Gunn, 2007:273).  
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dynamics. Firstly, the PAP’s active alliance with foreign capital (rather than depending on a 
local capitalist class) has remained important (Tremewan, 1994). Since its takeover in 1959, 
the PAP, recognising that Singapore was a state with few natural resources except for a port, 
quickly ensured the Singaporean economy was connected to the West. Today, Singapore’s 
reputation for being a competitive global economy, for acting as a hub for many transnational 
corporations due to its strong services sector (finance, banking, transport and communications) 
– continues to evidence the PAP’s approach to legitimising itself through maintaining robust 
links to regional and global economies. This economic openness, however, also renders 
Singapore particularly vulnerable to globalisation’s precarities. These dynamics have persisted 
and bolster dependence on the ‘strong’ state. Kenneth Tan (2017:16) argues that Singaporeans 
today are “increasingly affluent but still dependent on the paternalist state for…the continuance 
of their material well-being.”   
 Secondly, the PAP inherited a form of ideological anti-liberalism from their previous 
British colonial rulers. Salaff (1988:20) observes the vertical bureaucracy of both the PAP and 
the British colonial administration: “Paternalistic colonial rule by authoritarian decision makers 
bequeathed a legacy of non-competitive politics.” Legislation from colonial times, such as the 
Preservation of Public Security Ordinance and the Internal Security Act, were retained by the 
PAP to curtail trade union and political opposition. Forms of state violence such as detention 
without trial, hanging and flogging were part of the state’s apparatus in maintaining social 
control (Tremewan, 1994).  
One could point to various evidences of the PAP’s ideological anti-liberalism. Since 
1968, the parliament of Singapore was formed nearly entirely of PAP members (Salaff, 1988). 
In 1968, the industrial relations act limited trade union power to recruit, promote and retrench 
workers. The voices of university students were also curtailed; in mid-1974, university students 
seeking to raise consciousness over poverty and alternative development policies ended in the 
arrest and deportation of student leaders, and the reorganisation of university associations under 
state administration (Salaff, 1988). Of course, the British colonial influence was not 
determinative; the PAP’s anti-liberal approach was also informed by its social-democratic 
leanings. The PAP’s social-democratic leanings at least partly explains its disdain for excessive 
individualism – viewed as selfish, immoral and insensitive to the collective good (Chua, 2017). 
This anti-liberalism continues to be reflected through contemporary “climates of conservatism 
and censorship” within Singaporean ministries, and the use of Out-of-Bound markers – “a 
vague phrase frequently used by government ministers to identify taboo and sensitive topics” 
(Ho, 2010:237), including topics of race and class, in the interest of societal harmony. The 
PAP’s policing of these topics is described as overly vigilant and paranoid (Chua, 2017).     
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 The third and fourth legacies suggest ways in which the ‘fairness’ of particular subject-
positions have been legitimised first by the British colonial administration, and carried forward 
by the PAP. The third legacy relates to the observable lineage between the ways the colonial 
administration and the PAP managed racial diversity. Under British colonial rule, people were 
demarcated under stark categorisations of ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’, ‘Indian’ and so forth and were 
directed to live in different geographical quarters by the British. Race-based communities 
practised self-governance, with each community providing its own textbooks and teachers 
within vernacular schools. The most comprehensive of these was the Chinese education system, 
supported partly by the British colonial administration as the Chinese were deemed important 
local business partners. Moreover, these sharp demarcations gave rise to the ‘cultural deficit 
thesis’, whereby cultural stereotypes of “complacency, indolence, apathy, infused with a love 
of leisure, and an absence of motivation and discipline” were used to describe Malays by the 
British colonial administration – and carried forth particularly in early PAP political discourse 
(Rahim, 1998:49). Yet, it quickly became clear that the English language was the language of 
business, both under colonial and PAP rule.61 As such, English-language schools (rather than 
vernacular schools) led to the best jobs – resulting in a rapid rise in the enrolment of English-
language schools, although not all parents could afford this. The consequence was the 
“reproduction of a Chinese-, Malay-, and Tamil-speaking industrial working class and an 
English-speaking capitalist class” – and the English-speaking capitalist class was dominated by 
the Chinese (Tremewan, 1994:84). 
Yet, despite the historical fashioning of racial inequality, formal equality of (explicitly-
demarcated) ethno-racial groups before the law, and in education, remains an enduring principle 
within Singapore’s formal policy of ‘multiracialism’. After World War Two, the British began 
developing a unified education system due to the perceived twin threats of nationalism and 
communism (Chia, 2015). The All-Party Committee on Chinese Education, published in 1956, 
was the first major post-war educational report (Gopinathan, 2001). This called for formal 
equality of treatment between different races, and promoted bilingualism or trilingualism based 
on the four official languages: English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil. In contemporary Singapore, 
a unified education system that valorises the English language for pragmatic economic purposes 
over vernaculars has persisted. Furthermore, when the Malaysia-Singapore merger collapsed in 
August 1965, this was over differences between the Malaysian and (largely Chinese) 
Singaporean politicians’ views over affirmative action policies that favoured Malays 
(Gopinathan, 2012). PAP politicians in newly-independent Singapore quickly established that 
 
61As described earlier, the PAP aimed to secure political legitimacy through economically robust alliances with 
Western capital – thus, English proficiency was important.  
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“there can be no distinction between majority rights and minority rights” (Parliamentary 
Debates, cited in Tremewan, 1994). The dynamic of an explicit yet subordinated ethno-racial 
identity to the greater (economic, societal) good is an enduring strand in managing the identity 
politics of Singaporeans.62  
 Fourthly, Lee Kuan Yew and many PAP leaders were educated in Britain and were 
likely influenced by the elitist political and educational practices of Britain. They deployed 
similar terms to the British, such as ‘equal opportunity’ and ‘merit’ (Tremewan, 1994). In a 
system with ‘equal opportunity’, academic ‘merit’ was the key criterion for upward mobility, 
and for sifting the best and brightest for economic and political leadership. PAP politicians 
believed this would result in an efficient society governed by the putative best and brightest, 
where rewards are based on contribution rather than inherited wealth. Lee Kuan Yew explicated 
the links between merit, equal opportunity and elitism, in 1966 speech (cited in Tremewan, 
1994): 
Give equal opportunities to all regardless of rank, race, religion, sex in a given nation 
and you are likely to draw from each of your nationals, the best in him. Give him the 
best opportunity to educate himself in order to use his talents, and…the chances are you 
will have ever so much more talent that will emerge to the top. And in a society based 
on equal opportunity, if rewards are correlated to the effort and output of the man and 
not to his possession of wealth or status, then it is likely that you will give your people 
the incentive to strive for himself and for his community.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘deserving’ elite that emerges from this system should be helped further. Lee 
Kuan Yew argued that the elite formed no more than 5% of the population, and “[i]t is on this 
group that we must expend our limited and slender resources in order that they will 
provide…that catalyst in our society which alone will ensure that Singapore shall maintain its 
pre-eminent place in the societies that exist in South East Asia” (cited in Tremewan, 1994). A 
contradiction arises in how ‘equal opportunity’ rhetoric aligns with an exacting, stratifying 
meritocracy (Tremewan, 1994; Lim, 2013; Tan, 2017). Lee Kuan Yew’s likely answer would 
be that each reinforces the other: the social-democratic, widespread provision of education lays 
the basis for ‘equality of opportunity’, such that meritocratic logics operate smoothly to identify 
and reward the deserving elite to maximise their potential; the deserving elite then putatively 
governs in the interests of the people, for the collective good. The importance of ‘meritocracy’ 
has not changed significantly in political rhetoric since its conception, although there have been 
attempts to soften its harshness, as later sections suggest.   
 




 Overall, these four colonial legacies may be summarised as reinforcing a rhetoric of the 
valorisation of the collective good over individual interests, for the purpose of political stability, 
social cohesion and economic growth. This rhetoric of collective good over individual interest 
has often circulated around the politics of crisis and survival (Sim, 2008). When the PAP found 
itself solely in charge of Singapore in 1965, there was high unemployment, high population 
growth rate, and weak economic and educational infrastructure. Furthermore, the PAP formed 
an immigrant Chinese government in a largely Malay-Muslim region. This discourse of risk 
and vulnerability – ongoing rhetoric today – justified the need for prioritising collective over 
individual interests. As such, developing the responsible, disciplined subject who is loyal to the 
nation was of foremost importance (Wee, 2001). 
 The PAP’s nationalist rhetoric and appeals to the common good notwithstanding, 
however – how did the PAP foster cooperation and trust in conditions of high racial tensions 
(including racial riots in 1969), anti-liberal suppression of dissent, and an exacting, elitist 
meritocracy? Partly, the PAP did so through simultaneously developing dynamics of 
dependence and trust in itself, through its social-democratic policies that provide extensive 
services and infrastructure. Many saw the opportunities the PAP provided, and supported the 
PAP in 1959 and 1963 when it delivered on its promises for welfare (Tremewan, 1994) – 
forging the beginnings of the  ‘prosperity-loyalty compact’ (Gopinathan, 2007:66) between 
state and citizen, a relationship that endures into the present-day. The development of dynamics 
of dependence, amidst self-responsibilisation – particularly in Singaporeans’ educational lives 
– is explored further in the next sub-section. 
 
4.3. ‘Neoliberalism’ in the ‘Developmental’ State: Tracing Hybridity 
In their article: ‘Beyond Hybrid Regimes’, Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan (2007) argue 
that describing Asian states as ‘hybrid regimes’ can obscure political dynamics unique to these 
states. It is clear that terms devised in Anglo-American contexts can at once provide conceptual 
anchors, yet obscure as much as it reveals. Thus, while I retain the terms of ‘neoliberalism’ and 
‘developmental’ state, it is valuable to specify what these terms mean within a specific socio-
political context, and the constituent institutional practices within a so-called hybrid regime 
(Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007).  
This section explores how institutional specificities and practices are co-opted to 
produce dependency-responsibility relations in Singaporeans’ educational and family lives, 
within the simultaneously ‘neoliberal’ yet ‘developmental’ state. I start by discussing, briefly, 
dependency-responsibility dynamics in broader social policy – and then discuss (in greater 




4.3.1. Dependency-responsibility hybridity in social policies 
In broader social policy, the Singapore state simultaneously generates dependency and 
responsibility dynamics. On the one hand, it develops ‘dependency’ on itself as a 
‘developmental’ state. The term ‘developmental state’ was first used to describe a group of East 
Asian countries (notably, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan) that underwent rapid 
industrialisation in the post-World War Two period (Wade, 2018). They are characterised by 
four key features: 1) the state’s prioritisation of economic efficiency and growth, including 
through alliances with transnational capital (Pereira, 2008), 2) the state being a key co-ordinator 
of developmental processes; power is highly centralised, “concentrated at the top of ministries” 
(Wade, 2018:526), 3) the state leading a “national development project” that entails not only 
economic policies, but also “policies on health, education, training and transport, 
which…impacted directly on people’s lives across the whole society” (ibid, 529), 4) the state 
gains political legitimacy through economic growth, which provides resources for public 
services (ibid). Developmental state theory forms probably the best explanation for Singapore’s 
rapid economic transformation (Deng, Gopinathan, & Lee, 2013), where the state draws on a 
“combination of political power and economic expertise” (Pereira, 2008:1190) to achieve 
legitimacy and economic growth.63 
As a developmental state with social-democratic origins, the PAP’s social-democratic 
agenda (including the establishment of public infrastructure such as public housing and 
education) was quickly implemented upon winning the 1959 elections, to fulfil the PAP’s key 
priorities of expanding the economy and nation-building. Today, the PAP is either the exclusive 
or major provider of “infrastructure (utilities, communications, media, industrial estates, port 
and airport services) and of social services (housing, health and education)” (Chua, 2017:1). It 
is also Singapore’s largest employer, it controls all unions, and owns an apparatus of state 
coercion comprised of police, internal security organisations and a military force. The ‘strong’ 
state is most clearly-illustrated through state-capitalism and public housing – I discuss each in 
turn.64  
The PAP exercises state-capitalism, where free market economic policies are pursued, 
but headed by the state. The PAP has built various state enterprises that are bundled together 
 
63 Alexius Pereira (2008:1190) also argues that developmental states have tended to “ultimately lose power, and 
are expected to decline or devolve…In its place might emerge the ‘regulatory state’, which is less interventionist 
and more willing to let market forces run the economy”, particularly as local capitalist classes become 
economically stronger. However, he argues that unlike other East Asian developmental states, Singapore 
continues to evince ‘developmental’ state logics; the state remains a strong economic agent in society. 
64 Further details on the PAP’s approach to state-capitalism and public housing can be found in Beng Huat 
Chua’s (2017) book: ‘Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore’. 
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under large state-owned holding companies (Chua, 2017). After independence, the PAP devised 
an Export-Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) strategy: in the mid-60s, to create a low-wage, 
labour-intensive industrial sector to reduce unemployment, and by the close of the 70s, more 
knowledge-based industries. Subsequently, the PAP then focused on the services sector, 
expanding sectors such as finance, banking and communications. State-led capitalism was 
tremendously successful in attracting large amounts of foreign capital and modernising 
Singapore. High levels of real wage growth (across racial groups and genders) and growing 
employment levels were accompanied by moderate decreases in income inequality in 1970s, 
although the Gini coefficient began to rise again in the 1980s (Tremewan, 1994). The Singapore 
state is a key entrepreneur, investing widely in global and domestic corporations (Chua, 2017). 
The profits are then reinvested for governing purposes, typically to fund social redistribution. 
In particular, state-led economic growth provided resources for investment in education 
(Gopinathan, 2015). 
 The PAP also rapidly developed an extensive public housing scheme from the mid-
1960s. Traditional ‘kampung’ (a Malay term, meaning ‘village’) structures – which were 
spacious, typically built by its own occupants and accommodated extended families – were 
viewed as a waste of space (Salaff, 1988). The PAP dismantled ‘kampung’ structures, replacing 
them with multi-storey high-rise buildings built by the centralised Housing and Development 
Board (HDB) that could accommodate thousands of families in units of 1-5 rooms. In 1973-4, 
HDB flats accommodated 43% of Singapore’s population – by 1979-80, this proportion had 
risen to 67% (ibid). Today, the government owns 90% of the total land, and promises affordable 
house-ownership to up to 90% of the total population (Chua, 2017). Public housing constitutes 
“the most concrete social democratic ‘welfare’ program of the PAP government” – it is 
“fundamental to the PAP’s political legitimacy to govern” (ibid, 7).  
Moreover, the PAP is described as building a pastoral state-citizen relationship typically 
associated to an interventionist, ‘strong’ state (Lim, 2016b); this is evidenced in Lee Kuan 
Yew’s speech at the National Day Rally in 1986 (cited in Tremewan, 1994): 
I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yet, if I did not, had I 
not done that, we wouldn’t be here today. And I say without the slightest remorse, that 
we wouldn’t be here, we would not have made economic progress, if we had not 
intervened on very personal matters – who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise 
you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what is right. Never mind 
what the people think.  
 
While state-capitalism and public housing fosters, to an extent, dependence on the Singapore 
state, ‘responsibility’ dynamics are also pertinent, generated through ‘neoliberal’ orientations 
in Singaporean social policy (Teo, 2011; Liow, 2011). However, before proceeding further, it 
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is worth defining ‘neoliberalism’ and its applicability to the Singapore context. The term 
‘neoliberalism’ is, as a concept, over-stretched – it is “oft-invoked but ill-defined” (Mudge, 
2008:703). Thus, I explain here how I define the term ‘neoliberalism’. Following Flew (2014), 
I define it in terms of ideas, institutions and interests.  
At the ‘ideas’ level, ‘neoliberalism’ implies a socio-economic order constructed around 
an imaginary of the ‘market’ and the prioritisation of capital accumulation, skills and profits 
over ideals (Ball, 2013) and other social goals (Flew, 2014). In Foucauldian terms, the idea of 
‘neoliberalism’ centres around the emergence of “mercantile society” (Foucault, 1979:194) – 
where there is legitimisation of knowledges and practices based on efficiency. At the 
‘institutions’ level, there is a “generalization [sic] of the economic form of the 
market…throughout the social body” (Foucault, 2008:243), involving the application of market 
rationale to the education sector (Connell, 2013; Doherty, 2017) and the “economization [sic]” 
of education policy (Spring, 2015:32). At the ‘interests’ level, neoliberalism tends to be 
associated with the perpetuation of ruling-class interests – but Flew (2014) notes that ‘interests’ 
can vary across a wide range of socio-political institutional contexts and thus constitutes only 
a secondary defining characteristic of neoliberalism.65  
 In many ways, these defining characteristics of neoliberalism resonate in Singapore. 
Singapore’s economy described as one of the freest, most globalised in the world, opening up 
most Singaporeans to the precarities of globalisation and foreign competition (Wear, 
forthcoming). Furthermore, the PAP government has historically championed an ‘anti-welfarist’ 
ideology (Chua, 2017; Tan, 2017). Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, the then-Senior Minister of 
Singapore, stated, early in the PAP reign: “We want to teach people that the government is not 
a rich uncle…We are moving in the direction of making people pay for everything” (cited in 
Lim, 1989:177).  
The PAP generally discourages direct financial assistance, emphasising reliance on self 
and family. PAP politicians often justify this through fears that extensive welfare provision will 
breed complacency, laziness, cronyism and mediocrity – a disposition a small, vulnerable state 
like Singapore cannot afford. The PAP government has framed the family as “the basic unit of 
society”, as the first port-of-call for assistance, in its social welfare policies (Teo, 2011; Teo, 
2013; Chua, 2017). Chua (2017:84) notes: “The shift of responsibilities from the state to the 
family is framed within an ideology of filial piety which, although neo-Confucian in its 
inspiration, is applied to all Singaporeans.” Children are legally required to take care of elderly 
 
65 Flew (2014) notes that many political systems might deploy neoliberal institutional practices, while differing 
significantly at the ‘interests’ level (due to different political economies, histories and thus different motivations 
for deploying neoliberal practices).  
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parents, and married couples given “priority in the allocation of flats and additional cash grants” 
if they purchase flats near their parents (Chua, 2017:85). The nuclear family is valorised through 
political rhetoric and regulations (for instance, public housing regulations make it easier for 
married couples to purchase a public housing flat than a single person) (Chua, 2017). The PAP’s 
preferred approach to helping disadvantaged groups is through responsibilising a spectrum of 
actors and building partnerships between the state, community and families, as encouraged 
through the PAP government’s 1993 ‘Many Helping Hands’ policy (Kok & Liow, 1993; Tan, 
2017).  
How might we understand the hybridity of dependency-responsibility logics in social 
policy? In many East Asian states, a spirit of political experimentalism has resulted in the 
eclectic combination of different fragments of ideas and institutional practices (Ong, 2012). In 
Singapore, ‘neoliberal’ and ‘developmental’ state logics seem to co-exist. One way to 
understand this hybridity is through understanding the PAP government’s meta-ideology of 
‘pragmatism’ (Koh, 2007). While there are internal contradictions within and across the 
different political rationalities, these are stitched together via a pragmatic orientation; the 
Singapore state likely pragmatically selects different elements from different philosophical 
reservoirs (Chua, 2017) to create structural and discursive conditions for the sustainable, long-
term accumulation of capital. As such, ‘strong’ state provisions of public housing and education 
are not so much for the purpose of social redistribution, social welfare, or consumption, but as 
an investment to improve the productivity of the Singaporean workforce (Gopinathan, 2001; 
Lim, 1989). The logics work the opposite way round, too: neoliberal reason is used to ‘shore 
up’ authoritarian rule (Ong, 2012), by increasing capital accumulation, and thus proving the 
legitimacy of political rule and strengthening the ‘strong’ state. This is unlike European and 
Anglo-American contexts where neoliberal practices and ideas are often linked to a ‘weakening’ 
state (Gopinathan, 2007). Section 4.3.3 analyses this hybridity and its effects on families’ 
subjectivities in greater detail.   
 
4.3.2. Dependency-responsibility hybridity in education policies 
Contradictions between dependency and responsibility perhaps weigh most heavily on 
Singaporeans’ educational experiences, given that formal education is widely seen by 
Singaporeans as crucial to upward social mobility and future success (Deng & Gopinathan, 
2016). How dependency and responsibility for educational success are instilled, are discussed 
in turn.  
 
Dependency in Education 
96 
 
The political rationality of developmentalism is clear in Singapore’s education system 
(Gopinathan, 2007). Today, the PAP’s spending on education is second highest, after defense. 
Following independence in 1965, schools were rapidly co-opted by the PAP as crucial spaces 
for nation-building and human capital development to meet the needs of an industrial economy 
(Sim, 2008). After independence, the PAP effected rapid centralisation in highly racially and 
linguistically diverse Singapore, bringing different schools under the MOE. The PAP increased 
the number of schools, reduced tuition fees, improved school facilities, and provided more 
resources for teacher training. In 1960, the Primary School Leaving Examinations (still in effect 
today) was introduced, providing a single examination system and standard syllabus across all 
government schools. By 1970, universal free primary education was achieved (Deng & 
Gopinathan, 2016).  
Today, the Singapore education system remains highly centralised; the MOE closely 
oversees many aspects of formal education in Singapore, including the prescribing of curricula, 
textbook use, the administering of national examinations, teacher recruitment, professional 
development and training (all teachers are trained through one centralised institution, the 
National Institute of Education) (Sim, 2008). School personnel are expected to be implementers 
of MOE policy – characteristic of broader Singapore society and its relations with politicians 
and bureaucrats (Dimmock & Tan, 2015:16). As described in Chapter One, around 98% of 
Singaporean students currently attend MOE-governed schools, and education is heavily-
subsidised (especially the primary and secondary sectors), with additional, means-tested 
subsidies for low-income students (Ng, 2014). Despite it generals anti-welfarist orientation, the 
PAP government has also adopted a “child-centric approach” (ibid, 119) to welfare, providing 
childcare subsidies, kindergarten fees assistance, and the Financial Assistance Scheme (MOE, 
2019), as described in Chapter One.  
 
Responsibility in Education 
However, state ownership of the education system exists alongside the use of market logics. 
Market logics were most visibly introduced, during what commentators call the ‘efficiency-
driven’ (1979-1996) (Gopinathan, 2006) phase of Singapore’s education system development. 
This phase was initiated by political concern over inefficiencies – ‘educational wastage’ – in 
the system, evidenced by semi-literateness and high attrition (MOE, 1979). The landmark Goh 
Report (MOE, 1979) left a lasting mark on Singaporean education. The report suggested 
comprehensive education reforms such as examination-based streaming starting from Primary 
Three (thus introducing streaming), streaming at every grade, the introduction of the Gifted 
Education Programme for the top 8% (with the best educational resources provided to these 
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and the next 30%), more funding for tertiary and technical and vocational institutes and the 
introduction of school appraisals (implemented from 1980) which included evaluations of 
school organisation and extra-curriculars. The focus was on improving quality (rather than the 
equity) of the system; less attention was paid ‘upstream’ (e.g. funding at the primary school 
level), which would have expanded opportunities for disadvantaged groups (Tremewan, 1994). 
While streaming was officially justified as customising education according to student’s 
abilities and increasing efficiency, studies suggest extensive streaming (particularly early 
streaming) is regressive (Ng, 2014). However, the introduction of streaming correlated with a 
significant drop in attrition rates: the percentage of the total labour force with secondary 
education rose from 19.7% (1974) to 29.3% (1985) (Lim, 1989:178).  
Today, a competitive ethos remains in the Singapore education system, and is visible in 
different ways: high-stakes national examinations (the PSLE and, depending on ‘ability’, the 
Singaporean N-, O- and A-levels), a growing diversity of schools, and extensive streaming 
within schools. While policy rhetoric in the past two decades have attempted to reduce the high-
pressure nature of the system, the existing education system remains deeply performative, 
particularly at the school and classroom levels (Deng et al., 2013b). 
 Another instance of market logics in Singaporean education is evidenced in the 
centrality of human capital development and capital growth as a key goal of schooling (Spring, 
2015). The economistic orientation of education policy has been linked to the responsibilisation 
of individuals by Foucauldian scholars such as Mitchell Dean. Dean (2010:72) argues:  
[N]eo-liberalism presents, particularly in the theory of ‘human capital’…a map of this 
subject as an entrepreneur of him or herself…Here, the individual…is the site of the 
investment of self and others in his or her human capital to obtain both monetary 
earnings and psychic and cultural satisfactions. 
 
Since independence, education objectives were tied to economic imperatives in Singapore (Sim, 
2008; Gopinathan, 2015). Subjects of merit were mathematics and science, seen as most useful 
for industrialising Singapore, and even more strikingly, the language of merit was English – 
which transitioned from the “hated language of colonialism” to an “international language and 
the language of modernity, of science and technology” (Tremewan 1994:88). Singapore was 
unique in Southeast Asia for using the language of its former colonial masters. This economistic 
focus of education for human capital development persists in Singaporean education policy 
(Gopinathan, 2015).  
Recent reforms seem, on surface, to have a less economistic, instrumental focus: reform 
rhetoric has called for de-emphasising academic grades, valorising individual talents and 
interests (a seemingly more child-centred pedagogy), valorising higher-order thinking 
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competencies over rote-memorisation and drills, and broadening the definition of ‘merit’ 
beyond academic grades. However, these more child-centred approaches continue in tension 
with an economistic focus. Notably, the key policy framework of ‘Thinking School, Learning 
Nation’ (TSLN) that first strongly championed the reduction of focus on academic results and 
higher-order thinking competencies, was built following the 1997 Asian financial crisis the 
system out of recognition that Singapore’s system was too standardised and inflexible to meet 
the challenges of a global knowledge-based economy (Gopinathan, 2015). Following the 
financial crisis, Singaporean politicians were increasingly aware that other Southeast Asian 
countries were significant competitors who could draw on large populations, natural resources 
and low-skill, low-wage economies to undercut Singapore. Hence, equipping young people for 
a global economy was (and remains) prominent in official framings of the rationale for 
contemporary Singapore education policy. TSLN spawned various initiatives such as the IT 
Masterplans (which sought to incorporate IT in teaching and learning), ‘Innovation and 
Enterprise’ and ‘Teach Less Learn More’ (which putatively reduced curriculum content to 
provide more room for extra-academic activities and the development of higher-order thinking 
skills) (Ng, 2008). Additionally, ‘thinking skills’ and interdisciplinary project work became 
part of the curriculum (Gopinathan, 2015).  
TSLN paved the way for the ‘21st-Century Competencies’ (21CC) framework (Tan, 
Choo, Kang, & Liem, 2017) (see Appendix F). This was likewise geared towards inculcating 
“future-ready skills and dispositions”, such as critical and creative thinking and teamwork skills; 
these skills are to be “infused into the academic curriculum, co-curricular activities, character 
and citizenship education, as well as applied learning programmes” (Tan et al., 2017:428). The 
rationale for the most recent framework, ‘Learn for Life’, which reduced the assessment load 
on students and emphasised the need for “joy in learning”, was to prepare students for economic 
flourishing in a time of uncertainty (Ong, 2019). In introducing ‘Learn for Life’, Minister for 
Education Ong Ye Kung rhetorically asked: “Why has [‘Learn for Life’] become so important?” 
– before discussing Singapore’s economic development history, from the dominance of heavy 
manufacturing to the present-day automation of systems which require students to become 
“resilient, adaptable and global in their outlook”, to possess a feeling of “constantly being 
inadequate”, and “curious and eager to learn, for the rest of their lives” (ibid).  
The difficulties in becoming the responsible, future-ready subject capable of reaping 
rewards for self and nation in the global knowledge economy, however, are amplified by two 
problems. Firstly, the structures and processes of Singapore’s education system continue to 
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valorise academic grades (Chiam, Hong, Kwan, & Tay, 2014). 66  Despite calling for the 
development of the ‘joy of learning’ and emphasising the holistic development of the child, 
initiatives to encourage these co-exist alongside a rigorous emphasis on ‘fundamentals’, 
resulting in policy-practice disjunctions and a hybrid pedagogy that attempts to balance 
between inquiry-based, and didactic methods, yet leans more heavily toward didactic methods 
(Deng et al., 2013b). Secondly, Lim’s (2015) ethnographic fieldwork in two schools in 
Singapore suggests that there are differences in the way the curriculum is used to teach critical 
thinking skills in an ‘elite’ and ‘mainstream’ school. Crucially, he finds that at an elite school, 
the drive for critical thinking aimed at deep dispositions of genuine intellectual autonomy – 
“the inculcation of the sacred dispositions of inquiry highly valued in a curriculum explicitly 
tailored for a distinct class of elites” (2015:182). However, at a mainstream school, critical 
thinking is “conduced to an instrumental view of the subject as knowledge skills for the 
knowledge economy” (ibid). 
Another instance of responsibilising neoliberal logics in Singaporean education lies in 
its emphasis on choice and diversity. Inspired partly by the American model, a kind of 
‘decentralised centralism’ took place in the 1980s, whereby more elements of competition and 
choice were introduced into the education system (Gopinathan, 2015), to (as politicians 
explained) improve pedagogic innovation and cater to students’ diverse abilities. Niche schools 
(specialising in sports, science and math, science and technology, performing arts) were 
established – growing diversification was “justified on the grounds that under conditions of 
globalisation, a wider definition of ability was required and that the system’s preoccupation 
with academic ability hindered the promotion of creativity, problem solving and other 21st-
century competencies” (Gopinathan, 2015:4). The Direct School Admissions (hereon, DSA) 
policy was introduced, whereby secondary schools and JCs can admit students based not only 
on academic merit, but what schools adjudicate to be excellence and talent in leadership, sports, 
arts and character.  
Moreover, following the MOE’s 1987 ‘Towards Excellence in Schools’ report, top-
performing schools were given increased freedom from central control. Six of the most 
academically prestigious high schools were named ‘independent’ schools in 1986 to, as then-
Minister of Education Tony Tan described, “shift the focus of education innovation from the 
Ministry to the school” (cited in Tremewan, 1994). These schools remained under MOE’s 
 
66 Chiam et al (2014) note: “Large class size, limited physical space, lack of resources, insufficient time to 
complete the syllabuses, and readiness of the students” all form obstacles to the development of critical thinking 
‘on the ground’. In order to cover the saturated curriculum, teachers resort to rigid and highly-structured methods 
of teaching.  
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overall control, but were permitted some freedom in admissions policy and in curricular and 
pedagogic innovation. The government also supported the upgrading of their facilities 
(Tremewan, 1994). Within two years, school fees across independent schools rose 300-800%; 
thereafter, private tuition quickly became the norm (ibid). As such, while the MOE has 
attempted to reduce the fervour around elite schools through removing the stigmatising label of 
‘neighbourhood schools’ (as different to ‘independent schools’), reiterating its slogan of ‘Every 
School [is] a Good School’ – in everyday discourse, Singaporean families can differentiate 
between the more prestigious schools and the ‘neighbourhood schools’.  
Within this increasingly diversified educational landscape, parents are positioned as 
important ‘stakeholders’ in the system; they are expected to be responsible and knowledgeable 
in help their children navigate this increasingly complex system.67  Thus, education policy 
logics tacitly responsibilise not only young people, but also parents. Prior to 1998, parents were 
largely marginal to the education system, discouraged from ‘meddling’ with the matters of the 
school, and participating only occasionally in events such as prize-giving ceremonies (Khong 
& Ng, 2005). Following the MOE’s establishment of COMPASS (COMmunity and PArents in 
Support of Schools), 68  which sought to forge school-parent-community links, the policy 
rhetoric of ‘partnership’ emerged, where parents were called to ‘partner’ with schools in the 
creation of ‘total’ learning environments for their children (Khong & Ng, 2005:1), to help the 
school in identifying the child’s specific talents, and in enrolling their children in suitable 
educational environments.  
Thus, one can trace the growing responsibilisation of Singaporean parents, over time. 
The increasingly unambiguous language of ‘partnership’ may be viewed as a form of 
institutionalisation (Edwards, 2002) – the subjecting of bodies to institutional knowledge and 
practice, such that ‘home’ and ‘school’ are viewed as having “similar functions in relation to 
children, which require them to work in ‘partnership’ ”, leading to “state (institutional 
educational) colonisation and regulation of family life, parents (mothers) and children” (ibid, 
6). The concept of “state (institutional educational) colonisation” is reinforced by the fact that 
this home-school partnership largely entails ‘supporting’ the school, rather than providing space 
for parents to critique pedagogy, policy or administration in any way (for instance, through 
parents sitting on school boards). Tellingly, the MOE policy slogan to match ‘Every School a 
 
67 In 1993, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated: “If you bring a child into the world in the West, the state 
cares for him. If you bring a child into the world in Asia, that’s your personal responsibility” (cited in Rodan, 
2016:217). 
68 More information on COMPASS can be found at: https://www.moe.gov.sg/compass (accessed: 6 July 2019) 
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Good School’ is ‘Every Parent a Supportive Partner’ (MOE, 2014). 69  Consequently, in 
Singapore, one might understand the devolution of responsibility to parents as a devolution not 
so much of control, as of political accountability for young people’s failures and successes 
(Tremewan, 1994). This is at the heart of understanding the paradox of ‘parentocracy’ in a 
‘strong’ state (discussed in Chapter One): the state remains in control of its centralised system, 
while devolving accountability for success or failure to families.   
Yet, this growing responsibilisation of families is deeply classed. Critics have argued 
that parental ‘choice’ is artificial. Actual school choice is limited by ‘catchment areas’ 
established by the MOE, where families living within a specific radius of a school have higher 
chances of securing a place in a particular school. This has led wealthier parents to buy homes 
near elite schools, inflating property prices, triggering bidding wars and excluding poor families 
from living in these neighbourhoods (Gee, 2012). Furthermore, the growing diversity in 
Singapore’s education system has led to upper and middle-class families drawing on their 
generally relatively greater familiarity with system, their ability to pay for private tuition, more 
expensive independent school fees and enrichment classes, and alumni networks to gain 
privileged access to most prestigious schools. This helps them negotiate maximum 
opportunities for their children to succeed (Gee, 2012; Koh, 2014).  
 
4.3.3. Analysing ‘neoliberal’-‘developmental’ state logics in education    
Overall, to summarise what I have argued thus far in this section, I have shown that the political 
rationalities of Singaporean neoliberalism and developmentalism produce subjectivities that are 
at once dependent (on the state) and responsible. I have argued that the meta-ideology of the 
PAP government’s pragmatism, and the economistic, instrumental focus on human capital, 
helps us understand this paradox more clearly. That is, the PAP government pragmatically 
selects elements from a reservoir of contradictory political rationalities to provide conditions 
for economic growth, political legitimacy and social cohesion. In particular, the PAP 
government’s seemingly social-democratic provision of services such as education and housing 
are forms of investment, rather than of welfare. ‘Strong’ state logics legitimise neoliberal logics, 
as the extensive provision of services helps to enhance workforce productivity. Quantifiable, 
visible efficiency is crucial to the political legitimacy of the PAP, and both developmental and 
neoliberal political rationalities play a part in achieving this. The logics work in the opposite 
 
69 This was announced at a 2014 MOE Workplan Seminar, where then-Minister for Education described a 
‘supportive partner’ as follows: “work together with us; show appreciation when good work has been done; give 
us feedback when we can do better; at the same time, I ask for your support against the small minority of 
unreasonable demands of a small minority of parents.” 
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direction, too. ‘Neoliberal’ logics, from past to present-day, have reinforced the ‘strong’ state 
(Gopinathan, 2007; 2012); rather than being a symptom of austerity economics, neoliberal 
reason is tactically used to bolster the ‘strong’ state (Koh, 2007).  
I argue that the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity is produced at the juncture of 
responsibilising and dependency logics, for the purpose of capital accumulation. Salaff (1988:7) 
suggests that the PAP government simultaneously extends social control vertically (fostering 
dependence on state for education services) and laterally (fostering the self-disciplining subject 
through standardisation and competition). Salaff (1988:27) rationalises the co-existence of 
state-provided services and neoliberal logics, by arguing that state-provided services 
historically work to “enmesh citizens in the money economy and speed the tempo of the 
industrial way of life”; she argues that these services extend the scope of the market economy 
in people’s everyday lives, while increasing their dependence on state agencies.  
  What, then, are the effects on families’ subjectivities? Here, one might consider the 
Singaporean colloquialism of ‘kiasuism’, which refers to an intense fear of losing out to 
competition (Koh, 2014). The notion of ‘kiasu’ parenting may be viewed as the Singaporean 
version of ‘intensive parenting’.70 While in the West, ‘intensive parenting’ tends to be intersect 
more with constructions of the preciousness of children (Zelizer, 1985), ‘kiasu parenting’ can 
be more deeply understood in terms of two different social constructions of childhood in 
Singapore. 71  These are the ‘child-as-immature-being’ (children are positioned as passive 
subjects, requiring adult intervention) and the ‘child-as-human-capital’ (children are viewed as 
educational projects, future wage-earners or as workforce to sustain the national economy) (Lim, 
2015:318). The extreme forms of responsibilisation that emerged have been tempered by more 
recent government rhetoric calling parents to not over-pressurise their child – although the 
structures and processes of a high-stakes system make this difficult, if not impossible, for most 
parents (Bach & Christensen, 2017).  
Furthermore, a high-stakes education system, operating within the extensive, social-
democratic provision of a high-quality, well-resourced education system framed as open, 
neutral, fair – contributes to the production of a type of psycho-social pressure that seems at 
once inevitable, destructive, yet self-inflicted. The motor driving this psycho-social pressure 
has a self-referential circularity of logic. On the one hand, ‘kiasuism’ seems inevitable and 
destructive to many parents, which might lead to a certain discontentment towards PAP policy. 
 
70 This has been defined in Chapter Two as an increasingly global cultural script of parenting, whereby parents 
are increasingly investing financial, physical and emotional labour and time in raising children (Faircloth et al., 
2013). 
71The transnational reach of different social constructions of childhood cannot be denied – the preciousness of 
children is important in Singapore, too. As such, this statement is more a generalisation than determinative.  
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However, there is a nothingness when one countenances who exactly to blame – there is no-
one to blame for one’s neurotic, ‘kiasu’ behaviour other than oneself. In its provision of a 
putatively high-quality, highly-subsidised education system, there is the production of a sense 
of completeness on the state’s part and responsibility in helping one succeed. As such, one’s 
discontents with the system is, to an extent, similar to shouting into a vacuum or chasing wind 
– criticisms lost behind the seeming neutrality and objectivity of the “smokescreen of 
meritocratic talk” prevalent in much Singaporean public discourse (Koh, 2014:196), behind 
which the meritocracy-education mechanism continues to function.   
 
4.4. Meritocracy, Multiracialism and the (Non-)Production of Class and Race 
In the overall endeavour of crafting the dependent-yet-responsible subject, the PAP government 
has to manage racial and socio-economic diversity to generate conditions for the internalisation 
of self-responsibilisation – the focus of this section. The management of racial and socio-
economic diversity is crucial within an explicitly meritocratic state, because in a perfect 
meritocracy, the only inequalities should be those matched to ability and effort; the vision of 
‘social justice’ in meritocratic states is one that is “justly unequal” (Allen, 2011:370). I identify 
in this subsection three ways in which diversity is managed in Singapore: the invisibilisation of 
racial and class markers, the clarity of racial markers, and the subordination of these markers 
to the ‘common ground’. 
 First, racial and class differences are individualised and invisibilised, through the “overt 
principle of non-discrimination, [which] obscures the fact that students in Singapore stem from 
different socio-economic backgrounds and go to school differently prepared” (Lim, 2013:4). 
Poverty was largely ‘invisible’ in Singapore until approximately 2010, when disparities became 
too pronounced to ignore (Chua, 2017). Alongside ‘meritocracy’, the other foundational pillar 
of Singaporean governance – the principle of ‘multiracialism’ – claims that all races should be 
treated equally, and that each have their part to play in Singapore’s social and economic 
development – thus explicitly inscribing ‘fairness’ across racial groups in Singapore. In 1989, 
Lee Kuan Yew argued: “Singapore is a society based on effort and merit, not wealth and 
privilege depending on birth” (cited in Tremewan, 1994). The failure of lower classes and ethnic 
minorities in the education system is explained by disparities in ‘natural ability’ and effort 
(Tremewan, 1994).  
In addition to its overt principle of non-discrimination, the invisibilisation of class and 
race is partially achieved through the homogenisation of everyday life through widespread 
collective-consumption goods and services such as public housing and education (Chua & Tan, 
1999). This homogenisation is even more deeply coloured by the absence of a distinct working-
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class culture in Singapore, partly due to rapid upward intergenerational mobility during 
Singapore’s rapid industrialisation phase. The homogenisation of everyday life is also achieved 
through the PAP’s high levels of basic provisions (ibid, 137): 
[A]n overwhelming 85 per cent of the people live in subsidised public-housing flats 
within estates that have the same level of provisions of ancillary facilities for daily needs, 
for example, shopping facilities are everywhere; an overwhelming majority of children 
go to neighbourhood schools, where education is effectively free up to secondary level; 
and these public-housing residents are well served by the mass rapid transit (MRT) 
system, with the government undertaking the total development cost.72 
  
Claus Offe (1984) argues that state support – while undesirable according to capitalist 
expansionary logics, as it strains surplus value creation, plays the vital role of securing 
conditions for the long-term accumulation of capital. However, such provisions also in a sense 
repress and force a population (particularly the working-class) to adapt to capitalist economy 
requirements, removing the impetus for resistance against capitalism’s harshness. State 
provision therefore has the potential to empower and mitigate the “blind play of market forces” 
(Gough, 1979:66), but in so doing, it also has potential to disempower those it helps by blinding 
wider society to deeper structural disadvantages.73  
 Second, the PAP manages diversity through, paradoxically, the visibilising – or the 
clarity – of racial markers. The PAP’s approach to multiracialism involves explicit demarcation 
of racial groups, and vigilance over the relations between explicitly-demarcated racial groups. 
Within the PAP’s version of ‘multiracialism’, different racial groups are each viewed as 
individually valuable, but not as important as the collectivity that is the Singapore nation (Tan, 
2008). National interests take precedence over race group-based interests (Chua, 2017). This 
sentiment was concretised very early on in Singaporean history by politicians, in light of 
Singapore’s racial riots in the 1960s, and the precarious geopolitics of Singapore’s position as 
a Chinese-majority island surrounded by Malay-Muslim neighbours. The 9/11 terror attacks in 
and the arrest of Jemiah Islamiah (JI) followers in Singapore in 2001 has revitalised political 
discourse on the importance of preserving societal harmony (Rahim, 2012). The PAP 
government heavy-handedly controls discussion over racial and religious relations (Chua, 
2017). It deploys various legislative measures and coercive rhetoric that some critics describe 
as “draconian” (Tan, 2007:458) to police harmony – including the Maintenance of Religious 
 
72 It is worth noting, though, that while Chua & Tan (1999) recognise the state’s extensive provision for the 
‘overwhelming majority’ of Singaporeans, they are simultaneously critical in arguing that this homogenisation 
starkly highlights the wealthy minority in Singapore that own cars and private homes. 
73 This is particularly ironic, as the concept of welfare emerged out of strong, organised working-class 
movements to reinstate rights for the working-class, against the harshness of capitalism (Pierson, 2006). 
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Harmony Act of 1990, and the Internal Security Act (inherited from the British colonial 
administration).  
Yet, paradoxes arise at the intersection of the state’s invisibilising and visibilising tactics. 
For instance, in Singapore there exists an “interesting mix of policies that seek to sort 
individuals objectively while allowing racial groups to compensate for their perceived social 
and economic disadvantages” (Moore 2000:340). A key way the state allows racial groups to 
‘compensate’ for ‘perceived disadvantages’ – without adopting affirmative action policies 
which directly contradict Singaporean meritocracy – is through SHGs. These are racially 
demarcated, allowing each racial group to “compensate” for “perceived disadvantages”. 
Overall, the clarity and visibilisation of ‘race’ aids in the administration and vigilant regulation 
of ‘race’. At the same time, the visibility of racial markers also enables the inscribing of Chinese 
superiority (Barr & Low, 2005) and negative, racist stereotypes that foster cultural deficit 
interpretations of the weaker attainment of ethnic minority groups (Rahim, 1999).  
A third way through which diversity is managed is through subordinating this explicitly 
demarcated racial identity to the secular, ‘neutral’ ‘common ground’ of a unified Singaporean 
identity. The clarity of racial markers is paradoxically useful in minimising the politics of ‘race’ 
in Singapore. The PAP’s approach to multiracialism operates within a “hard multiculturalism” 
model (Tan & Tan, 2014:198); such engagement with diversity tend to be superficial and at 
times, essentialising. What the PAP government encourages, for instance through citizenship 
education curricula and celebrations of diversity (e.g. through state-sponsored race and 
religious festivals), is not a deep, complex understanding of different traditions and races, but 
simply a high degree of ‘tolerance’ (Chua, 2017). State multiracialism operates on a “very 
limited cultural terrain” (Chua, 2017:153); it only interferes when there are disturbances to 
racial or religious harmony. This neatness in categorisation has helped to make explicit the dual 
identities of each Singaporean: first, as a Singaporean, and second, their racial identity – with 
prioritisation given to the former in the name of ‘racial harmony’, because racial harmony is a 
public good.  
The PAP’s approach to multiracialism has, in some sense, ‘worked’: there have been no 
racial riots in Singapore since 1969, and most Singaporeans would say in a self-congratulatory 
fashion that they live harmoniously in a ‘multiracial’ state (Chua, 2017). Empirical research 
suggests that young Singaporeans agree that national identity dominates over racial identity; 
they identify themselves as Singaporeans first, then racially (Vasu, 2012) – despite the fact that 
the Singaporean identity remains slippery, something that politicians and the rest of the young 
city-state seem constantly in search of. 
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Nevertheless, the nature of this ‘common ground’ has been critiqued as thinly-veiled 
Confucian values – useful in bolstering the PAP’s own legitimacy. These values include 
political subservience and economic dutifulness. In the 1980s and 90s, as Singapore became 
increasingly economically liberalised and open to Western influence, including what 
Singaporean leaders thought of as unpalatable individualism – Singaporean politicians were 
anxious to develop a sense of Singaporean identity grounded in ‘Asian values’, against decadent 
Western values. There was a concerted effort to inculcate Confucian values in the citizenry; 
Confucian values were particularly amenable to the political-economic project of the PAP: 
capital accumulation (with the Confucian emphasis on values such as thrift and diligence), and 
developing a disciplined citizenry that is obedient to political authority (Sim & Ho, 2010), 
combined with familial and self-responsibilisation, and attentiveness to the collective good 
(Eklund & Göransson, 2016). However, out of recognition that Singapore is a multiracial state, 
‘Confucianism’ was replaced by the term ‘Asian Values’, which, following consultation with 
members of different ethno-religious groups, became formalised as the ‘National Identity’ of 
Singapore. This forms the basis of Character and Citizenship Education in Singapore, and 
comprise the official, systematic ideological articulation of state-citizen relations today (Tan, 
2012; Tremewan, 1994).74 These five shared values are:  
1) Nation before community, society before self  
2) Family as basic unit of society  
3) Community support and respect for individual  
4) Consensus not conflict  
5) Racial and religious harmony  
 
While the term ‘Asian Values’ suggests the multicultural nature of these values, other scholars 
have pointed out the clear Confucian influence on the choice of values (e.g. Chia, 2011; Tan 
and Tan, 2014). Barr & Low (2005) more forcefully argue that there is striking continuity in 
Singapore’s historical management of diversity – a long-standing “presumption that 
Singapore’s future lay with assimilating her various ethnic cultures into a dominant hegemonic 
culture” (ibid:161). They argue that the common public space is defined by Confucian values 
of submissiveness to authority, responsibility and hard work.  
 Given the PAP’s distrust towards the Chinese education system in the 1960s, which 
they viewed as a site where loyalty to China instead of newly-independent Singapore was 
 
74 A more detailed of the origins and components of these values can be found on the National Library Board’s 
Singapore Infopedia website (“Shared Values,” 2015). The entry on ‘Shared Values’ begins as follows: “The 
Shared Values are five national values of Singapore. They were formalised by the government on 15 January 
1991 to forge a national identity in the face of a changing society with evolving values. The Shared Values were 
formulated according to the nation’s multicultural heritage, as well as the attitudes and values that have 
contributed to the success of Singapore. They are inculcated through education in schools.”  
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inculcated – the PAP’s concern is likely not with preserving Chinese culture per se. Rather, 
‘Chineseness’ might be seen as a secondary factor, useful within the PAP’s pragmatic-realist 
lens for the fostering of economic discipline and political submissiveness. This argument is 
supported by critics who link the minimising of racial identity with the economisation of social 
life and dominance of capitalist logics in Singapore. Chua (2017:131), for instance, argues: 
“Understanding and engaging in the practice of capitalism on a daily basis constitute a far 
greater influence on the life of all Singaporeans than do their particular race-based traditional 
beliefs and practices.” 
As such, self and familial responsibilisation in highly-diverse Singapore is maintained 
through several mechanisms: invisibilising racial and class differences through the ‘neutrality’ 
of the meritocracy-education mechanism and the homogenising of everyday life; the clarity of 
racial markers which help maintain social order and administrative efficiency; subordinating 
racial identity to a ‘Singaporean’ identity, which is amenable to capital accumulation and 
obedience to political authority. In present-day Singapore, however, the ideology-
consciousness link concerning the legitimacy of ‘meritocracy’ seems to be weakening, partly 
due to growing awareness of the harshness of meritocracy (Gopinathan, 2012). The 
normalisation of a subject who is sufficiently dependent on the government to be grateful for 
it, and supportive of the PAP in elections – yet is willing to be responsible for themselves and 
their families, remains a significant challenge for the PAP government.  
 
4.5. Sustaining Legitimacy in the Post-Developmental State  
In the General Elections of May, 2011, the PAP – ruling for over forty years – garnered its 
lowest share of votes since independence (Koh & Chong, 2014).75 While the PAP retained 
enough seats in parliament to continue political rule, the elections were described as a 
“watershed election” (Chong & Ng, 2016:5). One might categorise the PAP’s ongoing 
challenges of sustaining the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity as twofold.  
The first pertains to accumulation difficulties within a maturing capitalist state. Partly, 
this challenge is due to the precariousness of economic globalisation, pertinently highlighted in 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Singapore’s accumulation difficulties extend also to the 
 
75 The reasons for this, as discussed in Chapter One, range from growing awareness of educational and economic 
inequalities, the government’s foreign immigration policy, the arrogance and elitism of the PAP government, 
and so on. 
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challenge of inequality – and growing awareness of the increasing bifurcation of society along 
class and race lines, as evidenced in the 2011 General Elections.76   
The second challenge is an increasingly confident, critical (largely middle-class) 
citizenry that has experienced the successes of East Asian developmental states. The 
developmental state is “inherently degenerative” (Evans, cited in Pereira, 2008:1191), a 
transitional entity that sows the seeds for its own destruction – because as citizens benefit from 
state-led growth, over time there emerges “[a] new more assertive capitalist class, ready to take 
on the world…increasingly confident that they no longer needed a state of technocrats, 
racketeers and political police” (Castells, 1992:66). Exacerbated by slowing growth, and 
globalisation-related economic vulnerabilities, legitimacy becomes increasingly hard-won 
across all social groups, because, as Dale (1990:31) argues: “ ‘[B]uying loyalty’ in various ways 
is fine but the price keeps going up as privileges become rights.” 
For decades, the PAP has maintained its end of the ‘prosperity-loyalty compact’ by 
delivering high levels of economic growth and a putatively top-performing education system. 
However, the two abovementioned reasons may result in the chipping away of the desired 
dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. Yet, I contend that following the “rude awakening” 
(Koh & Chong, 2014:626) of the 2011 Elections, the PAP government has actively (and largely 
successfully) sought to increase the dependency and trust of Singaporeans on itself. The PAP 
achieved a landslide victory in the following General Elections in 2015 (Rodan, 2016). In this 
final section, I discuss the governing techniques used by the PAP to retain dependency and trust 
amidst the abovementioned two challenges.  
Importantly, the PAP has maintained economic dependency relations. Today, the 
Singapore state is “still the most dominant economic agent within society, acting as the ‘visible 
hand’ that shapes the economy” (Pereira, 2008:1200). Singapore is different to other Asian 
developmental states, due to the absence of a local capitalist class in Singapore willing to 
challenge the state,77 and a working-class that “remains beholden to the state for jobs” (Pereira, 
2008:1201). The PAP’s continued success in securing economic growth further reinforces its 
legitimacy (Pereira, 2008; Chua, 2017); the same might be said of its ability to maintain high 
educational standards in international benchmarking tests like PISA and TIMSS. Minister for 
Education Ong Ye Kung (2018) stated: “Our good PISA scores are something which we must 
value and it affirms our approach so far”. 
 
76 ‘Meritocracy’ seems to fail by its own successes. It operates to stratify for the purpose of greater efficiency 
and capital accumulation, but in so doing, it bifurcates society and undermines the political legitimacy of the 
government that strives to uphold it. 
77 The PAP’s prioritisation and collaboration with transnational capital instead of domestic capital, limits the 
expansion and autonomy of domestic capitalist classes (Pereira, 2008). 
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Furthermore, the PAP deploys the language of virtuous leadership that invites, or 
putatively deserves, deep trusting dependence. Confucian influences on Singapore’s governing 
style has generated a ‘thicker’ moral texture to political authority. Within a Confucian 
conception, trustworthiness is a virtue that rulers must exhibit to secure the trust of their people. 
That is, given their ethical integrity, it follows that leaders should not be questioned, as much 
as obeyed and respected (Chua, 2017). Individual rights are viewed as less important. The 
Singapore state thus possesses a “pastoral” function in mapping the moral compass of 
Singapore society (Lim & Apple, 2016:9). Contrastingly, Lockean, political-liberal conceptions 
of state-citizen relations are more procedural and juridical. Chua (2017:67) argues:  
Given the PAP has to operate within an elected parliamentary system and that it is 
ideologically attracted to Confucianism, the PAP leaders’ understanding of trust is 
likely to be a somewhat muddled mixing of the two traditions, with a preference to 
believe that they have built an ‘ethical’ government based on ‘moral authority’ rather 
than a limited exchange between themselves and the Singaporean electorate.  
 
The ‘softer’ language of ethical integrity and pastoral care is reinforced by the predominant 
perception of the populace that the government is relatively corruption-free (Quah, 2010) – an 
ethical government that is constrained, but competent and most importantly, doing its best for 
the citizenry (Teo, 2011). 
 Finally, following the 2011 General Elections, the PAP has increased its policies and 
programmes aimed at fostering greater egalitarianism. High-level PAP politicians have 
described the need for policies to shift “left-of-centre”, and for ‘meritocracy’ to be 
“compassionate…fair and inclusive for all  – not just those who are lucky in their backgrounds 
or genetic endowments”, as Emeritus Senior Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong, noted in a 
2013 speech (C. L. Goh, 2013). Rodan (2016:219) stated: “Recent national budgets and 2015 
election commitments demonstrated that the PAP government is prepared to increase funds 
directly and indirectly towards social welfare, including that directed towards some of 
Singapore’s lowest paid.” 
In the education policy realm, there has also been a growing emphasis on equity. The 
emphasis on upstream interventions – expanding provision of MOE-funded pre-school 
education and reserving one-third of places in MOE kindergarten for lower-income homes – is 
one key initiative. Another is the Primary Education Review and Implementation (PERI) and 
Secondary Education Review and Implementation (SERI) reports, published in 2009 and 2010 
respectively, which have introduced different measures that have potential to increase equity – 
measures which the PAP has adopted (Lim, 2013). For instance, the PERI report has increased 
the number of Allied Educators (school counsellors, special needs educators, co-teachers), who 
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can support students who struggle with classroom learning. It has also increased the student-
teacher ratio, and increased sports, outdoor education, performing and visual arts opportunities 
in schools, which low-income families tend not to be able to afford (Lim, 2013). The PERI 
report has reduced the emphasis on assessment through cancelling major summative 
examinations in Primary One and Two; these summative examinations previously acted as 
strong stratifying devices in the education system. Both PERI and SERI reports have 
recommended richer, more holistic feedback on students – including non-cognitive skills and 
socio-emotional well-being, which research suggests students from low-income homes tend to 
struggle more with acquiring (Lim, 2013). Recent reforms have also attempted to reduce the 
salience of markers of streaming at the Secondary level through subject-based banding (MOE, 
2019). While this may be a step in the right direction, there is continued concern that excessive 
competition, stigmatisation and social inequality will persist – if the rigour of curricula and 
societal values that deeply valorise academic grades remain unchanged (Sinnakaruppan, 2019). 
Tensions between state legitimation and accumulation continue to result in a constant 
(re)balancing of policies perceived to be ‘efficient’ and amenable to capital accumulation 
(elitist-learning policies that provide more resources to the ‘best and brightest’) and those that 
help the state legitimise itself (egalitarian-leaning policies that provide comprehensive support 
to all students, particularly academically or socio-economically disadvantaged students) (Bonal 
& Rambla, 2003). Despite recent reform attempts to reduce the emphasis on streaming and 
grades, the overall consensus is that the Singapore education system – particularly its extensive 
diversity – not only reflects existing class-based inequalities, but perpetuates them (Talib and 
Fitzgerald, 2015; Teo, 2018).  
 Nevertheless, the PAP won the 2015 General Elections, which suggests that the political 
and ideological currency of the PAP is not yet spent (Rodan, 2016). In contemporary Singapore, 
the homogenisation and reproduction of attitudes towards poverty and welfare, shaped by “state 
discourses of meritocracy, self-reliance and anti-welfarism”, continues (Chong & Ng, 
2016:1). 78  However, it would be inaccurate to argue that the ‘dependency syndrome’ of 
Singaporeans on the state, whereby the citizenry is “overly dependent on the government for 
directions” and “feels impotent and becomes indifferent to the decision-making process” – 
continues, at least in the same form (Low & Kuo, 1999:56). The challenges posed by a more 
critical, active, engaged citizenry are certainly present. However, the PAP government seems 
to have largely met these challenges through a range of political rationalities and technologies 
deployed to meet accumulation challenges and maintain the ‘prosperity-loyalty compact’ for 
 
78 Chong & Ng (2016:6) draw their conclusions from a quantitative survey of 460 individuals and the qualitative 
responses of six individuals. The respondents were from “as diverse a group…as possible”, socio-economically.  
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large sections of society. Overall, scholars have argued what is clear is that while Singaporeans’ 
materialist, concrete, bread-and-butter issues are met, challenges to the PAP will remain weak 
(Rodan, 2016; Chua, 2017). After the PAP’s 2015 General Election victory, law professor 
Eleanor Wong lamented: “This is a vote confirming the type of system that Singaporeans want 
to live under” (cited in Chua, 2017:175).  
 
4.6. Closing Reflections  
This chapter has provided a historical mapping of the production and normalisation of the 
dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. The purpose of this exercise is not necessarily to 
critique or denounce our existing ethical vocabulary concerning ‘responsibility’ and 
‘dependence’79; rather, it seeks to make transparent the relations of power and authority that 
sustain the forms of life we value (Rose, 1992).  
This historical account reveals how a panoply of governing techniques have normalised 
(and continue to normalise) particular subjectivities and limit the development of alternative 
value-formations in Singaporean everyday life. These techniques help the PAP government 
achieve its three key goals: political legitimacy, capital accumulation and social cohesion. 
These mechanisms also make plausible the operation of the meritocracy-education mechanism. 








79 See Chapter Seven, Section 7.5, for a discussion on how the language of ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependence’ 
might be reformulated, based on findings in this study.  
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Table 4.1. Governing Techniques in Singapore’s Political System 
Governing 
Technique 







• Devolving political accountability for individual success and maintaining importance of 
responsibilisation of family and self, amidst future economic uncertainty 
• Using neoliberal performative tactics to improve efficiency and capital accumulation 
• Building strong norms around the importance of individual and family responsibility 
 
• High-stakes, increasingly 
diverse education system 






confidence in the 
state  
 
• Maintaining individuals’ and families’ dependency on the state for economic flourishing 
• Maintaining success in state-capitalism and international education rankings 
• Maintaining developmental state tactics to putatively ‘level the playing field’ 
• Increasing rhetoric and measures to ‘soften’ the harshness of meritocracy, encourage the 
‘joy of learning’ and broaden the meaning of ‘merit’ in a meritocracy 
 




• Increasing measures to 
help poor families, 
especially post-2011 
3) Mechanisms to 
manage racial and 
class ‘diversity’ 
• Invisibilising racial and class markers through ‘meritocratic’ rhetoric of fairness and the 
homogenising of everyday life 
• Superficially visibilising race markers for administrative efficiency and regulation 
• Subordinating these markers to the ‘common good’ and wider ‘Singaporean’ identity 
 
• A ‘hard multiculturalism’ 
model  
• Policy rhetoric on Shared 
Values and social 
harmony  






• Calling for the populace to prioritise collective over individual interests – although the 
interests of ‘meritorious’ individuals (the elite) is ‘justifiably’ prioritised over others 
• State surveillance over traditional media and school curricula  
• State surveillance and regulation of freedom of speech through ‘Out-of-Bound’ markers 
 
• Close overseeing of 
curricula (Character and 
Citizenship Education, 
and Social Studies) that 
specify appropriate state-
citizen relations  
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However, the governmentality perspective, and especially the three tiers of governance 
(outlined in Chapter Two), emphasises not only political rationalities and technologies, but also 
technologies of the self. As such, it is important to also understand how individual and familial 
agency interacts with and against mechanisms of normalisation. The next three chapters 
(Chapters Five, Six and Seven), drawing on interview findings with families, seek to shed 





CHAPTER 5. On Responsibility: Families as Pedagogic Actors 
 
“Family [is] the first teacher […] Because you’re educated since young, since baby. 
Especially mummy, mummy is the first teacher in your life.” (Hafiz, son, F9) 
 
“[S]ocial safety nets have to be coupled with self-reliance and resilience. We have to want to 
do the best for ourselves…The state will help you where it can, but it cannot replace what you 
and your family can do for yourself and each other.”  




24th May 2017 was the first time I visited the Vasoos’ (F4) home.80 The first thing I noticed 
about the flat was that the walls were painted bright blue. They were also covered with pencil 
graffiti. Through the half-open door of 607B, a woman was lying on the couch with a young 
child, and they were playing and laughing together. I rang the doorbell – twice, but the doorbell 
was not working, so I knocked. Once. Then a second time, louder. Lakshmi pushed the child 
off her and spotted me – and said laughingly that she was so sorry, she had forgotten, she hadn’t 
seen her kid for a while since she just got back from her shift, and he just got home from child 
care, so she just wanted to play with him awhile. She started cleaning the floor with some liquid 
and a cloth, and asked me to let myself in. I pushed the door further open and entered their 
home. 
 This chapter, and the two following, draw on perspectives largely from the living-rooms 
of 12 families in Singapore. These chapters aim to provide thick empirical evidence of families’ 
pedagogic work (their beliefs, approaches, challenges and desires), and the salience of 
dependency and responsibility as forces structuring families’ pedagogic work. As the opening 
quotes of this chapter suggest, there are myriad responsibilities and dependencies that families 
are embedded in – relations that criss-cross the public political sphere and the intimate sphere 
of home. Some are perceived by families as more acceptable and others more injurious. In these 
chapters, I seek to develop rich descriptions of the most salient types of responsibilities and 
dependencies evident in interview findings.81 In this study, it is necessary to delimit the scope 
and exclude some forms of dependencies and responsibilities. I discuss what seems to be the 
most consistent and salient forms of responsibility and dependency relations evident in families’ 
pedagogic work. By ‘salient’, I refer to the types of relations which families seemed to talk 
 
80 For the background context for each family (household income, parental occupation, etc.), please see 
Appendix C.  
81 Much more evidence and complexity can be marshalled around many of the key ideas described in Chapters 




most extensively about and with most emotion and interest. In this study, families spoke with 
most emotion and interest about their relations with the state and school; this influences parent-
child relations in important ways.  
 Broadly, the argument threading through Chapters Five to Seven, is as follows: families’ 
dependency on the ‘strong’ state and schools, forms a context which makes plausible and 
acceptable (to families) the responsibilisation of young people (at least, ‘acceptable’ insofar as 
they generally cooperate, rather than reject the system). They therefore largely reproduce the 
dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity promoted through Singapore’s political system, with 
myriad effects (both benefits and injuries) in their lives, although they also contest it in 
important ways. Chapters Five and Six adopt different conceptual and scalar emphases. Chapter 
Five explores the building-blocks of families’ pedagogic work in Singapore via the concept of 
responsibility, focusing on the scale of parent-child relations within the home – though these 
are crucially mediated by wider socio-political forces. Chapter Six delves further into these 
socio-political forces. It explores the concept of dependency, at the scale of home-school, home-
state relations, analysing families’ involvement with schools (which are viewed often as 
representatives of the state). Having sketched the dependency and responsibility relations in 
families’ lives, Chapter Seven draws on interview findings to explicate the relationship between 
dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity and the reproduction of inequality. While Chapters Five 
and Six illustrate a general dynamic of appreciation for Singaporean education, and families’ 
normalisation of the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity amenable to neoliberal capital 
accumulation – Chapter Seven explicitly focuses on the resistances and disillusionment towards 
the particular form of dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity valorised in Singaporean 
governance.   
Overall, in this chapter, I find that while families depend heavily on the school and state, 
they are also pedagogic actors who accept and enact responsibility for themselves and their 
families. Thus, in this chapter, I provide an overview of the elements of families’ pedagogic 
work in helping young people obtain what they deem to be a successful future.  
 
5.1. Stereotypes of the Irresponsible Poor Family in Singapore 
Teo (2018:85) argues that there are two key prejudices in Singapore towards those from low-
income backgrounds: 1) they have different ‘values’ and ‘mindsets’, 2) they deliberately avoid 
hard work, relying on state support. Through this chapter, I argue that, far from these 
stereotypes, disadvantaged families actively strive to be responsible parents, around often 
severe constraints. They also seek to inculcate responsibility in the next generation.  
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Regarding the first stereotype, families had similar ‘values’ and ‘mindsets’ as the 
Singaporean ideal of the educated, responsible self, although the emotional and socio-economic 
pressures of disadvantage coloured the ways they could enact these values. Generally, the 
desired end-point is the responsible, educated child. However, it is insufficient to stop at a 
reassertion of shared ‘values’ and ‘mindsets’ across class lines. Sayer (2005:952) argues that 
what is valued as desirable does not “correspond neatly with social divisions” – the poor often 
share the same normative end-point as the privileged. Yet, it is precisely the universalising, 
essentialising character of what is valued and valuable, that reproduces inequalities (Sayer, 
2005), as those with less recognition and distribution of resources fall short of calcified markers 
of respect and respectability (Sayer, 2005; Skeggs, 1997). Sayer (2005:958) argues that while 
Bourdieusian sociology is right in emphasising “struggles over definitions of goods” (the 
desirable end-point), “his concept of capitals…obscures their different sources and normative 
structure”. Thus, in understanding families’ pedagogic beliefs and values, one must also ask: 
What is valuable? Is it always the responsible, educated child? How did it come to be valuable? 
Why is it valuable? To whom is it valuable?  
Regarding the second stereotype, families – under significant emotional and socio-
economic pressure – work hard, to ensure their children gain academic qualifications, 
seemingly evincing an internalisation of a neoliberal, instrumental vision of education’s 
purposes (emphasising grades, certification and good jobs), as well as the harshness of 
schooling processes and practices. Generally, contrary to rejecting responsibility and relying 
complacently on state support, families’ dependence on the state’s help is precisely what makes 
plausible to families the acceptance of responsibility – a notion I develop throughout subsequent 
chapters. Yet, families also simultaneously draw on human creativity, kindness, and 
unexpectedly, state resources, to resist neoliberal, ‘parentocratic’ pressures.  
Overall, this chapter charts disadvantaged families’ technologies of the self, as they 
strive to be responsible and inculcate dispositions of responsibility. They strive to do so, 
embedded in discursive and historical contexts that valorise specific versions of the 
‘responsible’, capital-accumulating self (discussed in Chapter Four).  
 
5.2. Mapping Responsible Familial Subjectivities 
As argued above, most families in this study did not dispute the importance of taking on 
responsibility, both for their families (in the case of parents) and for their own lives and future 
success, although this imperative was mediated by families’ own creative agency. Within the 
meta-narrative of anti-welfarism and self-reliance (Teo, 2013; Chua, 2017) – from an empirical 
perspective, how are individual lives lived out? Or, “What kind of pedagogical and subjectivity 
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work does responsibility enable or oblige?” (McLeod, 2017:43). Based on my findings, I argue 
that in the production and enactment of the responsible family, a bricolage of protection, 
discipline and help-seeking exists. This is illustrated in Table 5.1, which outlines the building-
blocks of families’ pedagogic work. The table generally captures what families felt constituted 
responsible pedagogic work, and which they generally sought to enact in their lives.  
Of course, beliefs and values do not necessarily map neatly onto families’ approaches: 
“we have unclear and contradictory value systems which are complexly and unevenly related 
to our social practices” (Ball 2003:114). Additionally, families do not necessarily do what they 
say they do. While Table 5.1 elides complexity, for analytic clarity, it maps out the range of 
pedagogic work most clearly identifiable from interviews.  
 
Table 5.1. Mapping the Responsible Self: Families’ Pedagogic Work  
 




Power of education Power of education 
 
Young person is responsible for 
success 
Young person is primarily, but 
not solely, responsible. School 
and parents are also responsible 
 
Approaches Disciplinary Approaches: 
Nag  
Monitor academic/moral development  
Punish  
 
Disciplinary Approaches:  
Study hard  
Time management  
Help-seeking Approaches:  
Help from state/school 
Help from extended family   
 
Help-seeking Approaches:  
Help from state/school 
Help from extended family  
Protective Approaches: 
Give children time to rest 





Protective Approach:  
Aim for financial independence, 
particularly in funding their own 
post-secondary schooling 
 
The rest of the chapter unpacks: 1) families’ beliefs and values, 2) their pedagogic approaches 
– revealing the complexities of disadvantaged families’ pedagogic work. But first, the key 
contours of this ‘responsible’ self – in particular, the centrality of education to the responsible 




5.3. It All Comes Down to Education: “Proper channels” and tough-love parenting 
1989 was the year Srinivas (father, F3) was arrested. It wasn’t the first time, except each time 
in the past, his mother scraped out money for bail. This happened several times, until he was 
finally caught, and found himself in Changi prison, at 18 years of age, sentenced to six-and-a-
half years of jail-time for participating in gang-fights. However, to him, the downward spiral 
had begun long before that, when he mixed with “bad company” in school. Despite his parents’ 
urging to study well, he felt helpless against the influence of his peers. He finished Primary Six 
with low marks, entered vocational school, then dropped out when he joined a gang.  
 Prison life was hard. But it did give him a chance to reflect on his life, and to begin 
seeing some wisdom in his parents’ advice. He described:  
So my mother will come and visit me: “I already told you so many times, listen to me. 
Okay you never listen to me, at last you end up here. How now? Are you fine? Are you 
happy now? Once you listen to Ma, you won’t be here, you’ll be outside. Now six and 
a half years.” So I from there, I realise. Six and a half years inside the prison is not easy 
you know? It’s not easy. They will take you outside, one hour. […] One hour only you 
can see the sun, you can see the sky, you can feel the air – everything. After one hour, 
twenty three hours you’ll be inside there.  
 
Shortly after he was released, he met Anjushri, at a pub. She had, like him, only completed 
primary school, though they had dropped out for different reasons. He had dropped out after 
hanging out with ‘bad company’, she had dropped out shortly after a few years of truancy and 
poor academic results, after her father passed away. She had been her father’s favourite. “I still 
miss him”, she said. After years of fraught relationship with her mother and sisters, she 
eventually ran away from home, and married a man who turned out to be a drug dealer and a 
heavy drinker. Whenever he came home drunk, he would break windows, keep her from 
sleeping at night, and pester her to buy him beer with the money she earned from her shift job. 
They had two children. But she ended the marriage after he was arrested for drug-dealing. When 
she visited him in prison, she made him promise that he would never come find her and her 
children again.  
 Not long after, Srinivas and Anjushri met and married, and they had two more children. 
While Srinivas had struggled with bouts of temptation to mingle with old gang friends and 
participate in gang-fights after prison, having children with Anjushri changed him:  
Then I started to marry her. Married her, then I got the first kid come out. Then I 
thought, this gangsterism isn’t suitable for me. OK? I already got a kid. So it’s not 
suitable – try to avoid lah. That time, so many years my mother is telling me, my 
father telling me, I never think. Once I already got one kids […] once she born – I 




He realised: “Then I see, I need CPF,82 I must buy a house – so I join the bus company. When 
I already as a father, I got a kids, so I must go into proper channel.” He eventually bought a flat 
in the far north of Singapore, with government subsidies. However, when his old gang friends 
persistently tried to contact him, due to a combination of financial difficulty and fear that his 
children would follow in his footsteps, join gangs and leave school – he sold the flat, and moved 
the entire family to a rental one-bedroom flat in a different part of Singapore. While he is unable 
to help his children with homework – even parents with university degrees find it challenging 
to keep up with Singapore upper-primary curricula (Teo, 2018) – or to afford expensive private 
tuition and enrichment activities, he would do whatever he could to help give his children a 
better life. 
They had made mistakes, Srinivas and Anjushri both told me. They should have listened 
to their parents. They should have stayed in school. They shouldn’t have been so “playful” (as 
Anjushri remarked), in refusing to study. If I had stayed in school, I could have been a lawyer, 
Srinivas said, or a high-ranking army official. As a bus driver, his hours were long, and money 
was tight, especially with Anjushri’s recent health problems.83 They were a family of five, 
living in a one-bedroom rental flat – his wife and three children slept inside the room, while he 
slept on a mattress in the living-room when he came home from work at midnight. However, 
for all the mistakes made, they wanted a better future for their children – and education was the 
only way to achieve it. If anything, their own failure to finish school, and a recognition of what 
they had therefore missed out on, reinforced their anxiety and desire for their children to gain 
good education qualifications.  
Srinivas and Anjushri’s accounts illustrate the general sentiments of almost all parents 
in this study. Education was perceived as key to upward social mobility. As such, parents felt 
responsible for ensuring their children stayed in school; they would try their very best, to this 
end. Young people had even greater responsibility (as those actually in the education system), 
to stay in school, in order to stand on their own two feet someday. Parents cannot ‘force’ 
children to do anything, and with the government providing what they felt to be a very good 
education system, it was now ‘up to them’ – up to young people to do their part. Young people 
are essentially the focal-point of the responsibilising meritocratic ethos.  
 
82 The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a compulsory government social security savings scheme, funded by 
mandatory employers’ and employees’ contributions. To obtain CPF, Srinivas needed a government-recognised 
job which was why he joined the bus company. Within the CPF scheme, a portion of an employee’s salary is 
stored by the government until the age of 55 (the ‘withdrawal age’); it is reserved for housing, healthcare and 
retirement purposes. CPF can be seen as part of the apparatus of a ‘strong’ interventionist state, interested in 
regulating the lives and spending habits of citizens. For more information, please see: 
https://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/central-provident-fund/what-is-cpf  




Amidst descriptions of how young people must be responsible because schools and the 
government had already done their part – another father, Kumar (F4) described education 
qualifications as the “backbone” – a striking metaphor of support and safety. He claimed that 
the ‘certificates’ “will help them through life. So when we leave this world, both of us [parents] 
– that is there, to help them out.” Inflected through their own experience of hardship, and 
embedded in the hyper-competitive, credential-celebrating mega-city of Singapore, ‘education’ 
would help them navigate a hard, often cruel world.  
Parents described the world as a place where people will cheat you, exploit you, if you 
don’t know how to count, read, analyse. When she had children of her own, Anjushri worked 
on improving her English and mathematics through watching Sesame Street and from her 
children’s homework. This helped her realise her mother had cheated her out of the right amount 
of inheritance money.  
[T]he differences I know already – ah, when I started to study by my own self. Because 
my mother cheated [me] – I told you that, when my father’s house they sell, [they get] 
a lot of money, my mother cheated me. When I know, I asked my mother, my mother 
cannot answer me. I say, “Ma, this money, you give to [my sister], why never give me? 
You cheated me.” My mother was shocked. “Now I know money, you know, ma. I 
know how to count already.” Then my mother quiet. My mother shh.  
 
Education would have saved her from all her suffering, Anjushri said. Education was what 
could have made a difference. She then proceeded to stretch out her own biography before me, 
as an argument in counterfactuals for the importance of education.    
So I don’t want. We don’t want our children to be cheated also. When [if] that time I 
study, I – I won’t suffer a lot. I won’t run away from home and married. When I study, 
I got a good job, better job. Then my own mother cannot cheat me. Correct or not? 
 
By contrast, Anjushri told me the story of her sister, who had stayed in school and now owned 
a five-bedroom flat in Singapore, while her own family squeezed in a one-bedroom rented flat. 
The difference education made was, to many parents, very clear. Parents’ biographies thus often 
provided the raw material for their most deeply held pedagogic beliefs and approaches; their 
experiences of life in Singapore ineluctably meant a wholehearted investing in their children’s 
education. 
 
5.3. Families’ Beliefs and Values  
In studies that analyse the enactment of neoliberal reform, values and beliefs are typically 
ignored in favour of a one-dimensional, instrumental rationality (Bonal & Zancajo, 2018). 
Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, stated that he never “blamed” 
parents for “intensive” parenting behaviours, because “they are responding quite rationally to 
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the incentives. The exams, the selection systems, the entry requirements” (cited in Teng, 2019). 
He noted: “Parents are quite rational; in Singapore, a little risk-averse, so they err on the side 
of overdoing things” (ibid).  
While responding “rationally” to incentives in Singapore’s education system is one 
dimension of family life, “the ethics of the market are not…hegemonic” (Ball, 2003:113). To 
focus only on this aspect is to provide a thin picture of families’ interactions with their wider 
context, giving rise to a situation whereby the “denizen of the marketplace – homo economicus 
is somewhat emaciated” (Jordan, Redley & James, cited in Ball, 2003:111). Exploring families’ 
values and beliefs help provide a richer understanding of how technologies such as the 
‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ are experienced, and with what effects, in families’ lives. 
In this section, ‘beliefs’ and ‘values’ refer to families’ deeply embedded interpretations of their 
milieu (beliefs), and the perceived worthiness and desirability of particular beliefs (values) (Ball, 
2003). 
In this section, I discuss three dimensions of families’ beliefs and values: 1) the power 
families ascribe to education, 2) the responsibilisation of young people, and 3) the power of 
shame as a motivating force for families’ approaches.  
 
5.3.1. “Where there’s no education, you can see struggling like hell”: The power of education 
in Singapore 
In Singapore, the ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’ has functioned smoothly, delivering 
financial rewards to the academically ‘meritorious’. As argued in Chapter Two, Singaporean 
education policy has long drawn from the philosophical reservoirs of utilitarian human capital 
ideology (Lee & Qian, 2017); it focuses on preparing “ ‘human resources’ (i.e. students)” for 
economic ends (Koh, 2002:255). The interventionist PAP government has exercised careful 
management over the ‘tight coupling’ of education and the economy (Dimmock & Tan, 2015), 
ensuring that the educated graduate is rewarded by good jobs. This historically has given 
credence to the ‘meritocracy-education mechanism’. Interviewing both parents and young 
people suggested there was significant intergenerational transmission of belief in the efficacy 
of this mechanism.84  
 Thus, it is unsurprising that one of families’ core beliefs and values lay in the power of 
education. Families believed overwhelmingly that the key purpose of education was to gain 
academic qualifications (the ‘paper’ or ‘cert’), which would help young people find a job, which 
 
84 However, I suggest in Chapter Seven, especially Section 7.3, that some young people questioned the efficacy 
of the meritocracy-education mechanism.  
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would secure them a ‘future’. There was a teleological, confident linearity in most families’ 
reasoning – from the qualification, to a good job, to a successful future. The apparent 
naturalness of these linkages informed how parents felt good parents should act (that is, to 
support their children in moving through these linkages). It provided clarity and security in 
charting a certain route out of poverty, even if the route was a harsh, performance-contingent 
one. 
To Chandra (father, F2), the semantic distance between ‘education’ and ‘income’ was 
collapsed; the purpose of education was framed through bread-and-butter, practical, everyday 
notions of income and employment.  
Of course […] I would say education is the main source of income in future that will 
secure your future, you know, employment and all that. Then from there, you build up 
your future. Important is education. If you compare that to an uneducated person, or 
even a foreigner in another country, where there’s no education, you can see struggling 
like hell.  
 
This was important on both a national and individual level. Countries like ‘America’ and 
‘Britain’ had high standards of living, “all because of education”, whereas countries like 
‘Ethiopia’ and ‘India’ were struggling because people were uneducated. When asked how he 
knew this to be true, Chandra replied: “This one I, definitely I know.” He drew on anecdotal 
evidence of friends who received more education, and were in better employment, earning 
higher salaries than him. Some parents also described knowing this from (largely state-
controlled) mainstream media. One father, Khairul (F10), said: “Singapore only one thing, they 
ask you to study only. Not more than that also. Minister also said: ‘You up older already, 50 
years already, you need to study, go to ‘U’ [university] also, take your cert.”85 All twelve young 
people unanimously began their responses to “What do you think is the purpose of education?” 
– with the prospect of good jobs. Farah described the ‘purpose of education’ as “to gain 
knowledge, in order to perform well in future jobs […] Our teacher also say that [knowledge 
learned in school] could be used for your upcoming projects when you are in ITE, and also in 
future jobs.”  
While education was generally agreed upon as important across all countries, there was 
a simultaneous perception that the qualification was particularly important in Singapore. The 
credential was important to Singaporean employers, as most parents explained. As Chandra 
 
85 As part of a drive to encourage ‘lifelong learning’, the government’s SkillsFuture initiative provides money to 
adults to upskill and increase their competitiveness. For more information, please see: 
https://www.skillsfuture.sg/ 
While most parents were positive about ‘lifelong learning’ and desired time to upskill themselves, they also 
noted that realistically, they did not have time to take up further courses on top of raising their children and their 
day-to-day jobs.   
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(father, F2), joked, you even need an O-level to sweep the streets. Moreover, if education was 
important in getting you money, then it was particularly important in Singapore, where “all the 
rules are money”, as Hannah (mother, F7), remarked. It therefore followed that the more 
children studied, the better.  
However, my findings suggest that the ‘power’ of education can be bifurcated into more 
instrumental, versus more transcendental visions of education’s purpose. While an instrumental 
vision of education to get a job and money strongly pervaded families’ accounts, this 
instrumentalisation seemed more pronounced for young people, likely because they are exposed 
to the more instrumental logics of Singaporean education through daily schooling. Parents were 
typically able to conceptualise a richer vision of the purpose of education. The parent-child 
differences are particularly evident in this exchange between Devi and her parents (F4), where 
Devi’s parents tried to correct her more instrumental conception of the purpose of education.  
Interviewer: So what do you think is the purpose of education? 
 
Devi: To earn money. 
 
Lakshmi: Oh my dear… [Devi laughs] My opinion is not only money. Not earning 
money, ‘mam. Not only money. Money, plus our life is there. […] Money can earn; 
even people never study also earn money ah. Some lucky people they do business, 
education level low, very low. Some are very good at business. […] [But] education is 
very important for life. [coughs] ‘Cos without education people ah, some no luck, they 
suffer a lot. They don’t know how this world is going on. They cannot see anything 
ah. So I – I confident about this, education is life, not only money. [coughs] 
 
Devi: [To Kumar] You leh, old man. Say? 
 
Kumar: There is no end for education, OK? Education is the foundation. It’s the 
backbone for them, the answers for them [i.a.] I will say yes, it will help them at the 
day end. Money can never help you. When your education is there, you can get 
whatever you want. 
 
Devi: Education don’t give you everything – money gives you food. [laughs] 
 
Lakshmi: Money ah, money is lost and can go you know. For example, if we have got 
money, like our whole house got some money is there – maybe can lost the money. If 
you got the knowledge, education knowledge ah, wherever you go also can survive. I 
trust that lah.  
 
Interviewer: Sure, okay. [To Kumar] You agree? 
 




In this exchange,86 the ephemerality of ‘money’ is contrasted with ‘education knowledge’ that 
is long-lasting. Such ‘knowledge’ does not bring only money; it also brings enlightenment, 
enabling young people to “see” and understand “how this world is going on”. This was 
particularly striking, because, to contextualise Devi’s remark that “money gives you food” – 
different families (such as Juriffah, Naadia and Dimal’s families) pointed out that lack of money 
for food concerned them. Dimal’s daughter Farah described occasionally going without dinner 
sometimes, while Juriffah and Naadia’s sons described having not enough money from the 
MOE’s Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS) to buy enough food to sustain them through long 
schooling hours. Amongst young people interviewed, Hakeem (son, F7) was the only one who 
conceptualised the purpose of education in terms of a broader, lifelong process of learning and 
enlightenment. Initially, he described the purpose of education in more instrumental terms: 
Like, now, you see our world is changing to a new level – there has been more 
technology coming in. So like, if you don’t cope with now levels, we will like be at 
the bottom, and we will like be unknown to everyone. So, in our education, we must 
learn a lot.  
 
However, he continued, drawing on Hindu cultural repertoires: 
Then, in my [Hindu] culture, there’s been like lots of phrases that have captivated me. 
[…] Like, the size of your hand is whatever you have learned – there is still much 
more you can learn, you have to not stop learning, so that is one purpose of life. […] 
Like, if you pick up the grain of sand, right? That is how much you have learned. 
There is still more that you can learn. 
 
For parents, morality and life wisdom were viewed as further purposes of education:  
Yeah lah, if like they grows, they don’t know anything – then people do this to them, 
they follow…A lot of troublesome, right? Then, oh people say […] “Why you doing 
this?” “This boy ask me to do, I do.” So he didn’t go school, he got nothing! He got 
don’t know anything. Like became stupid like that. (Ayu, mother, F11) (emphasis added) 
 
If let’s say you are educated, you also know what is right, what is wrong, and later, you 
have your own family, you know how to lead your family also. […] If let’s say you are 
educated, you can go on your own, everywhere. You can go and find out, the knowledge 
is there. So you can do everything. (Hannah, mother, F7) (emphasis added) 
 
Finally, families at times conceptualised the purpose of education in social terms: to socialise 
with friends and teachers, or to ‘help’ others. The purpose of education in making young people 
helpful was a strong strand in families’ responses. By being educated, one would be able to 
help their present and future family – through applying critical thinking competencies to 
 
86 A very similar exchange was observed between Izzati and her daughter, Nurul. During the focus group 
interview, Izzati tried to persuade Nurul that schooling was more about gaining a qualification.  
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resolving any family problems, and through financially supporting family members. 
Furthermore, education can help young people to help the less fortunate. Farah (daughter, F5) 
stated: “The person I need to become is, I want to help people. When they are during their ups 
and downs, when they don’t have family around with them, then I will become their friends to 
help them.” Education would help her achieve her ambition to become a nurse, which would 
enable her to “help people when they are upset, or maybe injured.”  
 Thus, the construction of subjectivity was not purely through dominant neoliberal logics 
where “existential questions” about the purpose and meaning of education are transfigured into 
“technical questions of the most effective ways of managing malfunction and improving 
‘quality of life’ ” (Rose, 1992:1-2). Some families do exhibit glimpses of a deeper engagement 
with the broader, more transcendental purposes of education. As such, families understood 
‘responsibility’ both in neoliberal terms, as well as in richer, more relational ways.  
Yet, subsuming all these purposes of education – the acquisition of financial stability, 
knowledge, life wisdom, helpfulness – the greatest attraction of education lay in the broader 
project of developing the responsible individual. This primarily meant instilling in children an 
ability to “stand on their own feet”, to not be a burden to anyone. This was true for daughters 
as much as it is for sons. For instance, when asked if cultivating a spirit of independence was 
less important for daughters than sons, Chandra (father, F2) stated that regarding 
“independence”, this was just as important to cultivate in boys and girls. The quality Dimal 
(father, F5) wanted most for his daughter to achieve, is to be “independent…always know what 
she is doing”. The next subsection explores the development of the responsible subjectivity in 
greater detail.  
   
5.3.2 Responsibilising young people 
A core value that families held was that young people are primarily responsible for educational 
and future success, and to blame for failure to achieve this. Values, Sayer (2005:952) argues, 
develop not deductively in one’s own mind, but through “ongoing mutual and self-monitoring 
that occurs in everyday interactions with others”. The value of ‘responsibility’, while 
individualising, is also deeply social – connected to existing social practices and norms. A 
crucial social ‘interaction’ that reinforces this responsibilisation of young people, is families’ 
descriptions of relations of dependency with the state and school. That is, parents typically 
devolved responsibility to young people, reasoning that other parties (state, school and 
themselves) had done their part. The next chapter elaborates on this, but it is worth elaborating 
on this briefly here, as it is central to understanding parents’ attributions of responsibility to the 
child. For instance, Anjushri (mother, F3) stated:  
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Nowadays ah, Singapore, I always tell my children ah, you born in Singapore, you must 
be happy […] If we are suffering, suffering one thing. But education come ah, there’s 
no suffer you know. That’s what I tell my children […] Now the government is paying 
for everything. That’s the good benefit the government gave us already. Why you all 
don’t want to study? Only the government is asking you all to study only, never ask you 
to do anything already.  
 
Within this dependency context, it’s now all “up to them”, parents explained. Parents 
sometimes portrayed the future consequences (rewards and punishment) of being a 
responsible/irresponsible child, in extreme, hyperbolic ways: 
Yeah, so I always tell [my children]: “You just choose lah. You want 10,000 [dollars] 
or you want 2,000? 10,000 it means if you study hard, you will achieve monthly salary 
is 10,000. If you want 2,000, or less than 2,000, you keep doing what you are doing 
now.” […] “So if you don’t want to listen my advice now, you’ll be regret.” (Radzi, 
father, F11) 
 
Radzi’s comment reinforces an earlier argument concerning families’ confidence in the 
teleological linearity of meritocratic logic, from education to good jobs to a successful future.  
 Furthermore, this responsibilisation was focused on the young person, because it was 
typically a responsibilisation focused narrowly on the acquisition of the academic grades – 
nothing more. Since the young person was the one taking examinations, the responsibility was 
all his/hers. This constituted for some young people a claustrophobic responsibilisation, 
because pursuing good academic results seemed the one main goal in life. The less academically 
inclined young people, typically in NA and NT streams, found this particularly exhausting. This 
was illustrated in a focus group interview with a mother, Naadia, and her sons Irfan (who was 
in the NA stream) and Yusof (F10).  
Interviewer: Okay, what do all of you think is the point or the purpose of education? 
 
Yusof: Get a job. 
 
Irfan: Mmhm, get a job. Get a job and a life. 
 
Naadia: Get a life. [laughs] 
 
Irfan: You know like, proper life lah. Normal people. Just work and then die. 
 
Naadia: Better living lah, for your future. 
 
Irfan: Ah better living, yeah. That’s all…Like, without education, you’re just like, more 
of like a person who hard to get money and a proper life [and house] to stay in, once 
[you are] in the future. Then like, no money, no home, homeless then…That’s all lah. 





Interviewer: And how does education help to get you there, to that point? 
 
Irfan: Uh, certificate, diploma, degree. 
 
Interviewer: Okay sure. [To Yusof] And what do you think? Do you want to add to that, 
agree, disagree? 
 
Yusof: I agree. 
 
In contrast to the responsibilisation of young people in Singapore, in The Cultural 
Contradictions of Motherhood, Sharon Hays (1996:x) theorises the responsibilisation of parents 
in contemporary U.S. – that is, shifts towards “intensive motherhood”. For disadvantaged 
families in Singapore, however, the pressure is not so much to be a ‘good’ parent (Faircloth et 
al., 2013:3); this certainly exists, but in a context where pedagogic labour is reduced (through 
institutional structures and processes) to the imperative of acquiring academic qualifications, 
families’ focus is instead on the ‘good’ (that is, educated) child.  
This, as it turns out, is just as classed as “intensive motherhood” (Faircloth et al., 2013). 
Tan (2018) argues that Singaporean parents with higher earning power and education 
credentials were likelier to send children to private tuition and enrichment classes that would 
enable their children to negotiate different routes to good schools and futures – for instance, 
through Singapore’s diversified Direct School Admissions (DSA) scheme. Parents with less 
economic capital, however, were forced to focus on academic results as the primary route to 
success. This coheres with this study’s finding, that families laid profound psychosocial weight 
on academic performance. Another classed dimension of this focus on the ‘good’ educated child, 
is that acquiring good grades is increasingly difficult in increasingly parentocratic Singapore. 
While is true that the PAP government has provided significantly in terms of education (as 
Anjushri’s quote earlier in this subsection suggests), the national ‘common-sense’ of the state’s 
widespread provision of public education doesn’t account for the fact that middle-class parents 
have access to a private tuition and enrichment industry that reinforces their relative advantage, 
which disadvantaged families interviewed in this study seemed largely unaware of (Gee, 2012; 
Koh & Chong, 2014). 
Families on the socio-economic margins, positioned in a historical and a socio-political 
context that emphasises familial and self-responsibility – and faced with the harshness of a 
competitive, meritocratic system and the tightness of its logics (education-job-future) – 
struggled to see possibilities beyond responsibilising the younger generation and urging them 
to take up the responsibility mantle to earn good academic grades to secure a better future. Thus, 
families exerted responsibilising pressures on young people to attain the best possible results.  
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Young people broadly agreed that they were ultimately responsible for their own 
success. Nurul (daughter, F8) stated that the child was most responsible for his or her own 
success – “the child can make themselves […] be successful in life”; schools and parents were 
only there to support and motivate them. However, young people also tended to believe 
responsibility should be shared between multiple stakeholders. Schools and parents played 
important roles in encouraging and advising them, and helping them stay on track, as almost all 
young people described. Parents devolved ultimate responsibility to young people; however, it 
was not that they saw themselves as without responsibility. In fact, families also enact an 
‘intensive parenting’ focused around helping young people achieve academic grades, even if 
they saw ultimate responsibility and blame as resting on young people. Section 5.4 delineates 
the responsibilities parents felt they had, in child-rearing. 
 
5.3.3 Shame and the ‘educated’ child  
Shame is a crucial affect that reinforces the previous two dimensions of families’ values: the 
responsibilisation of young people, and the importance families ascribe to education. Shame 
may be defined as the “response to the imagined or actual views of others” – a “private, 
reflexive emotion, in that it primarily involves an evaluation of the self by the self” (Sayer, 
2005:952). Shame is significant in any analysis of inequality, because it is both a cause and 
effect of social hierarchy (Lister, 2004).  
Disadvantaged families’ desire to achieve external validation is easily exploited and 
amplified, due to their feelings of shame connected to their family’s low standing and their 
perceived failures in life. The propensity to feel shame is heightened in Singapore, where status-
consciousness is a cultural norm (Teo, 2018). For Anjushri (F3), living in a rental one-bedroom, 
her lack of education and her eldest daughter running away from home,87 was a cause for great 
shame. Thus, Anjushri’s “hope” was on her son Sanjay’s ability to secure a place in Poly, to 
relieve this shame. 
Anjushri: Ah, I want him to go Poly. I tell him your sister make my head down already. 




Anjushri: Make me shame already. […] Because my mother and my sisters all well. My 
sister stay in five room [flat]. My younger sister also stay in five room. When I sell my 
room, I come to the rental flat. When I go to the function… That’s why I stopped. When 
I go to the function or anything, my mother will tell me what, you know? “When 
everybody asks you ah, you don’t say that you stay at the rental flat. You just say you 
 
87 The reason for this, Anjushri said, was given in a letter her daughter left her parents: because she did not want 
to struggle with her family in poverty anymore.  
129 
 
stay at the four room flat” […] People ah, they will looked down on you […] I cannot 
take it. That is why I tell my son. Now my hope is in you. My hope is in your studies. I 
tell him, “I never tell you to take high results. I just want you to go Poly or […] JC.” 
 
Shame and responsibility are analytically connected, because ‘shame’ is “dependent on a 
positive valuation of…behaviours, ideals or principles”; one who feels shame has internalised 
certain societal norms, because: “[i]t is only if we have certain expectations of ourselves…that 
we can be shamed” (Sayer, 2005:954). In my findings, the gap between the shameful where-
we-are and the illustrious where-we-should-be is bridged by responsibilisation.88 Kumar (father, 
F4) argued that young people should excel in their studies to boost the family’s social standing: 
“ ‘Oh my dad, my mum […] both of them not from proper education, not good education, why 
can’t we do well and make proud our parents, you know? Show the society, we are so-and-so’s 
children. So this is what we expect as parents, you know.” 
 To mitigate this shame, parents often wanted their children to attend more prestigious 
institutions than young people did (e.g. Anjushri [F3] and Hannah’s [F7] family).89 Although 
only twelve families were interviewed, it is striking that not one of the young people aspired to 
enter Junior College. Young people, the ones who would be taking examinations and exposed 
to the rigours of schooling, were likely more familiar with how difficult entering and passing 
Junior College would be. The discrepancy in aspiration sometimes led to parent-child conflicts 
(e.g. in Deepta [F2] and Devi’s [F4] families).90  
Having outlined key dimensions of families’ beliefs and values, the rest of this chapter 
discusses families’ pedagogic approaches. Here, I show how many neoliberal imperatives 
described in families’ beliefs and values are instantiated in families’ pedagogic approaches. 
However, ‘technologies of the self’ tend not to be developed through straightforwardly 
internalising a set of socio-cultural rules, but through developing an overall disposition or 
capacity for self-improvement (Lambek, 2010). Thus, there are clear but uneven linkages 
between beliefs and values, and approaches (Ball, 2003). I discuss in the next three sections a 
bricolage of approaches that draw largely but not exclusively on neoliberal imperatives: 1) 
disciplinary approaches, 2) help-seeking approaches, 3) protective approaches. 
 
 
88 While families felt the desire to be responsible and to rise to the illustrious where-we-should-be, there were 
glimpses in interviews of an uncertainty that the gap could or should ever be bridged. Chapter Seven explores 
this further, particularly in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.  
89 One exception was Ayu’s family, where her daughter Masuda wanted to enter Poly, but Ayu felt ambivalent 
about this; she said she did not discourage it, but: “I won’t put too much hope on them.” 
90 Aspiration levels as drivers of inequality are explored further in Chapter Seven.  
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5.4. Disciplinary Approaches 
5.4.1. “I have given until I have got no words to give them no more”: Parents’ Talk and 
Nagging 
Families described their main way to help their children succeed, as predominantly verbal – as 
the quote above, by Kumar (father, F4), suggests. The key approach described by parents, when 
asked how they helped their children succeed, was that of ‘nagging’ young people to study hard.  
An air of light-heartedness permeated how Kumar framed ‘nagging’. He joked that their 
family called nagging ‘sing song’: “And my wife sees me, she will know I’m ready to sing song. 
‘Cos I come back [laughs], oh I never see them with a book,91 I’ll start nagging at them lah, 
you know?” This light-heartedness, however, was partly to relieve feelings of anxiety, fear and 
even conflict between parents and young people. During a discussion on nagging in a focus 
group interview with her parents Kumar and Lakshmi, Devi said flatly: “It’s demoralising”. 
Young people generally described responding to their parents by saying “OK”, although they 
did not necessarily later do as they were told. One mother, Ayu (F11), described:  
‘Cos my husband always torture [Aiman], scold him – not that we want to make him 
pressure, you know – we wants the best for him. ‘Cos, OK, “you can see you sisters, 
your brothers can do, why you cannot do? You don’t make people to look down on you, 
right?” 
 
But when her children don’t listen, she begins: “nagging, nagging, nagging right, I angry 
already, I nag, nag, nag, nag, nag all come out from my mouth. I don’t know what I’m talking, 
I don’t know what I’m angry for – everything will come out.” She continued: “People will think 
that I crazy or what, shouting at children, say scold children […] But I’m doing that for my 
kids.” Izzati, another mother (F8), felt similarly:  
If […] I keep telling them to work hard and every time there’s no, how to say, there’s 
no effort from them, then […] I feel like sedih92 you know, very sad. And I need to tell 
them. As a mother, we need to tell them every time, whether they listen or they don’t 
listen, we still need to tell them. 
 
 In a society that deeply valorised qualifications – including teachers, relatives, peers, 
employers – parents felt, “as a mother”, as Izzati stated, that nagging was crucial for their child’s 
good.  
At the same time, parents commonly averred that a child’s future is in their hands, and 
they could not pressure their children to do anything. On the surface, this appears like the 
provision of some autonomy that accompanies responsibilisation. However, when parents 
 
91 “See them with a book” was a shorthand for seeing young people revising or doing schoolwork.  
92 A Malay term, meaning ‘sad’. 
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described how they communicated this to the child, it was clear that the autonomy was a thin 
one. Young people were often encouraged to choose whatever course they wanted, within some 
bounds of respectability – for instance, not photography and modelling, or dancing, as two 
mothers, Naadia (F10) and Saanvi (F2), qualified, respectively. Reflecting on her mother 
Saanvi’s pressure on her to enter JC (when she preferred Poly) and to enter the teaching 
profession (when she preferred dance), Deepta stated: “Sometimes, yeah, I just wish that they 
can at least pretend, you know, [that] it’s okay” – ‘okay’ for her to make her own choices 
regarding her future. However, she recognised her parents’ advice was for her good: 
My mum says that I should go for a better course that can make me get into a much 
more better job […] Then saying that they really suffered and then they don’t want the 
same thing to happen to me. So I’ll take that into consideration. I think they’re just 
trying their best to help me succeed.  
 
Furthermore, when parents told a child it was ‘up to them’, this was not a statement of a parent’s 
helplessness, or a child’s control over their future – it was also a warning, a presenting of an 
autonomy shaded and bound by normativity. Often, parents described shifts in the social 
construction of parent-child relations. Parents felt that their parents were dogmatic and forceful 
with them. Contemporary parenting, however, was described as requiring a softer approach 
because young people were more independent and critical. However, parents’ descriptions of 
these shifts seemed to contradict their descriptions of how they ‘nagged’. For instance, one 
father, Radzi (F11), remarked:   
So I always tell them, “Now in life, only things you need to do is study hard. Why 
need to study hard? Once you study hard […] you achieve your studies, you can get a 
good career.” I believe everyone wants this. If you don’t want to study, it’s OK. In the 
end, you don’t regret yourself, OK?  
 
Another form of parental talk that intersected closely with nagging, was parents’ discussions of 
positive and negative real-life examples of people who had studied and people who hadn’t. For 
instance, Naadia (F10) drew on the example of her more educated cousin’s son, in encouraging 
her son Irfan to study: 
We tell him, advise to him, and we like, sit down with him and say: “You think yourself 
[…] I’m not trying to say the other people are so good” […]. [But] I say, “You see baby 
–” we call him ‘baby’ lah […] cos he’s the younger one so he’s like a baby to us. So 
when I say, “Baby, you see…I get to know from my cousin the son pass his Poly […] 
he go NS,93 the moment he finish NS, he go university and now he can find a better job. 
Don’t you like to be him, like him?” I said to him. And he say, “Yeah, yeah, yeah”. 
That’s all lah. I just show example like, currently like, other people, how it’s like this.  
 
 
93 NS is an acronym widely used in Singapore to stand for National Service, the compulsory military service for 
18-year-old males, introduced by the PAP government in 1967.  
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For negative statements, parents tended to draw on the example of themselves – as perhaps 
most vividly illustrated in this quote, also from Naadia:  
Also I said to [Irfan and Yusof], like: “You see your father work from morning until 
night 10+, 11+ to come home. Every day, even seven days a week. Even though Sunday 
other people already sleeping, resting, go out, for him it’s working. No rest at all.” I said, 
“Do you want your life to be like your father without any rest and earning just enough 
to provide food on the table?” Then they keep quiet, they say they don’t want. They 
don’t want to relive hell […] Then I say, “Okay then, your example is there. We are the 
living example of your life. So, motivate yourself and take it as a motivation for your 
life lah.” Then they said, “OK.” 
 
The impact of ‘education’ on ‘life’ ran through parents’ positive and negative imaginaries of 
what education could achieve, reflecting the tightness of education-job-future linkages. To 
Naadia, ‘education’ and ‘life’ were so closely interwoven they were conflated: “That’s why I 
told my sons: ‘Don’t regret it like me, once you stop schooling, it’s like end of your life’ – for 
me lah! I did tell them this.” Such sentiments reinforced their desire to shape their children’s 
subjectivities, even as they are shaped by the subjectifying forces of a hyper-competitive 
education system and the political economy that structures it (Tremewan, 1994).  
 
5.4.2. Monitoring, surveillance and punishment  
In Unequal Childhoods, Lareau (2003) describes middle-class families in the U.S. as enacting 
greater regulation over children’s lives, for instance through using detailed timetables – while 
working-class families tended to leave children to their own devices. In Singapore, however, 
despite their often long, irregular shift hours, and for several families, severe and often 
debilitating health problems94 – disadvantaged parents worked hard to monitor their children.95 
Parents monitored largely out of fear their children would stray from a defined ‘right path’ (as 
Kumar put it). This ‘right path’ was structured heavily by the ‘panoptical gaze’ of the good 
(‘educated’) child. This section describes two forms of monitoring: monitoring children’s moral 
development and monitoring for academic-related reasons. The two are not unrelated, because 
to most families, morally ‘good’ children were those who obeyed their parents and did their 
best to secure good grades in school. 
 
94 Examples of this include Ayu’s ongoing fight with cancer, Naadia’s chronic back pain and Kumar being 
wheelchair-bound and his struggles with clinical depression. These conditions not only constrained the time they 
could give to care-giving and helping their children with schoolwork, it also severely limited their ability to work 
and created additional sources of stress, financially and emotionally, at home.  
95 Parents were also very much helped in this regard, through ‘strong’ state provisions not only of public schools 
with many after-school co-curricular activities, but also the government’s provision of SHG tuition. From 
analysing their descriptions of a typical week in interviews, it was clear that most young people led highly 
structured lives.  
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 The concern over a child’s moral development largely centred over peer group. Parents 
described wanting to know who their children’s friends were. Dimal (F5), Chandra (F2) and 
Anjushri (F3) wanted to know where their child was, all the time. Chandra noted that if his 
daughter went out with friends, he wanted to know a friend’s contact information. Dimal 
commented: “My biggest worry is if they mix around with people, or teenagers right now, 
friends”. He added that he therefore had to monitor his daughters, “Because things can get bad 
and worse, if you didn’t monitor.” 
The Internet was another source of anxiety – specifically, young people spending too 
much time on their phones which would distract them from their studies (as Kumar mentioned), 
or in the access it provided to ‘bad’ influences such as drugs, as Ayu (F11) described: 
You know lah, nowadays the children have whatsapp […] My daughter don’t like me 
look on her phone, but I said, you like or don’t like, we have to. We as a parent have to 
check on your phone. So every week, my husband will do it […] Even Google or 
Youtube, everything have to check something fishy. 
 
It is unsurprising that most young people did not like such approaches, but to young people, 
this nonetheless constituted ‘normal’ parental behaviour.  
 Dania, another mother (F12), keeps a strict watch over her children’s use of social media. 
She describes having different ‘informers’ – some of whom are her daughter, Sabrena’s school 
friends, and her brother’s fiancée – who secretly report to Dania when Sabrena posts something 
judged to be questionable on social media. Dania also keeps track of her children’s belongings, 
to see if anything unexpected appears amongst their belongings. The latter form of monitoring 
emerged after her third son, Feisal, received a new handphone that turned out to be a stolen 
good; Feisal’s friend had broken into a mobile phone shop, stolen four phones and given him 
one. Her second son, who ran in overlapping social circles with Feisal, warned Dania that the 
police were closing in on Feisal and his friends. Sure enough, the week of our second interview, 
she received a call from Feisal, asking her to come to the police station to sign some paperwork 
for a urine test, and to post bail. Both Dania and Feisal were required to attend mandatory 
counselling sessions.  
  The day before our interview, Dania told Feisal she was already going through a very 
difficult time; she was in the middle of a divorce, she was worked off her feet from housework 
and her full-time job as a cleaner. She told him: “You have to help me, to make the transition 
smooth”, and: “You just wished me happy Mother’s Day on Sunday and then right after, this 
happened”. The larger problem was that Feisal was awaiting sentencing for a previous issue; in 
a fit of rage at his eldest brother, he threw his brother’s bicycle out the window of their fourth-
storey flat. The officer who dealt with his case had warned Dania that if another offense 
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emerged, the punishment (and remediation process) would be doubly severe. Thus, while 
monitoring at times appeared almost excessive, the cost of not monitoring children was severe 
and debilitating, for families already pressed for time and resources.  
 Apart from monitoring their moral development, parents also monitored their children’s 
academic development. They monitored their children’s attendance at school and punctuality, 
in collaboration with school staff – who, to parents’ satisfaction, were very particular about 
such things.  
Now the school be strict, I will say, “good”. Now, my son ah, five minutes late to 
secondary [school], my husband will receive message. It’s very good. The school ah, 
what the children are doing now in school, what they do, they are telling things to the 
parents. (Anjushri, mother, F3) 
 
Sure [the school] will call us. Even [children] go to school late, they give us. Because 
our secondary school got the discipline master […] [children] go to school, they bring 
handphones, they late to school – all these they really will inform us […] Each every 
child they watching, I’m happy. Because some country […] they don’t care, don’t 
know. But Singapore is different, yeah. (Lakshmi, mother, F4) 
  
Parents and teachers, as the next chapter elaborates on, collaborated closely – both formally and 
informally, through WhatsApp messaging, phone calls, emails and parent-teacher meetings. 
Monitoring in collaboration with schools was particularly pronounced for ‘problem’ students, 
but all parents of young people across all academic streams described close engagement with 
teachers. Even when parents could not make parent-teacher meetings due to irregular shift hours, 
teachers connected with parents informally (such as through phone calls) at a time that suited 
parents.  
Parents also closely monitored their children’s academic grades, and were deeply 
interested in their children’s attainment. Izzati (mother, F8) commented: 
I’m not asking for 80, 90 – I know they, it's very difficult for them to get, but to have 
the Pass. Like 60, 70. If they go down below that, then they will, I will talk to them lah, 
seriously. […] I will tell them […] “How do you study”, “Why your teacher feedback 
to me like this?” and, “Your teachers are telling me that you are not studying and you 
are playing around”. 
 
Despite their children being of Secondary Four age (16-17 years of age), parents described 
checking their schoolbags on Sunday evenings (such as in Ayu and Namrita’s families) – for 
notes from teachers to parents, and homework that children had accidentally or deliberately not 
completed. They also frequently asked their children: “Did you get any scolding? Did you do 
your homework? Did you go for your extra classes?”, as Lakshmi described.  
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This monitoring led to punishment when young people deviated from the ‘right path’. 
Punishment included withholding handphones (as Hannah [F7] and Srinivas [F3] did), or doling 
out physical beating (as Ayu [F12] did with a “hangar”, and Kumar and Lakshmi [F4] did, with 
Devi and her brother, for playing instead of revising). Beating is normal, Devi said. Devi 
suggested that, at times, getting a ‘whacking’ was not so much a pedagogic approach, as parents 
taking their stress out on children. But to her parents, ‘whacking’ was pedagogically crucial, in 
disciplining young people. The government doesn’t understand, though, Kumar and Lakshmi 
said. The government thinks beating is ‘abuse’ – however, from what they have seen, from their 
experiences navigating disadvantage, young people, as Lakshmi described, “go [their] own way, 
become play with the friends, do mistakes […] So the government – the police catch them – so 
the child’s life is spoiled now.” 
Harsh discipline, and care and love, are not necessarily mutually exclusive in 
disadvantaged families’ lives (Arditti, Burton and Neeves-Botelho, 2010; Deater-Deckard and 
Dodge, 1997), particularly when one understands “how and why” discipline occurs (Arditti et 
al., 2010:160). For instance, harsh discipline may be viewed as an adaptive mechanism in 
contexts of disadvantage, where a child’s obedience is important because safety-nets are thin 
(ibid).  
At times, monitoring and surveillance seemed geared towards protection, as seen in 
Dania’s monitoring of Feisal, but other times, it seemed oppressive. The latter form typically 
circled around academic qualifications, in the absence of alternative routes to success (Tan, 
2019). Generally,  understanding ‘intensive parenting’ in the Singapore context cannot be 
divorced from the meanings families attach to the high-stakes structures and processes of 
Singapore’s education system, the centrality of the academic grade in the meritocracy-
education mechanism, and the material contexts of disadvantage that lead to thin safety-nets. 
Families respond to their context not only as rational, calculative actors, but through a mixture 
of care and anxiety that is amplified by their lack of safety-nets, should their children fall to the 
wayside.  
 
5.4.3. Studying hard and managing time   
To young people, being responsible primarily meant studying hard at school to achieve the best 
possible grades. Farah (daughter, F5) described an ‘excellent’ student as follows: 
Memorise, then […] a few months before their exams, or their tests, they will revise on 
them. If they are not sure, they will take foolscap paper, they will do the question on the 
foolscap. If they get the answer correct, they will cover their answer with their hands, 




This was because a key requirement to get a good job was a “good grade in any exam”, Sabrena 
(daughter, F12) said – especially in mathematics and English, which were the key subjects 
students had to pass to enter any post-secondary institution in Singapore.  Furthermore, young 
people felt that knowing how to manage their time, between co-curriculars (which were 
compulsory) and schoolwork was crucial to success, due to their heavy workload.  
 
5.5. Help-seeking Approaches  
To share the burden of responsibility, two main forms of help-seeking is evident in some 
families’ lives. Firstly, families primarily collaborated with the school; Chapter Six analyses 
the nature of this in greater detail. Dania (mother, F12) described working collectively, ‘hand-
in-hand’, with schools to raise her children: “[I]f let’s say like, certain children of mine don’t 
want to open up to me, I leave it to the social worker, or I leave it to the school counsellor, I 
leave it to the school teacher.” 
 In such instances, the perceived widespread provision of well-resourced schools and 
well-trained staff blunts the necessity of ‘parentocratic’ behaviour. While most seemed unaware 
of the extent of ‘parentocracy’ in Singapore, even those who recognised some advantages of 
private tuition and enrichment class nonetheless claimed that the state and school provided 
adequately for their needs (see Section 5.6.3). Dania’s refusal of neoliberal individualism 
(which is propagated by Singapore’s high-stakes education system) is paradoxically constituted 
also through an achievement of the Singapore government – that sources of state-provided help 
are available. The net effect of this is a deep trust in the state, and the perpetuation of the status 
quo and inequality – even while counter-hegemonic possibilities that refuse neoliberal 
parentocracy are generated.96 Inequality is likely perpetuated, because the quality of provision 
generally differs, between public school and SHG provision, versus private tuition and 
enrichment classes (Gee, 2012).  
Secondly, families seek help from relatives, typically for academic help for their 
children. For some mothers, this provided emotional support and relaxation. Nasifah (F6) and 
Hannah (F7), two mothers, call their sisters everyday – sharing problems, ideas and suggestions 
for raising children. At times, families sought help from more highly educated relatives. Devi’s 
(daughter, F4) uncle is a government school Head of Department, while Shreya’s (daughter, F1) 
aunt is a teacher at an independent secondary school in Singapore. In both cases, Shreya and 
Devi sought advice from these relatives on how to study, and on post-secondary school options.    
 
96 Chapter Seven expands on the relationship between the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity, and inequality.  
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However, help-seeking practices were largely curtailed by families’ limited social 
capital, combined with a strong desire to stand on their own feet – a desire likely reinforced by 
Singapore’s anti-welfarist ideology (Chua, 2004; Teo, 2013). Responsibilisation in Singapore 
is historically linked to a rather Hobbesian concern – which critics describe as exaggerated 
(Chua, 2017; The Economist, 2010) – that citizens will exploit the government’s generosity if 
too much is given. Underpinning the politics of welfare in Singapore is the notion that if you 
don’t pay for something, you don’t value it.97  
Never ask people for money, Srinivas stated, this is “very bad”. For the majority of families, 
shame – people’s judgment of their poverty and the possibility of “gossip” (Ayu, mother, F12) 
– made it hard to seek help. Ayu, with an almost fierce individualism, stated: 
I got no friends. My childrens, my family are my friends. Yeah I got no friends. Frankly 
speaking I got no friends […] I never talk to people, I only in this house. […] Because 
people says when we talk a lot with them, there’s a lot of gossip. Like kaypoh98 like that. 
So better I quiet. 
 
Another reason why they sometimes did not seek help, was because they had tried to ask for 
financial assistance from the government but had been rejected. Ayu explained how the 
government denied them help, because her husband was not working. However, he was not 
working because she had been diagnosed with cancer and there were seven children to take care 
of while she underwent chemotherapy.  
Asking help or no help, also the same […] [The government] asking this, they asking 
that, “Why we are not working, why…” […] A lot of places also we got rejected, just 
because of my husband is not working. “Why is your husband not working?” My 
husband not working, not that lazy to work. He have a letter from a doctor, as in, he is 
a caregiver of me and my kids for about a year. 
 
It was shortly after her diagnosis, and in conditions of growing financial desperation, that her 
son Qawi dropped out of ITE to help earn money for the family.99  
Furthermore, extended family networks as a source of help was often tempered with 
distrust. Some extended family members passed judgment on them, over allowing children to 
drop out of school to work (as Ayu described, when Qawi dropped out of school) and living in 
a ‘rental flat’ (as Anjushri described). Extended family members could be fickle and 
unscrupulous over money matters, befriending you in good times, and leaving you when you 
 
97 This is evidenced in an article in The Economist (2010) which stated: “[O]ne policy that shows no sign of 
reversing is Singapore’s antipathy towards public welfare. The state’s attitude can be simply put: being poor here 
is your own fault. Citizens are obliged to save for the future, rely on their families and not expect any handouts 
from the government unless they hit rock bottom.” 
98 Malay term for ‘busybody’. 
99 I revisit Ayu’s story of Qawi dropping out of ITE later on in this chapter, in Section 5.6.3. 
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were poor – even cheating you, as Anjushri and Srinivas remarked. Extended family members’ 
‘cheating’ was particularly dangerous, as Anjushri and Srinivas saw their lack of schooling as 
exacerbating their vulnerability.  
Thus, disadvantaged families face particular challenges in seeking help, particularly in 
anti-welfarist Singapore (Teo, 2013). While help is available at the level of public provision of 
education, some families – particularly those that lacked social capital – felt the need for more 
help beyond what was already provided.  Yet in these cases, families seemed to prefer to keep 
quiet – for fear of shame, judgment and untrustworthy extended family members, as well as 
recognition of the stiffness of Singaporean bureaucracy around welfare provision.  
 
5.6. Protective Approaches  
5.6.1. Meeting physical and financial needs  
Parents often worked hard and expressed a strong desire to meet their children’s physical and 
financial needs – particularly to help children gain as much education as possible. They often 
described telling their children not to worry about the financial aspect of studying, that they 
would find some way to support them – even to attain a Masters or PhD, as Juriffah (mother, 
F9), described. Some parents paid for private phonics classes for their children (e.g. Naadia 
[F10] and Anjushri [F3]) for short periods of time, when they noticed their children were 
struggling to keep up with their peers. 
In providing for children’s physical and financial needs, the division of labour was, to 
some degree, gendered – fathers were broadly seen as the primary breadwinners, while mothers 
tended to spend more time with the children. Reay (1998) argues that gender tends to be elided 
in discussions of social class. Yet, in hyper-competitive Singapore, a dual income is often 
required to get by, at least for disadvantaged families – such that mothers tended to work, and 
fathers were also frequently involved in helping with raising children.100 Thus, the stratification 
of child-rearing labour by gender – while present –  is mitigated partly by the pressure of earning 
dual incomes in Singapore. In particular, the stratification of child-rearing labour tended to be 
based on parents’ education level instead, with the more highly educated parent often tasked 
with helping the children with schoolwork. Omar (father, F6), for instance, being university-
educated, is described by his wife Nasifah as knowing the intricacies of schooling better, and 
as being stricter and more vigilant over the children’s educational achievement than she is.  
 
100 Amongst the 12 families interviewed, seven were dual income-earning families, two were single income-
earning families (only the father was earning an income) and, for three families, there was no steady income.   
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However, the pressures on women were amplified when mothers were forced to assume 
the role of primary breadwinner – such as in the case of mothers such as Lakshmi (F4), whose 
husband is disabled, and Dania (F12) and Juliana (F1), both of whom were either divorced or 
undergoing divorce.101  Thus far, the young person has been described as the focus of the 
meritocratic ethos. This emphasis, however, can elide the stresses related to the particularly 
weighty responsibilisation these mothers face. Rosen & Twamley (2018:10) note: “ ‘the child’ 
is increasingly viewed as the ultimate vulnerable…subject, deserving of every care and 
attention, often to the detriment of women to whom responsibility often falls.” Dania describes 
waking up at 5-6:30am, working in her job as a cleaner until 5pm, coming home and doing 
housework. She then cooks dinner at around 8-9pm, “and then I still have to hang clothes or 
fold clothes”, so she sometimes skips dinner when she is too tired.  
Another responsibility parents had was to fill forms to acquire government financial 
support. While the Singapore government provides some sources of funding, there are many 
forms to fill to acquire this funding.102 This poses a problem for parents who do not have 
English proficiency, and who are often short on time due to the punishing conditions of lowly-
paid wage work (Teo, 2018). The bureaucracy added to parents’ exhaustion, yet families often 
sought the best they could for their children. Dania described: 
 
[E]ven though I am a working mum, I just have to rush during my lunchtime to travel, 
in order to get that form, or to download to get that form. I will do whatever that I can 
in order for my children to benefit. So I go through the hardship for them. So, that is 
what I have been doing throughout from my first child until my last child. 
 
At the same time, young people, can also be seen as protecting their parents by refusing private 
tuition. Devi (F4) and Deepta (F2) found school tough, but did not want to burden their families 
financially by asking for private tuition. Devi insisted on paying for her own post-secondary 
schooling, to the bafflement of her parents. She stated: “I don’t want their money. I want the 
degree with my money […] Degrees quite expensive.”103 Her mother Lakshmi challenged this: 
“Who say expensive, Devi?” Lakshmi turned to me: “[No matter] how difficult at work also, 
still I want to give her to study […] I’m telling [her this], but she said she want own money to 
get the studies.” For these families, there was a mutuality in the ways they protected each other 
 
101 The PAP government has been criticised for providing little public assistance for divorcees (and their 
dependants) (Quah, 2015).  
102 As such, Srinivas describes a key benefit of schooling, as knowing how to read, write and specifically, to fill 
forms. 
103 The context of this exchange was a discussion over Devi’s future. Some young people mentioned that 
university was a possibility, although when asked about this in more concrete terms, they tended to state that 
they were most likely to attend Polytechnic and start work straightaway.  
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from the harshness of neoliberal imperatives. This finding parallels Crivello & Espinoza-
Revollo's (2018:140) research on mother-child relationships in contexts of poverty; they found 
that there was “need for intergenerational mutuality as a strategy for personal and collective 
survival.” 
 
5.6.2. Encouraging academic and moral development  
While nagging implies greater forcefulness on parents’ part, parents also had gentler 
conversations with their children to encourage moral – and to a lesser degree, academic – 
development. Parents often felt they could not contribute academically, seeing themselves as 
“helpless” (as two mothers, Juriffah [F9] and Anjushri [F4] described), leaving academic 
development to ‘educated’ teachers. However, some mothers played a more active role in this 
when the children were younger, such as Naadia, whom her children said used to be a ‘teacher’ 
to them. Naadia (F10) recounts: “Like ‘refrigerator’, I have to put in colour, like ‘re’ green, ‘fri’ 
is blue. For him it’s like, fun and colourful, and then only then he starts to learn.”  
 Families tended to be more comfortable with their roles in young people’s moral 
development. Schools pass values to students – “for example, don’t be so rude, don’t be so 
arrogant” and “respecting others”, Rizwan (son, F9) said; however: “I think all these values 
imparted by the school has actually been done by parents, because parents are the first teachers 
for the kids.” In fact, Dania was viewed by her daughter Sabrena (F12) as a role-model: “My 
mum, so far, she is an independent woman, so I learn from her, and to be independent, and not 
to depend on her or anyone else.” Over the course of fieldwork, Dania was processing a divorce 
in court, her second son was arrested, her third son ran away from home for a few days104 and 
she fell into an argument and subsequent “cold war” with Sabrena that nearly led to the 
cancellation of the focus group interview. Young people noticed, and looked up, to their parents’ 
resilience in what they recognised were difficult conditions.  
 
5.6.3. “Give them space”: negotiating rest, moderating aspirations 
While not all parents displayed recognition of middle-class ‘parentocratic’ – what Hays (1996:x) 
might call “intensive” – parenting, some parents did, and were critical of it. Dania reflected:  
I don’t really go to parenting books because that is very strategic, you know, maybe it 
takes upon very successful people with very…not say convenient life, but they have all 
it takes to actually make it happen. Like certain parents, they do not want their child to 
fail on them. You know, compare with another child or another friend’s child.  
 
104 Running away from home, while troubling, was not atypical for disadvantaged families I interviewed; both 
Dania and Anjushri’s families described the pain of their children running away for periods of time. Parents 




While she admitted that it would be nice to have the financial resources to enrol her children 
for private tuition and enrichment, she distanced herself from ‘parentocratic’ behaviour, sensing 
it would be unnecessarily stressful for her children. Dania admired the imaginary “successful” 
family with “convenient” lives, yet simultaneously distanced herself from this posture of 
excessive pressurising.  
Thus, for material and personal reasons, and perhaps also that families (due to their 
limited social capital) are unaware of higher-income families’ strategic behaviour – low-income 
families described having no “strategies”, as Chandra (father, F2), Izzati (mother, F8) explained. 
They felt they were not like parents who can afford to be “strategic” (Dania, F12) by enrolling 
their children in different classes. Chandra’s only wish for his daughter Deepta, “is just achieve 
whatever you can achieve. The highest possible.” Yet, there was a level of reflexivity and active 
decision-making in choosing to protect young people from the hyper-competitive, 
‘parentocratic’ milieu through: 1) prioritising well-being over grades, and 2) exercising 
contentment with what they had.   
 Firstly, families were deeply concerned about their children’s present-day well-being. 
While academic grades were highly valued, this was tempered by a recognition that a young 
person’s well-being should (at least, in principle) take precedence. However, this is difficult 
because the two imperatives of current versus future well-being exist side-by-side in uneasy 
tension. They perpetually co-exist – because it is not so much that “performance has no room 
for caring” (Ball, 2003:224), as that the tensions between domination and care are complicated. 
The freedom to exercise care can be fragile and contingent, circumscribed by harsh structural 
constraints that limit this freedom. Thus, the work of care can be interpreted as both a  “struggle 
against/with the practices of performativity” (Ball & Olmedo, 2013:86). 
Several parents cited their knowledge of newspaper stories and hearsay of students 
committing suicide from academic pressure in Singapore, citing this as a reason why they 
should not pressure their children too much. Partly it wasn’t deemed productive, but also partly, 
parents were concerned for their child’s well-being – specifically, for their ‘mental’ well-being. 
Naadia (mother, F10) described the process as ‘give and take’: “So when we tell them, ‘Study 
study study’, we don’t like, ‘Eh, you!’. I mean, a bit of give and take. I say, ‘You must study’, 
but then let them take their own time – as long as they study.” 
Dania (F12) called for sensitivity to a child’s perspective: 
[A] child’s capability is only up to 80%, so…you need to understand from a child’s 
view, you know? When it’s enough for them. So I do not want them to be stressed out 




Instead, she re-conceptualised the term ‘luxury’, shifting it semantically from its typical 
materialistic, market-oriented construction, to a different ‘luxury’ – that of rest and time with 
friends.  
I do explain to them that when you guys area actually resting at home, your other friends 
are busy going for tuition, they don’t get enough friends, they do not get to play their 
phone and that kind of thing. So they get their luxury of resting at home or going out 
with friends. (emphasis added)  
 
Namrita – whose daughter divorced more than ten years ago, and whose grandchildren live 
primarily under her care105 – emphasised the importance of giving children not only emotional, 
but physical space – behind the “closed door” of their bedroom. She described deliberately 
holding herself in check:  
So they’ll come home, chit chat a bit, close the door. So I won’t knock the door and 
enter inside. Give them peace. Their life is like that. So I want to give them peace. Don’t 
think about parents: “Why my life like that, why my father like that, why my mother 
like that...” 
  
Instead of enacting a full-blown harshness which one might expect, given their strong belief 
and enthusiasm concerning academic qualifications – families self-consciously moderated their 
aspirations and stated that they were content if their children did their best, and if they could 
progress to the next level of formal education.  
 Secondly, families exhibited contentment with what they had. Ayu’s (F12) family is 
one of the most multiply-disadvantaged families in this study. Her family relies entirely on 
government welfare and some income from her 19-year-old son, Qawi, who dropped out of ITE 
to work part-time as a cleaner and restaurant worker. Like all the families interviewed in this 
study, Ayu deeply believed in the importance of education, encouraging her children: “If you 
think you can go further studies, you try your best, you go ahead […] Don’t think of mummy 
all that, no need to think about that.” When Qawi dropped out of ITE shortly after his mother 
was diagnosed with cancer, Ayu initially tried to persuade him to stay in school. However, she 
relented when she heard his reasoning. 
Then we talked to him, he talk to us also. He tell everything […]. And my husband 
said, we cannot force him to school if he don’t want. That is what he want, for the 
brothers, sisters. He say: “Never mind, I won’t lose anything. […] I can study [next 
time]. Now also I work.” He – he work KFC for 2 years, OK? He started working 
when he was in [Secondary] Three, he doing part-time.  
 
She then described with pride how, during a family gathering, her son talked back to her sister’s 
husband, who criticised him for dropping out of ITE to financially support the family.  
 
105 This is because the children’s mother, Juliana, worked long shift hours as a nurse at a private facility.  
143 
 
Because the uncle – my sister husband lah – said: “If you don’t wanna go school, see, 
you are a boy, why…? Further in your future you wanna find work, it’s very difficult 
for you.” Then [Qawi] said, “Why? Why should you say that to me? I got a lot of 
certificate and I no need to scared.” […] He told the uncle, and then the uncle was so 
shocked: “What certificate?” [Qawi] took out all the certificate: “OK, I got cooking 
certificate, I got pizza-making certificate also I have, everything I have.” 
 
Certification in its varied forms provided some satisfaction to some families; it allayed their 
fears over the future and constituted a form of value. Families were thus able to resist 
capitalism’s expansionary tendencies (Marx & Engels, 1998) and the relentless pursuit of ever-
higher qualifications and wealth. To be sure, families’ financial constraints shaped their desires, 
and what they felt constituted a sufficient level of qualification. Moreover, resistance should 
not be romanticised (Abu-Lughod, 1990), because refusals to compete in the meritocratic game 
exacerbate inequalities. Nonetheless, disadvantaged families such as Ayu’s displayed tentative, 
careful but powerful self-conscious breaks with neoliberal normality (Ball & Olmedo, 2013) 
that drew on both love for family, and contentment with what they already had. Despite the 
material costs of child-rearing, Ayu described her children as God-given gifts: “These childrens 
all is God give.” 
Ayu: Even though I – I – I’m sick, see? Even though I’m sick, I’m that weak, we are 
in a difficulty situation, financial problem, but we still happy, as one family.  
 
Interviewer: Yeah that’s the most important, I think, right? 
 
Ayu: Correct. As long we didn’t disturb people, we didn’t ask people money, food – 
OK, enough. What we have, we eat. What you don’t have, you just keep quiet. Like my 
childrens, like my eldest, uh, “Mummy you got no food at home – no, never mind, today 
I work, when go home I bring food.” “OK!” – happy also. “If no money, tomorrow I 
got a part-time job, I get $60.” “OK!” So the money won’t run out. We still happy you 
see. […] Even I be having this cancer, I don’t feel like I make my children, my husband, 
burdened. I told them: “Am I burden for you because I’m sick?” “No.” So I – I got the 
children, this stubborn – stubborn this one [gestures at her young son] – wah, I’m tired, 
even I’m tired – but I’m still happy.  
 
5.7. Closing Reflections  
This chapter has sought to outline the key pedagogic beliefs, values and approaches of families 
in preparing young people for the future – their expressions of what constitutes a responsible 
self, and how they seek to enact it. I map the responsible subjectivity in Table 5.1. I demonstrate 
that families, embedded within a particular socio-political, educational and historical context 
that emphasises individual and familial responsibility – seem to internalise various neoliberal, 
responsibilising imperatives. Perceiving academic qualifications as the key route to success, 
families enact pedagogic approaches focused tightly on academic results. The stereotype of the 
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irresponsible low-income family in certain Singaporean political discourse (Teo, 2018) is thus 
unsubstantiated in my findings. Instead, many low-income families likely work even harder 
than middle-income families in Singapore, since most middle-income families in Singapore can 
afford domestic help (Teo, 2018).  
By way of summarising and clarifying the key findings in this chapter, one might 
understand the ‘responsible’ Singaporean subjectivity via Foucault’s (1984) four dimensions of 
the self-constitution of an ethical subject, and mapping this to my empirical findings: 1) the 
singling out of a part of oneself for concern (in this study, one’s academic achievement), 2) the 
mode of subjection that rationalises and legitimates self-subjection, such as divine or natural 
law (in this study, the principle of meritocracy), 3) the means available to self-fashion oneself 
into a ‘responsible’ subject (for disadvantaged families, their only recourse is academic grades), 
4) the kind of being that subjects aspire to obtain, such as self-mastery or purity (in this study, 
the educated, qualification-bearing self).  
However, there are also glimpses of refusals of neoliberal, narrowly-responsibilising 
logic. This is evidenced through families’ transcendental visions of education’s purpose beyond 
the responsibility of academic grades acquisition – and through families’ child-rearing 
approaches that encompass discipline, help-seeking and protection (including a critical 
reflexivity over ‘parentocratic’ behaviour). Yet, such approaches can disadvantage families 
further, as I elaborate on in Chapter Seven.  
Collectively, my findings call for a more nuanced understanding of ‘responsibility’ 
beyond that which is frequently used in “anti-welfare familialist” (Teo, 2013:387) Singapore: 
who is responsible, what being responsible entails, the limits of responsibility in contexts of 
material disadvantage – and how affects of shame, anxiety and love are implicated in 
responsible pedagogic work. As McLeod (2017) suggests, a more productive understanding of 
responsibility – one that is relational (encompassing care for self and others), and one that 
accounts for circumstances of precarity and inequality – is possible, and necessary.  
There is a further powerful dynamic in families’ accounts – that of dependency. I 
demonstrate, in the next chapter, that dynamics of dependency enable a deeper understanding 
of why families accept the harsh, individualising and largely neoliberal nature of 
responsibilisation in Singapore. My contention is that the willingness of disadvantaged families 
to accept responsibility for their future, the optimism and confidence that underlies it – is 
striking, particularly in light of much research on how families interact with neoliberal 
imperatives in European and Anglo-American contexts. I suggest that at least part of the reason 
for these differences lies in the robustness of dependency dynamics in the Singapore context.   
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CHAPTER 6. On Dependency: Expertise and the Politics of Home-School 
Relations 
 
“Without the school, the child is nothing.” (Irfan, son, F10) 
 
“Education cannot compensate for society.” (Bernstein, 1970) 
 
6.0. Introduction 
The word ‘dependency’ is often seen as the antithesis to responsibility. Responsibility – viewed 
as the political ideal in neoliberal governance (Trnka & Trundle, 2017) – is valorised against 
the “culture of dependency” fostered in welfare states (Rose & Miller, 2010:295). However, in 
Chapter Two, I have argued that that humans are enmeshed in a web of responsibilities and 
dependencies, and dependency is an inevitable part of human existence. In Chapter Two, I 
defined ‘dependency’ as the construction of a particular relationship, whereby one party 
entrusts care, custody and management to another party (Kittay, 1999); it necessarily implies 
power inequalities, although there is variation in how interdependent certain dependencies are. 
 In this chapter, I explore how families position themselves in relations of dependency 
with the state and schools, and how this positioning influences their pedagogic work. I begin 
by discussing the analytic importance of ‘expertise’ in understanding dependency, particularly 
in Singapore. I then describe the nature of families’ dependency relations, charting different 
forms of dependency evident in interview findings. Subsequently, I examine why families 
depend (whether by choice – through perceptions of the competence or care of the state and 
schools, or by necessity). Here, I explain why families partner with state and state institutions, 
despite their marginal, often difficult circumstances. Through this discussion, I illuminate how 
dependency relations are normalised, and the positive and the negative aspects of families’ 
dependencies. I then consider how families’ positions of dependency and responsibility can 
hinder the enactment of recent education policy reforms towards producing the future-ready 
student for the 21st-century.  
 In this chapter, I find that families’ dependency relations with the state and the school 
are not only most salient in interviews106 – they are also generally warm, close and friendly. 
This is clearly unlike much literature on relations between disadvantaged groups and schools, 
conducted in European and Anglo-American contexts, which portray home-school relations as 
 
106 Notably, there are different relations of dependency in families’ lives. However, this chapter focuses on 
families’ relations with the state and school, seeing this as most salient in understanding families’ pedagogic 
work and whom they depend on to help them in conducting this work. 
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relations of alienation, dissociation and distance (Crozier, 1998; Lareau, 2000; Goodall & 
Montgomery, 2014; Ule et al., 2015). For instance, Lareau (2000) typifies working-class 
families’ relations with schools as that of ‘separation’ (where teachers and parents have limited 
interactions), while middle-class families’ relations are those of ‘interconnectedness’ (where 
parents are well-informed of school matters and reinforce school curricula at home). Such 
research also usually suggests that working-class families depend on teachers’ professional 
judgment, while middle-class families are more interfering. However, Crozier (1998:130) 
concludes: “Whilst middle-class parents are more likely to ‘interfere’ than working-class 
parents, they are also more likely to work in harmony with the school and the teachers”. Yet, 
in this chapter I illustrate the plentiful interaction, familiarity and closeness in relations between 
disadvantaged families, the school and the state. These dependency relations are crucial in 
understanding families’ acceptance and reproduction of the responsible subjectivity discussed 
in the previous chapter.  
 Overall, it is important at the outset to view home-school relations as a deeply politicised 
social space. The importance of this stance can be elucidated along two dimensions: the 
empirical and the theoretical. Firstly, empirically, families themselves often viewed the state 
and school as closely intertwined. Namrita, one grandmother (F1), attributed improvements in 
schooling in Singapore to the work of government: “Even sick also [schools] will call us, come 
and fetch your children go home, don’t let them alone, they will call us. So children okay you 
know. They happy now. So must thanks to the […] government.”107 Namrita’s comment is 
unsurprising, given that education provision is overwhelmingly largely state-provided, such 
that families tended to view the ‘school’ as part of the ‘state’ and its benefaction. 
 Secondly, theoretical literature suggests that the state is crucial in spreading behavioural 
norms to families and individuals, through schools, in order to achieve socio-political objectives. 
Bourdieu (1994:35) argued: “one of the major powers of the state is to produce and impose 
(especially through the school system) categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all 
things of the social world – including the state itself.”  Rose (1992), drawing on Foucauldian 
analyses, noted that in advanced liberal states, schools and homes are crucial sites for 
inculcating a ‘normality’ amenable to capital accumulation – a ‘normality’ developed not 
through overt punishment, but through self-surveillance and self-discipline. Thus, home-school 
relations can form a case-study of state-citizen relations (Vincent & Tomlinson, 1997).   
 
 
107 While schooling is viewed as subsumed under the ‘government’, not all of state provision is viewed as 
positively as education provision is. In this chapter, I also reference differences in how families view other 
sources of state provision, such as social service officers who provide direct financial assistance to families.  
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6.1. “I am not an expert”: Disadvantaged Families and Expertise in Singapore  
In Singapore, while the term ‘dependency’ is often pathologised (Teo, 2013, 2018) as draining 
the city-state’s resources, there is a kind of dependent subjectivity that is desirable and implicit 
in ‘strong’ developmental state logics. This dependency is one that leads to gratitude for 
government provision, and political legitimacy, and forms a basis for one’s uptake of 
responsibility. This form of desirable dependency recognises and values the ‘expertise’ of those 
in political and pedagogic authority, in technocratic Singapore (Chua, 2011; Rahim, 2015). 
Deference to those in political and pedagogic authority is also deeply valorised through neo-
Confucian cultural influences (Chua, 2017). As such, to understand dependency relations in 
Singapore involves understanding expertise.  
 Expertise can be defined as the “complex of actors, powers, institutions and bodies of 
knowledge” that mediate between the family and the state (Rose, 1992:69). Experts operate in 
“double alliance” (Miller & Rose, 2008:68). On the one hand, experts are allied with political 
authorities. Experts embody “neutrality, authority and skill in a wise figure” (ibid). Through 
promoting seemingly neutral ‘truths’ (such as the importance of a pragmatic, instrumental focus 
in education for the economic well-being of individuals and the nation), experts help to regulate 
individuals in line with socio-political objectives. They legitimise political technologies such 
as the meritocracy-education mechanism. On the other hand, experts ally themselves with 
individuals, “translating their daily worries and decisions over…child-rearing…into a language 
claiming the power of truth, and offering to teach them the techniques by which they might 
manage better, earn more, bring up healthier or happier children” (ibid).108 
 The ‘expert’, to disadvantaged families, referred to those with education credentials, 
such as educated teachers and educated government ministers. This was particularly evident 
early on in my interview with Lakshmi (mother, F3). As we settled down at Lakshmi’s dining 
table, I began explaining to Lakshmi the interview procedure, telling her that her views were 
important to me, that she was the “expert”. She laughed: “I am not an expert.” She explained 
that they were considered a “low-income family”, but they still get by.  
 Lakshmi’s views on expertise emerged more clearly through the interview – particularly 
her yardstick for expertise: education (specifically, academic qualifications). She said: “We 
cannot teach anything better than the school. Parents can teach not much things, but the […] 
teachers, I mean, educated teachers ah, they can teach for children more things” (emphasis 
 
108 Expertise thus resolves the paradox of the private family that is nonetheless laden with “social consequences 





mine). When asked what children could learn from teachers, Lakshmi laughed, incredulous that 
this question had been asked: “Everything!” As though to substantiate her comments, during a 
subsequent focus group interview with Kumar (her husband) and Devi (her daughter), at around 
9pm, a text message arrived from Devi’s Principle of Accounts (POA) teacher, interrupting the 
interview.  
Lakshmi: [reads message] Hi Ms. Lakshmi, some good news for you. [to us] POA 
teacher ah. 
 
Devi: Oh, my teacher! [laughs] Oh, GG.109 
 
Lakshmi: Ah. [reads message] You Devi has worked hard – [to us] Oh right, very good. 
The teacher message ah. 
 
Interviewer: The teacher messaged?  
 
Lakshmi: Just she send, ya […] Ah, [teacher] is very good.  
 
Kumar: [The teacher] is very interest. She said this girl is very good. But the thing is 
[Devi] doesn’t want to use her – her common sense. 
 
The teacher had updated Lakshmi on Devi’s improved test scores, and asked Kumar and 
Lakshmi to praise Devi, and encourage her to keep it up. Schools in Singapore are very good, 
Kumar said. This positivity is reflected in a Varkey Foundation survey of 1,000 Singaporean 
parents, which revealed that 73% rated government-funded schools as ‘good’ – significantly 
above the global average of 45%, and behind only Finland and Estonia out of 29 countries 
surveyed (Varkey Foundation, 2018).  
 To understand the nature of dependency, I discuss the ‘collaboration’ and 
‘communication’ of families and schools. I use the terms ‘collaboration’ and ‘communication’ 
because, even though there was broadly a power imbalance in favour of the schools and the 
state, families still retained a degree of activeness and reflexivity in conducting pedagogic work. 
It is not that families surrendered their agency as pedagogic agents entirely. It is more that 
families valued schools as crucial partners they needed to rely on, in achieving success – 
although most parents saw themselves as playing supportive rather than directive roles.110 
Furthermore, to some parents, an interdependency with schools demonstrated humility. Unlike 
certain parents who had more resources, Dania (mother, F12) said – those who say: “you cannot 
 
109‘GG’ is a colloquialism which stands for ‘good game’, used to connote a joking resignation to doom or defeat.  
110 This is in line with the MOE slogan: “Every Parent a Supportive Parent” (emphasis mine). 
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teach my child anyhow”, implying, to her, an arrogant over-protectiveness – she opted to parent 
with the help of schools. 
So some people might think that you cannot lecture my child, or you cannot teach my 
child anyhow. […] But it goes the other way round for me. So let’s say the child doesn’t 
open to me, I get the […] school, schoolteachers or school counsellors to work with the 
child […] 
 
Disadvantaged parents sometimes stated that they didn’t trust anyone – they trusted only their 
‘god’ (e.g. Srinivas, father, F3) and their own ‘heart’, experience and instincts (e.g. Ayu, mother, 
F11; Namrita, grandmother, F1). Descriptions of dependency on the state and school seemed 
out-of-place, next to such comments. However, these statements co-existed, suggesting an 
individualism that yielded space in the area of education and ‘future’-making, for the guidance 
and help of the state and schools.  
Finally, families’ dependency on expertise is crucial to understanding how 
disadvantaged families navigate the confusing plurality of messages sent by the MOE. As 
argued in Chapter Four, Singaporean families are caught in a “double bind” (Bach and 
Christensen, 2017:134). On the one hand, the Singaporean education policy regime is 
competitive and stratifying – the pressure-points are particularly intense during years when 
terminal examinations are held, such as at the Secondary Four level. A proactive, ‘intensive’ 
parenting seems necessitated through the system’s stratifying processes and structure. On the 
other, policy-makers provide injunctions to relax, to be ‘supportive’, trusting partners within a 
competent education system with competent schools. The question is thus: how do 
disadvantaged families navigate the ‘double bind’? Dependency on expertise, I argue, forms an 
important concept in responding to this question. Through their collaboration and 
communication with schools (discussed in the next section), disadvantaged families 
simultaneously depend on schools and work intensively; their confidence that the school and 
state has done all that it can, is the very context in which they feel compelled to work intensively 
and responsibly to acquire success.  
 
6.2. The Forms and Purposes of Collaboration  
6.2.1. Overview of home-school interactions  
All families described close, frequent communication with the school – which formed the 
foundation of their collaborative child-rearing practices. Figure 6.1 provides an overview of 





Figure 6.1. Types of Home-School Interactions 
 
Fundamentally, close interactions were important, because families saw child-rearing as a 
necessarily collaborative endeavour. In describing her relations with teachers and school 
counsellors, Dania (mother, F12) stated: “it takes a whole village to raise a child”. Chandra 
(father, F2) deployed the language of ‘upbringing’ to describe the school’s roles in young 
people’s lives: “I will say that the school is still giving them all the necessary tools for their […] 
bringing up”. Like Lakshmi’s comment of: “Everything!”, Chandra’s words suggest a 
comprehensiveness in the work of schools in equipping young people for the future, ranging 
from managing a family, to getting a job. Ayu (F12), despite being sick with cancer, made it a 
point to visit each of her seven children’s teachers, at least once a month. 
My findings suggest that families’ purpose of engaging frequently with schools can be 
described as threefold: 1) the young person’s academic development, 2) the young person’s 
moral development, and 3) the mediating of parent-child interactions. Each will be explored in 
turn. 
 
6.2.2 Partnering for academic development  
During parent-teacher meetings, families often sought advice from teachers on how young 
people could score better in examinations. All families described feeling comfortable at these 
events (although some young people found these events “scary” and “awkward”). Crucially, 
underpinning home-school collaborations was the shared notion (between parent, child and 
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for instance, remarked that during parent-teacher meetings: “the teachers will always say the 
subject is like this, he’s not doing well in the subject and what they can do to help. Or what can 
I do to help. […] For me, I try, the teacher also try.” Naadia (mother, F10) described asking 
many questions at parent-teacher meetings, to her son Irfan’s embarrassment: 
I ask the teacher how is he at school, what is his [grades], what can I do. I mean, I did 
ask, but then Irfan, the moment we came out of the classroom: “Mama, you ask so many 
questions!”. “Well I have to, I don’t know anything about school’s education right now, 
so I need to ask the teacher and from there I can learn something and to teach you what 
to do.” He say, “OK lah, I know lah, I know lah”.  
 
Teachers’ advice included speaking more Malay at home to improve her two sons’ Malay 
language proficiency. At the same time, Naadia felt sufficiently confident to bring her own 
concerns: 
Yeah, I did tell them like, “Irfan is like, don’t want to listen, don’t want to study, what 
should I do, what can I do? How to advise him on how to study?” And they did advise 
what to do, what to say lah. 
 
Srinivas (father, F3) described parents as following up and reinforcing the pedagogic work of 
schools. The parents do their part by “everyday you telling them to revise”, to complete school 
homework:  
Parents are helping the teachers. School is half day. So after the school finish, children 
are coming back home. So teachers cannot look after the children. So at home, the 
parents are putting the eyes on the children […] The parents then tell to the school: “My 
son is having a problem with maths, okay? My son got problem with science. So can 
you give him more class?” […] This is how the teachers and the parents bringing up the 
children. 
 
Young people also saw the need to work closely with schools to achieve academic success, 
which they generally unanimously desired. As Irfan (F10) stated, in the opening quote of this 
chapter: “Without the school, the child is nothing” – particularly in Singapore, where academic 
grades were felt to be everything. Shafiq (F6) highlighted teachers’ generosity with their time: 
Actually [school is] really fun because the teachers are really kind – they are very 
generous, and they are really, really willing to help. […] As in, if you need help in 
certain subject, they will stay back an extra hour to help us, usually one-on-one. 
 
Teachers also provided valuable information on how to navigate post-Secondary education 
options. Parents such as Chandra (father, F2) insisted that their children seek advice on this 
from teachers. When asked who she relied on most to give advice about education and life, 
Shreya (daughter, F1) replied: “teachers” – “because they know best” – and explained how she 
sat one-on-one with her teacher to discuss options for post-Secondary education. The majority 




6.2.3 Partnering for moral and emotional development  
Families also collaborated with schools in developing the moral maturity and emotional 
stability of young people. For instance, Dania (mother, F12) found it important to tell her 
children’s teachers about “family problems” such as her divorce, the terms of which she was 
(at the time) currently negotiating at court – because she worried that it would affect her 
children’s behaviour in schools. Her updating would enable teachers to be “well-prepared to 
face the child. If let’s say, the child shows like, he is not in the mood, or angry, or trouble and 
that kind of thing.” 
 It was not only teachers, but also the broader school staff that families willingly 
collaborated with – in particular, counsellors. Collaborating with well-trained counsellors is 
crucial, given studies that low-income families experience a disproportionately high rate of 
negative childhood experiences. For instance, in a Singapore Children’s Society (SCS) study, 
at least half of low-income individuals 111  claimed to experience four or more Adverse 
Childhood Experiences; these are defined as experiences that have significant negative effects 
on future well-being and health – such as being bullied, having a family member in prison or 
with mental illness (Tai, 2019). 
 Naadia’s account below illustrates a willingness to seek help from schools, when her 
son, Irfan, struggled with suicidal thoughts, after being bullied.  
Last year, I saw a letter on his table. He… maybe he forgot to throw away – and I open 
up and read: he wanted to commit suicide. Then I was like reading and keep on reading 
– is because of classmates of him. Few classmates, like bullying him, tell him to die, 
“You get out lah, you stupid lah, you ugly lah, you whatever” – call him names – and 
tell him to die. […] I mean like, I cry, what am I supposed to do now, my son is like 
wanting to commit suicide. […] In the letter he wrote, he already went up to the building 
and wanted to jump down. […] Then I call up my friend and my friend said: “You try 
call the school counsellor, maybe he can help”. So I called the counsellor, I said, “Please 
help me, please.” 
 And I told my friend like, “If my son is to die because of illness, it’s okay, if 
accident, it’s okay – but if he want to commit suicide just because of these pupil, I won’t 
take it.” Even I tell the counsellor, “Help me, help me”. Then the counsellor did counsel 
him lah. Then only [Irfan] start to cool down. Then even the counsellor told the students, 
“You cannot call people names.” The counsellor did help lah, and he starts to, from 
there I can see he back to his normal self again.  
 
When I interviewed Irfan later that afternoon, he identified the most important people in his life 
as not his father, or even his brother (who he is close to and tries to emulate in various ways) – 
 
111 ‘Low-income families’ are defined in the SCS report as families earning less than 
SGD$1000/month/household member. This is similar to the figure I use in my participant criteria: 
SGD$1,100/month/household member.  
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but his mother and the school counsellor. Close home-school collaboration can thus form an 
important buffer against adverse experiences.  
 Simialrly, Deepta (daughter, F2) confided in her teacher when undergoing traumatic 
family events, such as a season of alcohol-induced domestic violence:  
[The abuse] always happens in the night, when [my father] comes home and then, tipsy, 
and  […] sometimes [my mother] gets abused […] And then the next day to see that, 
physically – I guess, I just get – it just gets very stressful, ‘cos the same point I really 
want to help my mum but then I have to deal with school work as well and it gets very 
overwhelming. 
 
She said she kept most of this inside but confided in her teacher: “She just tells me advices. 
And because she said that my dad and my mum has a very big age gap so such things might 
happen, and like, the future I can’t really control.” Teachers can play a role in softening what 
Burton (2007) calls the ‘adultification’ of socio-economically disadvantaged young people, 
where children are prematurely exposed to adult knowledge and experience, due to various 
factors such as lack of privacy due to small home sizes and high degrees of stress created by 
economic deprivation. An account of Singaporean teachers’ perspectives – especially their 
emotional engagement with students and their commitment to student well-being – can be found 
in Fang's (2016) research that foregrounds Singaporean teachers’ narratives. 
 Close home-school relations were also important to parents, in correcting, monitoring 
and punishing young people, to ensure they stayed on a strictly-defined moral and behavioural 
‘right way’. To this end, parents felt they shared similar views with teachers on how to deal 
with young people’s behavioural issues – sometimes consulting teachers before mutually 
coming to agreement in how to manage particular behavioural issues. Anjushri’s (mother, F3) 
account evidences these aspects of home-school collaboration, when she described the time 
Sanjay’s grades dropped, and he was caught smoking in school: 
I cried to him, “Enough already Sanjay […] Since so many years you very well in the 
school. This year you going to finish [Secondary] Four, what happened to you? Why 
you putting yourself into trouble?” […] Then he cried and talked to the principal. Lucky 
I never go. My husband said you don’t come, you stay at home. If you go there, you 
will cry. My husband know I’m sensitive, I will cry.  
Then [my husband] went [to meeting with principal] then he tell me: “You know 
who teach him? His sister.” [Sanjay] cried to the principal, “My own sister teach 
me…My sister said that when you are stressed, just take one stick and smoke. When 
you stressed and you smoke ah, it’s nothing wrong, it’s very good.” Then those idiots 
go and do that [...] That time I also shocked. Smoking for few months, I don’t know, 
you know. Because I trust him a lot. My husband told him, “I only can tell one thing, 
your mother trusting you a lot. Don’t do that. What you doing to her, the god is looking 
at you. You will get the punishment, not your mother. She already has lots of suffer 
already. Why you all giving us sufferings?” My husband angry.  
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Now Sunday [Sanjay] will play soccer with the church people, now cancelled 
already. My husband said, “Don’t go. Punishment for you, few months you don’t go.” 
Teachers also called and tell us, “Give him this punishment. Don’t let him go. And don’t 
give him hand phone a lot.” [laughs] 
 
Often, parents’ collaborations with schools in this regard, emerged from a belief in the lack of 
dependability of the child, suggesting a strong binarisation of the mature ‘adult’ versus the 
immature ‘child’. This resonates with Sirene Lim's (2015:318) theorisation of the popular 
discourse of ‘child-as-immature-being’ in Singapore. This is evidenced in this exchange with 
Hannah (mother, F7):  
Before I found out from [my son], I will find out from teacher first. So, I want to see 
whether his story is in line with the teacher’s story. [laughs] So, we have to play smart 
way also. I don’t trust my child also, all the time. If I trust too much, something can 
happen. I mean, there will be some wrong thing can be happen. So, I don’t trust much. 
 
Like Anjushri, Hannah proceeded to explain how teachers and parents worked together to 
monitor and punish her son, to ensure he stayed on-track: 
Hannah: That’s why, I think sometimes it’s the influence from the friends. [He] start to 
do the funny things, so the teacher spoke to me. I really whack him. And then the teacher 
told me yesterday, “Hey, really ah, after I complain to you, he really improve in his 
study, he really focus now.” I said, “Yeah it’s a good thing you tell me earlier, rather 
than too late!” So, if let’s say, the teacher feedback earlier, so, we can also can take 
action. If not, if the teacher never complain anything, so we assume our child is doing 
good at school. 
 
Interviewer: So, the teacher will WhatsApp you if anything - 
 
Hannah: No, usually they will call. Let’s say if they call and I never answer, then they 
WhatsApp. 
 
The morally undependable child is thus contrasted against the dependability of schools. Parents, 
such appreciated the school’s attentive monitoring of children. In light of the schools’ careful 
checking of children’s attendance, Namrita described being: “so happy, you know. So children 
also can’t cheat the parents.”   
 Such collaborations facilitated the identification of pathologies and deviations to a 
strictly-defined normality. For instance, Kumar (father, F4) described: 
So the teacher will ask: “What have you been doing last night?” [My children would 
say:] “No, studying.” But they were not studying, I saw them. I personally as a parent 
will witness: “No, no, my son never study. My son is a mobile phone playing boy.” I 
will tell them, “He was playing with mobile phone.” This coming 3rd of April, I been 
going to see the school. They told me they want to comment about my son, ‘cos he’s 
very weak in his studies. So they asked me then I will tell the same thing lah. “What is 
he been doing at home? They were playing mobile phone game.” I will tell all these, as 
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parents you cannot hide these things also right? So they know what’s wrong with the 
students. 
 
These close home-school collaborations extended the panoptical gaze of adults over children’s 
lives, “locking each ‘free’ individual” into a “play of normative gazes” and “throwing a web of 
visibilities, of public codes and private embarrassments over personal government” (Rose, 
1992:7). Ayu (mother, F12) stated: “What you do in school, what you do in – at home, we 
[parents and teachers] will share.” 
 The level to which the dependability of schools outweighed the dependability of young 
people varied between parents, however. Ayu (mother, F12) had a more negative view of 
schools’ dependability, probably perceiving wider systems to have failed her more than other 
families did. Although she frequently asked teachers monitoring questions, such as: “What is 
he doing in school? Are they studying? Daydreaming? Sleeping?” – when asked if this meant 
she trusted the teacher to tell her what was happening in school, she immediately replied:  
No. […] OK, we cannot say we trust or not – but when we meet the teacher, we want 
ours children, our son or daughter will be there. So we talk, no any secret between us.  
 
She also critiqued teachers in her son’s school as irresponsible, not informing her of her son 
Aiman’s whereabouts when they asked him to stay back in school to complete his work. When 
she complained to the school, she felt the school responded blasély – apologising somewhat 
insincerely, as though they were looking down on her family. Ayu’s experience in this regard, 
however, was an exception in my interview findings. Overall, families willingly depended on 
and trusted schools in in helping them maintain young people’s emotional stability, and regulate 
and develop desired moral dispositions and behaviours.   
 
6.2.4 Mediating Parent-Child Interactions  
In negotiating the ‘double bind’ of pressure and competition and relaxing and trusting, teachers 
were crucial mediators in urging parents to not over-pressurise their children. In this focus 
group interview exchange with Srinivas, Anjushri and their son Sanjay (F3), they describe how 
a teacher told them not to compare students’ results, as this demoralises students and generates 
low self-esteem.  
Anjushri: Don’t compare. Don’t say, “Oh the boy take like this. Why you like this?” 
 
Srinivas: “The boy takes 80. Why you taking 70? Why you taking 50?” Don’t do that. 
[…] 
 






Srinivas: Yes. School, school, school. School always advised us.  
 
Anjushri: The teachers. We go to parents meeting, the teacher will say. It’s – it’s good. 
Last time I used to compare. I did that mistake. I will teachers I did that mistake. When 
I go to the school and they teach me, I know, oh, we cannot compare. That makes the 
children […] feel like, whatever they study, they still –  
 
Sanjay: Ah, get the same mark, same mark. Then they go to school [thinking] whatever 
you do, no need to study.  
  
Additionally, when parents and children struggled with generational gaps in understanding each 
other, parents sought the help of teachers. Devi (F4) explained how, at parent-teacher meetings, 
her parents expressed concern about her mobile phone usage and interest in Korean drama.   
Interviewer: Do your parents also bring their own concerns? 
 
Devi: Yes, about me and my phone and the Korean drama [TV series]. [laughs] “Is it 
really relevant to the lifestyle?” Then my teacher also laughing. 
 
Interviewer: [laughs] Then what does your teacher say? 
 
Devi: It’s a normal thing because it’s trending now, right? A lot of people is so glued 
in it. Because they don’t understand what is Korean drama, then my parents are 
too…not updated yet. Even my father doesn’t know how to use his phone [laughs] 
which makes me laugh. […] Yeah, my father is quite old, he was like, “What is this 
Korean drama? They talking what nonsense, I don’t understand.” 
 
Devi’s teacher attempted to defuse conflict by explaining and reassuring her parents that such 
behaviours were ‘normal’.  
  Furthermore, teachers not only taught parents how to relate to children, but how 
children should relate to parents. After Sanjay was caught smoking, Anjushri described 
slapping him and refusing to speak to him for days. His teacher prompted him to apologise to 
his mother, saying (in her words): “Sanjay, please think about your mother. Your mother is a 
very good mother, very worried about you. She cried to me [that] you lied to her.” Anjushri 
was grateful for the teacher’s intervention.112  
 
112 Additionally, Anjushri attended SINDA parenting classes, which she felt were “very good”. Teachers at 
SINDA parenting classes “teach us […] how to grow up the children. What are the things our children must eat? 
What time they must sleep? One day how many hours they must sleep. […] And he said fried egg don’t give 
them, give them the boiled egg, you know? […] At least one week you give them three to four times. It’s good 
for the brain.” 
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 In this section, I have illustrated the different forms and purposes of home-school 
interdependencies. The next section explores the reasons why families are willing to depend on 
and collaborate with schools – categorised into choice and necessity, two notions which are 
deeply structured by families’ material (socio-economic), socio-political and educational 
contexts (and thus, by power). Choice and necessity form not two distinct polarities but two 
ends of a spectrum; the extent to which one has freedom to depend, the capacity to select whom 
one depends on and to what degree, varies according to one’s privilege (Mills, 1959). 
Particularly in Section 6.3.2, I show how material disadvantage influences dependency 
dynamics, and thus sketch the more negative aspects of families’ dependency on the state and 
school.  
 
6.3. The Choice and Necessity of Dependence  
6.3.1. Depending by choice: perceived competence and care of state and school  
To an extent, families exercised reason and agency in choosing to depend on the state and the 
schools – that is, they chose to depend because they recognised the competence and care of the 
state and school. I discuss the perceived competence of the state and school, before discussing 
the perceived care of the state and school.  
 All families recognised the competence of the state and school in managing the 
education system. They described hearing through (largely state-controlled) traditional media, 
that Singapore was ranked first in the world for education. Comparisons with other countries 
animated families’ perceptions of the state’s competence. In particular, countries which families 
had extended kinship networks in formed an imaginary hinterland for comparison, as seen in 
Namrita and Hannah’s quotes below; both had migrated to Singapore from India and Malaysia 
respectively: 
Yeah, the education is good, Singapore the education is very good. Even from India also 
they come here and study you know. ‘Cause they say the education is very good. So we 
also very proud from our side people come here and study [laughs]. (Namrita, 
grandmother, F1) 
 
If I compare to Malaysia – [education in Singapore] still good, high standard, and also, 
our professionalism, and also, it’s recognised by worldwide. So, that’s why I like the 
education. (Hannah, mother, F7) 
 
Out of 12 families, five parents (all mothers) had migrated from other countries (Indonesia, 
India, Malaysia) to Singapore earlier in their lives. Their migration experience reinforced their 
liking for the Singapore education system, through comparisons they made to education 
systems in countries they had migrated from.  
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In addition to recognising the professionalism and quality of Singaporean education, 
families also noted the inclusiveness and equity of Singaporean education – particularly 
compared to neighbouring Malaysia. This was also a signal of the state’s competence.  
Like, recently, we went [on field trip] to Malaysia, then we just learned about their 
culture, whatever they do. And you will like, compare that to Singapore, how good we 
are than them. […] Their education system is so different, very different. Because of 
their government now, the government only gives more importance to the Malays.113 
[…] But then in Singapore, we are not like that. We give importance to all races, because 
we are equal, and we don’t – and we are not biased. (Hakeem, son, F7) 
 
[Singapore is] best government. I can tell them, fantastic government. See ah, like other 
countries, the government are there, but the people are suffering […] The [Malaysian] 
government helping [Malay] is a lot. […] Malaysia government like that. “You are 
Malay, you are Muslim, no need to pay. But other race, must pay”. Singapore 
government, we don’t have this kind of problem. (Srinivas, father, F3) 
 
In fact, streaming, a key feature of Singapore’s education system, was perceived as fair and 
valuable, although research such as Ng's (2014) suggest that streaming is a regressive feature 
of Singaporean education. Nonetheless, most disadvantaged families supported streaming, 
because they felt it would ensure their children’s weaknesses were detected early, so that they 
could be placed in less competitive classes, which would boost their self-confidence, and ensure 
they stayed in school longer. Dimal (father, F5) in fact wanted more, not less streaming:  
 The education system […] needs to learn more about all the students. […] So, to make 
them, make from Primary One, Primary Two must detect their special features, make 
them confident, make them understand. Not from Primary Five, Primary Six, too late! 
Primary One, Primary Two, you detect, go to Primary Three. […] When you catch – 
when you know that this is their features, you start earlier, then they will want to become 
better. 
 
The system was also perceived to be fair, because the MOE provided a variety of routes for 
students, based on students’ ability. When one door closes, another window opens, as Kumar 
described – because streaming enabled young people who missed out on Polytechnic to enter 
ITE,114 for instance. While they are right that Singapore’s education system is clearly structured 
with multiple pathways, which historically has been credited for limiting attrition (Gopinathan 
& Mardiana, 2013) – Omar (father, F6) captured the paradox of the Singapore system with the 
words: “more options, less opportunity.” In contemporary Singapore, there may be more 
 
113 Hakeem refers here to affirmative action policies taken by the Malaysian government to provide additional 
support to Malays. Hakeem himself has a parent identified as ‘Malay’ under the PAP government’s multicultural 
scheme. 
114 As mentioned in Chapter One, in Singapore, JC (Junior College) is the most prestigious and academically 
most competitive post-secondary education institution, followed by Polytechnic (Poly), and lastly, the Institute 
for Technical Education (ITE).  
159 
 
options out there, but the options do not necessarily translate into real opportunities to rise as 
much as parents expect – because an ITE qualification is markedly different in financial reward 
and cultural status to a JC A-level qualification. Here, Omar’s words highlight a tension 
inherent in the meritocratic ethos: the tension between all-can-achieve, and the existence of ITE 
as a safety-net for those who fail to achieve. However, unlike Omar,115 most families saw ITE 
as a redeeming grace, the offering of second chances in a rigorous system – although it was 
also the clearly less preferred option compared to Poly. For instance, one young person, Shafiq, 
said that people joked that ITE stood for: ‘It’s The End’. But it’s not as bad as they say, he 
quickly added. Being in the NT stream, he was most likely headed in that direction.  
 Notably, Omar was the only parent who wanted less streaming (either by collapsing the 
two Normal streams together, or getting rid of it entirely) – rather than keeping it as three 
(Express, NA, NT). My findings contrast with much of the (middle-class) commentary in 
Singapore that criticises streaming for its stigmatising effects. Disadvantaged families in this 
study generally appreciated streaming because it was preferable to being informally stigmatised 
in a class that operated at a much too fast pace. Their children, as it was, were exhausted from 
the rigour of schooling. To Farah (daughter, F5), streaming was a positive feature of 
Singapore’s education system – learning at “our own speed of learning” was valuable. Yet, their 
sentiments might signal more the toughness of schooling and the obsession around academic 
‘merit’, than the actual necessity of streaming. Nevertheless, for most disadvantaged families, 
they described high levels of state and school competence, both in terms of quality and equity.  
 Families also perceived the state and schools to have an affective orientation of care 
towards them. ‘Care’ can be understood as the physical and emotional labour, involving “both 
brutal and more delicate and subtle relations of power”; it can take place without ‘caring about’ 
the recipient (Bowlby, 2012:2102). However, here, I focus on families’ perceptions that the 
government, and school staff, genuinely ‘cared about’ their well-being. 
 For parents, this perception of care was rooted in larger structures of material provision 
concerning education. For some parents, the Singapore government did poorly in managing 
rising costs of living and the influx of foreign talent which increased job competition; they also 
criticised the lack of nuance in direct financial assistance schemes.116 However, in terms of 
 
115 Omar’s views differed slightly to most families’; he also possesses more markers of ‘middle-class’ status than 
most families in this study. For instance, he has a university degree. His family used to own a successful 
jewellery business before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It is unsurprising that those who have experienced 
seasons of relatively higher socio-economic status in the past would be less convinced of the competence of state 
and schools; they have higher expectations, because experience constitutes subjectivity (Skeggs, 1997). 
116 For instance, Kumar (father, F4) wanted more generous welfare support for disabled people, Dimal (father, 
F5) wanted more adjustments in welfare policy for bigger families, and Ayu (mother, F12) wanted welfare that 
was not so strictly contingent on working when circumstances made it difficult to work. 
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education, the government provided adequately, and families sensed that the government 
genuinely wanted every child to be as educated as possible. In Srinivas’ (father, F3) remark 
below, one can trace how his perception of a strong dependency context makes plausible the 
responsibilisation of young people – a chain of reasoning found almost unanimously across 
parents’ perspectives: 
Singapore education-wise, what I like. First thing, for education-wise, we go to our 
Singapore government, our MPs [Members of Parliament] – first place they will help 
you. They never say “no” – no such thing. For education, you go to our Singapore 
government, they will ask you “what”. [If it’s] regarding education, “Come come come 
come come, sit down, what you want”. They’ll give a first place to that […] 
That’s why I tell you, other thing the MP will say: “OK I will write a letter, wait 
for the reply to come” but education-wise no such thing. “No money? You don’t have 
uniform to buy for your children? No pocket-money? No shoe? No problem.” They 
write a letter, this letter you go give to your school, you can collect [these items] from 
the school. […] That’s like, very interesting, Singapore government. You no need to 
bring out any single cent. […]  
[So] If [the children] don’t want listen to us, you know everything but you don’t 
want to have a good life…that is up to you! You cannot blame the school, you cannot 
blame the parents. Everything they already give you, is yours, your life. You want to 
do, that is up to you.  
 
For young people, this affective orientation of care was mainly experienced through close, 
nearly familial relationships with teachers. Deepta (daughter, F2) described her classroom 
environment as follows: “You’ll feel at home. It's a very lively environment because you’ll feel 
that teachers are ‘legit’ 117  our parents.” “They don’t judge actually,” Deepta continued, 
speaking about her teachers. “They don’t point out failures, they actually focus more on the 
positive side.” In fact, teachers were seen as more like friends, as Devi (F4), Irfan (F10) and 
Sanjay (F3) commented. Sanjay stated what he liked about Singaporean education was: “the 
quality of the how they trained their teachers, so they trained the teachers in a way that the […] 
teacher will be a student and will teach us as our friend.” His teacher talks to him about football, 
and even bought him a football jersey once. They sometimes talked about life lessons, sharing 
about love and relationships. Irfan talked about ‘slacking’ after school with his teacher, in the 
gym. Young people did not link their perceptions of the competence and care of the state and 
schools to the necessity of taking up responsibility as explicitly as parents did; however, they 
agreed that accountability for success rested on them, and when asked, agreed with their parents’ 
reasoning. 
 Families’ perceived competence and care is structured through experience and memory; 
the past and present each gives meaning to the other (Smart, 2011). Focus group interviews 
 
117 Informal slang – similar in meaning to ‘truly’.   
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made this clear. Regarding care, when parents and young people compared their educational 
experiences in focus group interviews, they highlighted that teacher-student relationships had 
become more student-centred, caring and kinder. Devi (F4) stated that in the past, “[the students] 
have to go to their teachers, but I think our teacher will come to us.” Teachers were described 
as working beyond office hours (as seen in Lakshmi receiving a text message from a teacher at 
9pm). The professionalisation of teaching in Singapore (Wear, forthcoming) likely fostered 
closer, more student-centred teacher-student relationships.  
 Regarding competence, nowadays, parents explained, school activities were plentiful; 
young people not only learned in class, but went on trips to museums, did volunteer work, and 
visited post-secondary institutions in preparation for post-secondary life.  During “our time”, 
Chandra (father, F2) stated: “We have nothing much. Only study, that’s all. We don’t have, like, 
what they have […] the teacher conduct so much different-different, you know, bring them to 
places of interest and all that.” School staff were generally viewed as competent, led by 
“educated” teachers who are capable of teaching young people “everything”, as Lakshmi stated.  
 Families also described the growing extensiveness of material provision. Families drew 
on multiple sources of government provision in helping young people succeed educationally. 
Some families received financial assistance (MOE, 2019). 118  Additionally, all families 
interviewed drew on SHG support, which provided highly-subsidised or free tuition (depending 
on household income), as well as camps and vouchers (such as to visit Singapore Zoo, or 
bookstore vouchers) to reward high-achieving, most-improved or students with ‘good 
character’. Kumar (father, F4) showed me a form they had to fill so that Devi could get a 
computer from the school: for households earning below a certain income, the computer will 
be free; for those with slightly higher incomes, the school will pay a portion of it – for instance, 
SGD$600 for an SGD$800 computer. These were all provisions parents did not have, growing 
up.119  
 Collectively, families’ perceptions of competence and care eased tensions that often 
arise in sharing pedagogic authority with ‘experts’ (Lee, 2014). The close engagement between 
families and schools provided emotional buffers, helping young people stay in, and finish 
school. Warm relations between state-school-family also encouraged proactiveness and 
 
118 As mentioned in Chapter One, the government’s Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS) provided financial 
support for transport, school attire, textbooks, and a full waiver for Secondary school fees. Nine out of 12 
families were drawing on this scheme, at the time of fieldwork.   
119 Towards the end of the focus group interview, Deepta (daughter, F2) said she had something to add. She 
noted that in her individual interview, she had been very critical of Singaporean education and how 
meaninglessly rigorous it was. However, after listening to what her father said about how schooling used to be, 
she said she had not realised how fortunate they were to be in present-day Singapore. She told her father and I 
that she would not “take it for granted”.   
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optimism in families’ lives, developing a capacity and inclination to work hard. However, these 
close relations were also not always by ‘choice’. I describe aspects of dependency relations that 
are borne out of necessity – and in so doing, illustrate the injuries and oppression embedded in 
these relations.  
 
6.3.2 No choice but to depend: necessary dependence in contexts of disadvantage     
Families’ perceptions of the competence and care of state and schools are also structured by 
necessity. This ‘necessary’ dependency constitutes a more problematic form of state-craft, 
reinforcing political hegemony and limiting the impetus for socio-political transformation. The 
necessity of dependency must be interpreted vis-à-vis families’ socio-economic (material) and 
socio-political conditions. As such, I outline three reasons for families’ ‘necessary’ dependence, 
with reference to their wider conditions: 1) the lack of alternatives in a ‘strong’ state, 
particularly for disadvantaged families, 2) a harsh education system in a highly-credentialed 
society, 3) parents’ perceptions of their own lack of expertise, as relatively ‘uneducated’ 
individuals.  
 Firstly, a ‘strong’ state limits alternatives for dependency to itself. Political economists 
have long argued that the state augments its power through providing extensive state welfare 
and disrupting local bonds (especially between the working class, and extended family) 
(Donzelot, 1979; Young & Wilmott, 2007). This can be traced in Singapore, where the PAP 
government has broken up kampung structures and housed individual families in HDB flats 
using racial quotas (Salaff, 1988). Salaff (1988:8) argues that social services are “interlaced 
with the new ideology of individual merit and responsibility for one’s own poverty. They extol 
self-help, individualism and competition”, atomising families and devaluing reliance on all but 
the state. Even ‘Self-Help Groups’ are (to a degree) state-regulated, with government ministers 
sitting on the board of these groups. Salaff (1988:8), writing two decades ago, hypothesised: 
“Will families be pulled toward close dependence on the state through its offerings of uniform 
social services?”  
 The answer to Salaff’s question, in modern-day Singapore which is bifurcated by social 
class lines more deeply than 1980s Singapore, is that it depends. Socio-economically 
disadvantaged families struggle to afford private tuition and end enrichment classes; the 
difficulty of families’ material circumstances limit recourse to sources of help beyond the 
state.120 They are therefore more likely to be “pulled toward close dependence on the state” 
 
120 None of the families had young people enrolled in consistent private tuition or enrichment classes. Sometimes 
young people would be enrolled in private tuition for a few months, and then withdrawn when young people told 
their parents they felt back on track.  
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than more advantaged families are, who have access to the SGD$1.1 billion tuition industry, 
equivalent to around GBP£640 million (Wise, 2016).121 Dania (mother, F12), for instance, 
stated that parents who have “more convenient” lives can afford to be “strategic”, drawing on 
multiple resources: books, enrichment classes, private tuition. However, as stated earlier, for 
her, if she encounters struggle in helping her children educationally: “I leave it to the social 
worker, or I leave it to the school counsellor, I leave it to the school teacher” – all of these 
services were almost entirely freely provided by the PAP government.  
 Furthermore, disadvantaged families are limited not only in terms of economic capital, 
but in terms of time, to participate as much as they would like in their children’s educational 
lives. Teo (2018) calls ‘work-life balance’ a function of one’s privilege, in hyper-competitive 
Singapore.122 In such conditions, families had no choice but to ‘depend’: 
I wanted to [join support group at school] but it’s just that I don’t have time. Because I 
am working office hour. Usually they will meet parents to actually come in during the 
morning for reading programme, or to assist in Learning Journey. I want to, but I just 
can’t. (Dania, mother, F12) 
 
Moreover, the widespread provision of putatively ‘high-quality’, ‘fair’ educational provision 
can reduce the felt need (and the courage to ask) for social or political change. While it is 
legitimate to choose to vote for a government that provides for one’s perceived needs, the logic 
of welfare can work to mute the imperative for larger-scale socio-political transformations, by 
meeting more small-scale needs and moulding subjectivities and people’s desires in alignment 
with the requirements of capitalism (Gough, 1979). 
 Secondly, families had no choice but not depend on formal education experts within a 
high-stakes education system that strongly valorises academic merit, in popular culture and for 
employment (Chong, 2014). Tremewan (1994:151) argues: “[Singaporeans] are happy to be 
involved in the education system because they recognise it is the only pathway to jobs and 
economic survival, the only means to obtain welfare” (emphasis added). The smooth efficacious 
functioning of the meritocracy-education mechanism secured families’ dependence on the state, 
instilling confidence that if they co-operated with the school and state in the pursuit of academic 
merit, they would be rewarded. The efficacy of this mechanism is due to the government’s 
“tight coupling” between “logistics of a small system, congruent human resource policies and 
a social compact premised on paternalism” (Dimmock & Tan, 2015:14-15). Yet, as 
 
121 Spending on private tuition is growing – this figure is almost double the amount Singaporean households 
spent in 2005 – SGD$650 million (equivalent to around GBP£375 million) (Wise, 2016). 
122 As Teo (2018:79) argues, work-life balance should not be a matter of class privilege. Yet it often is the case 
in Singapore that for low-income families (such as the families I interviewed), wage work – the work generally 
of the relatively less educated –  is “poor quality”, with “low pay, lack of control over schedules, high stress”. 
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mentioned in Chapter Five (Section 5.3.2), such forms of dependency – such singularity of 
pathway – can be oppressive in young people’s lives, particularly those less academically 
inclined.  
 One might critique disadvantaged parents’ collaboration with the state and school, 
particularly in monitoring and punishing young people. However, these oppressive 
dependencies are not necessarily a matter of ‘choice’ for disadvantaged parents. As Miller & 
Rose (2008:205) argue, ‘freedom’ to choose (including choosing how to live one’s life or raise 
one’s children), is not a positive space beyond political power; instead, while subjects appear 
‘free’, ‘free’ individuals have “voluntarily assumed obligations…to make the most of their 
existence.” Moreover, disadvantaged families have even less ‘choice’ than those with wealth; 
Skeggs (1997) reminds us that disadvantaged families are never in a position to disregard 
money, or to construct distance from necessity. In a highly-credentialed context like Singapore, 
where education is perceived to be non-negotiable in the pursuit of financial success and 
cultural status (Chua, 2011) – families’ willingness to collaborate with schools, while 
oppressive, is simultaneously evidence of concern for their children’s present and future well-
being. These oppressive collaborations also derived from parents’ fears that future generations 
will suffer as they did. Young people broadly accepted, with a stoic pragmatism, the singularity 
of the pathway to a good future – the academic qualification – and understood the reason why 
their parents acted the way they did.  
 Thirdly, families’ (especially parents’) ‘necessary’ dependence also arose out of 
perceptions of their own incompetence vis-à-vis ‘educated’ teachers and ‘educated’ 
government ministers. At times, young people (such as Irfan [F10], Devi [F4], Hafiq and 
Rizwan [F9]) were more confident that their parents were important to their personal 
development than parents were themselves. Rose and Miller (2008:147) argue that the most 
potent way in which “the few” transform “the many” is not ultimately through technologies that 
“evaluate, reason and speak about their world” (such as differentiating mechanisms in 
Singaporean education, like streaming) – but technologies that transform a person at “the level 
of subjectivity”. The meritocracy-education mechanism, which valorises the academic 
qualification as a marker of deservedness, “transforms the ethical rationales and techniques 
according to which individuals relate to themselves, judge themselves and steer themselves 
in…their relations with others” (ibid). As such, families appear to “exercise their […] 
capacities and attributes freely” (ibid:147), but actually perform their pedagogic roles based on 
a subjectivity shaped profoundly by the meritocracy-education mechanism.  
 The hyper-competitive meritocratic ethos implants both norms of self-promotion, and a 
willingness to seek expert advice (Miller and Rose, 2008:171). Foucault’s (1988:57) conception 
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of technologies of the self encompasses not just the belief that one is an “imperfect, ignorant 
individual who requires correction” – it also stipulates that one “suffers from certain ills” and 
“needs to have them treated…by someone who has the necessary competence.” Thus, parents 
and young people ‘freely’ come to the recognition of their need to depend – while state-
regulated educational expertise weaves together this recognition of incompetence, with the 
norm of self-promotion.  
 At the extreme end, parents at times even felt their children were better qualified to 
make decisions on how the family should be run. Chandra (father, F2) stated: “Even now, she’s 
more educated than me. In fact, she must advise, not I advise her.” This contradicts the social 
construction of ‘child-as-immature-being’ (Lim, 2015) discussed earlier. However, the broader 
narrative is the same: education is important, and surveillance and nagging feel necessary to 
help their child achieve this vital norm. Yet, as the child gradually becomes increasingly 
‘educated’, they are also perceived as more dependable – with all the civilising connotations 
families attach to the acquisition of education. Teo (2018:139) summarises the problem of 
parents’ perceived incompetence and limited pedagogic authority as follows:   
Parenting while low-income is about parenting with the knowledge that one has low 
status in this [Singaporean] society. And so low-income parents find themselves 
having to do this immensely difficult thing: they have to tell their kids to listen to them 
and yet also send them the message: “don’t be like me.”123 It is difficult to exercise 
authority under these conditions.  
 
Overall, then, dependency relations are structured by both positive and negative aspects, 
depending on whether one depends out of choice (when one recognises the competence and 
care of the state and school), or a lack of choice, as this subsection describes. The dependency 
context generally makes plausible, and softens, responsibilisation – but there are negative 
aspects to this dependency context, too, particularly where dependency is constructed out of 
necessity rather than choice.  
 In the final section, I explore a further dimension of the dependent subjectivity: that is, 
the interface between the ‘dependent’ subjectivity and policy reform that aims to develop the 
future-ready student. I suggest that a particular form of the dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity is valorised by the meritocracy-education mechanism. However, a very-dependent 
subjectivity can restrict the enactment of particular policy reforms. The final section thus 
unpacks a further dimension of the politics of home-school relations, providing reasons as to 
 
123 Disadvantaged parents in this study express precisely the sentiments Teo (2018) describes, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, Section 5.4.1. 
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why policy ideals of the future-ready student may or may not map out in disadvantaged families’ 
lives.   
 
6.4. Dependency and Policy Reform    
A dependent subjectivity makes families both amenable to agreeing with government reform, 
yet also restricts the development of the future-ready student, equipped with flexible higher-
order thinking competencies required for the global knowledge economy. Rhetoric around 
developing such competencies is typically accompanied by rhetoric concerning the “joy of 
learning”, which develops a culture of “lifelong learning” (Ong, 2018b).  In this section, I do 
not wish to imply that disadvantaged groups do not have higher-order thinking competencies, 
or that the ‘future-ready’ subjectivity embedded in policy rhetoric is a normative good – for 
instance, Tan (2019:129) argues that critical thinking in Singapore has a pragmatic focus, 
geared towards gaining high test scores and maximising human capital, rather than being 
“emancipation-focused”. However, I do wish to suggest how, and why, competencies and 
subjectivities valued by the MOE, seen by the MOE as ideals, may not be actualised in 
disadvantaged young people’s lives.   
 In Chapter One, I outlined a key paradox in Singaporean education, between a high-
stakes performative education system and a system that has, since approximately 1997, 
attempted to develop broader competencies (in particular, flexible, critical and creative thinking) 
and reduce its emphasis on academic grades. The rationale for this has largely been to equip 
young people for an uncertain future and a global knowledge-based economy. For instance, the 
21CC Framework declares: “Globalisation, changing demographics and technological 
advancements are some of the key driving forces of the future. Our students will have to be 
prepared to face these challenges and seize the opportunities brought about by these forces” 
(see Appendix F). The MOE has pushed for a “much higher threshold for experimentation, 
innovation and uncertainty where output is not always guaranteed or even expected”:  
The ideal student for the knowledge-based economy would be one who is literate, 
numerate, IT-enabled, able to…apply knowledge to solve problems, capable of being 
creative and innovative, not risk-averse, be able to work both independently and in 
groups, and be lifelong learners. (Gopinathan, 2007:60) 
 
Correspondingly, Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam stated in a news article 
that parenting must evolve with changes in the education system. Rather than being “helicopter 
parents” who “hover” over their children and obsess over academic grades, parents should 
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adopt a more hybrid124 approach: “Kids need a mix of high expectations set for them and 
encouragement to think independently, think originally and develop their own interests” (Teng, 
2019). 
 While families generally seemed unaware of official policy rhetoric, when discussing 
these reforms with families, families responded in two distinct ways: 1) a more positive 
response, where I explain parents’ amenability to reform, and 2) a more negative response, 
where I illustrate why the policy ideal of the future-ready subjectivity may not be realised.  
 I begin by describing their more optimistic response. Families were positive about these 
reforms, because they trusted that the government and schools knew what they are doing (for 
reasons already explored in this chapter, concerning perceived competence and care). Even 
though they had never heard of these policy reforms, after I described the TSLN and 21CC 
framework to families, families agreed that the government knew what it was doing, and such 
reforms would (at least in principle) help young people prepare for future workplace and society. 
 In particular, parents (e.g. Chandra [F2], Dania [F12]) highlighted aspects of policy 
reform frameworks that they resonated with and saw in practice, such as a stronger emphasis 
on learning outside classrooms (whereas in the past, learning was within-classrooms), and how 
they felt this would help develop children’s thinking. They saw that curriculum and pedagogy 
was more “advanced” and “higher-level” that it was in the past, which would help push children 
to think more sharply, to ask “why” questions. Parents certainly felt a shift towards critical 
questioning; Anjushri stated that her youngest son, Anil, asked too many questions; for instance, 
he questioned a Hindu superstition that disallowed playing on swings at night. Anjushri averred 
that such a disposition was inculcated through modern-day schooling. Most parents, with the 
exception of Ayu’s, observed that teacher-student relationships were evolving away from 
didactic modes of teaching to more interactive, child-centred forms. They agreed with the 
general ethos of TSLN and 21CC; they were largely amenable to broad, rich conceptualisations 
of education that would develop a child not only academically, but emotionally, socially and 
morally.  
 On the other hand, my findings question whether official MOE policy rhetoric around 
flexible, higher-order thinking competencies will be enacted equitably and fairly. The rest of 
this section discusses three reasons why it likely will not; all three reasons collectively suggest 
that families’ amenability to dependence on the state and school, and their close relations with 
them, can trap young people in the all-consuming reality of the academic grade.  
 
124 The term ‘hybridity’ was also used in Chapter One to describe pedagogic methods in Singaporean schools – 
which combined both didactic, rote-learning methods with more child-centred ones. 
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 Firstly, academic grades and certification were valorised as the cornerstone of 
Singaporean education. Thus, families wondered about the necessity of higher-order thinking 
competencies. They saw these competencies as an “add-on” (as Naadia [F10] described, and 
which her two boys, Yusof and Irfan, agreed with) to the main business of education, to pass 
examinations. While the MOE outlined their intention for 21st-century competencies to be 
infused into the curriculum – describing the implementation of 21CC as: “Developing 
Innovative Mindsets through the Total Curriculum” (K. C. Tan, n.d.) – the term “add-on” 
denotes an entity that is not integral to the schooling experience. Perhaps, Izzati (F8) reflected, 
teachers’ focus is this ‘critical thinking’ business, but for families, it was the ‘gradings’ that 
counted:  
For us, is only gradings. For us parents, we only see the gradings. How high you get the 
marks, that’s how you understand in your subject. For the teachers, it will be a different 
thing lah, this [critical thinking] is the thing that they will be looking through. 
 
Izzati’s implication was that grades were what mattered more, in achieving a successful future. 
Furthermore, it was not only families who gave a peripheral position of critical and creative 
thinking; almost all young people (with the exception of Shafiq [F6]) noted that schools did not 
care much for such forms of thinking, either. When I asked Namrita and Shreya [F1] in a focus 
group interview what they thought of reforms towards instilling higher-order thinking 
competencies, the following exchange ensued:    
Namrita: Sure whatever the government do means it’s very good for children, you see, 
for future. 
 
Interviewer: Mm, OK, but do you see that do you see that actually happening in school? 
[…] 
 
Shreya: Not actually. […] Uh, for all I know now it’s like only focused on grades lah.  
 
When asked to describe how schooling had changed over time, families broadly, and almost 
unanimously, saw two major shifts. One was that teachers were more caring, student-centred 
and attentive to students. The second was that the curriculum had become exponentially more 
difficult and rigorous: 
What I’ve noticed is that […] certain subjects have been moved forward. […] We 
started on certain topics such as multiplication in Primary Three or Four, but now they 
start since Primary One. […] So yeah, that’s the worrying thing. […] That’s why I 
mentioned that the struggle will be much more different in the future. (Hafiq, son, F9) 
 
The recognition of increasing academic intensity directly contradicted recent statements by the 
Minister for Education, Ong Ye Kung, who claimed in a speech that, after the announcement 
of TSLN in 1997, the curriculum had been reduced by 30%, and by 2005, a further 20%. He 
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noted that this was because schools are “at risk of becoming too stressful and maybe some 
unwinding is in order” (Ong, 2018b).125 If the curriculum had indeed been reduced, families 
certainly did not detect this. 
 Secondly, relatedly, families questioned whether this emphasis on higher-order 
competencies was too tiring and difficult for young people, particularly in light of an already 
saturated curriculum. Namrita (grandmother, F1), while deeply positive about the government, 
commented: “[21CC/TSLN] is a good programme lah, but nowadays children cannot take it. 
See my granddaughter, third one. After school she go […] SINDA class then school homework, 
all. She very stress, you know […] You got see or not?” She pointed out the window of the 
McDonalds we were sitting at, gesturing abstractly at the street below us. “Some children they 
talk themselves when walking. Like mental, you know. Scared.” She described that the 
Singapore government wanted to train young people like “overseas” – like in “Europe” – where 
studying was infused with play. But playing and learning competencies beyond academic 
grades would take time. Namrita said: “Overseas not like this, you know, must study-study.” 
Overseas, “they all study a bit then play lah then very fast the school closed. […] But they say 
Singapore very tough. Studies ah, Singapore very tough, they pushing.” As described in earlier 
chapters, Singapore’s MOE is unique in adding competencies such as critical and creative 
thinking in an additive fashion to the curriculum, without retracting sufficient curriculum 
material to make room for new competencies (Deng et al., 2013b). Shreya stated that she found 
it hard to be ‘creative’: “I’m just too tired, I guess.”  
 A third reason why the policy rhetoric around the future-ready subjectivity might not be 
enacted, lies in the values families envisioned as necessary for ‘success’ – values that families 
felt were encouraged and propagated by schools, too, and in the labour market. When asked 
what the most important qualities for a young person were, to acquire a ‘successful future’ 
(defined as families wished), the top three responses most frequently cited by both parents and 
young people were: disciplined, responsible, and the importance of academic qualifications. 
To this end, a ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ student were typically described as those who study hard, 
listen to teachers, memorise well, and manage their time well.  
 Curriculum, pedagogy and assessment modes embedded in institutional education shape 
subjectivity (Ball, 1990). As mentioned in Chapter Four (Section 4.3.2), Leonel Lim's (2015) 
ethnographic study of critical thinking reforms suggest differences in how critical thinking 
reforms are enacted in an ‘elite’ independent and mainstream government school in 
 
125 The speech was at an annual Ministry of Education Work Plan Seminar, addressed largely to school leaders 
and teachers in Singapore, to announce and discuss changes to the education system.  
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Singapore.126 He argues that while the former school sought to develop rich dispositions of 
intellectual autonomy, the latter (although theoretically allowed by the MOE to develop 
curricular innovations) was limited in terms of administrative, financial and curricular resources 
– and taught critical thinking in a way that was technical, contextually-specific, thus reinforcing 
a market-oriented, instrumental rationality. My findings add to this analysis, suggesting that 
these instrumentally-oriented rationalities and dispositions are further reinforced in familial 
spaces.  
 Orderliness, discipline and tidiness were some of the most important lessons that 
schools taught young people, Anjushri explained. “The school, they learn discipline. They learn 
lots of discipline. Tuck in your shirt, iron your shirt, cut your hair. There’s a lot of discipline 
they learn at school, you know.” Her youngest daughter Gayatri, who was six-years-old at the 
time of interview and playing near her mother, piped up: “Cannot! [Hair] cannot be long.” 
Smiling, Anjushri continued:  
Ah, see, the small one also know. Then your shoes, cannot bend your socks. […] Like 
I tell you the school already teach you, how to dress up, how to talk to people, what time 
you must go to school – that is the one you must do.   
 
Thus, in families’ perception of what schools did and in the pedagogic work exercised at home 
(surveillance and monitoring) – discipline and responsibility took precedence over developing 
intellectual autonomy or attempting some “balance between rigour and joy” (Ong, 2018b).  
 The importance of discipline is reinforced further by families’ perceptions of a wider 
‘Singaporean’ culture that is hierarchical and authority-centric (Tan, 2019), including at the 
labour market level. A criticism only young people raised about the improbability of developing 
and exercising genuine critical thinking, concerned the existence of cultural norms that are 
silencing rather than encouraging of their voices. ‘Keeping quiet’ is viewed as a matter of 
morality, as seen in Devi’s (F4) deploying of angel-devil imagery: “Like in school, I’m not the 
person that talks a lot. I will listen in school. I’m the very angel-like person in school. Then at 
home, I’m devil-like. I talk, talk, talk, cannot stop talking right?” 
 Particularly energetic, talkative and opinionated (she always gets told off at home for 
‘talking back’, she said), Devi felt that these qualities ran counter to “Singapore culture”. To 
“shut your mouth” is a virtue reinforced across home, school and even the future labour market 
– and all three spheres are in agreement with each other: 
Devi: In Singapore […] my generation don’t really think about ourselves. We always 
listen to what other people say, to find our destination. Then in working, I think we also 
listen to what bosses say to find our destination, right? So I think to be a good citizen 
 
 126 In the ‘elite’ independent school, over 50% of students had parents who were university graduates, compared 
to what Lim (2015) called ‘mainstream’ government schools where the proportion was only 7-13%. 
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[of Singapore], you should really listen to other people mostly. I don’t think people 
really consider our – our what ah? Like my thoughts, or something. 
 
Interviewer: How do you get that impression of Singapore? 
 
Devi: I – I think it’s my school life. [laughs] Yeah, my teachers usually – they said if 
you want a good future, you should shut your mouth – 
 




Interviewer: Do they said that just to you or to everybody? 
 
Devi: To most of the people [laughs]. 
 
Clearly, the obstacles outlined here to policy enactment are not the sole reserve of 
disadvantaged families but likely apply to families across Singapore (Tan, 2019). However, 
these obstacles are likely particularly pronounced for disadvantaged families – due to 
disadvantaged families’ descriptions of close dependence on the schools and the state (and very 
relatedly, their confidence that the values they are inculcating are in line with the school, the 
state and the labour market). Furthermore, disadvantaged families have little recourse to 
enrichment classes; many of these classes emphasise development beyond “substantive 
content”, and broader competencies beyond grades acquisition (Vincent & Ball, 2007:1074). 
However, such resources were unaffordable, for disadvantaged families. 
 Furthermore, mainstream schools might be relatively less likely to develop intellectual 
autonomy than independent schools (Lim, 2015) – and in fact, from families’ perspectives, 
generally inculcate discipline and responsibility far more than autonomy and creativity, 
particularly for those in NA and NT streams. Left unchecked, these social processes may forge 
routes through which young people may become socialised into working-class jobs (Willis, 
1977).  
 Overall, then, from families’ perspectives, a fundamental contradiction might be traced 
between a rigorous, performative education system that emphasises discipline, submission and 
narrow forms of responsibility (dispositions also valorised socio-culturally and in the labour 
market) – versus the emphasis on broader competencies, encapsulated in 21CC and TSLN 
frameworks. Overall, the dependency relations sketched thus far, suggest that close 
collaboration and the sharing of a largely unproblematised, normative vision of what a ‘good 
future’ looks like and how to acquire it – can work against achieving the policy ideal of the 




6.5. Closing Reflections  
This chapter has illustrated the nature and configuration of dependency relations, between 
families, the state and schools, highlighting its positive and negative aspects. From the 
perspectives of disadvantaged families, dependency relations are crucial in helping families 
navigate a better future. Families willingly and, where possible within often difficult material 
constraints, proactively partner with the state and schools towards this goal. Families’ 
dependence on the state and school provides, to a degree, a buffer and a source of support and 
care for families facing various adverse situations. Furthermore, an interdependence by choice 
and reasoning (out of recognition of competence and care), can be motivating and encouraging 
for young people, keeping them in school and protecting them from alienation from public 
institutions, and freeing up parents to work long shift hours with less worry that their children 
will be unguarded and uncared for. This claim runs contrary to the suggestion in popular and 
political rhetoric that dependence generates laziness (Fraser & Gordon, 2002).  
  There are various aspects of the closeness, warmth and friendliness particularly evident 
in home-school relations, that can potentially promote social mobility and institutional trust. 
However, it is important not to exaggerate claims. Relations to authority are varied; families 
may have more positive relationships with education professionals compared to other 
authorities in Singapore, particularly those they may need to seek financial assistance directly 
from (Teo, 2018).127  
 From my analysis, various implications might be drawn.128 One implication is that 
dependence that is developed through a genuine recognition of competence and care of state 
and schools, is by far superior, and more empowering, than a ‘necessary’ dependence borne out 
of the government’s desire for political legitimacy, material constraints and negative self-
perception. Moreover, it is important to ensure that any dependency is rooted in actually-
existent state and school competence and care, so as to not take advantage of disadvantaged 
families’ reliance.  
Furthermore, even though families did not actively articulate this, a meaningful 
interdependency that provides pedagogic space for families to develop their own visions of 
good parenting and values families’ input in child-rearing is desirable, as it respects families’ 
pedagogic agency. Over-dependence on the state and state institutions can restrict visions on 
what constitutes a successful future, trapping young people in an oppressive, singular reality of 
 
127 As explained in this chapter, the more severely disadvantaged parents such as Ayu, Dimal and Omar describe 
the welfare system as bureaucratic and blunt, and social service workers as being unhelpful in managing their 
applications for financial help, beyond education.  
128 These implications are developed in greater detail in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
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the all-consuming grade and the importance of discipline, responsibility, keeping one’s mouth 
shut – at the expense of developing a sense of intellectual autonomy and independence. Inherent 
in docile subjectivities are barriers to the development of higher-order thinking competencies 
that the MOE aims to cultivate for all young people. 
 Throughout Part II, I have illustrated the salience of the dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity, constituted through historical (Chapter Four) and contemporary pedagogic 
practices and relations (Chapters Five and Six). I suggest that families largely reproduce 
meritocratic rationalities – that is, they tend to believe that since the state and schools have 
adequately provided in terms of competence and care, families (especially young people) 
should take on responsibility for their futures. In other words, the context of dependency makes 
plausible the acceptance of responsibilisation. The meritocracy-education mechanism then, in 
turn, connects individual and familial responsibility to ‘success’. However, the linkages in this 
optimistic meritocratic teleology do not necessarily map out in disadvantaged families’ lives. 
Chapter Seven draws on both historical and interview analyses to trace the inequalities, injuries 






CHAPTER 7. Problematising Meritocracy, Locating Inequality 
 
“For while institutions bear down upon us, we nevertheless cling to them; they place 




7.0. Introduction  
Thus far, Chapters Four to Six have traced the surprising affirmation of government power in 
families’ lives, despite their marginal status. Dependency, responsibility and success are 
connected linearly in the link-chain of the meritocracy-education mechanism, and this 
rationality is largely reproduced families’ lives. However, a key question that I seek to address 
in this chapter is this: given families’ constructions of close partnerships between state-school-
family, as well as their positive cons tructions of fairness and opportunity in Singapore, why 
does inequality nonetheless exist, as indicated in quantitative research and scholarly analyses? 
Why does dependency at times fail to translate to the taking of ownership of one’s life trajectory, 
upward social mobility and the achievement of families’ desires for success? What are the 
inequalities, injuries and resistances to the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity?   
 One of the benefits of a ‘studying through’ analysis of power (Shore & Wright, 2005) 
is sensitivity to breakdowns in the lived experience of dominant discourses such as ‘meritocracy’ 
in Singapore and the types of subjectivities it calls one to inhabit. Analyses drawing on the 
governmentality perspective have often been critiqued for their dystopian, totalising 
representations of power – and consequently, for their insufficient precision regarding how 
instruments of power and inequality actually ‘work’ (Rose et al., 2006). Synthesising findings 
from Chapters Four (which makes visible the historical constitution of governing techniques) 
and interview findings from Chapters Five and Six129 – I discuss in this chapter three ways in 
which the optimistic promises of Singaporean meritocracy at times do not map out as policy-
makers promise, in families’ (and especially young people’s) lives. This section seeks to make 
the injuries and inequalities of Singaporean meritocracy more explicit, through discussing three 
ways in which meritocratic optimism falters in contexts of socio-economic disadvantage. 
 These three problematisations serve as diagnostics of the injuries of power and 
inequality (Abu-Lughod, 1990). Through these discussions, I also make explicit some 
resistance (Butler, 1997) to the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity as it is experienced in 
everyday family life. The process of power in modern governance is one whereby “norms…are 
 
129 That is, I draw on all three levels of my theoretical framework (outlined in Chapter Two): political 
rationalities and technologies, and micro-level technologies of the self, which in particular enables one to trace 
the limits of the effects of political power. 
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endlessly ramified down to the finest details of the micropractices, so no action that counts as 
important and real falls outside the grid of normality” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:258). There 
is a “regular extension [of] the infinitely minute web of panoptic techniques” (Foucault, 
1984:213). Yet, in the temporal gap between repeated performances (Butler, 1997), there can 
be moments of rupture and resistance that problematise the dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity.  
 While a Foucauldian perspective valuably encourages much-needed reflexive 
assessment over dominant moral and ethical intuitions, it has been critiqued for being 
paradoxically and unhelpfully absolutist in its relativism (Hammersley & Traianou, 2014). In 
its total rejection of political power and universal morality, a Foucauldian perspective offers 
few tools with which one might reconstruct and re-conceptualise dominant values to improve 
the life chances of the disadvantaged. Thus, departing from the “contradictory and self-
destructive embrace of relativism” (Wacquant, 2011:89) that halts the critique a Foucauldian 
perspective in principle seek to achieve – I end by reflecting on how one might reframe 
‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ (as it is typically understood in theoretical and political 
discourse) to create fairer conditions for disadvantaged families.  
 
7.1. Reproducing Meritocracy, Reproducing Inequality? 
Before discussing the problematisations, I begin by making explicit the analytic links between 
dependence, responsibility, meritocracy and the neoliberal-developmental state. The 
meritocracy-education mechanism propagates a particular dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity. This mechanism is propped up by ‘developmental’ and ‘neoliberal’ political 
rationalities. ‘Developmental state’ logics seem to invite dependence on the state and its 
provision, while ‘neoliberal’ logics responsibilise individual selves and families. While 
neoliberal and developmental state logics are (at first) seemingly paradoxical, the seeming-
paradox is not a paradox: both logics collectively construct and legitimise the dependent-yet-
responsible subjectivity. That is, dependence on the state’s provision and its ‘success’ in 
‘levelling the playing field’ facilitates disadvantaged families’ acceptance of responsibility.130 
Does the meritocratic, dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity ameliorate or exacerbate 
inequality? The connection between meritocracy and inequality, as Chapter One explained, has 
long been theorised. Generally, existing literature suggests that neoliberal meritocracy valorises 
individual effort and talent, elides structural disadvantages, and essentialises the meaning of 
 
130 In the longer run, the logics operate in the reverse direction, too: neoliberal logics ‘shore up’ the ‘strong’ state 
by maximising capital accumulation and thus ‘proving’ and legitimising the governing succeses of the state 
(Ong, 2012).  
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‘success’; it dislocates actors from structures, and presents itself as post-feminism, post-race 
and post-class (Littler, 2018). The kind of ‘self’ that meritocracy constructs is one of the 
entrepreneurial self, yet disadvantaged individuals face “far greater difficulties in terms of both 
recognition and redistribution” required to take up such a subject-position (ibid, 70).  
 In Singapore, the ‘self’ valorised in meritocratic rationality has, from certain 
perspectives, a more mixed relationship with inequality. It is possible to trace how a dependent-
yet-responsible subjectivity pries open opportunities for families to optimistically and 
proactively participate in negotiating better socio-economic opportunities for themselves. A 
recent news article in The Straits Times (Tai, 2016), for instance, notes: 
In Singapore…14 per cent of those born in the bottom quintile, in terms of income, 
made it to the top quintile by their late 20s, according to a 2015 study by the Ministry 
of Finance. This is double that seen in the United States and slightly higher than the 12 
per cent observed in Denmark. 
 
Even more saliently, the subjective experience of neoliberal responsibilisation seems different 
in Singapore, compared to much theorisation and empirical research in European and Anglo-
American contexts that have traced the fracturing of state-citizen relations and the 
disenfranchisement of disadvantaged groups, in contexts of neoliberal policy reform  (e.g. 
Edwards, 2002; Güemes, 2017). In Singapore, understanding the sequential movement of 
dependency to responsibilisation is crucial in revealing the differences in subjective experience 
of neoliberal institutional practices. While quasi-markets are evident in Singaporean 
education131 through increasingly diversifying school types and greater accountability given to 
schools and parents – responsibilising ‘neoliberal’ logics co-exist with a robust dependency 
context. Dependency relations make responsibilisation more plausible and ‘fairer’ to families, 
softening the harshness of familial and self-responsibilisation. 
However, there are injuries, inequalities and resistances evident in the linkages of the 
meritocratic teleology in families’ everyday lives. Overall, I argue that historically contingent, 
socio-economic and socio-political conditions constrain the translation of belief in the system 
into lived realities of genuine empowerment and progress. In so doing, I problematise 
meritocracy and locate the inequalities therein.  
 
 
131 The marketisation of Singaporean education should not be over-stated, either, given the proportion of 
Singaporean students pursuing private schooling is only slightly under 4.5% (CEIC, n.d.). However, the growing 
diversity of schools and fee structures, even within Singaporean public education is clear (Tremewan, 1994). The 
Singapore system is best understood as a hybrid neoliberal-developmental system (Liow, 2011). 
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7.2. When Singaporean Responsibilisation is Oppressive  
If the logics of Singaporean meritocracy-education mechanism are understood as dependence 
(on the state and school) leading to responsibilisation, which leads to potential success – the 
first breakdown in this rationality, is between families’ perceived dependability of the state and 
the school and their willingness and capacity to accept responsibility.132  
 Firstly, the willingness of individuals in accepting the plausibility of responsibilisation 
was broadly generationally distinct. Young people – as the focal-point of Singapore’s 
meritocratic ethos – tended to find the relentless pressure to achieve educational success 
demoralising and demotivating. Childhood, Rose (1999:3) argues, is connected to the “destiny 
of the nation and the responsibilities of the state”; it is thus the “most intensively governed 
sector of personal existence”. Young people expressed a dislike of the flatness and linearity of 
life in Singapore:  
[My friends and I] just slack lah, talk about life – how bad it is […] Like in life, the 
main thing we see is just to get money and education, that’s what we see. And then if 
you don’t get education and money, then people will think that we’re useless. (Irfan, 
son, F10) 
 
I don't see a purpose in education [laughs]. I don’t know, I think it’s good, like, on one 
side because you know, it helps us in the future. But it’s also bad. Real bad. It’s really 
stressful. (Deepta, daughter, F2) 
 
Despite their recognition of how ‘good’ Singapore’s government was, Shreya (F1), Deepta (F2) 
and Irfan’s (F10) greatest wish in life was to leave Singapore – a simultaneously spatial and 
emotional distancing from ‘Singapore’. “I don’t like it here. I don’t know why,” Deepta said. 
In a way, meritocracy ‘works’ – one can in theory climb as high as one wishes; however, the 
structural impossibility of all achieving upward social mobility (Tremewan, 1994) – and the 
competition, comparison and pressure that arises from this – is equal part of ‘meritocracy’. The 
generational distinctness of young people’s sentiments can be illustrated through contrast with 
Shreya’s grandmother, Namrita’s (F1) statement:  
I like Singapore. Not like other country […] Singapore nothing, no problem. I like to 
stay in Singapore. [laughs] I don’t like to go overseas also. Singapore is OK. The 
government is helping so much. What for you want to run away from Singapore? 
Better stay here!   
 
Furthermore, for some parents, despite impassioned acknowledgments of the competence of 
the Singapore state and schools, they made just as impassioned acknowledgments of the 
negative effects of Singapore’s education system governance: that it demoralised young people, 
 
132 I locate the second problematisation, discussed in Section 7.3, ‘When Responsibilisation Doesn’t Lead to 
Success’, in-between responsibilisation and success.  
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ultimately curtailing young people’s capacity to take on responsibility for their future. 
Responsibilisation can, at times, lead to deresponsibilisation (Hunt, 2003).133  
So they [the government] are looking at now, Singapore, how to release the pressure. 
A lot of youngsters are committing suicide, or have got problem with anxiety attack, 
and this and that. […] But if the system can eject some…a bit more of lenience, that, I 
feel will boost the confidence of the students to say, “I want to be better! I can be 
better!” […] Instead of put such a difficult [exam] paper […] I think it is designed to 
make them fail. (Omar, father, F6) 
 
Moreover, the capacity of families to respond to the imperative of the entrepreneurial, 
responsible self, differed – based on whether the dependency context was robust enough in their 
own specific situation to enable up-take of responsibility. Without a sufficiently robust 
dependency context, responsibilisation functioned oppressively in families’ lives. 
Responsibility was perceived by most families to be warranted and necessary for social 
functioning – both within families, and within Singapore. However, the injuries and plausibility 
of responsibilisation was also context-specific. Such a recognition breaks open the linearity of 
the connection between self-responsibilisation and oppressiveness, to ask: Under what 
conditions does responsibilisation produce different effects?  
 Generally, the more multiply-disadvantaged a family was, the more disillusioned they 
seemed with the state and school. This is most clearly illustrated in the case of Ayu’s (F12) 
family; previous chapters have already described how responsibilisation can be implausible, 
given intersecting difficulties of chronic sickness, irregular income, bureaucratic work welfare 
provision and managing a large family amidst rapidly rising costs of living in Singapore. As 
the dependency context wore thin for Ayu’s family, taking up responsibility for academic 
success became impossible for Qawi, Ayu’s eldest son, who dropped out of ITE to work as a 
cleaner and restaurant worker. It is unsurprising that relations to the state and school are more 
frayed, in Ayu’s family.  
 The difficulty of taking up responsibility for academic (and thus, life) success can be 
evidenced in different ways. Ayu (F11) and Dania (F12) pointed out the lack of space to study 
at home, particularly as their families were large and space an expensive luxury in Singapore; 
a fieldwork note written after visiting Ayu’s house demonstrates this:  
 
133 Hunt (2003:184) describes this as an “alternative reaction” to responsibilisation, which “flags those responses 




Three young people, Irfan (F10), Mahmoud (F9) and Farah (F5), struggled with hunger. Farah 
sometimes ate chocolate for dinner because there was not enough to eat. Pocket money for food 
provided through FAS was insufficient; Irfan stated that FAS pocket-money only allowed him 
to “buy a small plate of rice with fish and egg. And a drink, that’s all”, but that is insufficient 
for their long schooling hours. His statement suggests how hunger weakens responsibilisation 
for schooling: “[money is] important to keep children going to school also. ‘Cos if no money, 
then they go school very hungry. Then they tend to like, stay at home more, because got food 
at home. If they starve themselves then they don’t like it lah.” The same can be said of sleep; 
Hafiz (F9) described how school ended at 2:30pm, CCAs kept them busy till 6pm, after which 
they had to manage a “pile of homework”. This led to lack of sleep, which led to inability to 
focus and falling asleep in school. 
 There is also a gendered dimension to responsibilisation, whereby the homogeneity of 
parents’ desires for both sons and daughters to gain top education credentials elides the fact that 
girls are typically expected to do housework and take care of younger siblings, atop their 
academic expectations. While daughters did not necessarily critique responsibilisation in 
gendered terms, the weight of responsibilisation seems particularly pronounced for them, as 
seen in this interview with Devi, and her mother Lakshmi (F4).  
Devi: I must maintain housework and education at the same time. So if I don’t do 
housework and school, I get scolded… 
 
Interviewer: So what kind of housework do you have? 
 
Devi: Me? As a girl, I think I’ve a lot… [laughs] 
 
Lakshmi: As a girl, she must know the home – how to do the work […] 
 
Interviewer: OK, right – so, [to Devi] your brother don’t have…? 
 
Devi: My brother, they don’t really – [laughs] Because they are boys. But he won’t do 
because he thinks girls should do it. 
 




Devi: Yes, he does. He said that to me: “You are a girl. You are supposed to do this.” 
 
Furthermore, cracks in the dependency context restricted the construction of aspiration. On 
surface, families had high aspirations, couching the potential of a formal education as vastly 
positive and transformative. However, beyond these abstract pronouncements, when asked to 
be more specific about their future career ambition, young people often chose not to take the 
risk of applying to Junior College.134 This was because they were anxious that they would not 
be able to keep up with the rigour of a Junior College education and drop out, as Nurul (F8), 
Deepta (F2) and Sanjay (F3) explained. In each case, parents wanted young people to aim for 
JC, but young people felt differently, leading to parent-child conflict. While the number of 
families interviewed was small, it is striking that not one young person (even those in the 
Express stream) expressed the desire to enter Junior College. Sanjay’s father, Srinivas (F3), 
stated: “Ya hey I tell [Sanjay]: ‘Go to JC, JC is very good! […] Compare Poly and JC, JC is 
very good.’ [Sanjay] said, ‘Don’t want, once I fail ah, I finished. I go to Poly better.’ ” While 
young people from more materially privileged families can draw on private tuition to 
supplement academic learning, and afford failure (so to speak) by absorbing the costs of time 
and money on an aborted JC education – disadvantaged young people do not have the same 
safety-net. The risk of failure, and the thinness of their safety-net, fundamentally curtails 
meritocratic aspiration and their capacity to adopt an entrepreneurial, ‘responsible’ subjectivity. 
At times, young people did not give such detailed reasons for why they did not feel the need to 
aim high. To Farah (daughter, F5), who planned to enter ITE, there was a matter-of-factness as 
she described why the existence of the NT stream and ITE was a positive feature of Singaporean 
education: “Because not everyone is born with dreams.”  
In some cases, the oppressiveness of responsibilisation was countered with a form of 
‘resistance’. As described in Chapter Six, families tried to moderate aspirations and pressure, 
to give children space, and sought contentment with what they had; young people disengaged 
from pursuing more academically challenging routes, expressing their disillusionment and 
criticism of the meaningless rigours of Singaporean education, and their desire to leave 
Singapore. Thus, while the responsibilisation of young people has a largely ‘neoliberal’ 
character, operating within a grid of normality bounded by academic grades, families deployed 
and resorted to other approaches in combination (rarely in direct conflict) with neoliberal logic. 
In understanding families’ alternative approaches, it is not that they effect a “reverse-discourse” 
(Butler, 1997:93) that (at least directly) challenges the dominant discourse of capital 
 
134 As mentioned in Chapter One, Junior College is the most prestigious post-secondary institution in Singapore. 
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accumulation. Rather, their ‘resistance’ takes the shape of “convergence with other discursive 
regimes, whereby inadvertently produced discourse complexity undermines the teleological 
aims of normalization [sic]” (Butler, 1997:93). To Butler’s statement, I add that these forms of 
‘resistance’ also combine with extra-discursive conditions of material disadvantage that 
restrains families’ capacity to act and aspire according to meritocratic-parentocratic norms.  
Yet, families’ undermining of the normalisation of ‘meritocratic’-‘parentocratic’ 
behaviour can also work to deepen their disadvantage by reducing families’ competitiveness 
within a hyper-competitive regime – and strengthen the position of wealthier families with 
greater amounts of social, economic and cultural capital, who enact ‘parentocratic’ strategies 
to leverage their comparative advantage (Tan, 2019). For families who resist ‘parentocracy’ by 
citing their reliance on the government’s extensive provision (illustrated in Dania’s case, in 
Section 5.5), such resistance of ‘parentocracy’ through relying on the state can also, in fostering 
positive feelings towards the government, concretise its harsh, responsibilising meritocratic 
system, silence critique, and reduce the imperative to change the status quo. This is how the 
paradox of ‘parentocracy’ in a ‘strong’ state135 (is experienced, in the lives of disadvantaged 
groups in Singapore. Their ‘resistance’ to ‘parentocracy’ can, in particular ways, deepen their 
disadvantage.  
  Overall, this analysis highlights the need for a more nuanced accounting of the tension 
between state welfare and individual responsibility, in an increasingly socio-economically 
bifurcated Singapore. Jason Tan (2019), in a news article, argued that the recently published 
Ministry of Education guidelines for parents’ roles and responsibilities do not account for 
families’ diverse socio-economic conditions. For instance, the guidelines call for parents to 
“create a conductive home environment for their children to complete homework” and to “help 
their children develop independence in terms of time management and completing homework 
on their own”. However, Tan (2019) argues: “Some [parents]…are unable to provide adequate 
guidance and supervision for their children’s schooling.” My findings underline Tan’s (2019) 
call for these guidelines and expectations to be flexibly applied – for instance, that schools may 
need to assist struggling families with finding students a place and time to study. Deputy Prime 
Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam has argued that “the state needs to intervene in a way that 
reinforces individual and civic responsibility” (cited in Tai, 2016); he goes on to claim that 
intervention and responsibility as not a paradox, but a position that permeates all Singaporean 
social policy. Yet, without a more nuanced accounting of families’ circumstances, within a 
 
135 This is described in Chapter One, Section 1.4. 
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context of growing precarity and inequity, the lived effects of social policies will be that of 
paradox and disjunction, between dependence and responsibility. 
 
7.3. When Responsibilisation Doesn’t Necessarily Lead to ‘Success’  
A second breakdown in the link-chain of meritocratic rationality is when some young people 
recognised that even if they were to cultivate a responsible, good-grades-achieving self, this 
would not necessarily lead to a ‘successful future’ in terms of labour market outcomes. This 
feeling largely arose out of their perceptions of credential inflation, graduate unemployment, 
and the desirability of hands-on skills and work experience for securing a well-paid job, 
compared to academic credentials.  
 In a way, one could argue that this doesn’t represent a breakdown of meritocratic 
rationality,  but a reproduction of it – because in recent years, MOE rhetoric has attempted to 
push the epistemic boundaries of ‘merit’ to incorporate a greater diversity of competencies, 
skills, dispositions, interests, abilities (Deng et al., 2013b). The MOE has suggested that 
vocational and technical education, skills and experience, can be just as valuable as traditionally 
valorised academic qualifications – what Chong (2014:644) has called the government’s 
impulse to “rehabilitate the vocational habitus”. The PAP government has used a combination 
of propaganda and “genuine structural changes…to make vocational education more attractive” 
(ibid), such as through restructuring vocational education and formalising accreditation 
schemes in vocational education institutes (ibid). The monthly salary of ITE graduates, Chong 
(2014) adds, has been increasing: from SGS$1391/month in 2009 to SGD$1646 in 2013. It is 
also true that credential inflation and graduate unemployment are emerging socio-political 
realities in Singapore (Teng, 2018).  
However, what is excluded from MOE policy rhetoric that encourages vocational and 
technical education, is the fact that university and white-collar jobs are highly pursued by 
middle-class Singaporeans, and confer higher socio-economic status – while technical 
education is stigmatised in the middle-class Singaporean imaginary (Chong, 2014). Moreover, 
the endeavour to “rehabilitate the vocational habitus” fits “the dominant elitist narrative of 
affinity and pride in one’s station in life, regardless of elevation” (ibid:644). At least in the 
present-day, Junior College still seems to constitute the smoothest pathway to a higher financial 
and cultural status (Chong, 2014). Thus, in actuality, academic merit is still broadly speaking 
the key arbiter in the meritocracy-education mechanism. Insofar as this is true, young people’s 
confusion and ambivalence over why they had to get good grades or go to Junior College, forms 
a reason why meritocratic optimism doesn’t map out in families’ lives.  
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In interview findings, while families generally did believe this link operated smoothly, 
there was disparity between parents’ and young people’s perceptions of the robustness of this 
link. Parents emphasised the centrality of academic grades and qualifications. As discussed in 
the previous section, parents generally had more ambitious aspirations than young people, and 
more faith in the meritocracy-education mechanism: they believed that achieving excellent 
academic grades would seal young people’s pathways to a successful future. Apart from two 
fathers, Omar (F6) and Dimal (F5),136 all parents felt that the ‘higher’ young people could study, 
the better it would be for the young person’s future. Young people, on the other hand, 
sometimes argued that qualifications were not as important as skills and experience – leading 
to disinterest in working hard in aiming for Junior College. They seemed more aware of 
credential inflation, graduate unemployment and the importance of skills and experience over 
qualifications. 
In fact, they felt that the disciplined, responsible technical worker with practical skills 
was superior to the overly academic and even economically undesirable global knowledge 
economy worker. Many young people highlighted the superiority of technical education, 
upturning the traditional hierarchy of value in Singapore (Chong, 2014). The importance of 
education was still deeply believed by families – but the type of education here was not 
necessarily academic; technical education, with its focus on ‘skills’, could be just as attractive, 
if not more, to employers:  
If you compare a diploma137 and A-level student, more companies will take diploma 
students, because they have the knowledge and the skills. Whereas for the A-level 
students, they only have the knowledge but not the skills. So the plus point of going 
through the diploma is the skills you get. (Hafiz, son, F9) 
 
This was tied to the type of job disadvantaged families anticipated having, in the future. In a 
focus group interview, Mahmoud and his brothers argued that the most prestigious academic 
qualifications do not necessarily translate to the kinds of vocational ‘hands-on’ jobs they were 
interested in: for instance, to be a pilot and an electrician. As such, the brothers described a 
mismatch between labour market requirements, and the imperative to get good grades – at least 
for them. 
 Disadvantaged young people may have inverted the traditional hierarchy of value in 
Singapore for various reasons. One might be simply an interest in vocational work. However, 
Skeggs (1997:59) notes that at times, disadvantaged groups “invert the status values which are 
attached to the academic/practical divisions…aligning themselves with the practical side…to 
 
136 Both parents expressed concern over graduate unemployment and credential inflation.   
137 Here, Hafiz is referring to a Polytechnic diploma. This was unanimously preferred over an ITE education.  
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the detriment of the academic side” (Skeggs, 1997:59) as a way in which they adapt to difficult 
circumstances. Inverting this hierarchy is a way they “generate credibility”, because “[t]heir 
rejection of the academic side of the curriculum is another attempt to find something at which 
they will not fail” (Skeggs, 1997:59). Finding a future job in which “they will not fail” is 
important, not only for their self-esteem but also for material reasons – because of the lack of 
an economic safety-net in their lives. 
The analysis thus far raises the question: Why is there disparity between young people 
and parents’ perspectives? As those attending school daily, young people may be more exposed 
to MOE rhetoric that valorises broader definitions of ‘merit’ and vocational education. 
Additionally, the different perspectives of parents and young people are likely rooted in their 
experiences of different generational, socio-political and historical contexts. Parents grew up in 
rapidly industrialising Singapore, marked by high economic growth, and, for significant 
segments of the population, upward social mobility (Tremewan, 1994). Due to the rapid nature 
of the industrialisation process, parents were often able to draw on anecdotes of friends and kin 
who were once in similar positions of disadvantage to them, who had worked hard in school, 
gained academic qualifications, and ascended the social mobility ladder into office jobs. 
Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998:980) argue: “[A]ctors tend to retrospectively 
assimilate new experiences to the old…Through this active process of recognition and 
assimilation, actors contribute to a sense of continuity and order within temporally evolving 
experience.” Young people, however, were growing up in conditions of slowing social mobility, 
widening socio-economic inequalities and the precarities of globalisation – captured in their 
anxieties (also echoed to an extent by parents) over ‘foreign talent’ – which included 
competitors from the ‘West’, as well as from China and India.  
 My findings suggest that individual family members’ constructions of aspiration are 
influenced by their subjective experiences of different generational, socio-political and 
historical contexts. Thus, what is required in understanding the problems of Singaporean 
meritocracy, is a more nuanced accounting of the tension between past and present, regarding 
changing political-economic conditions, opportunities and constraints. Given that Junior 
College still remains the most straightforward route to financial and cultural status in Singapore 
(Chong, 2014), it is important that well-suited young people are encouraged to apply for JC. At 
the same time, parents’ trust in the meritocracy-education mechanism must be more carefully 
qualified in light of changing socio-political and labour market conditions. While institutional 
trust can “[oil] the wheels of a variety of…transactions” (Field 2008:70), it can also lubricate 
the cog-wheels of affective machinery of “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2011:1), when conditions 
of inequality and precarity mean that aspirations are overly-optimistic. Disadvantaged parents’ 
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continued fixation on the academic result can be in itself an obstacle to flourishing: “one of 
optimism’s ordinary pleasures is to induce conventionality, that place where appetites find a 
shape in the predictable comforts of the good-life genres that a person or a world has seen fit to 
formulate” (Berlant, 2011:2). From a Foucauldian perspective, one might substitute the phrase 
“a world”, for political power.  
Finally, while there were generationally distinct logics between parents and young 
people, it must be noted that, for several families, there was also confusion, disorientation and 
ambivalence in trying to negotiate past and present. The confusion lay in the plurality of 
messages families were receiving, as participants within Singapore’s education system. The 
structures and processes of Singapore’s high-stakes education system signal the centrality of 
the academic qualification. Families were confident that employers and wider society valorised 
academic grades; grades was the main way Singaporeans distinguish between those who are 
“stupid” and “smart”, as one young person, Hafiz (F9) stated. Academic grades remained 
central to the “normalising gaze” which “establishes over individuals a visibility through which 
one differentiates them and judges them” (Foucault, 1979:174).  
Looking at a print-out of the 21st-Century Competencies Framework from the MOE 
website (see Appendix I), I pointed out in a focus group interview with Juriffah and her three 
sons, Hafiz, Rizwan and Mahmoud (F9), that despite the family’s continued strong emphasis 
on academic grades as crucial in Singaporean education, there were clearly other dispositions 
the government saw as necessary for future success, apart from academic grades. Hafiz replied, 
referring to academic grades: “Yeah, maybe there is inside, but actually hidden somewhere.” 
His brother, Rizwan, added: “Mesti ada”138 – and, to the laughter of his siblings: “This is a 
hidden information”. However, Mahmoud, the youngest sibling, countered his brothers’ views, 
stating that his teacher told them, in a module on ‘Globalisation’ in Social Studies, that skills 
and experience were more important than their grades. 
Disadvantaged families’ confusion and disorientation hints at the fundamental 
irreconcilability of an education system that strongly rewards academic attainment (through an 
academically rigorous curriculum and high-stakes testing), yet tries to push the epistemic 
boundaries of ‘merit’ to putatively valorise different competencies (Deng et al., 2013b). While 
these contradictions continue, disadvantaged young people remain somewhat ambivalent about 
how hard they should work to acquire good grades in school or to enter Junior College, 
particularly when the risk of failing, and the thinness of their socio-economic safety-net, create 
further discouragement to try. 
 




7.4. When Silence Speaks Louder than Words: back to the production of non-
productions of race and class 
Interviewer: Do you think being from a certain ethnic background – whether you’re 
Malay, Chinese, Indian – does that affect your life here in any way? Or is everybody 
the same?  
 
Mahmoud: Everybody’s the same. But the difference is culture, like that.  
 
Interviewer: How is the culture different?  
 
Mahmoud: Like cultures are different, like [different cultures] got other things. Like 
we got [certain] things right, and they’ll [Chinese, Indians] do other things. And you 
cannot interfere with their culture and they also cannot interfere with you.  
 
Another way of problematising Singaporean meritocracy lies in a deeper analysis of what is not 
articulated in interviews – particularly since I argue in Chapter Four that the meritocracy-
education mechanism subsists on the erasure and ‘non-production’ of ‘class’ and ‘race’.  
To Mahmoud, a young person (F9), ‘race’ had little impact on families’ life chances. 
The most salient part of ‘race’ was ‘culture’, and ‘culture’ referred superficially to outward 
practices, like (as he later elaborated) how Chinese liked to eat pork, but Malay-Muslims were 
not allowed to. Scholars have described how Singaporean ‘multiculturalism’, advanced through 
government rhetoric and school curricula, is superficial – minimising and essentialising ‘culture’ 
within a ‘hard multiculturalism’ approach (Tan & Tan, 2014:198).  
Foucault (1980:119) argues that political power is not repressive, but productive – it 
produces “things” and induces pleasure.139 However, I suggest that to legitimise itself, it can 
also produce ‘non-productions’ – minimising race and class to maximise focus on capital 
accumulation, and to pretend inequalities and failures in redistribution do not exist. Families 
interviewed in this study generally were not as interested in talking about their race-based 
disadvantage, as they were about material and class disadvantages, which in turn seemed to 
elicit less interest compared to discussing their children’s lack of discipline.140 
  A desire to analyse ‘silence’ mainly arose out of a contradiction I perceived: between 
the striking homogeneity in families’ general optimism and trust in the competence, care and 
fairness of the Singapore government (at least, regarding education) – and quantitative and 
scholarly analyses that point to an increasingly bifurcated Singapore, along lines of race (Rahim, 
1998) and social class (Teo, 2018) – both in terms of educational and economic achievement. 
 
139 The productive dimension of power is what makes power “hold good” (Foucault, 1980:119).  




Analysing silence formed a valuable analytic in understanding this contradiction. This section 
adds caution in interpreting the positivity at the state-school-family interface, in line with the 
governmentality ethos, which excavates the underlying forces that structure the surface of social 
reality, through questions such as: “Whose voices prevail?” and “How are their discourses made 
authoritative?” (Shore & Wright, 2005:15).  
 In this section, I delineate three reasons why families might remain silent about the 
unfairness of inequality in their lives, by way of highlighting further dimensions of inequality. 
Firstly, the meritocracy-education mechanism can blunt the salience of race and class as 
structuring forces in families’ lives (Hartas, 2015; Littler, 2018). Political technologies (such 
as the meritocracy-education mechanism) “advance by taking what is essentially a political 
problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral 
language of science” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:196). In Singapore, the ‘political problem’ is 
the underachievement of ethnic minorities (in particular, the Malay minority) and that of low-
income families. This is recast in the de-politicised, ‘neutral language’ of the science of 
academic grades, putatively attainable through a calculus of natural talent and effort. Or, in the 
area of school choice, the ‘neutral language’ of geographical proximity of residences to schools 
is evident, in how disadvantaged families view school selection. Families seemed to implicitly 
trust the MOE slogan: ‘Every School A Good School’. As Kumar (father, F4) stated:  
Whichever school you come from, whatever school you come from, don’t blame the 
school, blame yourself […] I’m satisfied with the school because it is all in the 
students’ hand. A neighbourhood school student can do the best, better than those in 
independent school. It’s all in your hand.  
 
School choice, for every family interviewed, was reduced to choosing schools based on distance 
to families’ homes, rather than on prestige or school facilities.141 For instance, prestigious 
institutions like Raffles Institution and the Anglo-Chinese School were ranked lowly, below 
mainstream government schools that were closer to home. Most families mainly selected 
schools, based on proximity from home (that is, convenience) alone as well as, for some 
families, hearsay on whether students in particular schools were well-behaved. Selecting 
schools based on proximity alone is not uncommon for poor families, due to stark information 
asymmetries that limit disadvantaged families’ knowledge and familiarity with the wider 
education system (Bonal & Zancajo, 2018).  
 
141 While schools generally in Singapore are of reasonable quality, the curricular and facility provisions at an 
independent and mainstream government schools is significantly different, as is the socio-economic composition 
of both. See: Lim (2015), Koh (2014).  
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While the ‘neutral language’ of geographical distance and academic grades was seldom 
explicitly problematised by families, it was particularly problematised by one father, Omar (F6), 
who remarked that the government pretended that which school you attend doesn’t matter, by 
publishing in newspapers ‘success stories’ from mainstream schools: 
This is what they want the people to believe. […] They […] publish in the newspaper, 
somebody has done well, and this school and that school […]. But in actual fact, it’s a 
part propaganda, and part strategy as well. They want more people to feel they are not 
worse off if they are going to the supposed ‘popular schools’, or go to neighbourhood 
schools.  
 
However, he believed that which school you attend does matter.   
In the ‘strong’ developmental state that encourages a particular form of heavy 
dependency on itself, through providing a putatively high-quality schooling system 
characterised by competence and care – families are encouraged to internalise responsibility as 
plausible and fair, evaluating themselves, the state and the schools through the putatively 
‘neutral languages’ of academic achievement and geographical proximity to schools. In such a 
context, the logical links that connect responsibilisation to politics is weakened, because the 
state and school’s part is perceived as complete – they have already done their part in 
establishing a seemingly well-functioning system. Devi (F4), for instance, pushes the blame for 
extreme stress not on the education system, but onto fuzzily-defined “third parties or fourth 
parties” beyond the school and families, who constantly tell families: “Must study hard. Must 
get this, must get that.” When parents hear this, Devi explains, they get ‘brainwashed’ to think: 
“Oh, you must get something that is stable for everyone to notice us”. The nature of the 
meritocracy-education mechanism is such that it restricts one’s vocabulary in trying to explain 
injustice in the system, at the level of politics. Trying to locate political accountability for failure 
beyond oneself (and one’s family), is, as described in Chapter Two, akin to shouting into a 
vacuum or chasing wind.   
 Secondly, there may be a deliberate ignoring, on families’ part, of structural factors of 
race and class, in order for families to ‘get by’, adapt to unjust conditions and move forward in 
their lives. A heightened consciousness of ‘race’ and ‘class’ may lead to emancipation from the 
colonised mindset (Chen, 2010). However, what is less recognised in mainstream sociology is 
the psychic burden and costs of consciousness, and how a strong consciousness of ‘race’ and 
‘class’ and its injuries can also function to imprison and paralyse families in pessimism. A 
strong consciousness of inequality can sap families’ already constrained reserves of energy, 
redirecting it from their efforts to increase their chances of achieving social mobility. One 
mother, Dania (F12) emphasised the importance of not dwelling on difficulty, asserting: 
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I am a very strong person […] I am not an easily give up person […] So I persevere, 
even though in my wits’ ends, I still persevere. And for me, I have always like back-
up plan, so I know what to do. Even though if you fall into a difficult position, or 
difficult state, I do not like give up, I do not like say, “Oh gosh, I’m dead, I don’t 
know where to go, I need help!” No, I go in front and help. 
 
Hence, Dania criticised low-income parents who refused to climb out of the pit of “low self-
esteem”. 
In Singapore, they have mixtures of low-income, middle-income and the high-income, 
that kind of thing. The low-income will definitely you know, have lot of low self-
esteem […] Some of them, they are not very confident, or they are not brave enough 
to come out and step up, you see? So for me, I know that the government is doing their 
best to get every children the same education everywhere. So, if let’s say, even the 
family can’t afford, that’s where all these [government] assistances come in. It’s just 
that the parents have to step up, they cannot just keep quiet and let their children 
suffer.  
 
Families’ assertions of responsibility and individualism – while appearing to be acceptances of 
meritocratic individualism – can also form valuable psycho-social resources that bolster a sense 
of agency and self, in claustrophobic conditions that often strain their self-esteem. Hence, their 
affirmations of self-responsibility cannot be casually interpreted as statements of support for 
Singaporean meritocracy. Such affirmations (and their silences) signal not only the competence 
and care of the state or school, but also the adaptative strategies one adopts to cope in contexts 
of severe hardship.  
 Thirdly, families may have been cautious to express critique in the ‘soft authoritarian’ 
Singaporean state (Ho, 2017; Lim & Apple, 2018). In a focus group interview with Juriffah and 
her three sons, Hafiq, Rizwan and Mahmoud (F9), they provided many recommendations as to 
how Singapore’s education system could be improved, such as through reducing homework 
and the number of heavy books students have to carry, replacing these with e-books. The 
following exchange ensued: 
Rizwan: ‘Cos we are already like try to voice out to the government, but [i.a.] […] 
 
Interviewer: OK, as in you said ‘voice out’ what, sorry? 
 
Rizwan: OK, because the students and the parents are trying also to voice up to the  
government, but there is no action taken. 
 
Interviewer: Oh – as in your family voices [out] to the government? 
 
Rizwan: Uh, no.  
 




Rizwan: I mean generally. [laughs] 
 
Mahmoud: ‘Cos families in Singapore, they don’t dare to voice out. 
 
Rizwan: Yeah that’s why, because we… 
 
Mahmoud: [You’ll] get to be sued lah. [laughs] 
 
Rizwan: You know lah, ah? 
 
Interviewer: Mmm.  
 
Rizwan: We cannot – 
 
Hafiq: Singapore doesn’t have that freedom of speech. 
 
Rizwan: Yes, agree.  
 
Mahmoud: Even though it’s a democratic country. 
 
Rizwan: Mm-mm. [agreement] 
 
While the advent of social media is revitalising young people’s political engagement, and 
multiplying critique and scrutiny of the government (Skoric & Poor, 2013) – in this study, 
disadvantaged families may have worried over state reprisal, even in anonymous interviews. 
As such, the role of fear in influencing interviews is worth contemplating further. Dependency-
responsibility relations are built on deeper foundations of power/knowledge relations. That is, 
because power is interwoven with knowledge (Foucault, 1980), state-citizen power relations 
influence not only the content of knowledge (what is knowable and thinkable), but also the 
articulation of knowledge.It is therefore insufficient to merely conceptualise dependency-
responsibility relations as co-constructed by multiple stakeholders: the state, schools, parents, 
young people. The politics of this co-construction – that is, the politics of expression – must 
also be a part of this inquiry. This requires attentiveness to the historical and ongoing conditions 
of censorship and the government’s use of ‘Out-of-Bound’ markers around discussions of race 
and class (Alviar-Martin & Baildon, 2016; Ho, 2017). Even the politics of expression is classed 
and raced, because disadvantaged families are already in a highly vulnerable position. 
 Overall, this subsection highlights the tension between voice and silence in interpreting 
disadvantaged families’ perspectives. An analysis of their perspectives must be situated within 
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an understanding of the politics of knowledge and expression in Singapore, which is in turn 
situated within Singapore’s socio-political context and history, described in Chapter Four.  
 
7.5. Reframing Dependency and Responsibility 
Based on my analyses of the resistances, break-downs and problems within meritocratic 
rationality, I outline preliminary reflections on how the terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ 
might be re-conceptualised. Singaporean meritocracy implies a particular kind of state-citizen 
relation, encapsulated in what I call the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity – a subjectivity 
often narrowly geared for efficiency and long-term capital accumulation. In the past decade, 
scholars have called for the need for a richer re-conceptualisation of the state-citizen compact, 
beyond the prosperity-loyalty compact (Gopinathan, 2007; Chua, 2017). I suggest that 
reframing ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ provides a starting point to begin building this 
richer re-conceptualisation.  
Both terms, as argued earlier in the thesis, tend to have negative connotations in specific 
circles. ‘Dependency’ is associated, within a liberal conception of personhood, with notions of 
constraint, subjugation, infantilisation (Edwards, 2002). ‘Responsibility’ is valorised within 
this liberal conception; it is associated with freedom, autonomy, enterprise (Rose, 1990). 
However, it is critiqued in scholarly literature for its regulatory and oppressive effects. I argue 
that such critiques of either ‘dependency’ or ‘responsibility’ obscure the variety of 
responsibilities and dependencies we are simultaneously embedded in, in everyday social life 
(McLeod, 2017). Human relations necessarily involve interdependency and responsibility.  
 As abovementioned, ‘responsibility’ is often framed negatively in scholarly literature. 
However, I argue it is possible to break open the linearity of the responsibility-oppressiveness 
link, by incorporating three further dimensions in understanding ‘responsibility’. Firstly, 
responsibility should be seen as an important part of healthy social (national and familial) 
functioning (McLeod, 2017; Trnka & Trundle, 2017); many disadvantaged families felt this to 
be so. Secondly, responsibility should be seen as relational – as encompassing care for self and 
others (McLeod, 2017), instead of the purely individualistic acquisition of grades, status and 
money. For instance, parents constructed their responsibility also in terms of protecting young 
people from the fierceness of individualistic competition. Young people saw being ‘responsible’ 
in school as a means towards providing for their current and future families, and gaining 
competencies to help them help wider society in the future. Responsibility involves acquisition, 
but it also includes care for others and self; it is the latter that needs to be emphasised to counter 
prevailing liberal conceptions of personhood.  
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 Thirdly, responsibility must be reframed to account for conditions of precarity and 
inequality, and the diversity of conditions that structure people’s capacity to take responsibility 
for their lives. Littler’s (2018:72) pronouncement of the effects of meritocracy are relevant to 
the Singapore context: “Whilst the elite access meritocracy through a rapid express elevator, 
these constituencies have to run hard just to keep on the same spot”, their efforts coloured with 
desperation. My findings support Bennett, Lutz and Jayaram’s (2012) findings, that there is not 
so much a difference in middle-class and working-class parenting ‘cultures’, as there is 
difference in the material conditions in which families are situated.142 Disadvantaged families 
broadly desire what most families desire: dignity and respect, social advancement, financial 
independence; they see the importance of academic grades and the value of schooling beyond 
the academic grade, including the importance of extracurriculars and higher-order thinking 
competencies, such as creative and critical thinking. However, their material conditions 
constrain the ways they exercise pedagogic responsibility. They lay profound weight on 
academic grades, seeing these as crucial to social mobility, and side-line other features of 
Singaporean education. They also lay profound weight on academic grades because they have 
no other options; they lack the financial resources to enroll young people in enrichment lessons 
(such as piano, bowling or ballet) that can help young people explore diverse pathways and take 
advantage of the government’s attempts to ‘broaden the definition of merit’.  
 At the same time, responsibility cannot be disconnected from contexts of dependency 
(as the third dimension of ‘responsibility’ has already revealed) – because responsibility 
without a sufficiently robust dependency context, can be exhausting, injurious and result in 
disillusionment. What I am advocating is a more nuanced conception of intersecting sources of 
inequality that can weaken a family’s capacity to take on responsibility; meritocracy, as critics 
have pointed out, is a blunt instrument (McNamee & Miller, 2009). While this might require 
more resources (both time and money) on the government’s part, this more nuanced accounting 
and provision of help will reduce the qualitative impacts of anxiety, disillusionment and 
demoralisation felt by multiply-disadvantaged families, such as Ayu’s (F12) and Kumar’s (F4). 
However, what is required is more than a more nuanced calculation of how much different 
families require; to improve equality in meaningful ways, the notion of ‘dependency’ must be 
re-conceptualised as ‘interdependency’. 
A meaningful interdependence between state-school-parent-child can lead to greater 
equality, particularly in terms of redressing the politics of recognition. A meaningful 
 
142 See Carol Stack’s (1997) anthropological study: All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community, 
which rejects Oscar Lewis’ notion of ‘culture of poverty’. Stack argues that poor families resort to adaptive 
strategies to navigate structural constraints related to unemployment and a low income. 
193 
 
interdependence requires understanding that state and state institutions yield particular power 
over disadvantaged families, who are constrained in their choices of who they can depend on. 
Families’ dependence should not be exploited – their reasons for depending on the state and 
school should be grounded in genuine perceptions of the state and school’s competence and 
care. Furthermore, these perceptions of competence and care should not be premised on 
relations of “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2011:1), where conditions of possibility are constructed 
under what Omar called the “false pretence” of the government, in pretending academic 
qualifications are not important when they actually are. Different family members’ perspectives 
(especially across generations) are useful here in highlighting shifting conditions of possibility, 
and the importance of the government carefully analysing and navigating the tension between 
past and present, and qualifying its pronouncements on the value of academic qualifications 
vis-à-vis skills and experience. Interviewing parents and young people who have grown up in 
Singapore provides valuable temporal depth to our understanding of families’ pedagogic work, 
and the tensions and negotiations at play within parent-child relationships.  
 Moreover, for meaningful interdependence to exist, it is important to account for 
families’ perceptions of a desirable, successful future – and re-inscribe families as pedagogic 
agents in ‘paternalistic’ Singapore (Sim, 2008:260). The government has attempted to soften 
its ‘paternalistic’ approach – such as through Our Singapore Conversations,143 where, in August 
2012, 660 dialogue sessions with 47,000 Singaporeans were held to determine what kind of 
‘Singapore’ Singaporeans wanted. However, my findings suggest that the tension between 
voice and silence remains salient, at least for disadvantaged families. To remain silent in fact 
seems intertwined with the essence of Singaporean citizenship144, as Rahman and his wife, 
Izzati, suggest, jokingly – but such a conception is rooted in the PAP government’s historically 
illiberal approach to politics (Tremewan, 1994; Chua, 2017).  
Rahman: We can’t do anything wah, just follow. [Izzati laughs] […] When [leaders] 
already demand something ah, nothing can be done. Just follow. You follow the 
leader. [laughs] 
 
Izzati: That’s Singapore citizen [laughs] 
 
Families also tended to accept the demands of schooling and the centrality of the academic 
qualification, with two families stating they feared suggesting otherwise to the government – 
even though they deeply felt the injuries of academic demands. Many parents in this study also 
did not feel they could contribute to young people’s development in meaningful ways, seeing 
 
143 See the government website link for more information: https://www.reach.gov.sg/read/our-sg-conversation 
144 See also, Devi’s quote (in Section 6.4): “So I think to be a good citizen [of Singapore], you should really 
listen to other people mostly. I don’t think people really consider […] like my thoughts, or something.” 
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themselves as mainly supporting the school and encouraging their children to study hard (in 
line with what they believed schools wanted). 
 Meaningful interdependence also involves listening to what young people want, seeing 
young people as more than prevailing discursive trappings of ‘child-as-human-capital’ and 
‘child-as-immature-being’ (S. Lim, 2015). The Singapore government may find this to be 
inevitable, because social constructions of childhood are shifting towards a greater autonomy, 
agency and reflexivity of young people in cultivating their own ‘minds’, as a mother, Izzati (F8) 
describes:  
Previously for us, when were at our age, we don't ask too much questions, we don’t 
critique too much. Like: “Teachers, you did wrong” – we never, previously. For now, 
the students are different. Even [to] their parents, they will say, “Ibu145, you're wrong”. 
They will have their own mind. For us, we don’t. Previously we are more to 
conservative, you know? We can’t do that, we can’t do this. 
 
My interviews with young people suggest that young people wished their perspectives were 
heard more, as they felt constrained in articulating their perspectives within hierarchical 
‘Singaporean’ culture.  
Overall, this section suggests how one might re-conceptualise ‘dependency’ and 
‘responsibility’, and in so doing, enrich the existing state-citizen compact. It also posits that 
incorporating an understanding of the three tensions highlighted in previous sections (between 
welfare and individual responsibility, past and present, and voice and silence) can aid the 
construction of fairer, more empowering forms of ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ that pay 
closer attention to the politics of redistribution and recognition (Fraser, 1996).  
 
7.6. Closing Reflections  
It is clear that state-citizen relations in Singapore deeply influence families’ lives, mediating 
parent-child relations in significant ways. One could map my analysis of families’ subjectivities 
to the ‘Shared Values’ discussed in Chapter Four, the clearest articulation of state-citizen 
relations in Singapore (Tan, 2012) and often inculcated through schools (“Shared Values,” 
2015):  
1) Nation before community, society before self  
2) Family as basic unit of society  
3) Community support and respect for individual  
4) Consensus not conflict  
5) Racial and religious harmony  
 
 
145 Malay term for ‘Mother’. 
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The families interviewed in this study seem largely to reproduce these values, and the 
dependency-responsibility relations implicit within Singaporean meritocracy. However, in this 
chapter, I have discussed three ongoing tensions that are key to problematising Singaporean 
meritocracy, and the state-citizen relations that underlie it: between welfare and responsibility, 
past and present, and silence and voice. In the interstices of these tensions, inequalities in 
distribution and recognition (Fraser, 1996) result. I then posited that one might, drawing on 
families’ perspectives, reformulate and refine the terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependence’, 
instead of jettisoning these entirely due to their largely negative valence in scholarly or political 
discourse. This re-conceptualisation can aid the construction of a richer state-citizen compact, 
beyond the prosperity-loyalty compact (Gopinathan, 2007).  
 Based on my analysis in Part II, three arguments can be made in relation to my 
overarching research question: how do families navigate the opportunities and constraints of 
the Singaporean education policy landscape? Firstly, context matters – the ‘strong’ state of 
Singapore structures families’ pedagogic work in ways that differ from Anglo-American 
contexts. The subjective experience of neoliberalism (and practices related to responsibilisation, 
streaming and performativity) are reshaped in the developmental state, and are generally more 
positively received by disadvantaged families. However, while market logics are reshaped in 
the developmental state, they are not transcended (in fact, at times, these logics become 
amplified). Secondly, disadvantaged Singaporean families largely reproduce a dependent-yet-
responsible subjectivity; they feel dependent, yet also deeply responsible for educational and 
life outcomes. This is not (logically) paradoxical, because the former makes plausible the latter. 
Thirdly, there are no straightforward connections between the dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity and the perpetuation of inequality (hence the value of not starting on either side of 
the functionalist-conflict binary): this subjectivity can be amenable to opportunities for social 
mobility and empowerment, and lead to the perpetuation of inequality, subjectification and 
oppression. A better question is, under what conditions do empowerment and oppression result?  
 While the socio-economically disadvantaged, dependent-yet-responsible subject (in 
some cases) has opportunity to rise, it is undeniable that there are growing educational and 
socio-economic inequalities in Singapore. As such, the question raised in the introduction of 
this chapter is a pertinent one: how might we understand the differing constructions of families’ 
life chances: the positivity and confidence of families, vis-à-vis large-scale quantitative data 
and scholarly analyses (such as that described in Chapter One) that suggests growing, persistent 
educational and socio-economic inequalities in Singapore? Families are not ideological dupes. 
Instead, one might conceive of two kinds of erasure-of-pessimism, based on my historical and 
empirical analyses.  
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The first is a state-led erasure of ‘race’ and ‘class’ (and other structural factors), via the 
meritocracy-education mechanism, in the Singaporean consciousness – reducing ‘success’ to 
natural talent and effort, as encapsulated in the academic grade. The second is a family-led, 
deliberate erasure of pessimism – which indexes not only the competence and care of the state 
and schools, but also families’ struggles to adapt and assert their own agency in difficult 
contexts, as well as a gratefulness, good-spiritedness and resilience in persevering in difficult 
circumstances. In line with a governmentality ethos, the process, or route towards developing 
the dependent-yet-responsible self – the principles, knowledges and resources families draw on 
to construct this ‘self’ (and the erasures, along the way) – effectively reveal how power works.  
 The implication of my analysis is then that families’ positivity cannot be interpreted as 
encouragement to maintain the status quo (instead, the reverse is true: families’ positivity and 
lack of critique likely maintains the status quo, which generally does not work in their favour). 
Rather, the implication of this analysis is that the likelihood of empowerment or oppression 
depends on how pedagogic actors – state, schools and families – manage tensions between 
welfare and responsibility, past and present, silence and voice. It also depends on whether 
‘dependency’ and ‘responsibility’ can be reconceptualised more richly, within Singapore’s 
state-citizen compact. Overall, my analysis calls for a multidimensional, nuanced approach to 
fostering greater equality – one that is attentive to historical, socio-political, labour market and 
material conditions, and to the complex ways in which we cling to institutions that also curtail 
and constrain us (Durkheim, 1982:47). The final chapter provides more specific 




































































CHAPTER 8. Significance and Recommendations  
 
“Out beyond ideas of wrong-doing and right-doing, there is a field. I’ll meet you there.” 
-Jelaluddin Rumi, 13th-century poet 
 
 
8.0. Introduction: On Drawing Implications  
Conducting a study of this nature, and drawing implications from it, can be ethically precarious. 
This is because casting families’ lives under the microscope of research leads to the constant 
danger of “symbolic violence”146 (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977:5) – and the possibility of unfair 
judgment, and overly simplistic, reductionistic accounts of families’ perspectives or the work 
of the state (Shore & Wright, 2005). At the conclusion of this study, one might be tempted to 
point fingers – at families, the state or the school. However, as argued at the outset of this thesis 
and demonstrated across different chapters, the reproduction of inequality is not straightforward, 
and the politics of positivity and collaboration is complex.  
What might be therefore most valuable is to create a space for understanding and 
engagement, between different stakeholders: policymakers, researchers, parents and young 
people. Rumi’s quote, while not denying the existence of normativity, paints the possibility of 
a meeting place – a space where different parties might come into more meaningful 
‘interdependence’ in understanding the other, and chart possibilities for a better, fairer future. 
It is my hope that this thesis makes a modest contribution towards developing this space – 
through showing how the political and personal, the macro and micro, exist in perpetual relation 
to each other, generating disempowerment and frictions, as well as empowering synergies at 
the interface of these levels. This thesis has sought to develop this ‘field’ Rumi describes – 
through theoretical, methodological, historical and empirical means.  
 The previous seven chapters have worked step-by-step towards achieving this goal. 
Chapter One outlined the structure of my inquiry: the research problem and questions, against 
the backdrop of the Singaporean education policy milieu and its stratifying nature. Chapter Two 
provided an overview of relevant theoretical concepts to understand state-school-family 
relations, detailing the governmentality ethos, and the key theoretical framework of this study, 
comprised of the three tiers of governance (political rationalities, political technologies and 
technologies of the self) combined with the responsibility-dependency frame. Chapter Three 
 
146 ‘Symbolic violence’ refers to the “imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power” (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1977:5). In this study, my representations of families’ perspectives can, as Chapter Three already 
described, potentially impose unfair representations on the families whose perspectives I have tried to 
reconstruct in this study.  
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outlined the methodological tools and principles, both practical and ethical, that enabled this 
study.  
 Chapters Four to Six explored the construction, normalisation and contestation of the 
dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. I have demonstrated that, in Singapore, a kind of 
subjectivity that is at once dependent and responsible is produced, and at times contested, 
through historical mechanisms (Chapter Four) and families’ perspectives and practices in 
relation to the state and schooling (Chapters Five and Six). Chapter Four demonstrated how 
political rationalities and technologies have constructed this subjectivity over time, providing 
historical depth to this study. Drawing on analyses of 72 interviews, Chapter Five detailed the 
dynamics of responsibility and responsibilisation in disadvantaged families’ lives, while 
Chapter Six demonstrated dynamics of families’ dependence, particularly on the state and 
school. Chapter Seven drew on both historical and interview findings to problematise the 
meritocratic rationality, discussing the relationship between the dependent-yet-responsible 
subjectivity and inequality in the meritocratic Singapore city-state.  
In the rest of this chapter, I clarify the key contributions of this study. I do this primarily 
through responding to my two research questions outlined in Chapter One, weaving into these 
responses the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of this thesis, as well as 
some ways in which my findings might help shape policy discussions. Subsequently, I explore 
the limitations in the analysis and structuring of this thesis. I then describe recommendations 
for future scholarship, before making a concluding reflection.  
 
8.1. Research Question 1: Understanding Families’ Pedagogic Work 
My first research question asks: How do disadvantaged families conceptualise and attempt to 
enact a successful future for their children? All families in this study conceptualised a 
‘successful’ future and actively worked to pursue this, often giving up comfort and time, and 
working under the significant material and emotional stress of material disadvantage to enable 
this. A ‘successful future’ was viewed as one where young people might acquire academic 
grades that would enable them to pursue post-secondary education and thus, gain a secure future 
(often office-based) job. The importance of academic grades is partly a pervasive socio-cultural 
norm in Singapore (Deng et al., 2013b; Jones, 2018) and partly due to material constraints, 
because disadvantaged families struggle to take advantage of policy moves to ‘broaden the 
definition of merit’ or to see possibilities for success beyond good academic grades. Taking 
advantage of ‘broader definitions of merit’ requires understanding of the complexity and 
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diversity of the Singaporean education landscape and admissions schemes,147 and considerable 
social, economic and cultural capital (e.g. enrollment in enrichment classes) (C. Tan, 2018). 
 Nonetheless, families in this study also conceptualised a ‘successful future’ more 
broadly – usually not in place of, nor against, but in addition to the instrumental focus on 
academic grades. Parents, in particular, offered more transcendental views of what a ‘successful 
future’ looked like, and how formal education could contribute to this. Notably, they believed 
schooling could develop higher-order, independent thinking skills that would help young 
people across various domains of sociality beyond acquiring grades and a good job, including 
the dispositions and capacities to live wisely and ethically. Young people in particular 
developed alternative visions to academic grades, valorising the pursuit of hands-on skills rather 
than merely qualifications. Both parents and young people emphasised that formal education 
can help develop a disposition of other-centered helpfulness, and competencies required to be 
a helpful member of their (present and future) family and wider society. 
 Families described a range of pedagogic approaches that they felt would help them 
achieve a successful future. For young people, given a ‘successful future’ was constituted by 
good grades and a good job, their key approach was to study as hard as they could. For parents, 
their pedagogic approaches involved disciplinary approaches (nagging, monitoring and 
punishment) and protective approaches to protect young people from the rigour and harshness 
of the system the prioritising of well-being and rejection of ‘parentocratic’ behaviours). Against 
the individualising tendencies of meritocracy, both parents and young people described seeking 
and relying extensively on help, particularly from public institutions such as schools, as the 
next section elaborates on. Some families also relied on extended family for help, when they 
were not estranged from them.  
Overall, I demonstrate that disadvantaged families are not irresponsible, as popular 
stereotypes suggest (Teo, 2018); neither are they merely rational, calculative actors acting 
instrumentally to gain financial security, although this is clearly important to many families. 
Instead, they are “concrete selves necessarily acting within multiple networks of collective 
obligations and solidarities to work out strategies of coping with, resisting or using to their 
advantage the vast array of technologies of power deployed by the modern state” (Chatterjee, 
2016:282). The next section elaborates on the ‘multiple networks’ of responsibilities and 
dependencies that disadvantaged families negotiate, in building a better future for young people. 
 
 
147 This is a challenge even for university-educated parents (Teo, 2018), who are both literate and likelier to have 
greater familiarity with the system than most disadvantaged parents.  
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8.2 Research Question 2: Two Theoretical Contributions in Understanding State-School-
Family Relations  
The second research question asks: How do families relate to the state and state institutions 
(especially schools) as they navigate the wider historical and socio-political context in which 
they are embedded?  
State-school-family relations are crucial in understanding families’ lives, in the ‘strong’, 
interventionist Singapore state (Lim & Apple, 2016). In particular, the concepts of 
responsibility and dependency can help us understand these relations more deeply.     
By way of summarising and clarifying my key findings, I outline two theoretical moves 
that deepen and systematise (Outhwaite, 1974) our understanding of the interactions of 
responsibility and dependency in disadvantaged families’ lives. These two moves work towards 
constructing an emergent conceptual model of the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. The 
first move is theoretical-methodological, the second theoretical-empirical; these form the two 
key theoretical contributions this study makes. These two contributions correspond to the two 
problems (methodological and empirical) sketched at the outset of this thesis, in Chapter One 
(Section 1.0).    
 
8.2.1. Theoretical-methodological contribution 
In light of the challenges of incorporating the macro and micro within a single analytic in order 
to ‘study through’ (rather than ‘study down’ or ‘study up’) (Shore & Wright, 2005), I propose 
that this can be done through combining the three tiers of governance framework (Rose et al., 
2006) with the “magnetizing [sic] concepts” (Berlant, 2012:165) of ‘responsibility’ and 
‘dependency’, that knit together the three tiers. This theoretical configuration is, to my 
knowledge, a novel contribution to the theoretical and methodological difficulties of 
incorporating the macro and micro within a single analytic.  
My theoretical framework suggests the fundamental interdependence of the three 
dimensions: political rationalities (abstract political ideals), political technologies (the 
instantiations of political rationalities in specific mechanisms of governance) and technologies 
of the self (the work individuals do to achieve their goals) – in the production of subjectivity. 
Not only does this framework offer a form for a rich, multi-layered ontology of power, I add to 
this the responsibility-dependency frame, which provides a way of examining the substance of 
these relations. The responsibility-dependency frame offers greater specificity in understanding 
the nature and workings of power and how it generates inequality and injury. In this thesis, I 
have shown that responsibility-dependency relations offer significant analytical purchase: in 
understanding families’ pedagogic work, and in connecting families’ experiences to the wider 
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socio-political context. The three tiers of governance framework, combined with the 
responsibility-dependency frame, can be an analytically fruitful heuristic in other contexts, to 
help us understand how political power works in contemporary, advanced capitalist societies.  
Overall, this theoretical-methodological contribution helps us move beyond macro-
micro dualisms in two ways. Firstly, it portrays each of the different levels (especially the level 
of families’ technologies of the self that is often under-emphasised in governmentality research) 
as analytically important. It helps us see power as a set of forces originating outside the 
individual body – however, in power’s ‘gossamer’-like reach (Martin, 2005:241), as forces that 
are interior, rather than exterior, to the local polity (Abu-Lughod, 1990). It avoids a post-modern 
emphasis on “polyphony” which only offer superficial equality to marginalised perspectives 
(Shore & Wright, 2005:15). Instead, it foregrounds families’ roles as “not just rhetorical, but 
contested political spaces” – as “policy communities” (ibid) with creative agency that is 
nonetheless structured by socio-political, historical forces. Thus, unlike many studies conducted 
in the governmentality tradition, with often imply hierarchical, top-down relations between 
‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels (Rose et al., 2006), this theoretical orientation foregrounds the 
experience and creativity of agents at the micro-level of families’ technologies of the self. 
Secondly, this theoretical framework encourages sensitivity to the content or qualitative nature 
of the relations between these levels; in this case (as arguably in many other advanced capitalist 
societies), these relations are that of responsibility and dependency. Figure 8.1 summarises this 
theoretical-methodological contribution.  
 




Figure 8.1 illustrates how political rationalities of neoliberalism and developmentalism 
instantiate responsibilising and dependency logics into the meritocracy-education mechanism. 
The political technology of the meritocracy-education mechanism secures the PAP’s 
government goals of political legitimacy, capital accumulation and social cohesion through: 
instilling responsibility, instilling dependency, minimising ‘race’ and ‘class’ and limiting 
dissent and alternative visions of politics and political economy in Singapore (as described in 
Chapter Four). Political rationalities and technologies influence families’ technologies of the 
self, working to legitimise the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity. Families internalisation 
and adoption of this subject-position can, in turn, reinforce the dominance of political 
rationalities and technologies. Yet, the diagram also suggests that families can exceed the 
dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity.   
One important caveat is that, one can, of course, never be exactly sure how socio-
political contexts influence people’s behaviours and thoughts (Desimone, 2009). I take the 
position of many policy scholars who argue that while causation is proximate, policy discourse 
creates conditions of possibility – a horizon of discursive resources that limits what is 
thinkable/unthinkable and desirable/undesirable (Grimaldi, 2012).  However, I argue that the 
structuring power of state discourses are particularly salient in the ‘strong’ interventionist 
Singapore state, where traditional forms of media and school curricula are largely state-
controlled, and state and family exist in close relation (Teo, 2011). At the very least, following 
Gillies, Edwards & Horsley (2008:68), what we can do is to highlight whether and how state 
narratives are reproduced – and the “neat fit of the logic” between families’ perspectives and 
prevailing governing rationalities, concerning responsibility and dependency.  
 
8.2.2. Theoretical-empirical contribution: Towards an emergent model of the dependent-yet-
responsible subjectivity 
The second theoretical move delves more deeply into families’ technologies of the self, drawing 
on interview findings to understand the dynamic interactions between responsibility and 
dependence. At the outset of this thesis, I described an imperative to understand, empirically, 
how disadvantaged families conduct their pedagogic work in the neoliberal-developmental state 
of Singapore, where responsibilising and dependency logics co-exist. 
 From my findings, families broadly seem to reproduce Singaporean meritocratic 
rationality. That is, families generally believe that because the state and schools have provided 
adequately (providing both in terms of technical competence and care) – thus, the state and its 
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schools are dependable. This, in turn, makes plausible the acceptance of responsibility.148 As 
such, families largely reproduce the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity – although they also 
contest this in important ways. My findings thus help us understand the theoretical versatility 
of ‘neoliberalism’ – how hybrid regimes differently structure families’ perspectives and 
subjective experiences (Flew, 2014; Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007). It responds to calls by scholars 
to understand how families – laden with increasing responsibilities with the spread of neoliberal 
ideology – interact with different political and welfare regime (Edwards, 2002; Eklund & 
Göransson, 2016). Moreover, research on educational inequality in Singapore tends to focus on 
formal institutions (e.g. schools, curriculum and government policy); research that foregrounds 
families’ perspectives in understanding educational inequality is relatively limited. Thus, this 
study makes a novel contribution by providing an emergent conceptual model of the dependent-
yet-responsible familial subjectivity. 
To begin, drawing on this study’s empirical findings, Table 8.1 summarises key 
dimensions of responsibility and dependency highlighted by families – at the state-family and 
parent-child levels. In this thesis, I claim that state-family relations in the ‘strong’ state of 
Singapore tend to mediate parent-child relations, although through empirically mapping 
families’ technologies of the self, these dependency-responsibility relations can also exceed 
state-sanctioned norms.   
 
Table 8.1. Responsibility and Dependency at State-Family, Parent-Child Levels in 
Singapore 
 Dependency Responsibility 
State-Family 
Level 
• Competence of state/school 
• Care of state/school  
• No choice but to depend (no 
alternatives) 
• Families perceive themselves as 





• Parents see young people as 
dependent on adult monitoring 
and guidance to ensure they 
remain on right path 
• Families depend on the (future) 
‘educated’ child – but are, at 
present, wary of giving child too 
much autonomy  
 
• Parents and young people see young 
people as primarily responsible for 
success   
• They also have broader 
conceptualisations of responsibility 
– encompassing care for others, the 
valuing of hands-on and vocational 
work, and transcendental visions of 
the purpose of education  
  
 
148 Dependency alone, without being accompanied by responsibility, is pathologised in Singaporean political 
discourse (Teo, 2013). 
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These state-family and parent-child responsibility and dependency dynamics, and their 
sequencing, might be diagrammatically represented in Figure 8.2 – which shows an emergent 
conceptual model of the dependent-yet-responsible familial subjectivity. Figure 8.2 illustrates 
the nature of families’ relations of dependence on the state and school, and how this connects 
with how they construe their pedagogic responsibilities in their attempts to achieve future 
‘success’. Specifically, it represents a key rationality evidenced across interviews: that because 
the state and school had already done their best, it was now “up to the child” to secure success 
(and, as such, the child’s fault if success was not achieved). This model, however, is – as is 
Figure 8.1 – mainly for heuristic purposes. Families’ pedagogic work is complex and dynamic; 
there are forms of responsibility and dependency beyond state-family and parent-child relations, 
and there are ruptures in this overall logic. 
 
Figure 8.2. Emergent conceptual model of the dependent-yet-responsible subjectivity in 
Singapore  
 
Summarising earlier chapters, the dependency context is structured along three axes: 1) the 
perceived competence of state and school, 2) the perceived care of state and school, and 3) no 
choice but to depend. While the first two axes potentially create meaningful interdependencies, 
if the sole axis structuring this dependency context is the third axis, families’ relations with 
state and school become more problematic and less meaningful, at times becoming frayed.149 
Each axis will be briefly elaborated here.  
Firstly, the perceived competence of state and school encompasses belief in the efficacy 
of schools (in raising children, in helping children acquire a ‘successful’ future), appreciation 
for the subsidised nature of schooling and SHG tuition in Singapore, and the efficacy of the 
meritocracy-education. Secondly, families believed in the care the state and school had for them. 
Disadvantaged families spoke of close, comfortable, warm, often informal interdependencies 
 
149 Broadly, however, in interviews, this seemed not to be the case, for most families. 
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with schools – unlike relations between disadvantaged families and public institutions in the 
U.K. and U.S. that are largely characterised by distance and disenfranchisement (e.g. Ule et al, 
2015; Lareau, 2003; Reay, 2001). As such, there was frequent communication and collaboration 
with schools, despite the material constraints parents faced. There was an almost instinctive 
posture of supportiveness towards schools – as long as families were not disillusioned through 
severe disadvantage, as Ayu’s was.   
Thirdly, families at times had no choice but to depend. Families’ propensity to depend 
must also be interpreted through a lens of socio-political and material constraints. Families who 
were aware of ‘parentocratic’ middle-class behaviour criticised middle-class parents’ 
‘parentocratic’ behaviour, yet also wished they had other sources to depend on, such as high-
quality private tuition and enrichment. Parents attributed responsibility to schools and young 
people not necessarily because they wanted to, but because they had no choice but to do so, in 
the ‘strong’ Singapore state.  
 Robust relations of dependency can form a crucial context in which families expressed 
willingness and capability of taking up responsibility, if: 1) it is more an interdependency than 
mere dependency, 2) the ‘dependency’ is borne out of genuine perceptions of state and schools’ 
competence and care. While this overall dependency-responsibility dynamic can lead to 
proactiveness and optimism in negotiating upward mobility, the governmentality ethos (and the 
theory of power therein) raises important equity implications that excavate beneath surface-
level optimism and collaboration.  
As Table 8.1 demonstrates, responsibility and dependency work at two levels: the state-
family and parent-child levels. Because state-family relations strongly mediate parent-child 
relations, young people can be subject to a double-layer of responsibilising and dependency 
forces. At the state-family level, within a neoliberal vision, the child is seen as potential for 
capital accumulation, and is responbilised to this end (Ule et al., 2015). Within the home, the 
child is further responsibilised by their parents. Yet, at the same time, young people are also 
constructed as dependent, requiring surveillance and monitoring – by parents, and by the state 
and schools (at least, families described this to be so). The co-existence of dependency and 
responsibility is not surprising in academic literature. Prout (2000:304) for instance, notes: 
 On the one hand, there is an increasing tendency to see children as individuals with a 
capacity for self-realisation and, within the limits of social interdependency, 
autonomous action; on the other, there are practices directed at a greater surveillance, 
control and regulation of children. 
 
The ‘child’ is thus socially constructed as simultaneously more dependent, yet called to act 
more responsibly in accordance with stronger norms of control. This results in a conferring of 
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adult-like responsibilisation upon the child, while regulating, controlling and monitoring young 
people in at times patronising ways. Similarly, for that matter, ‘parents’ are socially constructed 
as needing to take responsibility to be ‘good’, responsible parents – yet are also seen as more 
dependent than ever on external expertise (Lee, 2014).  
However, the double-layer of responsibilising and dependency forces in young people’s 
lives can reinforce dominant normativities and restrict alternative visions of the ‘good life’. 
What is striking in the Singapore context is the coherence and closeness families described in 
state-school-family relations. This coherence can lead to comfort, stability and even 
proactiveness in improving one’s life chances – but it can also act claustrophobically, 
particularly in the lives of less academically-inclined young people. The very-dependent and 
very-responsible child is also not amenable to achieving contemporary policy ideals that 
valorise creativity, entrepreneurship, and the development of a child’s own interests. 
 Overall, these dynamics can result in disillusionment and injury. In Chapter Seven, 
drawing on my analysis of historical and interview findings, I demonstrated that inequalities in 
state-school-family relations can be understood through analysing the tensions between state 
welfare and individual responsibility, past and present, silence and voice. I showed how each 
of these tensions can help us problematise and reformulate the theoretically and politically-
laden language of ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ that underpin Singapore’s existing state-
citizen compact. As such, families’ perspectives can offer insights that potentially re-shape 
policy concepts and discussions, sensitising policy-makers and policy researchers to the 
difficulties disadvantaged families face.  
I summarise the three tensions here. Firstly, responsibilisation can be oppressive (and 
the actual up-take of responsibility impossible), particularly when welfare is insufficient and 
there are cracks in the dependency context. Secondly, the meritocracy-education mechanism 
may not deliver as effectively as it used to, in shifting historical (and political and labour market) 
conditions. Relations of dependence can become relations of “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2011:1) 
within emerging socio-political realities of credential inflation and graduate unemployment. 
Thirdly, families might present their relations with the state and state institutions in positive 
terms due to the invisibilising effects of meritocracy concerning structural disadvantage, and 
due to the limits of expression in the ‘soft authoritarian’ Singapore state. These three tensions 
aid us in problematising the (often overly) optimistic meritocratic teleology: of dependency (on 
state and state institutions), followed by the uptake of responsibility, in turn followed by the 




8.3. Reflections on the Scope and Structure of Analysis 
While this thesis makes novel theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions, it is 
worth reflecting on analytic avenues one might explore in greater detail in future work. I discuss 
three avenues here:  one related to the structure of the analysis, and two related to the scope of 
analysis.  
  Firstly, I organised my main analysis of interview findings into two chapters, each 
focused on one meta-theme – the first on responsibility, the second on dependency. Structuring 
the findings this way offers a clear, easily comprehensible way of grasping my key argument, 
concerning the salience of ‘dependency’ and ‘responsibility’ relations in families’ lives. 
However, while these meta-themes were not pre-determined but selected based on my 
interpretation of interview findings, this thematically-driven structure has specific drawbacks. 
It generates a less personal narrative, with limited in-depth engagement with each family; 
instead, the contextual material on each family is provided only in appendix form (Appendix 
C). In light of space constraints, it was difficult to develop as rich contextualisations of families’ 
lives as I would have liked. In future family research, particularly with less space constraints, 
an alternative structure might be to use themes rather than meta-themes to structure findings, 
and to add richer contextualisations of families’ lives within the narrative. 
 I now turn to two ways in which the scope of the analysis might be extended. In Chapter 
One, I defined the ‘macro’-level as related to wider systems of state and international 
institutions, and the political economy and social relations in which these institutions are 
embedded. In this thesis, based on the pervasiveness of the ‘strong’ state in families’ imagined 
and material lives, the ‘macro’ level primarily focused on the Singapore state’s political 
rationalities and technologies. However, a dimension that is alluded to but not discussed deeply 
in this thesis, is that of the international or global. Notably, the PAP has pursued a high-growth 
population policy that encouraged an influx of foreign labour, particularly since its adoption of 
the 2013 White Paper on Population, averring that increasing Singapore’s population is 
necessary to maintain economic growth (Koh, 2004; Rahim, 2015). However, the influx of low-
wage foreign migrant labour has been met with public hostility; research suggests a correlation 
between “over-reliance on low-wage foreign workers and wage stagnation of less-skilled 
Singaporean workers” (Rahim, 2015:166).  
In interviews, families did discuss such discontentment. Yet, this seemed only to 
strengthen their commitment to securing academic grades, a seemingly sure pathway to 
financial safety – thus upholding Singapore’s meritocracy-education mechanism, and families’ 
reliance on the developmental state that is still perceived as the arbiter of opportunity. Clearly, 
while ‘globalisation’ is often viewed as powerfully restructuring state rationalities, states 
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mediate global influences differently (Dale, 1999; Gopinathan, 2007). How globalisation might 
challenge and bolster state-society relations of responsibility and dependency would form an 
apt extension of this study.150 
 The second point related to the scope of analysis, pertains to the absence of detailed 
discussion of the intersectionality of disadvantage, especially regarding race and religion. In 
analysing interviews, I found it surprising that families generally did not discuss issues of race 
and religion in describing their pedagogic work and relations with the state and schools. This 
was surprising, given the growing salience of Islam to Malay-Muslim identity in Southeast Asia 
(Kadir, 2004). In my study, I paid secondary attention to dimensions such as race and religion, 
based primarily on what families foregrounded, and based on a desire to delimit the study’s 
scope. However, as argued in Chapter Seven, these dimensions may have been elided through 
the meritocratic ‘non-production’ of structural factors related to race and religion.151 Moreover, 
participants may have been less willing to speak about race and religion with a ‘Chinese’ 
researcher like myself. The next section elaborates on how future scholarship might build on 
these possibilities, and more broadly, enrich our understanding of state-school-family relations.  
 
8.4. Recommendations for Further Study 
In light of the methodological limitations (locating the ‘disadvantaged’ family, self-selecting 
bias, linguistic considerations – as outlined in Chapter Three, Section 3.6) and analytic 
possibilities (Chapter Eight, Section 8.3) described, this section outlines various 
recommendations for further study.  
Firstly, this study has demonstrated the value of an analysis that combines macro 
analyses of rationalities and narratives in government policy, with the micro analyses of 
families’ everyday lives. In education policy research, studies that explicitly seek to understand 
the mediations and interactions between macro (political and policy) and micro (family) levels, 
are, to my knowledge, limited. Hence, more such studies can be conducted to understand how 
socio-political regimes and familial subjectivities interact in the reproduction of inequality. 
Moreover, the ‘macro’ can be construed beyond state logics, to incorporate greater sensitivity 
to how globalising forces structure political rationalities, political technologies and families’ 
technologies of the self.  
 
150 For scholarship on the relationship between globalisation and education in Singapore, see, for instance: Deng, 
Gopinathan, & Lee, 2013a; Gopinathan, 2007; Koh, 2007; C. Tan, 2008b). 
151 For scholarsihp on the relationship between race, religion and education in Singapore, see, for instance: (Barr 
& Skrbis, 2008; Rahim, 1998; C. Tan, 2008a). 
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Secondly, this study has relied primarily on interview methods. A methodological 
pluralism could be useful in further developing key ideas in this thesis.152 For instance, carefully 
conducted quantitative research analyses could seek to understand state-school-family relations, 
across the wider Singaporean population. Such analyses can provide insight into how 
widespread some of the mechanisms identified in this thesis (of responsibility, dependency, 
consent and collaboration) are. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to delve into the 
similarities and differences in how low, middle and high-income families construct the state-
citizen compact in relation to education, and how state-school-family relations differ across 
these groups. Thus far, studies have generally either analysed middle-income groups (Khong, 
2001; Göransson, 2015) or low-income groups (such as this study). A study that asks the same 
interview and survey questions of different income groups, could help us understand more 
clearly how the perpetuation of inequality works. These questions could seek to understand 
how families construct the tightness of connection between the academic grade and a successful 
future, and what their approaches are, to securing a successful future.  
Thirdly, as discussed in Chapter Three, research that engages the perspectives of the 
most disadvantaged groups in Singapore, that escapes the self-selecting bias of recruiting 
participants through SHGs – is more difficult but worthwhile, in understanding socio-economic 
hardship in Singapore. The relations with the state and school would likely be different – 
although perhaps not significantly different, given the “resounding 2015 electoral victory” of 
the PAP government (Rodan, 2016:219), and the fact that electoral voting in Singapore is 
compulsory (K. Tan, 2008). As mentioned in Chapter Three, ethnographic work that involves 
observations conducted over time can add a valuable dimension to understanding families’ 
pedagogic approaches, and how they enact the conceptualisations, beliefs, values and relations 
outlined in this study. It is, however, the case that such work would be intrusive, and 
precautionary measures must be taken to minimise the disruption of families’ already extremely 
busy lives in typically very cramped flats. Furthermore, related to the importance of considering 
globalising forces, it is worth noting that the influx of foreign labour has inevitably altered the 
class structure in Singapore by generating a new under-class.153 This not only redefines who 
 
152 Paul Thompson (2004:255), reflecting on the research area of family and social mobility, argues convincingly 
for the  need to draw on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative sociology – for a “zigzag” between 
these methods that incorporates “alternation between in-depth and survey fieldwork, with the qualitative 
fieldwork carried out especially in the earliest stages of formulating issues and the last stage in analysis, of re-
exploration to refine hypotheses.” 
153 Rahim (2015:167) points out that foreign labourers are “commonly housed in crowded dormitories, crammed 
rooms, or illegally camp on construction sites which do not have adequate toilet facilities.” She also relates this 
to a measure of unrest and protest in the Singapore city-state. 
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are the ‘most disadvantaged’ in Singapore, but can influence how Singapore citizens view their 
own class positions, and thus their relations with the state and state institutions.  
Finally, studies that carefully and more explicitly foreground dynamics of race, gender, 
religion and even disability – and how institutions perpetuate inequalities along these axes – 
may unveil a deeper understanding of the intersectionality of disadvantage in Singapore. 
Nevertheless, it is my contention that these dimensions should never be studied without 
consideration of social class, given the salience of capitalism, and the stigmatising material and 
symbolic effects of class divisions, in Singaporean everyday life (Chua & Tan, 1999; Teo, 
2018). Locating problems at the level of race alone, for instance, ignores how capitalistic, anti-
welfarist tendencies in Singapore perpetuate stratification by education results, and deepen 
class disadvantage. With these caveats in place, there is scope for further studies to more deeply 
explore the range of mechanisms and processes in producing relations of responsibility, 
dependency and inequality – and how these relations work across different social groups, as 
well as their pervasiveness on a larger scale.   
 
8.5. Closing Reflections: When ‘Peaceful Co-existence’ is Not Enough  
Presenting the findings of this study at different academic events in the past two years has 
elicited surprise from the audience concerning the ‘positivity’ of families, towards the state and 
schools. This reaction is unsurprising, given that much social theory (largely generated in the 
global North) about the relations between state, schools, families and individuals tends to 
understand the ‘state’ as devoted almost singularly to capital accumulation and political 
legitimacy (Cheng, 2018), and as complicit in the perpetuation of marginalisation and 
inequality (Sadovnik & Semel, 2010). Social theory, particularly in the 20th-century, has 
developed more complex views of the state and its functions – theorising in particular subject-
citizens’ “voluntary cooperation with the state” (Cheng, 2018:524). However, empirical work 
that understands these macro-micro relations, that reveal the complexity and depth of emotion, 
reasoning and relationship between individuals and collectivities across different socio-political 
contexts, remains under-developed. People remain startled and skeptical over the positivity of 
disadvantaged groups towards the state and schools, and perhaps rightly so. 
In this thesis, I am reasonably confident that I have qualified families’ positivity through 
highlighting the politics of expression in Singapore, and delineating how inequality and injury 
still happen in spite of, and sometimes because of, this positivity. Markedly, this positivity tends 
to maintain the status quo, rather than to challenge it. That being said, there are moments I 
question the ethical implications, the accuracy and trustworthiness of my own findings. These 
reflections are compounded by the fact that I am a Chinese researcher at an elite institution – 
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surely, preserving the status quo works more in my interests than fighting it. Moreover, having 
not experienced the same disadvantages families did, my analysis may be more indifferent to 
the psycho-social injuries of inequality than someone who has.  
As I pored over interview transcripts, my overall conclusion is that to be overly negative 
about state power is to ignore families’ perspectives and elide particular dimensions of families’ 
lives, as well as to assume theoretical superiority over them, seeing them as ideological dupes 
of the state. Given families’ well-reasoned responses towards the state and school, it seemed 
apt to accept their word that the Singaporean government has managed certain aspects of 
Singapore’s education system well. At the same time, it is crucial to also recognise that there 
are differences in the levels of families’ positivity (related to the extent of their disadvantage), 
and that there are injuries that happen in spite of, and because of, these close, coherent state-
school-family relations. It is also perpetually important to understand families’ perspectives 
vis-à-vis various sources of social scientific knowledge: quantitative research suggesting trends 
of persistent inequality, power-sensitive theoretical resources such as the governmentality ethos 
and a critical policy analysis approach, as well as historical evidence of racial domination and 
elitism in the Singaporean city-state.  
A key question going forward, is: what should the government do, with families’ 
positive orientations and dependence on them, to make life better for disadvantaged families? 
How can the government ensure that they deliver on promises they make, to ensure relations of 
“cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2011:1) do not result – or how should they revise their promises 
based on shifting conditions of possibility? It is entirely possible to have good intentions to 
increase egalitarianism, while still extending logics of neo-colonial oppression (Chen, 2010) – 
whether through the stratifying structures and processes of schooling, or through the durability 
of unfair conceptualisations of ‘responsibility’ and ‘dependency’ that underlie political and 
everyday practices. As such, good intentions and “peaceful co-existence” (Chen, 2010:133) is 
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Appendix C: Families’ Demographic Background Information 
 
























F1  Grandfather (Fardeen) 
Grandmother (Namrita)*  
Uncle (Ritesh)  
Mother (Juliana) 
Son (Yudhav) 
Daughter 1 (Shreya)*  
Daughter 2 (Jasmit)  











Secondary (grandfather)  
 
Primary (grandmother)  
 
Secondary + ITE  
Certificate (uncle)  
 
















operator in food 
packaging 
factory (mother) 
Secondary + VITB 
Certificate160 (father)  
 





F3 Father (Srinivas)* 
Mother (Anjushri)*  
Son 1 (Sanjay)* 
Son 2 (Anil)* 
Daughter 1 (Gayatri) 
Indian  NA   380  -FAS 
-SINDA tuition/ 
support 




Primary (father)  






154 ‘Household’ refers to people living in the same house, under the same roof.  
155 Household members who were only interviewed in focus groups (not individually interviewed) are indicated by double-asterisk [**] 
156 Based on state classification – which is based on father’s racial classification. However, I also indicate mixed parentage homes where families noted this. Ultimately, while six 
identified generally as Indian and six as Malay, three indicated mixed-parentage (F5, F6, F7).  
157 This figure excludes government financial support. Generally, this figure is after CPF has been deducted. However, in some cases, the parent interviewed only preferred to give an 
approximate figure, or weren’t sure what the exact figure was, pre- and post-CPF. 
158 Unless otherwise indicated, education qualification was completed in Singapore.  
159 The flat was bought by Fardeen and Namrita, over 30 years ago. Many flats were purchased many years ago, typically by grandparents.  
160 VITB stands for Vocational and Industrial Training Board, which is the former name for the present-day Institute for Technical Education. 
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F4 Father (Kumar)* 
Mother (Lakshmi)*  
Son 1 (Raj) 
Daughter 1 (Devi)*  
Son 2 (Vaasu) 











Secondary + Diploma of 
Accounting (father)  
 





F5 Father (Dimal)* 
Mother (Salimah) 
Daughter 1 (Farah)*  
Daughter 2 (Dhia) 
Daughter 3 (Aishah) 
Daughter 4 (Sophia) 
Daughter 5 (Munah) 
Daughter 6 (Suriani) 
Indian-
Malay  
NT  664 -FAS  
-SINDA tuition/ 
support 









F6 Father (Omar)*  
Mother (Nasifah)*  
Son 1 (Adam) 
Son 2 (Iyaan) 
Son 3 (Shafiq)* 
Daughter 1 (Tasmia) 
Indian-
Malay 









Bachelor’s degree from 







F7 Father (Abdul) 
Mother (Hannah)* 
Son 1 (Hakeem)* 
Son 2 (Wasfi) 
Son 3 (Sannan)  
Son 4 (Nijat) 
Malay-
Indian  








manager (father)  
 
Secondary + ITE 
Diploma (father) 
 
Bachelors’ degree from 




F8 Father (Rahman)*  
Mother (Izzati)* 
Son 1 (Amir) 
Son 2 (Rashid) 
Daughter (Nurul)* 














161 Both parents described this qualification as equivalent only to secondary school, for Singapore standards. Most degrees or diplomas acquired in Southeast Asian countries outside 
Singapore were seen as significantly less valuable than a Singaporean qualification.   





Secondary + Diploma in 
Accountancy from 
Malaysia (mother)  
F9 Father (Zainul) 
Mother (Juriffah)* 
Son 1 (Hafiz)** 
Son 2 (Rizwan)** 
Son 3 (Mahmoud)* 
Malay NA  207 -MENDAKI 
tuition/ 
support   
-FAS 
Pest control 












F10 Father (Khairul)** 
Mother (Naadia)* 
Son 1 (Irfan)* 
Son 2 (Yusof)** 




- Primary (father)  
 




F11 Father (Radzi)*  
Mother (Ayu)*  
Son 1 (Qawi)  
Daughter 1 (Masuda) 
Son 2 (Aiman)* 
Son 3 (Ibrahim) 
Son 4 (Aqil) 
Daughter 2 (Wadida) 




Cleaner (and on 
weekends, 
restaurant 
worker) (son 1)  
Secondary + Diploma 







163 This was equated by participants to the equivalent of less than primary school level, in Singapore’s education system 
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Appendix D: Participant Consent Form  
 
CONSENT FORM – Families 
 
For Young Person to Fill In: 
 
I, _______________________________________ (your name), understand and agree to the 
following: 
 
I am willing to participate in a 1-1.5 hour interview with the researcher, Charleen 
Chiong.  
 
My views, along with others’ views, will be used as part of a PhD research project 
authorized by the University of Cambridge. My views may also be used in journal 
articles, conference presentations or similar kinds of publications.  
   
All of my personal information in this project will be confidential. No one will be 
able to identify me, from this PhD research project, or from any publications and 
presentations resulting from this project. My real name will not be used. (If you prefer 
for your real name to be used, please tick here:      ) 
 
My participation is voluntary and optional. At any time, I can choose to withdraw 
from the interview by informing the researcher.  
 
All my questions and concerns about this project have been addressed to my 
satisfaction, by the researcher.  
 
I agree to all the above.  
 




For Researcher to Fill In: 
 
I, Charleen Chiong, the interviewer/researcher, confirm that the informed consent procedure 
for the interviews of _______________________________ has been followed.  
 











For Parent/Caregiver to Fill In: 
 
I, _________________________________________ (your name), understand and agree to 
the following: 
 
I am willing to participate in a 1-1.5 hour interview with the researcher, Charleen 
Chiong.  
 
I give permission for my child to participate in this project.  
 
My views, along with others’ views, will be used as part of a PhD research project 
authorized by the University of Cambridge. My views may also be used in journal 
articles, conference presentations or similar kinds of publications.  
   
All of my personal information in this project will be confidential. No one will be 
able to identify me, from this PhD research project, or from any publications and 
presentations resulting from this project. My real name will not be used. (If you prefer 
for your real name to be used, please tick here:      ) 
 
My participation is voluntary and optional. At any time, I can choose to withdraw 
from the interview by informing the researcher. 
 
All my questions and concerns about this project have been addressed to my 
satisfaction, by the researcher.  
 
I agree to all the above.  
 
 




For Researcher to Fill In: 
 
I, Charleen Chiong, the interviewer/researcher, confirm that the informed consent procedure 
for the interviews of _______________________________ has been followed.  
 







Appendix E: Interview Schedules 
 
In this Appendix, I include the interview schedule I brought with me into each interview (E.1: 
Interview Schedule for Parents, E.2. Interview Schedule for Young People, E.3: Focus 
Group). ‘Prompts’ and ‘Probes’ (indicated in schedule) were not always used, depending on 
participants’ responses. 
 
E.1 Interview Schedule for Parents  
 
ROUND 1  
Opening Explanations: 
• Greeting, introduce yourself, introduce project  
• Go through Consent Form (including permission to record, and confidentiality). Ask 
them if they have any questions. 




• Name?  
• No. of children? Academic stream of your children?  
• Are you working at the moment? What do you (and your spouse) work as?  
• What is the highest education level you have? What about your spouse?  
 
These questions may be more private, so don’t worry if you prefer not to say.  
• Do you buy/rent your current house? How many rooms?   
• I know the government gives subsidies to many families in Singapore. Do you receive 
financial support from government? Do you think it is enough? 
• How many people are earning incomes in your household?  
• Would you mind telling me the combined income for the whole family / month?   
• How many people does this income support?  
 
• How many generations of your family have been living in Singapore? What about 
your spouse’s family?   
 
Life history 
1) Tell me about the most important things that have happened in your life up till now.  
-Prompt: Where were you born? How did you end up in this job? Who were the most 
influential people in your life? What was your first paid job?  
-Probe: Why (were certain decisions made)? 
 
2) What was your schooling experience like?  
-Prompt: Did you enjoy it? How is it different to your son/daughter’s? Were your 
parents supportive? How old were you when you left school? Why did you stop 
school? 
 
Views on Education 
3) Do you know your child’s predicted results? How do you feel about them? 
 
4) What is your biggest wish for your child? What kind of person do you hope your child 




5) What is your biggest worry for your child? Why?  
 
6) What is your child’s ambition? How did they decide? 
 
7) What do you think is the purpose of education?  
-Prompt: What do you think are the main benefits of going to school, for your child?  
 
8) What do you like about education in Singapore? What do you dislike? 
-Probe: Can you give specific examples? Thoughts on government?  
 
9) If you were the Principal of your child’s school, what would you change? If you were 
the Minister of Education, what would you change? 
 
Views on the Political and Economic Ends of Education 
10) What qualities does a young person need to get a good job?  
 
11) What qualities does a young person need to be good person?  
 
12) What qualities does a young person need to be a good citizen of Singapore?  
 
13) How do you/your family help your child to succeed in life? 
-Probe: Can you give specific examples? What are some strategies you take?  
 
Social Network 
14) Who would you say are your closest friends? Do you talk to them frequently? What do 
you do with / talk about, with your best friends?  
-Probe: Do you talk frequently to parents of children at your child’s school? 
 
15) Who are the people who give your kids the most advice and support about education 
and life? 
  
16) How do you get your ideas on how to help your child succeed, at school & in life?  
-Prompt: Friends? Teachers/tutors? News? Parenting books and websites? 
-Probe: Who or what is most influential?  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
17) Timetable: Since I’ve never been a parent in Singapore before, can you tell me about a 
week in your daily life? What happens on Mondays, Tuesdays (etc.)? 
-Probe: Where do you ‘go out’ to as a family?  
 





ROUND 2  
Parental involvement 
1) Do you feel involved in your child’s education? Do you feel satisfied with your level of 
involvement?  
-Prompt: Do you wish you could be involved more or in other ways? Are you involved 
in the same ways in each of your children’s lives? 
 
2) Do you talk to your child often about school/education? What kinds of things do you 
say?  
-Probe: Can you tell me about a recent time this happened? How does your child respond? 
 
3) What are main challenges you face, in helping your child to succeed in education and 
life? 
-Prompt: Time? Energy? Not knowing how to help? 
 
4) Do you attend any events the school holds for parents?  
-Probe: Tell me what it’s like. Was it beneficial or not? When was the last time you 
met people from school? What for? How often do you meet your child’s teachers or 
any school staff?   
 
5) Have you been to any parent-teacher meetings recently? What do teachers tend to 
discuss with you at these meetings? What are the main concerns you discuss with 
teachers (if any)? Do you feel comfortable at these meetings? 
 
6) Are you part of a Parent Support Group (PSG)? 
-Probe: Why/why not? How has being part of it benefited you? 
 
Schooling and SHGs (General)  
7) How does SINDA/MENDAKI help your family to reach their fullest potential? 
 
8) What does a ‘good student’ look like? 
  
9) What school does your child attend?  What do you like or dislike about your child’s 
current school? 
-Probe: Why/why not? Was it your first-choice school? How did you decide on schools? 
 
10) What subjects does your child take? How did they decide?  
 
Pedagogy  
11) Does your child enjoy school? Is what s/he is learning, fun to them? 
-Probe: Why/why not? Examples? 
 
12) Can you tell me about what you think happens inside a normal classroom? What is it 
like? What does the teacher do? How are students like?   
 
13) Now can you tell me about how you think teachers teach classes: 
a. English/Mother Tongue, b. Math, c. Science, d. Any other subjects they take?  
-Prompt: What methods do they use to teach kids? Anything your child’s teacher does 
to teach students, that you found was very good, fun, or interesting?    
 
14) Does your child’s school teach them to be creative, think outside of the box? 




15) Is what s/he learning in school, a good preparation for real life?  
-Probe: Why/why not? Examples? 
 
16) Are you aware of anything your child’s school is doing to give your child more than 
just knowledge that can be found in books / passing exams?  
 
17) Have you heard of ‘Project Work’? Have you ever given your child help with their 
projects?  
-Probe: What kinds of projects has your child done recently?  
 
Assessment  
18) Apart from parent-teacher meetings, how does your child’s school let you know about 
how your child is doing at school?  
-Prompt: Report cards? Exam results?  
-Probe: Is it just academic results, or are there other things the school also assesses? 
 
19) To get those good results, what does a child need to do?  
 
CCAs 
20) What CCAs does your child do? How did they decide on which CCA?  
 
21) What are the main benefits of attending CCAs, for your child?  
 
Values in Action  
22) Are you aware of anything the school is doing to encourage students to learn to be 
helpful and caring?   
-Probe: Tell me about the kinds of activities your child has done. Did they enjoy it? 
 
23) Have you heard of ‘Values-in-Action’?     
 
Applied Learning  
24) Have you heard of the term ‘Applied Learning’ or ‘Learning Journeys’?  
 
25) Does the school give your child opportunities to go on trips (overseas and local)?  
-Prompt: Such as JC, Poly, ITE? Workplace?  
 
26) Any other ways you can think of, that school prepares you to be ready for the future? 
 
Policy Frameworks  
27) Have you ever heard of ‘Thinking School, Learning Nation’? [If not, explain to them: 
government programmes in schools to help students to think deeply and creatively, not 
just learning what’s in the textbook or how to pass exams]  
-Probe: What do you think of this?  
 
28) Have you heard of ‘21st-Century Competencies’? [Show Printout – government wants 
to develop in students more qualities (not just academic), to prepare for the future] 
-Probe: What do you think of this? 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
29) Anything you want to add or change? Any questions for me?  
242 
 




• Greeting, introduce yourself, introduce project   
• Go through Consent Form (including permission to record, and confidentiality). Ask 
them if they have any questions. 




• Name?  
• School? Academic stream?  
• Career ambition?  
 
• I know the government gives subsidies to many families in Singapore. Do you receive 
financial support from government? Do you think it is enough? 
• How many generations of your family have been living in Singapore?  
 
Life history  
1) Tell me about the most important things that have happened in your life up till now.  
-Prompt: Where were you born? What sorts of things are your parents strict about?  
-Probe: Why (were certain decisions made)? 
 
2) Did your parents go to school? How did your parents shape who are today? 
 
Views on Education 
3) What are your current grades like? How do you feel about them?  
-Probe: Do you think you can do better? Why/why not? What do your teachers say 
about them? Are they similar to your peers? 
 
4) What is your biggest wish in life? What is your biggest worry?  
-Probe: Why? 
 
5) What kind of person do you hope to become?  
 
6) What do you think is the point/purpose of education?  
-Prompt: What are the main benefits of going to school?  
 
7) What do you like about education in Singapore? What do you dislike? 
-Probe: Can you give specific examples?  
 
8) If you were the Principal of your school, what would you change? If you were the 
Minister of Education, what would you change? 
  
Views on the Political & Economic Ends of Education 
9) If a company gave you a job with a very high salary now, would you quit school now 
to take the job up?  
-Probe: What if the job was given to you permanently?   
 




11) What qualities does a child need to be a good person? 
 
12) What qualities does a child need to be a good citizen? 
  
13) How does your family help you to become successful in life? 
-Probe: Can you give specific examples?  
 
14) You mentioned you wanted to be a [career ambition]. What qualities are needed for 
that job? 
  
15) How does your school prepare you for that job?  
 
Social Network 
16) Who would you say are your closest friends? Do you talk to them frequently? What do 
you do with / talk about, with your best friends?  
 
17) Who are the people who give you the most advice and support about education and life? 
  
Concluding Thoughts:  
18) Timetable: Since I’ve never lived in Singapore before, can you tell me about a week in 
your daily life? What happens on Mondays, Tuesdays (etc)? 
 
19) Anything you want to add or change? Any questions for me? 
 
 
ROUND 2  
Parental involvement 
1) Do your parent(s) talk to you about school/education?  
-Probe:  How is it like? What do they ask? Can you tell me about a recent time you 
talked about school/education? 
 
2) Are your parents involved in your education? How does your family support you in 
your education?  
-Probe: Do you feel satisfied with their level of involvement, or wish they could be 
involved more/in other ways?  Are your parents involved in the same ways in each of 
their children’s lives? 
 
3) Do you attend any events the school holds for parents and students?  
-Probe: In what setting, and why? Was it beneficial or not? When was the last time, 
and what for? How often do you meet your child’s teachers or any school staff?   
 
4) Have you been to any parent-teacher meetings recently? What do teachers tend to 
discuss with you at these meetings? What are the main concerns you discuss with 
teachers (if any)? Do you feel comfortable at these meetings? 
 
Schooling and SHGs (General) 
5) What does a ‘good student’ look like? 
  
6) What school do you attend?  What do you like or dislike about your current school? 




7) What subjects do you take? How did you decide?  
 
1) How does SINDA/MENDAKI help your family to reach their fullest potential? 
 
Pedagogy  
8) Do you enjoy school? Is what you’re learning, fun? 
-Probe: Why/why not? Examples? 
 
9) Can you tell me about what you think happens inside a normal classroom? What is it 
like? What does the teacher do? How are students like?   
 
10) Now can you tell me about how you think teachers teach classes like: a. 
English/Mother Tongue, b. Math, c. Science, d. Social Studies, e. Character & 
Citizenship Education, f. Any other subjects you take?  
-Prompt: What methods do they use to teach (e.g. textbook, technology)? Anything 
your teacher does to teach students, that you find very good, fun, or interesting?    
 
11) Does your school teach you to be creative, think outside of the box? 
-Probe: Why/why not? Examples? 
 
12) Is what you’re learning in school, a good preparation for real life?  
-Probe: Why/why not? Examples? 
 
13) Are you aware of anything your school is doing to give you more than just knowledge 
that can be found in books or passing exams?  
 
14) Have you heard of ‘Project Work’? Have you ever had help from your parents to do this? 
-Probe: Tell me about your experience of a recent project you did.  
 
Assessment  
15) Apart from parent-teacher meetings, how does your school let you know about how 
you’re doing in school?  
-Prompt: Report cards? Exam results?  
-Probe: Is it just academic results, or are there other things the school also assesses? 
 
16) To get those good results, what do you need to do?  
 
CCAs 
17) What CCAs do you do? How did you decide on which CCA?  
 
18) What are the main skills that CCAs teach you?  
 
Values in Action  
19) Are you aware of anything the school is doing to encourage students to learn to be 
helpful and caring?   
-Probe: Tell me about the kinds of activities you’ve done.  
 
20) Have you heard of ‘Values-in-Action’?     
 
Applied Learning  




22) Does the school give you opportunities to go on trips (overseas and local)?  
-Prompt: Visits to Poly, JC, ITE? Workplace?  
 
23) Any other ways you can think of, that school prepares you to be ready for the future? 
 
Policy Frameworks  
24) Have you ever heard of ‘Thinking School, Learning Nation’? [If not, explain to them: 
government programmes in schools to encourage students to think deeply and 
creatively, not just learning what’s in the textbook or how to pass exams]  
-Probe: What do you think of this?  
 
25) Have you heard of ‘21st-Century Competencies’? [Show printout – government wants 
to develop in students more qualities (not just academic) needed, to prepare for the 
future] 
-Probe: What do you think of this? 
 
Concluding Thoughts 









Experiences of Schooling 
1) How has education changed from (child’s) time to (parent’s) time?  
 
2) How did you choose this school?  
-Probe: Have you attended a Secondary school orientation event together? If so, do you 
remember what you thought about the event? What do people in Singapore think about 
this school? 
 
3) Do you think your school prepares you well for the future?  
-Prompt: To get a good job? To be a good person/citizen?  
-Probe: Examples? Why/why not? 
 
4) Apart from getting a qualification/certificate, are there any other reasons why going to 
school is beneficial?  
-Probe: How does the school do this? Examples?  
 
Parental Involvement  
5) Parent: What kinds of things do you do (as a parent), to help your children become 
successful? (What strategies? What roles do different parents play?) 
 
6) Does your extended family get involved in the education of children in your family? In 
what ways?  
 
7) Who is most responsible for a child’s success – school teachers, or family, or child 
him/herself? 
-Probe: Why?  
 
Experiences of Policy in Singapore 
8) Say if I were to walk into a Singapore Secondary classroom today, what would it be 
like?  
-Prompt: What would I see? What would I hear? What is the teacher doing, what 
activity are the students doing?  
 
9) We talked earlier about how the government is trying to develop more skills like 
critical and creative thinking, not just focusing on exams and textbook. Do you see 
that happening your school?  
-Probe: Do you agree that what the government is trying to do is important?  
 
10) 21st-Century Competencies [show printout]: Do you see that happening in your 
school? Do you agree that it’s important? 
 
11) Is it important for parents to know about government education policies? (Like 
‘Thinking School Learning Nation’, and moving towards learning that is not just 
textbooks and exams?) 
-Probe: Why/why not?  
 
12) Parent: Would knowing about this, change the way you parent?  




Broad Views on Education 
13) What do you think is the point/purpose of education?  
-Probe: What are the most important benefits of going to school?  
 
14) If there’s one thing you could recommend to the Singapore government that you want 
to change, what would it be the Number One thing to change?  
 
15) Is there anything more you wish government can do, to help families like yours, to 
help your children become more successful in life?  
 
16) Young Person: What are your plans for after N or O-levels?  
Prompt: JC, Poly, ITE? What course? Will you start work?  
 
17) What steps are you taking to make this come true? How does your family help to 
make this come true?  
 
18) Can you tell me about how SINDA/MENDAKI helps your family? 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
19) Anything else you want to say about 1) Being a parent in Singapore, 2) Being a 
student in Singapore? 
 















Appendix F: Framework for 21st Century Competencies and Student 
Outcomes   
 
Framework for 21st Century Competencies and Student Outcomes  
  
“Globalisation, changing demographics and technological advancements are some of the key 
driving forces of the future. Our students will have to be prepared to face these challenges and 
seize the opportunities brought about by these forces. To help our students thrive in a fast-
changing world, MOE has identified competencies that have become increasingly important 
in the 21st Century. These competencies, represented in the following framework, underpin 
the holistic education that our schools provide to better prepare our students for the future. It 
is envisaged that schools and parents need to work hand-in-hand to help our students develop 
















Appendix G: Example of an Analytic Memo  
 
Participant Profile 
Family ID: Mal12 
Pseudonym: Dania  
Stream of Child: NT 
 
Interview Details 
Date: Wed, 11 May 2017, 6-7:40pm 
Location: (Anonymised) 
 
Interviewer’s First Impressions  
We got along relatively well over the phone; she spoke fluent English and was very friendly, so I 
had a feeling the interview would go smoothly. As it turned out, I was mostly right. Dania, dressed 
simply in a dress of faded colours and minimal/no makeup, was sitting with her youngest of 5 kids 
(9-year-old son), and her daughter Sabrena who was going to be interviewed next.  
Sabrena, on the other hand, wore bright pink lipstick, fashionable thin wire-rimmed glasses. 
She was also stuck on her phone mostly, and left shortly after we began interviewing to meet her 
friends, saying she’d come back later when it was her turn.  
I offered to buy dinner for Dania, and ended up paying for both her and her son’s meals 
($10), which I was glad to. I chatted with Dania as we were queuing to buy the food, and she said 
this wasn’t her first time being interviewed; she has apparently been interviewed a few times mainly 
by Family Services Centre. She said she knows that some families are very private and unwilling 
to share, but for her, she explained she was open to helping with research, to help grow 
understanding for the greater good. I thought this was very kind of her, and expressed my 
appreciation.  
The only problem was that sometimes she spent a long time on an answer, and sometimes 
went on a long tangent and I had trouble cutting in and bringing her back. I didn’t mind a long 
interview, it was just that we were squeezed for time because she told me earlier that afternoon over 
text that she had to leave at 7:40pm. I felt like at different points there were many times I wanted 
to digest her answers a bit, and found it was very difficult to focus on what she was saying because 
my mind kept trying to make connections to other things other participants had said. Note to self: 
Take more notes in margins if need be, it’s very hard to go back and remember what was being said 
afterwards. But I am becoming more aware of emerging themes, like independence, importance of 
good company, parents wanting kids to learn from their mistakes re: dropping out of school, the 
increase in how hard school is becoming over time (e.g. Kindergarten doing Primary One work etc), 
parents saying they weren’t sure about the particulars of school and giving responsibility to teachers 
to manage it, the self-responsibilising ethos.  This family does have more social network (relatives 
etc.) than most families I’ve interviewed thus far. ‘Concentrating’, ‘handing in their work on time’ 
comprises their idea of a ‘good student’.  
There was some difference between what she and her child said: she says she’s very hands 
on about their education (mainly about filling forms and ensuring all administrative work for funds 
etc. are in place) but to Sabrena (her daughter), they have not had a conversation about education 
in months. Interestingly, Dania is Secretary for the Residents’ Committee. Dania was also really 
kind in scheduling the next interview for next week, at the organisation’s ‘pantry’. It would be great 
to see where some grassroots work is being done and it adds an interesting element to the study. 
For next interview: Ask Round 2 questions, ask more about her answer to the question about ‘who 




Appendix H: Guidelines on Transcription and Signed Agreement for 
Transcribers  
 
Guidelines on Transcription 
 
Thank you for helping to transcribe for this PhD project, on the educational experiences 
of families in Singapore. Below are some guidelines on how to transcribe: 
 
1) Please transcribe as accurately as you can, within reason. Also, sometimes I (the 
interviewer, Charleen), sometimes say ‘mm’, ‘yes’ or ‘ok’ in the middle of an 
interviewee’s explanations; you don’t need to transcribe every single ‘mm’, ‘yes’, 
‘ok’, ‘sure’ that I say especially if it’s in the middle of their explanations.  
 
2) Don’t correct the interviewee’s English, as much as possible. Try to record it down in 
their words and expressions.  
 
3) Please use ‘I’ to denote interviewer, and ‘P’ to denote participant. See below example: 
 
I: Please can you tell me your name?  
 
P: My name is…   
  
4) If there’s a long pause in between words, where someone is thinking, you can show 
that with: ‘…’  
 
5) Please also note in your transcript, in italics and brackets, non-verbal sounds made by 
either interviewer or the interviewee, like ‘(laughs)’ and ‘(coughs)’ if you hear 
laughter or coughs in the recording. For example:  
 
I: (laughs) Why do you say that?   
 
6) Where you don’t understand what the participant is saying:  
-Replay that part of the recording a few more times,  
-If you still don’t know what they’re saying, either put down your best guess followed 
by ‘[s.l.]’ which stands for ‘sounds like’, or put ‘[i.a.]’ which stands for ‘inaudible’. 
See example below:  
 
P: Mm, actually I ask them, ‘Eh you want to be a C-I-D’?  
 
I: A what?  
 
P: C-I-D.  
 
I: What’s that?  
 
P: C-I-D is Criminal [i.a.]…it’s a police [s.l.], but…policeman wearing blue collar 
shirt right? But C-I-D they won’t wear. They have their uniform. They got more 




After the word ‘criminal’, the interviewee says something that is inaudible, followed 
by a short pause while he thinks, before continuing to speak. Hence, put [i.a.]. 
 
The word sounds like ‘police’ but the transcriber can’t be sure. Hence put [s.l.] 
 
7) When you are done with typing out the first draft of the script, please play the 
recording and read your script to make sure your script (more or less) matches the 
recording. 
 
8) There is no need for time stamps. 
 
9) If you wish to let me know of anything, or ask anything as you transcribe – simply 
highlight the text you want to ask about or raise a question about, and put a comment 
in the margins of the document you are transcribing (in Microsoft Word, go to 
‘Review’ > ‘New Comment’).   
 
10) Please read and sign (or print your name) the Agreement below, and send it back to 
me before you start transcribing.  
 







I, ____________________________(your name) agree to keep the audio recording and the 
Word document of my transcription, confidential.  
 
I agree to not distribute, share or permit anyone to listen to the recording or read the file 
I transcribe, except to the researcher (Charleen Chiong).  
 
I agree to delete my transcript and the audio recording sent to me, after the researcher 
acknowledges that she has received your completed transcript and asks me to delete it. 
 
The agreed payment is SGD 0.01 / word.  
 
 














Appendix I: Coding Framework 
 
Themes Code No. Codes  
Context 1)  Biographical  
2)  General structural/historical conditions and 
changes in Singapore  
3)  Education system and its changes over time 
Approaches  4)  Nagging  
5)  Monitoring  
6)  Meeting child’s physical needs  
7)  Financial support  
8)  Academic support (teaching child) 
9)  Emotional support   
10)  Giving moral/life wisdom and guidance 
(including future planning) 
11)  Communication with schools 
12)  Collaboration with schools (practices of 
parents and schools working together – relying 
on each others’ knowledge etc.)  
13)  Giving ‘space’ 
14)  Help from others (outside state/school) 
15)  Punishment  
Conceptualisations
/ Beliefs 
16)  Purpose/importance of education (instrumental 
vs transcendental)  
17)  Attributions of responsibility 
18)  Competence of state, school, family, child 
19)  Care of state, school, family, child  
20)  Belief in meritocracy  
Challenges 21)  Time 
22)  Resources 
23)  Rigour/difficulty of education system 
24)  Child’s misdemeanor 
25)  Child’s peer group  
26)  Personal/Relational troubles 
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27)  Social capital/networks 
28)  Religious conservatism in a secular state  
Desires 29)  Aspirations 
30)  Anxieties 
31)  Normative conceptions of good child/person 
32)  Normative conceptions of successful future 
33)  Normative conceptions of good parenting  
34)  Normative conceptions of good education 
system / school 
 
 
 
 
 
